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The Twentyfifth year of the DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

Darshana International has completed twenty four years of its existence and is now entering in its 25th year with this number. *Darshana International* has serve the cause of Philosophy and its allied disciplines for a long period of 24 years. It is all due to God's Grace, kindness of our learned Contributors, Members of the Editorial Board, Subscribers from all over the world who have worked hard to see it survived. The members of the Editorial Board have actively contributed to the cause of the Journal and have helped us in continuing this philosophical activity which has attracted the attention of Scholars all over the English speaking world. We express our most heartfelt and sincere thanks to our contributors, members of the Editorial Board and the Subscribers who deserve our appreciation for their continued interest in its publication. *Darshana International* has achieved the enviable status in the realm of philosophical journals of the world.

Mr. B. V. S. S. Mani, the Hony Managing Director of the Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha, Madras is enabling us to send *Darshana International* as gift to several Institutions and has increased the amount of gift subscriptions to 41 more institution from this year. We are much obliged to Mr. Mani who has been a great source of inspiration and motivation for us to continue this noble venture of ours. His continuous financial assistance to promote the publication of this Journal for so many years without any other help from outside is praise worthy.

Our plans to overcome the difficulties and shortcoming have not yet materialized for the reason due to the rise and high cost of production. We are really sorry for not able to maintain the desired standard as we envisaged.

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Darshana International has maintained its standard of procuring articles of high standard as usual to attract more and more scholarly readers. This is the only journal in the world which is being run by an individual teacher of philosophy who has exhausted all his resources to continue this untiring work.

Darshana Printers and its staff under the guidance of Sri Suresh Kumar Agrawal is doing the work with sincerity and devotion to maintain regularity of time. They deserve our heartfelt thanks for the work they are doing to bring out *Darshana International* in time.

In August 1984 our General Editor went to Seoul (South Korea) to attend the World Congress on God and visited Japan and Hongkong and came in contact with several renouned Scholars and renewed the old acquaintance. He also attended International Buddhist Congress organized by the Govt. of India in Oct. 1984 and met several Buddhist National and foreign Scholars who have assured their help in contributing articles to the *Darshana International.*

We wish all our Readers, Editors, Contributors a Very Happy and Prosperous New Year.

ANURAG ATREYA
Managing Editor

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I

Interpersonal Relations and Religious Experience

Clyde Pax

The record of mankind's religious experience is a complex and very long record. The task of this article, however, is neither to retell this story nor to attempt to bring all of its complexity into clarity. The task I have chosen is the much more modest one of reflecting upon certain moments or aspects of that record in order to ask how religious experience can act as a structuring influence upon interpersonal relations, especially as these relations can be described in terms of symmetry and asymmetry. By a symmetrical relation I mean a relation in which the persons or things related are of the same significance or importance in reference to a given context. By a relation of asymmetry I mean a relation in which persons or things are brought together while retaining a difference in significance or importance. A common asymmetrical relation is one in which the members are related while retaining an unequal degree of significance or importance, but inequality should not be taken as the only type of difference giving rise to asymmetrical relations.

The focus of my remarks will be on the religious experience as an experience of tension. The preliminary justification for taking this focus is the fact that one of the troublesome aspects of the record of religious experience is that religion has often been seen as a place and even a source of tension. The record does, to be sure, tell of the creation and adoption of codes of respect, tolerance and love, and of actions—even heroic actions—flowing from these codes. But on the other hand, the record testifes to religiously based strife, misunderstandings mutual condemnations among antagonists and bloody religious wars. From the historical record it seems clear that persons can be and have been related asymmetrically by reason of

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the religious dimension of their lives. What is not immediately clear is whether the lack of symmetry is limited to those interpersonal relations which are characterized by strife and breakdown.

In the course of this reflection I hope to show that religious experience in quite essential ways, that is, in ways which define for a religious person his own self understanding as a person, structures his relations to others in terms of both symmetry and asymmetry. I shall argue also that religious experience has this two fold structuring and defining influence not only in the relations between believers and non-believers, but also among believers themselves, and also within the individual believer. Furthermore, I shall attempt to show that religious experience engenders and reveals a tension between the very notions of symmetry and asymmetry and ultimately insists upon a priority of asymmetry over symmetry.

In order to go directly to the limited task just proposed, I wish to disclaim at the beginning any intent to enter the ever recurring debate about the reality or lack of reality of the object of religious experience. The concern of the present study is not whether God exists nor whether religious experience is illusory. The specific concern is rather with the kind of stance that the religious person takes by reason of the experience that he judges to be religious We wish to ask what is the self understanding and the understanding of others that the religious person brings to the arena of interpersonal relations. When we approach this question with the plan of describing the phenomenon, the stance or the "intentionality" of the religious person will, of course, be correlative to the content or "object" of his experience.[1] There is indeed no way to identify the dominant structures of this experience without reference to the "object" of the experience. For our present and limited purposes, however, this correlation and this "object" will be treated as unities of meaning without our having, initially at least, to enter into the question of the existential standing of the object meant.

Even while we make this deliberate bracketing for our limited purposes of study it is well to remember that this abstention from the existential order appears to be eminently impossible for the religious person (and perhaps ultimately also for the philosopher who wishes to reflect upon this experience in its full concreteness).

1 By placing the word *intentionality* within quotation marks I wish to indicate that I am using it in the Husserlian sense of a radical ecstasis which defines and constitutes every act of consciousness. Similarly, I am using *object* to designate the unified meaning intended by an act of intentionality. In subsequent pages I shall continue to use *object* to designate the particular unity of meaning intended by the religious consciousness. By itself, therefore, this usage says nothing about the ontological status or ontological character of the *object*.

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The inability of the religious consciousness to perceive itself as somehow unrelated to the existential order is central to the self-understanding of such consciousness. This means that anyone who wishes to study the effect of religious experience upon interpersonal relations must take into account the bond to the existential order which this kind of experience unavoidably entails. The givenness of this bond, as an integral part of the experience called religious, can only be gathered or accepted from the articulate and inarticulate testimony of the religious person or the religious community of persons The necessity of listening to this community for evidence does not rest upon the fact that the object of study is religious, but upon the fact that the object of study is experience. There is no place to go for the data of religious experience except to persons in this experience, just as there is no place to go for the data of perception *as experience* except to the persons who are or have been perceiving.

The task, then, is to identify those specific structures or directionalities of the experience generally called religious which appear to be promising for our purpose and to ask in what way or ways they bring the religious person into relations with his fellows. I speak deliberately of the religious experience as *bringing* the religious person into relations with others. The reason for speaking thus is as follows. While the religious person may be said to exist always factually within a community of religious persons and factually within a larger human community which includes both believers and non-believers, the primary intentionality or directionality of the religious experience as religious is not toward these communities or toward the individuals of these communities, but elsewhere. This is true, I suggest, not only for those religious persons who direct their attention to a Deity transcendent to the world; but also for those who see a divine principle totally immanent to nature, or for those, such as certain Buddhists, who see the goal of life as the Void or Nirvana. In spite of significant differences, all of these religious stances share the ideal of directing the empirical individual toward something either greater than or in some important way different from the empirical order of existents. My hope is that by reflecting upon the internal logic of this primary intentionality of the religious consciousness, we will be able to uncover depths or nuances of interpersonal relations which remain hidden if we restrict our considerations to the more immediate manifestations of these relations. Let us consider in somewhat greater detail this primary referential direction which might be said to constitute, for the religious person, that dimension of experience which such a person customarily thinks of as religious.

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When we look to the traditions and Scriptures of the great religions, and when we read the authors working in the phenomenology of religious experience, several aspects of this primary referential direction stand out by reason of their regular occurrence and their apparent central importance. Among these I single out three for consideration. (1) The religious "object" is seen as authoritative and meaning-giving in an encompassing and existential manner. Perhaps a sufficiently clear indication of this dimension is seen in the designation of the "object" as Lord, Creator, etc., and the religious person's corresponding self understanding of himself as created or fundamentally dependent. Designations, such as the above, occur not only in the literature of the Judaeo-Christian tradition but also in Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic literature (2) Secondly, the "object", although decidedly present, is seen as undefinable and, in terms of the ordinary modes of experience, as unknowable. The "mysterium" of Rudolf Otto's term "mysterium tremendum" is an attempt to capture this second aspect, and Otto rightly directs our attention to the "mysterium" as signaling a unique element of the experience, distinct from the intelligibility of the "tremendum".[2] The Upanishadic seer expresses both the presence and the inscrutability well in saying of Brahman: "It is conceived of by him by whom It is not conceived of. He by whom It is conceived of, knows it not."[3] And elsewhere the seer says. "I dare not say I do not know Brahman."[4] (3) Thirdly, the religious "object" is understood by the religious person as making a demand not only upon his cognitive faculties, but upon his whole person. Tillich notes this aspect of the experience when he characterizes religion as a matter of ultimate concern.[5] This aspect of the religious experience, which demands a response from the total person, has considerable relevance for the question of interpersonal relations because it is this aspect of the experience which enables us to locate most easily the place where religious experience comes into contact with ethics understood as a special realm of relations among persons. The tie with the ethical

2 Otto, Rudolf. *The Idea of the Holy*, trs. John W. Harvey, Oxford Press, New York, 1958, p. 25.

3 *Kena Upanishad* as quoted in *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy*, edited by S. Radhakrishnan and C. A Moore, Princeton University Press, Princeton. New Jersey, 1957, p 42. Cf. also the opening line of the *Tao Te-Ching*: "The Tao that can be told of is not the eternal Tao."

4 *Ibid*, The explicit statement is not found in the portion quoted in the *Sourcebook* but can be found in the edition of Juan Mascaro, *The Upanishads*, Penguin Books, Baltimore. Maryland, 1965, p.52. Moreover. the idea is basic to the whole teaching of the *Upanishads*.

5 Tillich, Paul, *The Courage to Be*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1952.

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realm, however, does not exhaust the full scope of this aspect. Its scope extends to all instances and dimensions of the behavior of the religious person. In making the notion of *powerfulness* central to his phenomenology of religion, Van der Leeuw correctly, I believe, sees that no part of the believer's life or world is left unaffected by his religious stance.

Whether a particular religious person or a particular tradition separates these and other elements of the religious "object" and addresses them as distinct deities or sees them as belonging together, the religious person finds himself before that which is existentially and authortitatively encompassing, that which is eminently present and yet "unknowable", and that which makes an unrestricted demand upon him as an acting person.

What can reflection upon a consciousness which intends such an "object" reveal about the nature of interpersonal relations, and especially about these relations insofar as they appear to be either symmetrical or asymmetrical ?

Evident immediately is the fact that the authoritative and encompassing nature of the "object" requires that the religuous person see himself as existing in a relation of radical aysmmetry vis-a vis this "object". For such a consciousness, it is this "object", and not the individual's own self presence or his talents or actions, which in the last analysis gives meaning to his life. It is within this "object" that the person lives and moves and has his being. Already in this early moment of reflection, it becomes evident why the religious person cannot, except in an artificial or sinful way, bracket or withdraw from a consideration of his relation to the existential order. Van der Leeuw begins his study of religion with the astute observation : "That which those sciences concerned with Religion regard as the *Object* of Religion is, for Religion itself, the active and primary Agent in the situation or, in this sense of the term, the *Subject*." This reversal of roles places relationship, and specifically the relationship of asymmetry, at the very center of the religious consciousness.

Moreover, it is not only the religious person who is seen as existing in this founded relation to the primary "object" of the experience. The religious consciousness sees the authority of this "object" as extending over all finite beings, including other persons, and thus placing each and all them also in a non symmetrical relation to the "object", a relation of being founded or grounded existentially and factually. For the religious person, both he himself and all others are constituted in existence by a relation of dependence. This fact alone does not mean, as it is sometimes argued, that

6 Van der Leeuw, Gerardus, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation* 2 vols , trs. J. E. Turner, Harper and Row, New York p 23.

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the religious person values himself and others less than does the non-religious person It does mean that he sees his relations to his fellows in a context or a framework in which both he and they are defined by a non-symmetrical relation of being continuonsly held in existence. Whether placing oneself or others in this framework or context causes one to place a higher or a lower value on the human person is an independent though related question. For the religious consciousness, this relation to the encompassing other places all persons "in the same boat" and thus paradoxically gives the basis and the root meaning to an all inclusive symmetrical relation among all persons, and indeed among all finite beings. It could plausibly be argued that only this asymmetrical relation to the totally encompassing other enables and requires the religious person to view himself as brother and sister to all other persons and even to all sentient and non sentinent beings. This founding and asymmetrical relation of oneself and of all others to an abiding existential origin is governing for the religious consciousness and takes precedence over all further relations of both symmetry and asymmetry.

Within this basic relationship, other relations of various kinds arise. It is from within this relationship, as we just noted above, that a symmetrical relation to all of one's brothers and sisters arises. If we now extend our consideration to take in a community of religious consciousness, we can see that there is a further symmetrical relation among the members of the general community of religious persons. While this relationship is secondary to that of the community of creatures, it can nevertheless be exceedingly forceful and central to the lives of the individuals within the believing community; the strength of the bond arises from the fact that participation in the community is granted on the condition of the acceptance of the governing presence of the religious "object" understood in an undefined and maximally broad sense. The relationship on this secondary level between the religious person and the non religious person might be equally intense, but is constituted by a lack of symmetry inasmuch as the religious person sees both himself and others as factually present and meaningful in a condition of being continually held and sustained in meaning and existence, while the non-religious person views both himself and others as factually present and meaningful within themselves without any reference to any encompassing other.

The radical asymmetry in regard to self.understanding and the understanding of others which separates the religious from the non-religious consciousness is always in danger of being overlooked and covered up as if it were a somewhat accidental difference of opinion among persons who are after all basically the same. The difference, however, must be recognized as going deeper than any

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accidental level if we are to come to an understanding of those intense historical conflicts and those recurrent catastrophes, frequently familial catastrophes, which are birthed in this asymmetrical relationship. The difference in understanding extends all the way to *what shall be called person* and perhaps, if we anticipate remarks still to be made, to what shall be treasured aud respected as person. The ultimate meaning and value of a person, in the view of the religious consciousness, is constituted in an act of passive genesis *of the very facticity* of the person. *Having accepted* this level and form of constitution as basic, the religious person perceives personal life as receiving meaning and worth from all the subsequent actions in and influences from the world. If we are to come to an understanding of this matter, it is perhaps necessary to state at least occassionally that, in its starkest formulation, the situation between the religious and the non-religious understanding of person presents a radical *either-or*. Either person is gift to oneself and always an ecstasis toward the encompassing other, however this latter is adressed, or person is in itself already the initial point of meaning and value to be expanded. Neither party of this either-or *can* adopt the other's understanding without at the same time undergoing a radical conversion of his or her fundamental self-understanding and understanding of others. The fact that such radical conversions do occur indicates that the force of this logical *either or* cannot be said to be totally inclusive of the human possibilities in this area of experience.

So far we have been considering the structuring effects that the religious consciousness has on interpersonal relations insofar as this consciousness is defined by the first aspect of the religious "object", namely its authoritative and encompassing meaning-giving character.

Beyond being authoritative and meaning giving, we noted above that the religious "object" is seen by the religious consciousness as being undeniably present but nonetheless unknowable according to customary modes of knowing. Reflection upon this element of the religious "object" may assist us further in understanding some aspects of interpersonal relations.

Among other meanings, the term "belief" has traditionally meant a kind of knowledge to which the religious person lays claim or in which he seeks to stand. I would like to suggest and only briefly comment upon three different relations, all of them asymmetrical, in reference to the issue of belief understood as a species of knowledge.

First, the insistence by the religious person that he is in a knowledge—or a no knowledge—beyond the realm where public and/or rational verification is possible and meaningful frequently sets him in opposition to his non-religious person. The opposition is not an

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opposition about this or that object of knowledge At issue is a difference in the understanding of what constitutes the significant exercise of intelligence and, more fundamental still, a difference in the meaning of intelligence and the meaning of meaning. The extension of the scope of intelligence, by the religious person or community, to include religious objects appears to the non-religious person as an uncritical and lamentable lapse in the proper use of intelligence. For the religious persons, however, it is this very extension of the scope of intelligence which grounds and makes meaningful in an ultimate and concrete way all other acts of intelligence. In regard to this second or higher order of truth, the orders of both perception and reason are in some sense false if they are separated from the higher truth. So separated, they are *maya* or, in Luther's phrase, "the whore of reason". Thus a difference which appears to be only a difference in the scope of intelligence is, in fact, a difference in the meaning of intelligence. It is a difference between an intelligence which sees itself as intentional (in the strong sense in which some phenomenologists use this term) in its very facticity, as well as in its operations, and, on the other hand, an intelligence which views itself as factually present and knowing, but which does not question its own facticity in such a way as to allow this questioning to determine its meaning as intelligence; instead either it sees itself as the source of its own understandings, or it sees itself as intentional only within an already factually given world. Speaking about religious belief, Gabriel Marcel alludes to this difference when he notes that the non-believer finds himself in the position of having no reasons "to believe *that*...", whereas the believer finds himself in the stance of "I believe *in*..."[7] Van derLeeuw expresses the same idea more explicitly : "Without this absolutely valid and decisive understanding, indeed, there would be no understanding whatever. For all understanding that extends 'to the ground' ceases to be understanding before it reaches the ground, and recognizes itself as a 'becoming understood."[8]

The unknowable and yet authoritative character of the object of belief frequently engenders asymmetrical relations within the community of religious persons as well as that noted above between the religious and the non religious communities. The conflicts which can and have arisen between religious communities of different faiths have sometimes been of bloody intensity. This should not be surprising, nor should it be surprising that the road to ecumenism is long, arduous, and frequently frustrating. The unknowable presence is not only unknowable, but is at the same time an unconditional

7 Marcel, Gabriel, *The Mystery of Being*, 2 vols., Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1960, Vol. II, Ch. 5 "Opinion and Faith."

8 Van der Leeuw, *op. cit*, p. 684.

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demand for loyalty. This places each believer and each faith in the awkward position of having to articulate, from and in spite of its limited and finite perspective, a knowledge that is strong enough and sacred enough to make the tie with the ultimate authority unbreakable. This common acceptance by various religious communities of a radical grounding of all intelligence in a *listening* to an originating authority, coupled with the multiplicity of diverse and seemingly irreconcilable finite modes of listening, makes this form of asymmetrical interpersonal relation most baffling to the non-believer. The non beleiver perceives the whole conflict from his own equally finite perspective and equally faithful commitment to truth within the bounds of reason (perhaps even of objectifying reason), and is thus not in a position to perceive with an existential appreciation the field or the terms of the conflict.

Finally, the unknowablility of the "object" causes a lack of symmetry with the individual believer himself. To remain within belief he must give full allegiance to the "object", but cannot be certain or satisfied that he has done so. In this lack of sheer identity with himself the believer must recognize faith as a gift and must fear sinning against the gift. It is because of this lack of identity with himself that he can utter a prayer for faith from within faith: "Lord, I do believe; help my unbelief." This prayer is neither tautological nor incidental to the intellectual stance of the believer, but is rather expressive of the ontological lack of unity of the self of the believing person. For such a person, one element of self-understanding, the element of doubt, arises within the framework and impetus of an epistemology of certitude which itself rests upon a prior conception of the self as a knower who is fully known to itself. The other element of his self understanding, the element more tightly linked to belief, arises from a prior stance which finds no need to accept the centrality of that certitude and of that self as ultimate epistemological or ontological givens.

Beyond being authoritative and undefinable, the religious "object", we suggested above, makes a total demand, that is, a demand not only upon the cognitive faculty of the believer, but upon his whole existence. An interesting feature of this facet of the "object" is that it makes it *impossible* for the religious person to retreat into a purely private religious life. By calling upon his whole person, in his worldly involvement, the religous "object" places him definitely, that is, religiously, into relations with all fellow beings. The manifestations of this fellowship in ritual, cult, morality, ecclesia and politics are as varied as the manifestations of human life. Here I will consider only two manifestations which represent, in some ways, two extremes of a spectrum of interpersonal relations, and which therefore will be instructive for our general topic.

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At one extreme the response of the believer to what he perceives as the holy can take the form of a seeming withdrawal from the world, that is, from the fellowship just mentioned. I refer to the movement toward meditation and prayer, perhaps a movement toward a monastic or hermetical life. To the non-believer such actions and the adoption of such a life might well appear as a withdrawl from social relations, either in a perhaps well meant, but nonetheless irresponsible choice, or these actions might appear as a therapeutic defense of a person too weak or too cowardly to face the world. These same actions are seen by the believer, with clear consistency with his understanding of who man and society are, as an immersion into social relations at the very center where societal relations become meaningful. This question is in need of much more development than it can be given here. What is at issue, ultimately, is not the question of how social life is to be lived, but rather the question of where and how any society is founded, and how anything like meaningful social actions and ideals are at all able to be present, or even able to be thought[9]

The second instance I would like to draw attention to is the situation in which the religious person finds himself obliged because of a presumed or real call upon him from the holy to go against the established moral or ethical vision of his society. The classic example of a religious man in this situation is Abraham finding himself commanded by Yahweh to kill his son Isaac. To the non-believer such an act must appear as a repudiation or a suspension of the ethical, at least insofar as the ethical dictates a concern for one's fellow beings. For the believer the act is fundamentally a religious act and in no way implies a renunciation of the ethical or a lack of concern for one's fellows; rather, it speaks out of a different idea about the constitution of human action and human freedom. While a humanistic ethics sees freedom as a source of responsible action, a religiously based ethics proceeds from an understanding of human action and human freedom as originally and abidingly constituted in an asymmetrical relation to their source. It thus sees the spontaneity of freedom as always a re spontaneity, and sees action as always constituted in meaningfulness by reason of its being an obedience to a call. Thinking on the example of Abraham enables us to see the

9 Unless I am mistaken a kindred idea, namely that there is a kind of social relationship whose center does not lie within the individuals themselves, can be found in Tonnies' distinction between *Gemeinshaft* and *Gesellshaft* as well as in Josiah Royce's conception of "loyalty to a cause" as the basis for social relations. The criticism made against some "existentialist" philosophers that they have not provided a social philosophy appears to rest upon a failure to appreciate the fact that at least some of them are working on this fundamental level of the possibility of societal relations.

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difference between the two views clearly : Abraham's willingness to proceed comes clearly out of a motive of responding to the command of Yahweh; the non-believer's repudiation of religion on the basis that it allows and fosters such actions in history springs from a motive of wanting to be true to the call from one's fellows on an immediately human level It would, however, be a mistake to fasten so closely upon this extreme example of Abraham that we fail to see that this difference pervades the entire ethical realm, as this realm is viewed and lived by the two different consciousnesses that we are considering. The extension to the entire ethical realm is expressed forcibly in one of the oldest of the *Upanishads*, the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*.

> .....not for love of the husband is a husband dear, but for the love of the Self (Atman) a husband is dear.
>
> .....not for love of the wife is a wife dear, but for love of the Self is a wife dear.
>
> .....not for love of the sons are sons dear, but for love of the Self sons are dear.
>
> .....not for love of the worlds are the worlds dear, for the love of Self the worlds are dear.[10]

For the religious consciousness, the husband, wife, and world are indeed dear, but not on their own account as formal entities.

Our concern, of course, is not with the validity or adequacy of either view, but with seeing clearly a fundamental difference between the two views. In the light of this basic difference, to treat what can be called the same *physical* action performed from two different intentionalities as the same *human* action is a simple failure of reflection; this failure can lead to unrealistic expectations and to further failures in our efforts to extend in a genuine and lasting way the areas of human harmony.

Perhaps the most interesting and troublesome challenge uncovered by a serious reflection upon the structuring character of religious experience concerns not the structuring that it gives directly to interpersonal relations, but the structuring it gives by insisting that asymmetry is more foundational than symmetry for all considerations of persons and society. As late-born children of the Englightenment, and therefore reared on the idea and ideal of the dignity of each individual person, we find it easy to accept symmetry—expressed as equality—as the obviously proper and perhaps only viable and humane basis for interpersonal relations While this view is admittedly modern, one might still wonder whether the notion of equality, and the notion of inequality, are not concepts which are better suited for the understanding and explanation of

10 *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, ch. *Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy*, p. 80.

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objects, and of persons thought of as objective subjects, than they are suited to the understanding of interpersonal relations. As explanatory concepts, both equality and inequality presuppose the presence of clearly indentifiable boundaries between what is taken to be equal or unequal. This would seem to indicate that insofar as persons can be rightly seen as functionaries (e.g., as objects before the law, wage-earners, etc.), but *only thus far*, is equality essentially linked with justice and with respect for persons. To the extent and in the ways in which persons exist relationally beyond the kinds of relations which define objects, equality and inequality are concepts which are neither illuminating nor politically serviceable in a fundamental effort to build a humane society.

It cannot be doubted that the concepts of equality and of inequality are very powerful explanatory and structuring concepts. Their power lies in their extraordinary ability to bring clarity to a multiplicity of items or meanings by establishing an objective and definitive order among them. This power, like other forms of power, can be useful or can be dangerous. Where this power is clearly needed, let us use it fully. At the same time, let us be clear that its danger lies in the fact that its very powerfulness can conceal a need for a different mode of reflection and for uncovering and creating more adequate and more humane categories of thought for understanding and building human societies. It may be that the resolution of some of our more knotty social questions depends upon our developing the insight and the courage to create concepts and social instruments which arise from a closer scrutiny of the ways in which human relations extend beyond and are fundamentally different from the relations among objects. There is abundant evidence that we need to do some such thinking when we direct our attention to the unreasonable confusion that surrounds such issues as the experience of dying, care of the dying, the possibility of a nuclear holcaust, abortion, etc. Needless to say, this thinking will not be easy, nor will its possibility be demonstrated by anything other than the actual doing of it.

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II

Truth and Freedom in Kant's Work

Nader Chokr

It is on the basis of an analysis of Kantian philosophy that we can best account for the shift from a logico-epistemological concern — or problematique (truth, science) to an ethical concern — or problematique (the good, freedom, morality), for Kant's philosophy covers the path which from a philosophy of *knowledge* leads to a philosophy of *action*. Indeed, one of the essential modifications of the philosophical scene throughout history consists in the displacement of interest somehow from *knowledge* to *action*. In contrast to a received opinion, knowledge and action are not two chapters, sections, or areas in philosophy, but rather two *moments* of philosophy. Note that indeed ancient and classical philosophy were concerned with the problem of *truth*, while the fundamental concept of modern philosophy is undoubtedly *freedom*.

Even when the ancients talked of ethics, they talked with intellectualistic terms (to *know* the good); even when moderns talk of knowledge they use *practical* terms (science in the service of technical action). Kant's philosophy is in this sense decisive for, pure reason (to know) is supplemented by practical reason (to act).

I. Science and Metaphysics :

While Aristotle professed an ontological hylomorphism (a being-the bed-is composed of matter—wood, iron, or whatever—and form —characteristic of this conceived object so that one can lie in it), we know that Kant professed a gnoseological hylomorphism: knowledge supposes the union of form and matter. Ordinary knowledge, for example, results from the conjunction of a *concept* (product of a mind striving to understand) and an *intuition* (furnished by our sensibility, our experience). Intuition without a concept is blind. (I perceive through a language which structures the real world); a

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concept without intuition is empty. Physics may then succeed since it disposes of a matter (furnished by observation, experimentation). Metaphysics in contrast seems to manifest the failure of a reason which wants to be self sufficient.

The *Critique of Pure Reason* is indeed a *critique*; it attempts to destroy the ambitions of the metaphysician who aims at discovering the truth by way of the sole respect for the laws of reason; the *a priori* forms of understanding (concepts, principles) condemn us to the sterility of metaphysical babbling when they do not serve to organize the "raw material" furnished by intuition (or experience). Metaphysical knowledge lacks determination: to its concepts correspond no intuition(s) (the soul ? God ? ...?). Any speculation on these concepts can only be a frightful muddle of words. One then understands that metaphysics does not progress, and that there are, for lack of agreement or consensus (or even agreement to disagree) as many metaphysics as there are metaphysicians.

It is important to note at this point that the Kantian conception condemns man to ingore the reality as it is in itself (the noumena, the thing-in itself) since matter/the real world/(objects) only appear in-formed or de-formed by a subject. Forms (space, time, concepts, principles) mask as much as they structure (and reveal) reality. I only know an in formed reality, and consequently, transformed by my knowing subjectivity. Phenomena (in formed reality) differ from noumena (reality as it is in-itself, apart from the act of a subject knowing it).

Acid	+		base	——→		salt
matter	+		form	——→		knowledge
——→	acid	±	salt			
——→	matter	±	knowledge		=	man

cannot know reality as it is in itself.

Let us imagine a person who can only see through pink glasses : he (or she) is condemned to ignore the "real" color of objects, since he/she projects on them the pink coloration which modifies it. If he/she removes his/her glasses, he/she cannot see. Such is our situation as human beings. We see the world through our respective subjectivity and the forms which characterize it. We are condemned to ignore "reality," because we project thereon our forms which modify it. If we do not impose our forms upon reality, reality becomes out of reach, it does not mean anything (intuitions without concepts are blind). Kant's philosophy is an invitation to renounce our pretention to absolute knowledge. All knowledge is relative — the world in itself is unknowable. What is then the role of *reason* ? What are its limits ?

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(a) Success of the Science of Nature

Physics is the science of phenomena. Man succeeds in clarifying the world of phenomena by discovering its laws. But his reason is not legislative in that recourse to experience is necessary in order to formulate the physical laws. Thus, the cartesian dream of a physics deduced from metaphysics (that is, elaborated in *a priori* fashion, without reference to experience) must be abandoned. Hume was right to remark that one cannot *a priori* (by virtue of mere reason) know which effects result from which causes. And Kant goes a step further in inviting us to abandon dogmatic rationalism. Reason can only serve to organize, give order to a collection of raw materials which impose themselves through experience to the human mind. A physical law is the praduct of *understanding* (which in-forms an intuitive raw material furnished by experience (senses)) and not *of reason* (which, it seems, is for Kant what understanding becomes when it pretends to do without experience). Such is in a sense the egotistic and vain pretention of the metaphysician.

(b) Failure of metaphysics

When in effect one starts to reason on concepts to which correspond no intuition, one is actually pretending to have acce s to a knowledge of the things in themselves, the noumena, reality as it is. When we write about *the world*, no intuition corresponds to our concept: experience never reveals to us this totality of phenomena. If one raises the question "Is the world finite or infinite ?", one is actually raising a question that one does not have the right to raise (or that it is not "right" to raise (in Goodman's sense): the concept of "world" is empty, it is only a word, a form without matter (or material) It is not surprising that reason is incapable to answer the question, refuting the thesis (the world is finite) as well as the antithesis (the world is infinite). Kant calls these contradictions, antinomies, which reason faces, incapable as it is to choose between two solutions of a problem that it should not have raised in the first place. His merit is to have shown that what is essential is perhaps not to strive to find answers to the questions that one raises, but not to raise questions which are beyond the capacities of one's mind. One can, for example, try to determine the cause of a concrete and isolated phenomenon (the tide, for example). Our understanding will impose the principle of causality to this phenomenon, and link or relate it to other phenomena, and thus formulate the law which unites them. But one cannot ask this other question "Are there phenomena which are not caused ?" (problem of freedom); or ' Is the world the effect of a cause (God) ?" For, in so doing, one is using the form of the principle of causality (cause——→effect) in order to understand the totality of phenomena (the idea of an absolute beginning within a free act or the creation of the world by God)

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which comes down to do without the raw material of experience, since totality is never given. Reason is therefore incapable of choosing between determinism and freedom, for the good reason that it does not have the right to raise this problem. Determinism being a scientific principle, that is, being imposed by the human mind as structure in order to understand the series of phenomena, it is obvious that experience will never reveal the existence of a free act. There is experience only if phenomena are linked, by constant and necessary relationships. To experience. to have an experience, presupposes that such relationships exist.

Properly speaking, our understanding *finds* the law, but this does not mean that it *proves* determinism, since it postulates it. The problem of freedom is not therefore resolved, neither by understanding (which postulates its non-existence) nor by reason (which does not have the right to raise the question of its existence). There is never a free act in nature since nature is the group of phenomena subjected to laws. One cannot prove that there exists (or not) freedom in this world, since the world is a concept to which corresponds no intuition. The problem of freedom cannot therefore be formulated in speculative terms, neither by understanding (which solves it without posing it) nor by reason (which poses the problem without solving it because reason does not have the right to raise the problem).

One has then to abandon this speculative perspective (philosophy of knowledge) and take up a practical perspective (philosophy of action) whereby the concept of freedom gathers meaning.

II. Truth and Freedom

Until the 18th century, philosophy had for theme of reflection man-as-a-thinking-being, thus making of the concept of truth, a key-concept. With Rousseau, and Kant, the emphasis is put on man-as-an-acting being, and it is this aspect of the human phenomenon which has interested the 19th and 20th centuries : the concept of freedom becomes central; philosophy is concerned with art, labor, technique, and technology (Hegel Marx). In the eyes of man today, the moral problem is posed in terms of action, activism, and choice. Why, indeed, cannot the moral problem be posed in speculative terms ?

1. Because knowledge is opposed to action in the same way as *patience* is opposed to *urgency* : Truth may (or may not) appear at the horizon of my heuristic endeavor, but I am condemned to use *now* my freedom, to decide, to choose, to act.

Recall it is for this reason that Descartes gave himself a temporary ethical guide to go by—so that he does not remain undecided in *his actions*, while reason would compel him to be so in his thoughts.

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2. Because judeo-christianism spread the idea of *sin* which implies a deliberate will to do evil — an evil which is no longer imputable only to my ignorance (I see what is good, but I do evil). The wise man was he who knew; but it is no longer sufficient to know in order to act. The ideal of wisdom implies a contemplative *conception*, and often leads to acceptance, whereas in the eyes of man today a moral agent must *act* to live by his *values*, and achieve his ideals (to fight against hunger, war, nuclear weapons, injustice, etc.).

Note, finally, in passing that the christian notion of love invites to substitute a democratic conception of morality which is constituted through and by dialogue with *Other* to an autocratic conception of wisdom which one gains for oneself only.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant therefore poses the problem of *human action* Remember that causality is a *form* that understanding imposes upon wha ever it pretends to know. It is obvious that if I attempt to understand human action, this action can only appear to me as *determined* (I appear determined to myself when I think of my action). But if *I act*, it is altogether different. Determinism being *the form* that human thought imposes upon whatever is its object, human action does not fall under this principle. To say that the principle of causality is a regulator of thought (to think is to pose that phenomena are subjected to laws and governed by a strict determinism) does not imply that it is constitutive of action (there may be freedom in human action!). Kantian philosophy can be summarized by the following simple trilogy :

(1) Science : Y !
(2) Metaphysics : No !
(3) Freedom : Perhaps, maybe !

If the *Critique of Pure Reason* does not *prove* freedom (because freedom is a metaphysical concept to which corresponds no intuition, since experience is always experience of phenomena, events, acts which succeed one another and condition one another), it does not either *deny it*. Since pure reason cannot raise the problem of freedom, it cannot solve it, neither by the affirmative nor by the negative.

Freedom of action is possible. Since one cannot prove freedom, the existence of God, this immortality of the soul, one shall turn to *belief* rather than *knowledge* in order to be persuaded of their existence. In substance, Kant says, "I had to suppress knowledge and substitute belief to it." He thereby clearly joins a traditional idea : the religious feeling does not impose itself to *reason*, it is itself imposed by *faith*. Kant transfers into the *Critique of Practical Reason* the concepts of *soul*, *God*, *freedom* that he needs to construct his moral universe — but that the *Critique of Pure Reason* seemed to suggest that one should abandon (concepts without intuition). Yet,

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Kant does not contradict himself, for these concepts are not the object of any certainty; they are just the objects of our aspiration. Kant calls them the *postulates* of practical reason. It is important, I think, that one understands clearly their nature; they are not some sort of knowledge that a metaphysical reasoning makes us discover. The cartesian itinerary is given up :

Metaphysics ——→ Science ——→ Ethics

In fact, Kant separates science (success) and metaphysics (failure) and articulates the ethical problem in terms properly moral (action). Human Action is the unique theme of an authentic philosophy of morals. It turns out that it is necessary to *believe* (and not to prove) in freedom for an ethical life to have meaning. Freedom is thus an aspiration derived from the requirements of morality. It emerges as a hope, on the horizon line of my moral action. The Kantian itinerary is therefore :

	Knowledge		Knowledge	
(+)	Science	±	Metaphysics	(—)
	±		±	
	Ethics ——————————→		Metaphysics	(+)
	Action		Belief	

If one reconsiders the fundamental distinction between *noumena* and *phenomena* (the thing in itself, and the thing as it appears), one will understand that man who wants to know himself (to be himself the object of study of the subject that he represents) thinks of himself, and thus appears to himself as a phenomenon (or phenomena) — thus determined, determinism — being the law of phenomena, or else, which comes down to the same, the constitutive principle of thinking : "Like man, man is only the phenomenon of himself" (Kant).

But as an acting being, man himself is a *noumena* He is as he *is* and not as he appears to himself. *He acts as being*, even when he thinks of his action as phenomenon (as appearance) And if one recalls that time (as well as space) is an *a priori* form of our experience through our senses, that is to say, a proper way for man to perceive the world, (space being the form of our external sense — objects being in space, and time, the form of our internal sense — psychic phenomena take place in time) one understands then my *noumenal ego* escapes time, that the action which stems from it is not constrained by the diachromic determination of its antecedents; in short, one understands that my action can be *free*,

The *Critique of Pure Reason* has neither proved nor disproved freedom. Time (and the necessary connections in time which give a content to the principle of causality) is only a condition of phenomena, and nothing prevents me from *believing* that my action stems

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from the depth of my being and is a sign of my freedom to begin truly a series of new actions. The delinquent who feels repentant for his actions may from now on accomplish only honest actions : by a *free* decision which situated on a meta-physical level (beyond nature and its necessary laws), he has interrupted the series of his previous actions, the tyranny of his natural tendencies, and his submission to an unhealthy milieu. A vertical (free) causality descends mysteriously from the noumenal world and redresses the horizontal series (determination) of the events of his temporal existence.

Theoretical reason does not inform us about the world of the things-in-themselves. It can only affirm their *existence* (if nothing existed — noumena — nothing would appear — phenomena): there must be a foundation to appearances. But reason ignores their *essence*. Kant seems to situate freedom in this mysterious foundation of our being Only the world of phenomena is coherent, for it is subjected to determinism. Freedom, which as it turned out the moral universe needs, remains for us an inaccessible mystery : "We understand the incomprehensibility of freedom" (Kant).

It has been our purpose herein to show how Kant, who separated physics from metaphysics in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, isolates the ethical problematique in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, rejecting thus definitely the cartesian tree of science. Can we accept the elegant Kantian solution to the conflict between *truth* and *freedom* ? The debate in any case seems to be still very actual, and one can find that it is still going on, put in modern terms, in the conflict between *Structuralism* (and its offshoots) which claims to know man by destroying in him the illusion of freedom — which is only a result of the ignorance of himself, and *Existentialism* (and its offshoots) which invites us to understand that the tragedy of our human condition stems from the fact that we are condemned to be free.

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III

The Golden Rule

A. Syrkin

The old proverb goes: "Comparaison n'est pas raison". And yet comparisons are widespread—not only in those fields where they do not pretend to serve as proof, but also in artistic literature and our daily talk. The principle of likening one object to another is common in science, too, where it aims precisely at proving and, in correspondence to the function of science, at regulating our notions —thus serving as one of the basic devices for such a regulation. The history of scientific thought (we are now speaking about humanitarian studies) invariably testifies it. Whenever the new material appears it is judged according to the material already acquired—whether from the researcher's own culture, or from an alien source. Such are, e.g. numerous analogies between Buddhism and Christianity, or Indian and classical Greek philosophies, etc. — analogies of more general character or in frames of certain ideas or texts, put forward by European specialists in indology or classical studies, as they were becoming acquainted with corresponding testimonies (specialists in other fields will easily draw other examples).

However striking such analogies may seem, by themselves, they are often of little importance. Easily multiplied by the most superficial erudition and corresponding trends of thought, they only illustrate the fact that one can find everything every where, according to one's wish. Our mind (sometimes automatically and unconsciously) notes and stresses only definite details which affirm the analogy sought (and thus "disturbs" the object of investigation). Besides this pragmatic factor there is another, more general one—the scholar, no matter how unprejudiced, inevitably superimposes his own scheme of cultural values and language of description upon the system studied. As a result, the elements of comparison belonging to alien culture suffer changes in the course of interpretation. A demand

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for equally deep penetration into compared spheres seems to be a basic condition for a true comparison; and this very demand seems to represent an ideal situation, allowing only a certain degree of approximation.

Besides, the situation is not always as hopeless as all that, for scientific methodology provides some conditions that can, at any rate, facilitate the validity of certain comparisons. Each resemblance must be systematically functional; it must take into consideration the character of the systems correlated, the place of the elements compared, their "specific gravity", and their relations to other elements within the frameworks of corresponding systems. The more similar the relative positions of the elements collated the more similar their semantic and functional ties within their contexts, the more justified is the comparison itself. It refers also to phenomena genetically connected within the framework of one or other interacting cultural traditions, for, evidently, such genetic affinity does not by itself guarantee a systematic functional resemblance.

One can suppose that the probability of such resemblances varies in different spheres of behavior. It grows, for example, in the testimonies concerning inward religious experience : the states of reclusion, self-denial, contemplation and unity with the highest being. Such states are characterised by a certain distraction from concrete historic, social, ethographic details that constitutes the peculiarity of corresponding culture; and it is natural that their modes of description are comparatively limited. One might be reminded here of such motifs as love of God, negative definition of the Absolute, preaching silence, etc.[1] It is here that we find literal parallels in different traditions, which were evidently never in contact. Some of these parallels are found in the texts, functionally near to each other, and have a similar value in corresponding religious teachings; therefore their comparison seems to be quite justified and often helps us to understand important traits of our own system of values better.

We find rich material for such a comparison in the genre of aphorism. The probability of coincidences grows here, due to the very large scope of experience reflected in aphorisms and to the combination of laconicism and semantic capacity, characteristic of them. Though these very qualities demand a careful approach to such cases (capaciousness and brevity facilitate the introduction of aphorisms into very different contexts), some of the coincidences seem to be quite regular, in conformity to conditions stated above. True enough, even those parallels can be of only small informational

1 Cf. A. Syrkin. O sravnitel'noj verojatnosti nekotoryx tipologiceskix parallelej — "III Letnjaja skola po vtoricnym modelirujuscim sistemam", Tartu, 1986, str. 12 sq.

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value, presenting no more than the wellknown fact that the life experience and everyday thoughts of different men, their physiology and psyche, are essentially the same. However, the importance of some aphorisms leads them beyond the scope of their context, and their study is justified from a cultural point of view. Being transmitted from generation to generation, they become an immutable commandment; having reflected their authors' experience, they themselves continue to act — sometimes with magic force — upon our own experience.

We shall refer here briefly to one of such sayings, that seems to be noteworthy, regarding its sense and fate. Its ubiquity makes it hard to find an optioual order for corresponding examples,[2] for it is evidently independent and sometimes lacks an exact date though we shall accept, rather conditionally, its original movement from the East to the West. We shall call it the "Golden Rule", in accordance with a European tradition dated from XVIIIth century.[3]

Some time between the Vth century B. C. and the beginning of the IVth, a treatise "Lun Yu" ("Analects") was compiled in China: a collection of precepts in ethical and social behaviour, written down by disciples of Confucius (551-479 B. C.) after their teacher's death. One of the main principles of "Lun Yu" is "jen" ("humanity", "love to men"). It is presented in such a way: "Tsze-Kung asked... "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" The master said: "Is not reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others" (15.23)[4].

This commandment repeats itself several times in "Lun Yu" (12.2 etc.). We also find it in later Confucian texts. In "Li Chi" ("Notes on Ritual") these words are elucidated: such are desirable relations between father and son, master and servant, elder nd younger brothers and friends (28. 1. 32). In another place ("Li Chi" 39 23) there is a periphrasis of the same rule: Not to display before subordinates the qualities you do not like in superiors; not to display before superiors the qualities you do not like in subordinates, etc.[5] In another treatise, "Chung Yung" ("The doctrine of the mean") this commandment (like to "Li Chi") is also applied to relatives, friends, etc. (13.3-4).[6]

2 See in this connection: L. J. Filippidis, Die "goldene Regel" religionswissenschaftlich untersucht. Leipzig, 1929.

3 Cf. H. Reiner, Die "goldene Regel". Die Bedeutung einer, sittlichen Grundformel der Menschheit — "Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung". Bd. III, 1948, S. 74; Lexicon fur Theologie und Kirche, Bd. IV, 1960, S. 1040, etc.

4 The Chinese classics, tr. by J. Legge, Vol. I, Hong Kong, 1960, p. 300. Cf. V. A. Rubin, Individual and State in Ancient China, New York, 1976, pp. 21 sq.

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In the framework of Confucain tradition the principle of "jen" is a necessary condition for the social harmony. The context of "Lun Yun" 12.2 is instructive : "Chung=Kung asked about perfect virtue. The Master said : "It is when you go abroad, to behave to everyone as if you were receiving a great guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice, not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself, to have no murmuring against you in the country and none in the family"[7]. At the same time "Lun Yu" 15.23 shows that Confucius saw here the general ethical rule that was most laconic and fit for learning. "Chung Yung" 13.3 says: "When one cultivates to the utmost the principles of his nature, and exercises them on the principle of reciprocity, he is not far from the path. What you do not like when done to yourself, do not do to others".[8]

To evaluate the meaning of this rule for Confucian ethics we must remember that its principal source "Lun Yu", for thousands of years, was perhaps the most popular treatise in China. Its precepts had been learnt by heart from childhood and influenced a man's behaviour during the course of his life; they determined, to a high degree, the character of Chinese spiritual life.

Rules of the same meaning are found in other schools of Chinese thought. Such are the teachings of Mo Tzu (ca. 479-381 B. C.) about the universal love that would ensure the welfare of the maximum of men. It was perhaps influenced by Confucianism, though the pupils of Mo Tzu (Mohists) were deeply in dispute with Confucius' disciples. The same commandment serves here for the common wealth — which reminds the European reader of utilitarian ideas (see below). He who loves his parents — Mo Tzu argues — naturally wishes others to love them also; to enable it he must love the others and their parents first. In another place his reasoning leads directly to the Golden Rule. A thief steals because he loves his own family more than another's; a ruler conducts welfare because he loves his own territory more than his neighbor's. Thus, "If we were to have the same regard for others as we have for ourselves, who would do anyone an injustice ?"[9]

Another analogy is found in "Tao=te=ching" ("Classic of the way and its power") the principal text of Taoism (ca. IV-III cc. B.C.) : "The sage has no invariable mind of his own; he makes the

5 Cf. Texts of Confucianism, tr. by J. Legge, pt. IV, Oxford, 1885, pp. 305-306, 419.

6 The Chinese Classics, Vol. I, p. 394.

7 Ibid., p. 251.

8 Ibid., p. 394.

9 Cf. Rubin, p. 38; E. W. Hirst, The Categorical Imperative and the Golden Rule — "Philosophy", Vol. IX, 1934, p. 332.

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mind of the people his mind. To those who are good (to me), I am good; and to those who are not good (to me), I am also good — and thus (all) get to be good. To those who are sincere (with me), I am sincere; and to those who are not sincere (with me), I am also sincere — and thus (all) get to be sincere (49. 1-2); cf. below 63.1 — of recompensing injury with kindness.[10]

The great Indian epic "Mahābhārata" was probably composed some time between the IVth century B. C. and the III-IVth century A. D. It is traditionally placed within the cycle of literature, transmitted "by heart" (smṛti), but has long ago surpassed the frames of this cycle and has virtually become a sacred book of the Hindus, proclaiming the most important laws of Hinduism. Its immense (about 100,000 distichs) text includes digressions of an independent ethical and philosophical value. One such digression contains the teachings of Vidure to his royal brother Dhṛtarāṣṭra (V. 33-41), discussing the principles of virtue Vidura says: "Do not do to others what is disagreeable to your self; that is dharma in brief; the other proceeds from desire"[11].

The same rule appears also in other parts of "Mahābhārata" (XII. 260. 21; 277. 10; XIII. 114.8) particularly in the XII Book "Mokṣadharma" (Teaching of Salvation") which constitutes an independent poem (XII, 175-367). The sage Bhīṣma, giving a lesson in dharma to Yudhisthira, speaks of the principle of reciprocity (XII, 260, 15 sq.): an innocent man fears nobody, while a sinner thinks other people to be like himself. "A person should never do to others which he dislikes when done to him by others". And Bhīṣma explains: "What can one, who becomes the lover of another man's wife, say to another man ?... How can one who wishes to himself draw breath, think of murder ?" Several chapters below (277.10) he gives the periphrasis of the same rule: "The wise man always looks upon other creatures even as he looks upon himself."[12]

As we see, the same principle of behavior serves here as a brief exposition of dharma. This word (from Skr. "dhar" — to hold) can mean "statute", "law", "moral debt", etc. The notion of dharma is basic in ancient Indian religions, ethics and social institutions. Here it refers most probably to the aggregate of a man's duties regarding his religion, family and social life. Each estate had

10 The sacred Books of China, The Texts of Taoism, tr. by J Legge, pt. I Oxford, 1891, pp. 91, 106.

11 Cf L. Sternbach. Similar thoughts in the Mahābhārata, the literature of "Greater India" and in the Christian Gospels — JAOS vol. 91, no. 3, 1971, pp. 440 sq

12 Cf. The Mahabharata of Krishna-Dwaipayana Vyasa, by P. Ch. Roy, Vol IX, Calcutta, [s. a.], pp. 246-247, 311.

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his dharma and its performance was regarded as the highest obligation. Thus, again we find here the brief essence of the basic ethical principles. The words in V. 39.57: "the other proceeds from desire" (kāmād) can be explained in various ways. Here "the other" means perhaps the "positive" aspect of the rule (performing of good deeds) as opposed to the "negative" action, proclaimed in these lines (we shall refer below to corresponding variants of the Golden Rule).[13] It can also be supposed, judging from the context (V. 39. 58 sq), that behaviour connected with worldly passions (i. e. a due reaction to wrath, impiety, cupidity, etc.) is suggested here. One has to remember that dharma, together with artha (the activity aimed at the use of material goods), kāma (satisfying sensual drives) and mokṣa (deliverance from the bonds of mundane existence) constituted the organic unity of main vital purposes that, according to Hinduist tradition, had to be duly combined in the course of life.

The Golden Rule is found also in relatively later Hinduist sources.[14] It is mentioned in different versions of "Pañcatantra", the famous collection of fables that expanded far beyond the frontiers of India. In another popular collection "Vetāla-pañcaviṁśatikā" ("Twenty-five stories of Vetala"), it sounds thus: "Listen to the essence of dharma and after having heard it, take it to heart! What is disagreeable to you, do not do to others" (Śivadāsa version, 10.2; cf. "Pañcatantra", Kashmir version, 3.104). Likewise here it is called (cf. "Mahābhārata") "the essence (sarvasva) of dharma". In these very texts (Vetāl, 10 3; Pañc. 3 103; cf. also a collection of fables "Siṁhāsanadvātriṁśikā", "Thirty-two tales of the throne" 13 2, etc.), the "essence of dharma" is formulated in another way: "to help others is a virtue; to injure them is a sin." In numerous Hinduist texts we find similar expressions admonishing the individual to put himself in his neighbour's place, to follow the principle of reciprocity, etc. In a collection of fables "Hitopadeśa" (Good counsel"), we read: "Life is dear to others as it is to oneself. Good men bear this in mind and are merciful to all living creatures" (I. 2 11).[15]

From these texts the Golden Rule passed to different anthologies of sayings — of Cāṇakya (cf. I. 7 etc.), Vallabhadeva (2950), Śārṅgadhara (670), where, by the way, it is ascribed to the sage Vyāsa the legendary author of "Mahābhārata", to "Sūktiratnahāra" (9.1), etc. It is found in the literature of India's neighbours, who were influenced by Indian epic and didactics: in Ceylon ("Vyāsakāraya" 12),

13 Sternbach, p. 441.
14 Ibidem.
15 Hitopadesa or the Book of good counsel, tr. by B. Hale-Wortham, London, [s. a.], p. 13.

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Siam ("Vyākāraśataka" 12), Java ("Sārasamuccaya" 47; 50), the Tibetan translations of Sanskrit works, etc.

In Indian literature the Golden Rule is known not only to Hinduist tradition. In a collection of Buddhist jātakas — tales of Buddha's previous births, notified by his deeds of compassion — "Jātakamālā" ("The Garland of birth stories") by Arya Śūra (ca. IV cent. A. D.), Buddha in the image of the fabulous eight-legged deer, śarabha, saves his persecutor from mortal danger. Having drawn his enemy from the precipice he persuades him to leave the cruel custom of hunting : "Understand that all living creatures feel similarly, looking for pleasant and pushing aside unpleasant. So try not to do to another what you do not want for yourself."[16]

One of the most important Buddhist texts "Dhammapada" ("Way of Dhamma" — a pāli variant for dharma) (ca. IV — III cc. B. C.) presents a similar admonition : "All men tremble at punishment, all men fear death. Likening others to oneself, one should neither slay nor cause to slay. All men tremble at punishment, all men love life. Likening others to oneself one should neither slay, nor cause to slay" (X. 129-130)[17] The same thought exists in Śāntideva's (ca. VII c. A. D.) "Bodhicaryāvatāra" ("Entering the path of Enlightenment") : "Primarily one should zealously cultivate the equality of the other and of the self. All joys and sorrows are equal and I am to guard them like my own" (VIII, 90).[18]

Jainism, which is approximately coeval to Buddhism (ca. VI c. B. C.), also provides several examples. In its canonical treatise "Sūtrakritāṅga" ("Precepts in attaining righteousness" — ca. IV-III c. B. C.), in the chapter on the highest deliverance (samahi) the behaviour of the enlightened (arhat) is described thus : "Having mastered the Law and got rid of carelessness, he should live on allowed food, and treat all beings as he himself would be treated"

16 The Jātaka=Mālā or Bodhisattvāvadāna=Mālā by Arya=Cūra, ed. by H. Kern, Boston, 1891 (XXV, 26).

17 Cf. The Dhammapada, with introd. essays, pāli text, Engl. transl. and notes by S Radhakrishnan, London 1958, pp. 102 103 (cf. in frames of Mahābhārata : Bhagavadgītā VI. 32). Notes concerning the use of traditional formula of the Rule in another pāli canonical text = Sigālovāda sutta 31 (cf. R. E. Hume, The World's living religions, New York 1959, p. 276; P. Weiss, Man's freedom, New Haven, 1950, p. 138), are based on a periphrastic translation of samānathatā (i. e. "by equilibrium", "by impartiality") by T. W. Rhys Davids as: "by treating them as he treats himself" (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. 4, L. 1921, p. 182; however, Ibidem, pp. 145, 223 in Lakkhaṇa sutta 1.16 and Saṅgīti sutta 1.11, XL, he translates more precisely: "impartiality").

18 Entering the Path of Enlightenment, tr. by M. L Maties, London 1970, p. 202; Cf The Path of Light, rend. by L. D. Barnett, London, 1909, pp. 87 88.

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(I. 10.3). And in the next chapter, concerning the Way (path): "Indifferent to worldly objects, a man should wander about treating all creatures in the world so as he himself would be treated" (I, 11. 33).[19]

In the "Yogaśāstra" of Hemacandra (XII cent.) we find the same appeal: "As if experiencing himself joy and grief, pleasant and unpleasant, overtaking all creatures, let a man not do to another what is painful for himself" (II. 20).[20] This text, though relatively late, is one of the most authoritative; its first four chapters constitute everyday reading of Jaina monks.

We found one of the oldest testimonies of the Golden Rule in the Near East in the Babylonian tale of Ahikar, composed evidently in the VII century B. C. and reflected in a number of later versions (Syriac, Ethiopian, Arabic, etc.). Its earliest fragments in Aramaic are dated about Vth century B. C. One of the admonitions of the hero — the legendary sage Ahikar — says: "My son, what seems to you bad, that you must not do also to your friends, and what does not belong to you, that you must not give to others".[21]

It is perhaps in the stream of this tradition that we find the Golden Rule in ancient Hebrew literature.[22] In the Book of Tobit we read: "What you yourself hate, do to no man" (4.15). The source of this book can be traced to the VIIth century B. C.; and its author evidently knew the tale of Ahikar, though the redaction preserved is much later (ab. II cent. B. C.). The most famous testimony of this rule is associated, however, with the great teacher Hillel (Ist cent. B. C.), famous for his tolerance and mildness (in contrast with his contemporary Shammai — a severe rigorist). According to a legend from Babylonian Talmud (Shabbat, 31*a*), a heathen came to Shammai and said he would become a Jew if the latter would teach him the essence of the law during the time that he could stand on one foot. Shammai drove him away in anger and the heathen went to Hillel, who said: "That which is to you hateful do not do to your neighbor. This is the whole law; the rest is commentary on it, go, learn".[23]

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19 Cf. Jaina Sutras, tr. by H. Jacobi, pt. II, New York, 1968, pp. 306 307, 314.

20 E Windisch. Hemacandra's Yogacāstra. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntniss der Jaina-Lehra. — ZDMG, Bd. 28, 1874, pp. 196, 228.

21 Cf. P. Vetter, Das Buch Tobias und die Achikar-sage — "Theologische Quartalschrift", Bd. 86, no. 3, 1904, S. 343.

22 With respect to corresponding examples see: G. Friedlander, The Jewish Sources of the Sermon on the Mount, New York, 1969. pp. 230 sq; G B. Kind, The "negative" golden rule — "The Journal of Religions", Vol. VIII, 1928, pp. 268 sq.

23 Friedlander (op. cit. p 233) pays attention to the additional meaning of Hillel's words: By giving this summary of the Law he, at the same time, showed the interlocutor how unbecoming his behaviour was.

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In another Talmudic treatise "Abot de Rabbi Nathan" (second recension) we also find a variant of the same legend : A certain man came to Rabbi Akiba (ab. 50 135), asking to teach him all the Law at once. Akiba answered : "My son, Moses our teacher, tarried on the Mount forty days and forty nights, before he learned it, and you say : Teach me the whole Law all at once ! Nevertheless, my son, this is the fundamental principle of the Law : That which you hate respecting yourself, do not do to your neighbour..."(XXVI).[24] In the same treatise (XV, XVI) one can find similar advice based on the principle of reciprocity: to respect the neighbour's honour as one's own, to suppress evil rumours about him as one should suppress rumours about oneself, etc. (cf. also teachings of R. Eleazar ben Arach and R. Jose in "Pirke Abot" II, 10; 12)

The same thought, according to the evidence of Eusebius, (ca. 260-340) (Praeparatio Evangelica VIII, 7.6), belongs to Philon of Alexandria (I c. B. C. — I c. A. D.) : "What any one hates to suffer let him not do to another". It is possible, however, that Philo was influenced by the Greek tradition (cf. Isocrates — see below).

In Hebrew Apocryphal literature on the verge of our era we find the same words in the "Testament of Naphtali" (I): "One should not do to his neighbor what he does not desire for himself." The Ecclesiasticus ("The Wisdom of Jesus the Son of Sirach" 31.15) teaches : "Be considerate to thy companion as thyself, and be mindful of all thou detestest".[25] Another Apocryphal text — "The Letter of Aristaeus" (about the Ist half of the Ist century B. C.) says : "What is the teaching of wisdom ?... As thou desirest that evils should not befall thee, but to partake of all that is good, thou couldst act in this spirit to thy subjects and to offenders" (207).

One can see clearly that these teachings (like those of early Christian texts — cf. below) have a direct analogy to the ancient Torah's commandment, the essence of which they render according to Hillel : "Love your neighbour as thyself" (Leviticus 19 18). The rabbinical tradition for centuries conrected these two principles — of Leviticus and Hillel[26] — beginning with R. Akiba, who said that Leviticus 19.18 likewise sums up the essence of the Law This connection is proclaimed in the Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim X. 5, 41c), the midrashim (Genesis Rabba XXIV. 7), Siphra Kedoshim 4, etc. One-and-a-half thousand years later in Poland R. Samuel Edels (1555-1631), Explaining the legend about Hillel, said that it was brought forward specifically as a commentary to Leviticus 19 18.

The Golden Rule is also found in mediaeval Judaic tradition. It is mentioned several times by Maimonides (1135 1204). In "Sefer

24 S. Schechter. Abot de Rabbi Nathan, Wien, 1887, S. 53.
25 Cf. on different versions of the text : King, pp. 272-273, note 6.
26 Cf. Friedlander, p. 238.

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ha Mitzvoth" the commandment of love for one's neighbour is commented thus : "Whatsoever I desire for myself I will desire for h m as himself, and whatsoever I hate for myself... I will hate for him as himself."[27]

Ancient Greek culture did not know "Sacred Writings", functionally corresponding to canonized religious texts of the East, and the Golden Rule is represented in "secular" genres. Nevertheless it is connected here with the most authoritative and highly esteemed names. In Homer's "Odysseia (V. 188 189) the nymph Calypso, assuring the hero of her devotion, promises : "I have such thoughts in mind, and will give such counsel, as I should devise for mine own self, if such need should come to me".[28]

Of the "seven sages" traditionally revered in antiquity two proclaimed the same rule : Thales of Milet (640-546) on being asked : "How shall we lead the best and most righteous life?" answered : "By refraining from doing what we blame in others."[29] These words are preserved in the relatively later "Lives and Opinions of the famous Philosophers" by Diogenes Laertius in the III. c. A.D. (Thales 1. 36). Another sage, Pittakos from Mytilene (VII-VI cc. B.C) said : "Do not do yourself what you condemn in your neighbour".[30] Similar thoughts are twice expressed by "The Father of History" Herodotos (ab. 484-425). Maeandrius, the successor of Samos tyrant Polycrates, promises to citizens : "What I condemn in another, I will myself. to the utmost of my ability, abstain from doing" (III. 142). In another place the Persian king Xerxes (486-465) says to Lacedaemonians that "He would not do the very thing which he blamed in them" (VII. 136).[31]

The famous orator Lysias (ab. 459 380) argues in one of his speeches : "It is not right, therefore, that you should resort to those offences which you saw them committing, or regard those deeds, which you deemed unjust when done to you, as just when you do them to others. No, let your feeling towards us after your restoration be the same as you had towards yourselves in your exile" (XXV. 20).[32] Similar arguments are used in the speeches of Isocrates

27 Cf. similar thoughts in his Mishneh Torah, Hilkot Ebel XIV, 1; Hilkot Deot, VI, 3 — see King, p. 273.

28 Homer. The Odyssey. With an Engl. transl. by A. T. Murray, London, Vol I, 1956, pp. 182 183.

29 Diogenes Laertius, Lives on eminent philosophers, with an Engl. transl by R. D. Hicks, London, Vol. I, pp. 38-39.

30 Cf. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, hrsg. v. H. Diehl, Bd. I, Dublin, 1968, S. 64.

31 Herodotus literally translated by H. Cary, London, 1889, pp 230, 454.

32 Lysias, with an Engl. transl. by W. R. M. Lamb, London, 1943, pp. 548-549.

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(436-338): "Do not do to others that which angers you when they do it to you. Practise nothing in your needs for which you condemn others in your words" ("Nicocles" 61); "Conduct yourself towards your parents as you would have children conduct themselves towards you" ("To Demonicos" 14). In his "Panegyricos" (81) he praises men that thought "it their duty to fell toward the weaker as they expected the stronger to feel toward themselves".[33] It has been observed that Plato (428-347) also expressed, to some extent, similar ideas in "Respublica" and "Laws".[34] Aristoteles (384-322) brings forward analogous thoughts in "Nicomachean Ethik" (IX. 8). Like Phales, he is reported by Diogenes Laertius ("Lives" V. 21) to have answered the question how we should behave to friends, with: "As we should wish them to behave to us".[35] A collection of sayings, which was popular in antiquity, "Sentences of Menander", ascribed to the famous author of comedies (342 292) repeats the words of Herodotos: "Let not imitate what we condemn".[36]

Some examples can be extracted from the later stoic tradition. One of Epiktetos' (ab. 50 130) Fragments says: "What you avoid suffering, do not attempt to make others suffer. You avoid slavery: take care that others are not your slaves".[37] The stoic Hierocles (the 1st half of the IInd century) gives similar advice in his "Philadelphia" ("Brotherly love") by recommending the master to put himself in his slave's place; the parent—in his child's place, etc.[38] Another periphrasis of this rule is found in Marcus Aurelius' (121-180) "To himself": 'See that thou never have for the inhuman the feeling which the inhuman have for human kind" (VII. 65; cf. also ibid. X. 30).[39] In "Roman History" of Cassius Dio (ab. 150 235) Mecaenas, admonishing Julius Caesar, advises him: "Whatever you wish your subjects to think and do, this you should always say and do yourself" (L. 11.34), and adds in the end of his long speech:

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33 Isocrates, with an Engl transl. by G. Norlin, London, Vol. I, 8961, respectively, pp. 110-113. 10 11. 166 169; cf. Ibid., pp. 54 55: "Deal with weaker states as you would expect stronger states to deal with you" ("To Nicocles" 24); pp. 62 63: "Whatever advice you give to your children, consent to follow it yourself" (Ibid., 38).

34 J. O. Hertzler, On Golden Rules — "International Journal of Ethics", Vol. 44. No. 3, 1934, p. 422.

35 Diogenes Laertius, Vol. I, pp. 464-465.

36 Menandri Sententiae, ed. S. Jaekel, Lipsiae, 1964, p. 33.

37 The Discourses of Epictetus, with the Encheiridion and Fragments, tr. by G. Long. London, 1890, p. 414. Cf Ioannis Stobaei Florilegium, rec. A. Meineke, Vol. I, Lipsiae, 1855, p. 136.

38 Ioannis Stobaei, Vol. III, 1856, p. 126.

39 The communings with himself of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. A revised text and tr. by C. R. Haines, London, 1953, pp. 190 191.

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"There is, however, one statement which will serve as a summary with respect both to what has been said and to what has been left unsaid : if you of your own accord, do all that you would wish another to do if he became your ruler, you will err in nothing and succeed in everything, and in consequence you will find your life most happy and utterly free from danger" (L. 11.39).[40]

Testimonies from Roman Latin literature are relatively few and are found, generally, in the frames of stoic (earlier) or Christian (later) traditions. Lucius Annaeus Seneca (ab. 4 B.C. — 65 A.D.) mentions the Rule several times : "This is the kernel of my advice: Treat your inferiors as you would be treated by your betters" ("Letter to Lucilius" 47. 11). In another letter (94 43) quoting Publilius Syrus, a mimeographer of the 1st century B. C. : "You must expect to be treated by others as you yourself have treated them" (a kind of Golden Rule inversion) he adds concerning these words : "We receive a sort of shock when we hear such sayings; no one ever thinks of doubting them or asking "Why?". So strongly indeed does mere truth, unaccompanied by reason, attract us".[41] In his treatise "De Beneficiis" he writes : "Now let us examine... the question of the way in which a benefit should be given. And in this matter I think that I can point out a very easy course—let us give in the manner that would have been acceptable, if we were receiving" (II 1). Another variant in his "De Ira" ("On Anger") : "Let us put ourselves in the place of the man with whom we are angry; as it is, an unwarranted opinion of self makes us prone to anger, and we are unwilling to bear what we ourselves would have been willing to inflict" (III. 12).[42] We find a latter example—from the IVth century in Ausonius' "Prayer" (II. III. 61 62). The poet asks : "Let me not do to any that which at the same time I would not have done to me".[43] These verses evidently reflect the Gospels motifs.

Concerning such reflections there is a noteworthy evidence of one of the authors of "Scriptores historae Augustae" (Aelius Lampridius, III cent.) about the emperor Alexander Severus (222 235) : "He often used to exclaim what he had heard from someone, either a Jew or a Christian, and always remembered, and he also had it

40 Dio's Roman History, with an Engl. transl. by E. Cary, London, Vol VI. 1968, pp 166-167, 182-183.

41 Seneca. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales. with an Engl. transl. by R. M. Gummere. London, Vol. I, 1960, pp. 306 307; Vol. III, 1962, pp 38-39.

42 Seneca. Moral essays, with an Engl. transl. by J. W. Basore, London, Vol. III. 1964, pp. 50 51; Vol. I, 1963, pp. 284 2.5.

43 Ausonius. with an Engl transl. by H. G. E. White, London, Vol. I, pp. 20 21

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announced by a herald whenever he was disciplining anyone, "What you do not wish that a man should do to you, do not do to him". And so highly did he value this sentiment that he had it written up in the palace and in public buildings" (XVIII. 51. 7-8) [44] The testimony is very characteristic — at that time the Romans could easily confuse Jews with Christians. And, indeed, the greater part of Greek and Latin evidence of the Golden Rule, from the first centuries A.D., already belong to Christianity.

Though the early Christian authors could themselves have been influenced by the Hellenistic or Roman tradition (e.g. directly through stoics or obliquely through Hellenized Jews, like Philo), their main and immediate source was Judaism.[45] This succession is testified most evidently by one of the chief and authoritative examples— the words of Jesus from the Sermon on the Mount : "Always treat others as you would like them to treat you : *that is the Law and the prophets*" (Matth, 7.12; Luke 6 31 omits the last words). The Golden Rule is found twice also in the "Acts of the Apostles" (15-20; 29). It is expressed here negatively, being near, from the formal and functional points of view, to Hillel's commandment. At the Jerusalem council, the Apostles, following James' advice to "impose no irksome restrictions on those of the gentiles who are turning to God" (15.19), wrote them about their "decision to lay no further burden upon you beyond these essentials : You are to abstain from meat that has been offered to idols, from blood, from anything that has been strangled, and from fornication, and from doing to others what you would not like done to yourselves" (15.28-29). Several times the Gospels repeat the Torah's commandment from Leviticus 19 18 : "Love your neighbour as thyself" — cf. Matth. 22 39; Mark 12 33. In the next verse — Matth. 22.40 — Jesus says that on this commandment (like on the commandment : "Love the Lord, your God with all your heart..." — cf. Deuteronomy 6 5) "everything in the Law and the prophets hangs"; and thus it becomes linked with the Golden Rule (cf. above R. Akiba's judgment of Leviticus 19 18 as an essence of the Torah, or "Law"). In "The Epistle of James" (2.8) the Leviticus rule is called "the sovereign law"; and according to Apostle Paul's words, all the commandments — "thou shalt not

44 The Scriptores Historiae Augustae, with an Engl. transl. by D. Magie. London, Vol. II, 1924 pp. 282 283. Cf. ibid. XVIII. 39 2; 43.6-7; 45.7; 49.6 on his interest in Jews and Christians. There are testimonies also about connections between the emperor's mother Mamea and Christians. Aelius' evidence is confirmed by Latin epigraphy as well — cf. e.g. corresponding inscription ('quod tibi fieri non vis alio ne feceris") from Juila Concordia — Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, Vol. V, pt. 2, Berolini, 1877, p. 1062 (No. 8738).

45 Cf. Friedlander, pp. 230 sq.

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commit adultery," "thou shalt not kill", etc. — are summed up in it (Romans 13.9). Indeed, the "whole law" can be summed up in it (Galatians 5.14). Concerning this succession one can remember that Paul calls himself, in his "attitude to law, a Pharisee" (Philippians 3.5); "a Pharisee, a Pharisee born and bred" (Acts 23.6); "thoroughly trained in every point of our ancestral law," he recalls his being a pupil of Gamaliel (Acts 22.3) — grandson of Hillel.

New Testament evidence begins the unbroken tradition of preaching the Golden Rule in Christian literature — a preaching, directly based on the Bible authority. The Rule is formulated here in the "positive" (Gospels) or "negative" (Acts) variants verbally, or periphrastically. We shall not refer to all the evidence — the early Christian Apocryphas, Institutions, Fathers, Lives of Saints, etc[46] — but shall only mention some of them briefly. "Didache", "The teaching of the Twelve Apostles" — one of the earliest Christian texts (probably the end of the IInd century) — begins with two commandments, defining the "Way of Life" (contrary to the "Way of Death"): the first is love of God; the second is Leviticus 19.18 and "Whatsoever thou wouldst not have done to thyself, do not thou to another".[47] Below (I 2) the content of the Rule is explained similarly to Romans 13 9 The same thought is found, in the second century, in Justin — one of the first Christian philosophers — who saw in it the universal basis of morality ("Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo" 91.1-3), in Aristides of Athens ("Apologia" XV. 5), in Theophylus, bishop of Antioch ("Ad Autolycum" II 34), etc. The collection of aphorisms "The sentences of Sextus" (IInd cent. A.D.) advises to treat others in the manner in which you want to be treated by them (90; 210 *b.*); to abstain from doing what you yourself condemn (90); not to do to others what you do not want to suffer yourself (179)[48] — practically repeating all the main variants of the Golden Rule, widespread in antiquity. We meet it further in Irenaeus (ca. 130-200), in the "Didaskalia Apostolorum" (I. 4), a collection of precepts dated the earlier half of the III cent., in "Apostolic Constitutions" (VII. 2) based particularly on "Didache"

46 See Reiner, Die Goldene Regel. S. 77 sq ; Idem, Die Philosophische Ethic, Heidelberg, 1964. S. 188 sq. Concerning the following examples cf. respectively: Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca, t. 6 Parisi is 1857, p. 697; 1108; t. 1. 1886, p. 997; Series Latina, t. 73. 1849. p. 1039; Series Graeca, t. 2, 1886, p. 220; t. 8, 1891, p. 1089; Series Latina. t. 6. 1844. p.1070; t. 22, 1845, p 1025; t. 32. 1841, p. 674; t. 33, 1841, p. 681; t. 158, 1853, p. 582; t. 163, 1893, p. 1051.

47 Cf. The Apostolic Fathers, with a transl. by K. Lake, V. I, London, 1975 pp. 308 309

48 See The Sentences of Sextus, by H. Chadwick, Cambridge, 1959, pp. 22, 32, 36.

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(ca. IVth cent.), in "Lives of Fathers" (ca. IV-Vth cent.) dedicated to Egyptian monasticism (cf. Latin version, VII. 16 2), in so-called pseudo=Clementines — relatively late apocryphal texts, ascribed to Roman bishop Clement I e.g. "Homilia" VII. 4, etc. The Golden Rule is also mentioned by the following famous Church authorities: Clement of Alexandria (ab. 150-215) in his "Stromata" ("Miscellaneous Studies" II. 23); Tertullianus (ab. 160-225) in "Adversus Marcionem" (IV. 16.13); Lactantius (ab. 240 320) who called it "the root of justice", "the foundation of all equality" ("Epitome of Divine Instituitions" 60. 3 sq.); Jerome (ab. 342 420) in one of his epistles (121.8); etc. Several times it is quoted by Augustinus (354-430), who calls it a "popular proverb" ("vulgare proverbium") and regards it as a natural law of morality, a law of true love not concentrated on oneself but passing to all the fellow creatures, equal before God, cf. "De Ordine" (II. 8.25); "Enarratio in Psalmos" (57. 1 sq); "De doctrina Christiana" (III.14); Confessiones (I.18 29), "Letter to Hilarius" (Epistola 157.3.15); etc.

A continuous tradition connects the texts of the first centuries A. D. with those of the Middle Ages. The same principle is brought forward by Anselm of Canterbury (1033 1109) who sees in it a natural law ("Liber de voluntate Dei" II); the founder of Saint Victor — William of Shampeaux (1020 1122), in "Dialogus inter Christianum et Judaeum"; Hugh of St. Victor (1096-1144) in his "De Sacramentis Christianae fidei" (I. 12 4); Albertus Magnus (1193-1280) in "Summa de Creaturis"; a famous disciple of the latter, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) in "Scriptum super libros Sententiarum" (IV. 33.1.1); Bonaventura (1221-1274) in "Compendium theologiae veritatis" (V. 2), "Expos. in Psalterium" (57), etc. The leaders of the Reformation continued this tradition. For Martin Luther (1483-1546) it is a "natural law, in which Christus himself unifies all prophets and laws" ("Wider die himmlischen Propheten von den Bildern und Sakrament", 1525).[49] We find similar thoughts in one of Calvin's (1509-1564) letters (2441). The Golden Rule is referred to in Church Institutions, e g. in collection of Gratian (XII cent.). and also in the secular laws — for example, in the "Laws of King Alfred the Great" (871-899). Citing the "Acts of the Apostles", Alfred admonishes the judge to "remember that the adjudge to no man that which he would not that he adjudge to him, if he sought judgment against him".[50]

To be continued.

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49 D. Martin Luther's Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 18 Bd. Weimar, 1908, S. 80

50 Cf. The whole works of King Alfred, Vol. III, Oxford, 1852, pp. 119 sq.; Hertzler, p. 425.

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IV

"Pratityasamutpada" and Its Implications in Terms of A Logico-Empirical Representations

Filita Bharucha

INTRODUCTION

The Buddha recognised the insufficiency, incompleteness and imperfection of man and mundane life, a state which he characterized as 'dukkha'. This was not the consequence of a negative attitude or of a fruitless '*Weltschmerz*', a pessimistic attitude towards the world (of which Buddhism has often been accused) but due to the knowledge of a state of perfection within the reach of human attainment. This knowledge was not based on logical conclusions but on his own experience of illumination (Sambodhi) in which he transcended the limitations of individual consciousness by overcoming the illusion of egohood. (could it he perhaps compared with "the leap of faith" of Kierkegaard's existentialistic view)

In *Samyutta—Nikaya* 11, 15 : it is said "The world, O Kaccana, is given to dualism, to the 'It is' and to the 'It is not'. However, O Kaccana he who perceives in accordance with truth and wisdom, how the things of this world arise, for him there is no 'it is not' in this world. And he, Kaccana who perceives in accordance with truth and wisdom, how the things of this world pass away, for him there is no 'it is' in the world.

Instead of this *dualistic view*, the Buddha showed '*the Middle way*'—the relativity of all phenomena by way of Dependent Origination (Pratitya samutpada). The doctrine of the Buddha is the antithesis of the concept of 'substance' which dominated human thought so far. It influenced Indian thought just as *Einstein's theory of Relativity* transformed modern thought.

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The law of Dependent Origination was for more than the proclamation of a merely mechanical law of causality. The Buddha was not concerned with a science of calculable abstract magnitudes but with the interaction of living, *consciousness—directed forces.*

The meaning of Pratityasamutpada does not depend on the temporal sequence of its links. but may be understood as the simultaneous co-operation of all its factors, each link representing the sum total of all the others. In other words, no *'phenomenon'* no individual form of life *exists in itself,* independent of other, in its own nature. Therefore they have been called 'Shunya' —empty of an independent or absolute nature. Since no first beginning of an individual or any individual form of appearance can be found (whether within or without ourselves) each of them has the totality of the universe as its basis. Or, if we want to express this from the point of view of time : each form of appearence is based on an infinite past and thus on an infinity of causes, conditions and relationships. which do not exclude anything that has or ever will ever come into existence.

The doctrine of Pratityasamutpada mirrors the universe in every phenomenon, is expressed in the individual, becomes conscious in it, and may finally be realized in it—provided that this consciousness attain its full maturity, the state of enlightenment.

In this experience of timeless reality beyond the realm of opposites, the relative is not annihilated in favour of the absolute. The manifoldness of life is not sacrificed in favour of an abstract unity, (as in the case of Bradley, and Vedanta Schools) The individual and the universal penetrate and condition each other so completely. that the one cannot be separated from the other. "The appearence of consciousness must conceal within it a reality whose elan constitutes man's enduring experience of infinitude". By this is not meant that *Sartre's* dismissal of a noumenal 'self' needs any correction".

("*Reason in Existence*".....'Our feeling of the flux and the emptiness of the worldly phenomena presupposes a reality in us that enjoys the world,.....")

Perhaps the doctrine of *Pratityasamutpada* by its ultimate justification of our individual existence and the fulfillment of our universal nature lends the "*existential cult*" to *Buddhism.* Though the study of Buddhism with certain schools of phenomenology (Western) remains to be compared (by me).

Before I begin the exposition of the doctrine (proper) I would like to quote *definitions* of "Pratityasamutpada" as referred to by some writers.

"The doctrine of metempsychosis, involving the perpetuation of the misery of life which was the great central doctrine of Indian

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Philosophy was clothed by Gautama in a new dress" (—*Monier—Williams*).

"The Buddhist conception of "Pratityasamutpada" as reality in a nature of relatedness or that of Nirvana as a state of pure consciousness purged of all obsessions and pre-occupations created by the habits of thought. have proved too intellectual even for the philosophic mind."... (—*Mitra*)

"Conditions (or laws) of existence which proceed from a cause, the cause of these hath the Buddha explained as also the cessation (Or destruction) of these. Of such truths is the great Sramana the teacher" (—*formula carved on Buddhist monuments*).

"Pratityasamutpada or chain of causation is the name given to a well-known formula which sums up the principal cause of existence. (nidanas, 12 in number)

The formula embodies Gautama's solution of the great problem of the origin of civil and is one of the most fundamental and characteristic doctrines of his teaching" (—*Childers*).

"The constant revolving of the wheel of life in one eternal circle, according to the fixed and immutable laws is perhaps after all the sum and substance of the philosophy of Buddhism. And this eternal wheel has six spokes representing six forms of existence" (— *Grimm*)

Perhaps the aesthetic beauty of the lines from "*Light of Asia*" by *E. Arnold* must be added to lend 'the moonlight and roses' touch to our topic.

'Stars sweep and question not. This is enough
That life and death and joy and woe abide
And cause and sequence. and the course of time
And Being's ceaseless tide."

'Before beginning and without an end
As space eternal and surety sure
Is fixed a Power divine which moves to good
Only its laws endure".

II. Source of Chain of Causation *(Idapaccayata)*

The Buddha believed that the whole world is conditioned. The idea of *conditional existence* is elaborated in a two fold way :—

(a) doctrine of dependent origination
(*Paticcasamuppada — naya*)

(b) doctrine of co relational existence
(*Patthana — naya*)

These two views together are described as the Buddhist theory of *idapaccayata* ("This arises out of that")

In Pali we have
imasmim sati idari hoti, ima ssuppada
idari uppajjati. yadidari avijjapaccaya.

1 "In the extreme view of pessimism of Ajivikas under Makhali Gosala who insisted that purity and depravity arose without cause, that the fate of men did not depend on their actions. All that a being experiences is a matter of chance.

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2. The other extreme view of fatalism viz. all that a being experiences in life is a sum total of his past deeds.
Buddha seeks to reconcile these 2 views. Besides he wanted to purge Brahmanism of the purely incorporeal spirit of self. The theory of transmigration of the soul explained the origin of evil, but how could Buddha accept soul transmigration as he denied the existence of any spirit as distinct from material organisation. So he put forth his own view — hence the origin of the doctrine of causation.

Etymologically the word 'paticcasamuppada' arose as follows:—

(i) 'Patticca' means 'on account of'
(ii) 'Sama' means 'together'
(iii) 'Uppada' means 'origination'

The *Classical formula* of dependent origination is given as :—
(Samyutta — Nikaya)
On ignorance depends karma;
On Karma depends consciousness;
On consciousness depend name and form;
On name and form depend the six organs of sense;
On the six organs of sense depends contact;
On contact depends sensation;
On sensation depends desire;
On desire depends attachment;
On attachment depends existence;
On existence depends birth;
On birth depends old age and death.
sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief and despair,
Thus does this entire aggregation of misery arise.

The chain can also apply in the reverse order
On the cessation of Karma ceases consciousness;
On the cessation of consciousness ceases name and form;
On the cessation of name and form cease the six organs of sense;
On the cessation of the six organs of sense ceases contact;
On the cessation of contact ceases sensation;
On the cessation of sensation ceases desire;
On the cessation of desire ceases attachment;
On the cessation of attachment ceases existence;
On the cessation of existence ceases birth
On the cessation of birth ceases old age and death,
sorrow lamentation, misery, grief and despair.
Thus does this entire aggregation of misery cease.

III. The Links of the Chain

(1) Ignorance (Avijja)

Ignorance in the chain has a limited sense and no cosmic significance, like of the Vedanta.

It is repeatedly defined as

(a) Individual's ignorance of the 4 noble truths
(b) The origin and disappearence of the aggregates making up individuality.
(c) The delusion which recognizes a self.

According the Pali Canon, it is caused by the 5 hindrances (*nivaranas*)

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Cause C1 :— hankering after the world
" C2 :— the desire to injure
" C3 :— torpor
" C4 :— flurry and worry
" C5 :— wavering.

These are nourished by sins of body, speech, and thought, failure to subdue senses, failure to listen to law etc.

Briefly it is thirst or desire which produce ignorance. Just as in the Sankhya it is the failure to discriminate between soul and nature leaves an impression on the internal organs which produces in the next birth fatal ignorance.

Though the cycle is normally unending ignorance has a right to the title of "root" given in the Milindapanha for it is the link which can be destroyed by the gaining of intuition.

"Ye suffer from yourselves, None else compels,
None other holds you that ye live and lie,
And whirl upon the wheel and hug and kiss
Its spokes of agony"
"Within yourselves, deliverance must be sought
Each man his prison makes". (*Light of Asia*)
"Bound by the bond of passions and becoming
Bound by the bond of view, by ignorance
Circled about, to birth and death returning
Creatures go faring on Sansara's round". (— *Anguttora — Nikaya*)

2. **Dispositions (Sankhara)**

The dispositions which ignorance produces can be interpreted in the same sense as the Samskaras of the Sankhya system; in which ignorance creates impressions on the inner organs which are continued in future life.

They can be classed as good, bad or neutral
OR in 6 classes according to the object which evokes them,

The regular explanation of their occurence in the chain is that they are the dispositions of the body, expiration and inspiration of speech .....etc. According to Keith this view is impossible to accept as the creation of 2 such curious bodily complexes alone by ignorance is as amazing as the selection of 2 elements of thought which in the individual form aggregates side by side with the dispositions, while feeling appears in a position of its own in the chain. This confusion is due to the lack of skill of Tibetan translaters by equating this with action (Karman).

3. **Consciousness (Vinnana)**

If consciousness did not enter the womb, there would be no living embryo, if it did not continue there, the embryo would die! It passes from deat to life whether we regard it as quasi—corporeal in itself for it is visible—or as accompanied by a subtle body ?

According to Keith whatever be the case it cannot be supposed to be prior to nama-rupa, since he thinks it cannot exist without 'name

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and form'. But the causation chain does not claim any strict logical order. Hence Keith feels that the doctrine that 'consciousness' and 'Nama-rupa' stand to each other in the position of 2 bundles of reeds. They are mutually dependent (which by some is considered a serious objection to the chain).

The fact remains that it is the union of consciousness with matter to form the individual, However the chain must not be understood to assert an invariable relation, since at a higher stage of development, consciousness is reborn in the formless or immaterial sphere, where there is no matter.

The power which drives the consciousness to its new birth and determines its form is that of action, only if the necessary intuition is found to break the chain, then though the law of action is broken for the future, the deeds of past have to be worked out in a mild form i.e. a man guilty of murders in the past may be repaid by a few blows.

This suggests that between consciousness and disposition there is a transition from the old to a new life.

> "Can we consider this concept to Christian sense of re birth, viz. "being born in the spirit ?"

In '*Vasubandu's Abidharmankosa*' (translated by Stecherbatsky)

We have an explanation of 'memory' "Consciousness being in a special conditioned and connected with a previous knowledge of the remembered object produces its recollection".

Say not "I am" "I was" or "I shall be"
Think not ye pass from house to house of flesh.

4. **Name and Form (nama-rupa)**

The 6 sense organs can be viewed in a double light. The first five of them viz. eye, ear, smell, taste, touch are material but invisible—thus being distinguished from the fleshy organs in which they reside; They function only by resistance contact (patigha).

The mind is immaterial invisible not affected by resistance contact. It is composed of a mind element of obscure character and has a physical basis of some sort. Its objects are both exterior objects mediated by the senses and ideas,

According to Keith : —"The mind elements seem indistinguishable from the consciousness element, mind being essentially consciousness".

J. E. Elam says "The word Nama rupa indicates the—essential provision of Buddhist philosophy; that is to say, the physical and psychical are not to be considered as separate and distinct, but only as two sides of one and the same thing.

According to *Christmas Humphreys* even as a river is such only by virtue of its banks, so must this obstract consciousness submit to

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limitation in order that it may express itself in terms of time and space.

Nama-rupa in this case becomes equivalent to personality, a symbol of the necessary 'body of illusion" which the abstract must endure before the birth of egoism, of the sense of separateness possessed by each fragment of reality which imagines its "self" is separate from the Universal self from which it came.

"By mind, the world is led, by mind is drawn;
And all men own the sovereignity of mind". (*Aiiha Salini*)

5. **Contact (Phassa)**

It is the mediation between the senses and their objects. It is of great importance in the theory of cognition.

It denotes the collision or co-operation of the attention as-pect of consciousness directed to the organ in connection with such an object.

The scholastics interpret it as denoting the consciousness resulting from the contact and not the contact itself.

"Who so give rein to passions in this world
Not passion-freed, in sense-desire delighting
Those oft and oft subject to birth and eld,
Bondsmen to craving, down the current go" *Anguttara—Nikaya*

6. **Feeling (Vedana)**

These are pleasant, painful or mentrol and arise as an outcome of contact, simultaneously according to the canonical view. But the later thought distinguishes the moments of contact, sensation, production and feeling.

Though distinguished from cognition it must have a cognitive aspect for contact is the application of consciousness to the knowledge of an object.

Milindapanha makes contemporaneous with feeling perception conceived attention initial and sustained application and consciousness while their intermixture is asserted in the canon itself.

'Him I will call a Brahmin, who has left behind
him all human attachments
(such as love of life, or sensual pleasures)
and further has even transcended
heavenly attachments, thus detaching
himself from all ties! — *Dhammapada*

"A heart untouched by wordly things, a heart that is not swayed
By sorrow, a heart passionless secure that is the greatest blessing."
— *Sermon of the Greatest Blessings Maha Mangala Sutta*

7. **Thirst (Tanha)**

Thirst is born of feeling but only in the case of the unenlightened man whose ignorance renders his feelings a danger.

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The saint has feelings but not thirst.

Thirst in its turn nourishes ignorance, for it produces the delusive concept of being.

It is of six kinds, according to the sense organs and objects.

It is triple in nature as :—

(a) thirst for union with pleasant feeling
(b) severance from painful feeling
(c) desire not to be parted from that neutral feeling which marks states of meditation in which there is no pleasure or pain, but which tend to Nirvana.

In the 2nd noble truth '*Dukham Samudaya*' it is the thirst for the things of sense, for existence, for non-existence.

Thirst is characterised by attachment and thus forms the starting point of grasping, though according to the scholastic it arises simultaneously with it.

"That thirst which makes the living drink
Deeper and deeper of the salt sea waves
Whereon they float-pleasures, ambition, wealth,
praise, fame or domination, conquest, love;
Rich meats and robes and fairabodes and pride of ancient lines, and lust of days and strife to live, and sins that flow from strife....."

Light of Asia

8 Grasping (Upadana)

It could be considered as an aspect of thirst rather hyperthirst, demanding never to leave the pleasure possessed and asking more. It is also thirst for existence.

Thirst generates the false idea of a self—

Hence we have a 4 fold division of grasping into the contaminations (Kleca)

(1) attachment to the pleasures of sense
(2) to heretical views
(3) to moral and ascetic practices regarded as an equate to salvation
(4) to the belief in the self.

(1) is pure thirst
(2), (3), (4) arise due to ignorance.

But the term also denotes 'the object of grasping'

Thus thirst is the Upadana (clinging) when consciousness passes to a new existence and in this sense we have the doctrine that the five aggregates constituting the individual are the objects grasped,

Skin is the idea that the Upadana serves as support in the sense of ailment in the shape of assimilation of food for the body or of psychic matter for the spirit. Thus grasping is treated as taking upon oneself the 5 aggregates, material or psychic and making them one's own assimilation.

"Just as a tree, though cut down, can grow again and again if its roots are undamaged and strong in the same way if the roots of craving are not wholly uprooted sorrow will come again and again"

— *Dhammapada*

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(a) **Becoming (Bhava)**

In the canon, becoming normally denotes rebirth, passing from one existence to another.

Three sorts of existence are distinguished in

(1) Sphere of desire
(2) Sphere of matter
(3) Sphere of non matter

In the Sanskrit Scholasticism we have originating existence (Upapatti-bhava) the continuation of the preceeding death existence in the constant flow of consciousness each part of which is conditioned by all the past and conditions of the future.

But the term is also applicable to the condition of a being in a state intermediate between death and rebirth.

"Samsara, the transmigration of life, takes place in one's mind. Let me therefore keep the mind pure, for what one thinks that he *becomes*:
this is the mystery of eternity" — *Maitri Upanisad*

10. **Birth (Jati)**

Birth denotes strictly the union of consciousness and matter in the womb which is the commencement of new life not the ejection of the foetus.

Nay, but as when one layeth
His worn-out robes away
And taking new robe sayeth,
'These will I wear to doy !"
So putteth by the spirilth
Lightly its garb of flesh
And passeth to inherit
A residence afresh. — ***Sir Edwin Arnold***
(translate of Bhagwad-Gita)

11. **Old-Age, Death; grief, lamentation, sorrow**
(Jara marana — soka, — parideva, dukkha, dom an assa)

Old age was doubtless meant literally though canon already has the doctrine that even in youth, age i.e. change is setting in, the prototype of the doctrine of death at every moment which is made clear in later scholastic.

That Scholastic also makes it clear that at death, the subliminal consciousness (bhavangh) the foundation of life disappears in a thought of departure (Cyutti Citta) or of death to re-appear after the thought which heralds the new existence (Pratisamadhi-citta).

Death is the death of the body and its invisible counterpart. The body came into being; it must therefore one day die.

Buddhists believe 'The cause of death is not disease but birth'.

To mourn for the unevitable dissolution of a temporary garment is foolishness.

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"That nothing dies to die for good
In clay or dust in stone or wood
But only rests awhile to keep
Life's ancient convenant with sleep".

"O lovers, O Lovers it is time to *abandon* the world;
Th drum of departure reaches my spiritual ear from heaven.
Fo tonight the teeming world gives birth to the world everlasting.
Tho went dust and art a spirit, thou went ignorant and art wise.

— *Tr. R. A. Nicholson*

IV. The Interpretation of the Chain (by various Scholars in Buddhism)

Childers would solve the riddle of its interpretation by denying any real chain each item explains existence in some aspect, the order then is indifferent. *Burnouf* regarded it as the evolution of a concrete entity from non-existence.

Kern holds it to be based on a cosmogamic myth. describing the creation and destruction of the world showing the phases observed in the phenomenon of life and nature.

Kirste treats it as an evolution of successive phases which are not changes, which appear in an organism, but independent temporary existences which disappear to make room for others.

Jacobi and in further detail *Pischel* derive the character interpretation of the chain from the Sanakhya. Ignorance in both is not cosmic, it produce dispositions which determine the next life, the intellect (buddhi)is akin to consciousness, the former produces individuality (ahamkara) which is much the same as name and form...etc.

Senart claims that the 1st two terms are borrowed from the Samkhya, for if ignorance, is as in Buddhism empiric, it has no claim to head the list of terms.

Warren holds that there is contamination and to make any sense we must admit that the connexion is not causal, but may take the form of the relation of general and particular.

Franke also uses the method of denying causality in the same sense between the links, all is really timeless misery and the chain must be made entirely ideal;

Oltarmare offers a different explanation based on the view that Buddha aimed at explaining misery, not the origin of life, and at doing so without a self as if misery were evolving in abstracto by the sole force of ignorance.

Bekh suggests a theory based on his conception of Buddhism as denying the existence of matter in any form and as holding that all that is real is becoming which is purely, ideal in character and on the view that the theory of early Buddhism was affected by the doctrines of Samkhya and Yoga.

As for *E Arnold*;

"If ye lay bound upon the wheel of change,
And no way were of breaking from the chain,
The Heart of boundless Being is a curse,
The soul of things fell pain.

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Ye are not bound ! The soul of Things is sweet,
The Heart of Being is celestial rest;
Stronger than woe is will; that which was Good
Doth pass to Better—Best".

V. The Nature of the Chain

This doctrine of causation can best be summed up by Anayarika Govinda as :

"We have neither a purely temporal nor yet a purely logical causality but a living organic relationship, a simultaneous correlation, juxtaposition and succession of all links, in which each, so to say, represents the transverse summation of all the others and bears in itself its whole past as well as all the possibilities of its future".

Patticcasamupada represents vertical

Causal connections —1—
whereas patthananaya —1—
shows horizontal causal —1—
connections —1—
—1—

In the chain each preceeding link is the cause of the succeeding link, of these 12 links, generally the first two are classified as belonging to the past life or existence.

(*atita—Kamma bhava*)

The next eight links belonging to the present existence,

(*Paccuppanna—Karma bhava*)

which includes active samkharas (29 classes of javana consciousness) as well as resultant consciousness (*vipaka-citta*).

The last two classes are classified as belonging to the future existence (anagata Kamma-bhava).

These 12 links of the chain of causation according to the system have no beginning or end. They form a cycle without any starting or ending point.

Any 2 links are related to each other in one or more of the twenty-four ways (*paccayas*) for which the usual general expression is "imasmim sati idam hoti".
(this being so that happens).

There are in the patthuna, 24 such relations,
(1) Astu (2) arammana (3) anantara (4) Samanantara
(5) Sahajata (6) annamanna (7) nissaya (8) upon issaya etc. and so on.

It is one or more of these 24 relations that the 2 consecutive links are related to each other.

e.g. consciousness is related to nanaa-rupa by relation of annamanna.

"The Buddha hath the causes told
of all things springing from a cause;
And also how things cease to be—
T'is this the mighty Monk proclaims".

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VI. Monier-william

summaries the entire process in an elegent manner—
each being is composed of five constitutent elements (skandas) which have their source in chinjuj (Upadana) and are continually combining dissolving and recombining.

(1) Form (rupa)
(2) Sensation (Vedana)
(3) Perception (Sanna)
(4) Aggregate of formations (Samkhara)
(5) Consciousness (Vijnana)

The 5th one is most important as it is the only soul recognized by the Buddhists.

Theoretically it perishes with the other Skandas but practically it is continued, since its exact counterpart is reproduced in a new body. Although when a man dies all the five constitutents of existence are dissolved, yet by the force resulting from his actions (Karma) combined with Upadana (clinging to existence) a new set of five, of which consciousness is still the dominant faculty starts into being. The process of the new creation is so instantaneous that is equivalent to the continuance of the same personality pervaded by the same consciousness.

It is the act force (Karma) which combines with Upadana and is the connecting link between each man's previous present and future bodies.

Anguttara—Nikaya defines act force as :

My action is the womb that bears me.

In its subtle and irrestible form it can be compared to chemical and electrical energy.

Hence it was the force of Gautama's own acts in a long chain of successive births

(approx, 550.....by the Jataka legends)

that had terminated in the perfect Buddha with no more births to undergo.

There is no eternal things except causality—the eternity of Becoming, not of being".

VII. The concept of consciousness

Stcherbatsky explains the nature of consciousness as a dynamic changing force, constantly in a flux of becoming.

In fact he explains the sum and substance of an individual as :—

"Mere elements exist ! There is no soul
This stainless doctrine of the Buddhas".

This brings us to the important problem of modern thought viz. of 'personality'.

For the Buddha, an individual can be described as
"Expressions are they (bit not truth)

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Real elements have no duration,
Vitality makes them combine,
In mutually dependent apparitions"

Buddha himself is not considered as a permanent personality but a stream of changing elements.

"Be it Buddhas of the past
Be it Buddhas of the future
Be it Buddhas of the present
They all remove sufferings of many sentient beings".

VIII. The Buddhist Idea of Karma

The Buddhists approached the problem of Karma from a purely psychological point of view. A man need not fear the vast accumulations of Karma, as they can be undone by a momentary action of the mind.

It should not be interpreted as fatalism on account of the fact that the Buddhists believe that a man reaps whatever he has sown before.

Mrs. Rhys Davids says "Afflictions are for Buddhists so many forms not of pre-payment, by which future compensation may be claimed, but of settlement of outstanding debts accruing from bad i.e. from evil bringing unhappiness promoting acts done either in this life or in previous lives".

Perhaps one can consider the Buddhist view as Newton's third law of motion that 'Action — Reaction are equal and opposite' applied to the moral and all other realms of sentient life !

According to Anguttaru — Nikaya, the law of Karma is based on the principle of just requittal, (Cetanaham bhikkhave kammain Vadami)

(a) Meaning of Karma

Buddha says "I declare monks that there can be no annulment of voluntary deeds ..... without the experience of the results thereof". and I declare monks, volition to be action. A state of Karma is a unique determination of the will".

(b) Kinds of Karma

There are various classifications of Karma. We consider the one mentioned in Vasubandhu's Abhi dharmakosa :—

(1) actions of great weight
(2) actions near in time
(3) actions grown into habit
(4) remaining preceeding actions.

In fact 'Rahula' recites them as :—

"Among the actions going round (from birth to death)
Those will be ripening first in order
Than those one 'got accustomed to
And lastly the remaining ones".

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(c) **Consequences and continuity of Karma :**

Depending on the difference in Karma appears in the difference in individual features of being in worldly conditions, in gain or loss, fame or disgrace, happiness or misery.

The doctrine of Karma is inseparably bound up with that of renewed existence. The results of Karma can never be obviated not even by gods or prayers or sacrifices.

Omar Khayyam was or Buddhist when he wrote :—

"The moving finger writes; and having writ,
Moves on, nor all thy piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a line,
Nor all thy tears wash out a word of it !

'By oneself is evil done, by oneself one suffers.
By oneself evil is left undone, by oneself one is purified'
— Dhammapada.

This explains 'why this man should be born a beggar, this a prince? Why this a genius, this a fool ?'
Emerson also said 'abstract laws of the universe execute themselves .....'

Hence we *conclude* that Karma is thus the antithesis of fatalism. That which is done can by the doer be in time, as it were, neutralized. That which is yet to be depends on the deeds now being done. There is here no cruel Nemesis; only the slow and perfect action of an all-embracing law.

IX. Rebirth

Karma involves the element of time, in the sense that it is unreasonable to hold that all the causes generated in an average life will produce their full effect before the last day of that period. Hence new forms are created to fulfill this purpose.

For the Buddhist, a life on earth is like a wayside in upon the road. There are many travellers inside and many leave and enter by the doors of Birth and death. Or in the words of a beautiful song
"We are like passing ships
That cross each other in the night".

The question what is re-born has serious complications. The imagery of the metaphor "one candle lighted from another' must be understood as 'light one candle from another and the light is the same, yet different'.

"Life after life, therefore, the ever changing and evolving 'bundle of characterestics' return for fresh experience until, the last of the fetters shed, in the words of the 'Light of Asia'
'The dewdrop ships into the shining sea'.
Nibbana is also described as—

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"Where is nothing, where naught is grasped,
this is the Isle of no beyond,
Nibbana do I call it—
the utter extinction of agony and dying".

What are the *characteristics* that accompany a *man* on his understanding of this doctrine is explicitly stated in the lines below :

"But he who conquering all set rolling on
The Dhamma—wheel in pity for all creatures—
To such, the best of Devas and mankind
All beings bow; He hath passed over becoming"

"By comprehending all the world,
In all the world just as it is;
From all the world is he released,
In all the world he clings to naught".

"He is "the man who standeth fast "they say,
He, comprehending all states, high and low
In whom all states are quenched, ended, exist not —
He, knowing all, the God-life having lived,
Is called "world-ender, who hath passed beyond".

XI. Doctrine of Pratityasamutapada in comparison with contemporary thought

1. The modern *positivist position*

They also maintain that both body and mind are resolved into their elements at death. The only immortal part of us consists in the good deeds, words, thoughts and influences we leave behind us, to be made of us by our descendants for the elevation of humanity, Hence we see its analogous trend to the Buddhist doctrine of causation.

2. Kierkegaard's view (*existentialist school*)

Each man must we are told, find the truth in inwardness for himself.

To objectify is to render truth trivial clearly the existentialist's could not have any well defend ideas of causation. In fact there is a wide gap between existentialists thought (even Kierkegaard's) and that of Buddhism.

But the points of similarity lies in a few subtle points like :—

(a) Buddha's stress on the understanding of the doctrine of causation ...' everything that arises must die' instils in the man the salvation. Similarly the existentials emphasize the experience of the nothingness of the flux of life to understand the consciousness of being and becoming.

(b) contemporary existentialists who are atheists emphasize that there is no life hereafter or no being.

For them it is a constant becoming.

(c) Like Buddha, who stressed the importane of will, the existentialists believe in "the dreadful freedom" to choose and act.

(d) Both reject metaphysics as formally understood.

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At this stage, it is not possible to give a rigorous exposition of the two situations occupied by Buddhism and Existentialism, It would require a divergence from the topic of the essay.

3. **Hume' view :**

The basic principle employed by those who believe in the argument from design is that "like effects prove like causes".
Even among biological entities, there may be some sort of inner self-regulation and growth, that orders the direction of their development.

Critique of causality :—

In such a chain too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that which preceeded it, and causes that which succeeds it.
Where then is the difficulty ?

But the whole you say wants a cause I answer that the uniting of these parts into a whole like the uniting of several countries into one Kingdom. is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things.

Thus it is Hume's contention that the observable succession of events that we consider causes and effects requires no ultimate beginning, since it can be conceived of as continuing indefinitely backwards or forwards.

We see to a certain extent the shades of the Buddhist doctrine of Karma in the arguments of Hume.

Russell's view :—

For our purposes we need to consider the following pastulates (a) The postulate of separable causal lines (b) The postulate of spatio-temporal continuity.

(a) It is frequently possible to form a series of events such that from one or two members of the series something can be influenced as to all members'.

(b) It applies only to series of events which are taken to form separable causal lines and states "causality within these series is continuous".

Hence (a) can give us the 2 lines of (1) patityasamutapada (2) Pattanaraya while (b) gives us their continuity.

XII. Problems and criticisms

Before we begin any logical arguments, I would like to clarify that we shall proceed with the usual system of deduction, after questioning certain inductive assumptions. (3 dimensional logic).

1. The most popular criticism levelled against Buddhist is about the cause of avidya (ignorance)".

   How exactly does it arise ?

   Radhakrishnan seems to object to the unexplained cause of ignorance.

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In short Buddhism has a closed system without referring to a first cause.

But then this objection can be over-ruled. On what grounds are we making the assumption that "everything has a first cause". Besides even if we begin explaining the process of the chain by ignorance, there is no strict logical order anyhow.

2. The problem of generating causal energy was explained by the principle of Intelligence (purusa) by its contact with Prakrti.

But then Buddhism cannot deal with the situation similarly, so it regards the effect as neither the same nor different from it. In fact we have a non terminating infinite series,

..... C, E, C, E, C, E, C, E, ...

Note the relation between cause-effect is neither one; non many-one, one many. Then what sort of a relation is it ?

It implies that every effect has a uniqueness and so has every cause. i e. same effect cannot be produced twice as the same collocations of conditions are not possible.

I feel this relation should be more effectively defined.

3. The problem of "causal energy being self-generating" remains.

But then we are subjecting this system to a logical analysis, hence it must also have certain logical privileges. Is it possible to build any "logical system" without atleast one fundamental assumption ?

I don't think so!

Hence we can consider that this "causal energy" is sui generis to be a fundamental notion.

This may not seem satisfactory for a perfect system. But then a "perfect system exists" is itself a big assumption.

3. Radhakrishnan points out that for Buddhism "Individuality born of avidya is the crux of all life, the original sin of existence".

I feel that this question cannot be effectively raised or answered at the moment, till further investigations are made with regard to the concept of 'individuality' from the point of modern psychological methods.

4. Some Upanisadic writers feel as long as a "Central permanent Brahman" is not admitted, the power of concealing or revealing reality is unsolved.

5. Keith thinks that the coherence of the whole system is not very effective merely demonstrative. It cannot be considered a programme for universal causation. It is essentially an explanation of misery but tells us nothing of physical causes. Due to this there is no uniformity in the causal process.

6 The chain does not fully explain the working of action. To assert the operation of working was one thing, to show its actual working something very different.

7. The morality of an act predominates the Buddhist view and virtual practices are considered useless. But there is no attemt to demonstrate the principles which render an act immoral or moral except by the formal statements of the 8 fold path,

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Perhaps the Buddhist essentially seeks and has nothing to do with goodness or badness.

LOGICO-EMPIRICAL REPRESENTATION :

The Buddhist Theory of Pratityasamutpada believe that there is no first cause C or effect E nor last cause C or effect E.

".....C, E, C, E, C, E, C, E, ...

In this connection we shall see what Russell and Whitehead have to say,

RUSSELL : Such a series can be shown to converge or diverge in positive infinity ($+\infty$) or negative infinity ($-\infty$) or in a finite limit L.

WHITEHEAD however, believes that to such a cause and effect would be merely related to conceptuability and not in existence.

Hence, how do we reconcile their views ? I suggest the following logico-empirical representation. For clarity I have divided this representation in the following steps :

STEP—I Analyse the components of cause E. into the various four blocks :

(P), (M), (E), (S)

Where	(P)	.....Physical Space Block		
,,	(M)	.....Mental ,,	,,	With reference to block
,,	(E)	.....Emotional ,,	,,	definitions in Systems
,,	(S)	.....Spiritual ,,	,,	Philosophy.

STEP—II Apply abstract probability measures to causal events in each block separately, Then calculate the total measure 'μ' by block operation.

STEP—III Suppose we get $\mu(C_1)=M_1$

Similarly we proceed for effect E and obtain $\mu(E_1)=M_1$ say

STEP—IV Consider the ratio $\dfrac{\mu(C_1)=M_1}{\mu(E_1)=M_1'}$

i.e , the modulus of the ratio $\mu(C_1)$ and $\mu(E_1)$ is equal to $\dfrac{M_1}{M_1'}$. If $\dfrac{M_1}{M_1'}<1$ consistently (i.e., everywhere except on a set of a measure Zero) then the Cause-Effect series is convergent and has some finite limit L.

If $\dfrac{M_1}{M_1'}<1$, then the series is divergent and tends to positive infinity ($+\infty$) or negative infinity ($-\infty$) respectively.

If $\dfrac{M_1}{M_1'}=1$ then the series oscillates.

However, the question arises whether causes $C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4, C_5, C_5 \ldots C_n$, can be put into one-to-one correspondence with effects $E_1 \ldots E_2 \ldots E_3 \ldots E_n$

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This may not be necessarily true because, a single cause may have more than one effect. In any case we consider the following function

$$f \; ; \; C \rightarrow E$$

Where C.....Domain of Causal change
" E.....Range of Effect change

defined by—

$$f(c) = e \quad \ldots c \in C$$
$$e \in E$$

Is this function well defined ?

If it is so, we have to prove that f is an existence function. But what do we mean by an existence function ? Are we regarding existence as a predicate ?

All these questions remain to be answered in the near future. In conclusion I think that if the continuity of the function f can be established* then more light can be thrown on the Buddhist concept of "PRATITYASAMUTPADA".

* The continuity of the function F has been worked out by me. That constitutes a part of my next article.

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V

The Neoplatonic Elements in Medieval Bulgarian Philosophy

Pancho Roussev

The religious and philosophical life in medieval Bulgaria was closely linked with that in Byzantium. This was so because the latter was our immediate neighbour to the south and, at the same time, as the Eastern Roman Empire it was the best organized and most advanced feudal state at the time. It was not accidental that Engels measured the duration of the medieval period with its historical existence : from the fall of Rome under the blows of the Barbarians in 476 up to the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453.

Before starting with the subject of our research, it is necessary to clarify some general and specific aspects of the ideological and spiritual life of Byzantium with respect to the antique philosophical traditions. Without understanding Byzantium in this context, it would be difficult to elucidate the Neoplatonic elements in medieval Bulgarian philosophy.

I. The social and philosophical changes following the collapse of the slave system were parallelled by changes in philosophical life as well. In the different zones (the Arab Khalifat, Byzantium, Western Europe) these two lines of change were clearly outlined with their own differences and peculiarities within the frames of the feudal society.

That is why the fate of the antique philosophical traditions in these different zones was different. For example, Western Europe came to appreciate their spiritual wealth much later and did so through the prism of scholasticism, something which could not be met in such a way in Byzantium, for one.

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The Orthodox Church in Byzantium also threw its dogmatic shadow upon its philosophy. But the fact that : (a) within its borders fell such developed centres of culture as Athens, Constantinople, Antioch and Alexandria, and (b) it lay at the crossroads between the big countries of the old East (China, India, Arabia, Egypt) and the West, created conditions for a faster development of Byzantine culture in the Middle Ages [1]

Naturally, this culture was entirely under the impact of the dominating Christian world outlook. The Greek philosophical theoretical consciousness, insofar as it was inherited by the Byzantine thinkers, acquired a religious Christian character.

But the theologization of philosophy during the early Middle Ages, as it happened in Byzantium, did not hamper the revival of the ancient philosophical traditions, nor did it delete the traces of their specificity as areas for philosophic quests of a world historic significance.

Indisputably before Byzantine philosophy there stood the task to 'substantiate the dogma'. But it is even more indisputable that this did not happen in such a markedly scholastic way as it did in the Catholic West, for example. This 'substantiation' in Byzantium did not lead to a complete elimination of reality as something entirely despicable. The Orthodox dogma, as any other religious dogma, was also a state of doubtlessness, but it did not take on those extreme, ugly forms that brought about Protestantism in the West.

The acceptance of God's existence itself was done in quite different nuances and ways, not only in the religious but also in the different philosophical teachings of that time. However, in them one can discern traces of the ideological and spiritual tradition of antiquity. Marx points out that as certified by Sext Empyric, both Pythagoras and Empedocles and the Ionians, both Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, and the stoicists, and may be the Epicureans, too, let God exist.

What deserves being stressed as a strengthening philosophical trend during the decline of the slave system is the consolidation of Neoplatonism. We underline this current because it not only continued to exist after the closure of the philosophical schools by the

1 Cf. Dill, Sh. Basic problems of Byzantian History, M , 1947; Liubarskij. J N., Michael Psel : Personality and creational work. To the history of the Byzantine prehumanism, M., 1978; Uspenskij, F. I Sketches on the history of Byzantine education, S. Ph. 1891; Uspenskij F. I History of the Byzantine Empire, Vol I, 1912 Cf also K. Roth. Sozial- u. Kulturgeschichte des byzant Reiches, Berlin. 1919; J. C. S. Runsiman, Byzantine Civilization, London, 1933; C. Diehl, Byzans, grandeur et decadence, 2. ed. Paris, 1926; B. N. Tatakis, La philosophie byzantine, Paris, 1949; H. Ball, Byzantinisches Christentum, Koln, 1958, etc.

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emperor Justinian in 529, but persevered in many countries in one form or another both during the Middle Ages and after them.

2. After Proclus, the last antique philosopher, we can mention as later widely known Neoplatonists Augustinus, J. Sk. Eriugena, Nikolaus Kusanus. etc.[2]

By its nature Neoplatonism proved to be an exceptionally convenient source for a theoretical substantiation of the Christian theodicy. Neoplatonism and Christianity upheld the same position in a different way.

Neoplatonism is 'a fantastic combination of the stoic, Epicurean and sceptical teachings with the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle' The union and discord between Neoplatonism and Christianity are due to the fact that they say the same thing in different ways.

As the founders of Marxism point out, Neoplatonism emerged at a time when even in Rome and Greece, and even more in Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt the absolute non-critical intermixing of the blatant superstitions of the different peoples was taken for granted and was supplemented by pious delusion and open charlatanism; the time when wonders, ecstasies, visions, ghosts, soothsayings and the like played a most prominent role.

All these confusions were mental reproductions upon the ground of the unsatisfying present, its bizarre reflection, saturated with an emotional charge. Their ghostly brightness is a certain subjective acquisition at the expense of the objective loss. We cannot say that Plato foresaw all this but we are obliged to admit that without having expressed it definitively, in one of his thoughts there is something in this direction, namely that 'the intellect possesses all, it is all and lives with itself... It has all, without having it... It does not own it in the sense in which we treat something that we own, as something else or foreign; what it owns is different from it. Because it is entirely everything, and is everything everywhere and is not mixed, but is again in itself and for itself.' The real is only subjectively real. And as it is entirely immediate because of the lack of outer perception as a result of a certain influence, this having in itself and for itself is a purely internal revelation. Only in such cases does immediate reflection become a reflective immediacy. And because of this immediacy, as Lenin states, it is not subject to proof.

2 Cf Ed. Zel[illegible]r, Die Philosophie der Griechen. Bd. 2; C. Bigg Neoplatonism. L[illegible]on, 1895; E Hofmann, Platonismus und Mystik [illegible]m Altertu[illegible] H[illegible]berg, 1935; T. Whittaker, The Neopla[illegible]onists, 2 ed. Cam[illegible] unverand. Nachdruck, Hildesheim 1961; C. [illegible]rbiere. [illegible]anisme et fin de la philosophie antique Essai sur la po[illegible] du neuplatonisme avec la christianism[illegible] Paris, 1921; R. J[illegible] Augustin et le neoplatonisme chretien. Paris, 1933; N [illegible] Geschichte der Mystik. Erigena [illegible] der [illegible] 1925, etc.

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Contrary to the stoicists, for whom thinking is thinking about 'something being', for the neoplatonists the content of thinking is what is thought itself, taken from thinking itself and not as from the being is the case with the stoicists. And as a result of this, with the neoplatonists what is thought becomes an absolute essence, lying beyond thinking. And inso'ar as this essence is met in a concretized form, it is met as a wonder, myth or God. Neither in mysticism, nor in mythology, or religion can we meet something objectively fixed as a fixed objective thing. In them the subjective reality (wonders, myths, deities, etc.) does not and cannot have a correspondent relation with any objective materiality whatsoever. With the Neoplatonists the different things thought are formally real, in the sense of abstractions, but are not real in the sense of a concreteness. They are subjective by nature, but freed from the confines of the subject.

With the Neoplatonists the ignoring of the natural as a basis and the exclusion of the correspondent relation between man and the world as a relation of orientation, and his possibility for realization, reveals an unlimited scope for subjectivization of everything objective, for an objectivization of everything subjective. In his introversion the subject can project everything in thinking, and vice versa.

In comparison with Plato, Proclus goes still farther on the way of religious mystics. Accepting Plato's principle of the world of ideas, Proclus raises the principle of unity, instead of being. The principle of unity stands above everything in which the first thing is God. For him all things are divine, because 'God is all in himself' He claims that the substances belong to whom the thoughts belong, because one's thinking is identical with his being, and everyone is both—thinking and being. In God, as a supreme unity, everything is dissolved. There are no material things, or difficult formations of the sensory world. There is only one entirety which is life and existence of everything seeming—God. He is not only the supreme unity, but also the unitedness of all. Or everything is God's singularity.[3]

3. Neoplatonism as upheld by Proclus, penetrated in the person of Joan Petrici[4] into the Bulgarian lands. too.

Very little is known about J. Petrici's life. The Bulgarian professor of systematic philosophy, Dimiter Mikhalchev, maintained

3 P. Roussev, Philosophical Comprehension of Man in Antiquity, S. 1984.

4 Petrici J. A review of Plato's philosophy and Proclus Diodokha. —J Petrici and his world outlook, Tbilissi 1948; Marr N., Joan Petrici, the Georgian neoplatonist of the XI-XII Century,. 1909; Nuubides, History of Georgian philosophy, Tbilissi 1950; Oanzhava I D., Petrici, M , 1982.

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that this famous Neoplatonist was born in the small Bulgarian village of Petrich from which he took his name Petrichki, later changed into Petrici.[5] According to other sources, he took the name of the village of Petrich as the village of Bachkovo was once called. The monastery built by that village is known as Bachkovo Monastery.

From Soviet sources it is known that during the '70s of the 11th century Petrici attended the Constantinople philosophical school, founded by Michael Psel (1018-1078 or 1096), where young Georgians also went to study. When during the '80s his teacher I. Ital, whose follower he was, fell into disgrace as a participant in church struggles, J. Petrici managed to escape persecution at the Bachkovo Monastery in the Rhodope Mountains south of Plovdiv, a city founded by Philip of Macedon. This monastery was built by two brothers from Georgia.[6] Later he took refuge in Georgia where he continued to study philosophy and translated works by ancient Greek philosophers, mainly by Proclus.

The historians of philosophy are unanimous that the Arabs and Byzantines were the first to appreciate the spiritual and especially the philosophical heritage of antiquity. The countries of the Near East : Syria, Armenia, Georgia and Egypt, and the towns in the European part of Byzantium, as well as those in the Bulgarian state, established in its northern territories, become a huge region of investigating and preserving of the spiritual wealth of antiquity.

We should not forget though, that in Byzantium and in the countries influenced by it, this work was done under the sign of the dominating Christian religion, as a result of which a christianized attitude to this wealth developed The above was true not only of the heritage of Plato and the Neoplatonists, which as a rule is quite suitable for such a treatment, but also for Aristotle and the representatives of earlier Greek philosophical schools.

It is difficult to say exactly what spiritual work Petrici was occupied with during his life in Constantinople, the Bachkovo Monastery and Georgia. Doubtless, in Bulgaria which was under Byzantine rule at the time, he continued his work which he had begun in Constantinople, i.e deepening and enriching his knowledge of ancient philosophy, fascinated by Plato and mainly by Proclus' Neoplatonism, and adding to his language koowledge. In these fields he reached real prominence in those remote times.

Without dwelling upon his translations into Georgian of the philosophical writings of the ancient thinkers and foremostly of Proclus, we have to underline his significant work 'A Treatise on Plato's Philosophy and Proclus',

5 According to other authors he has taken the name of the village of Petrich as the village of Bachkovo was once called.

6 Comp. I. D Paatz khava, Petrici, M., 1982. p. 4, 5.

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In spite of his reasoning in the spirit of Plato and the Neoplatonists, there are a number of valuable elements sparkling in Petrici's work which deserve serious attention.

We have in mind his efforts to realize 'in what way the primary by nature becomes the next (secondary—PR) in the thinking of the knowing subject', an effort rightly orientated onto the way of strengthening the theory of cognitive reflection.

We sould say the same about his understanding of cognition as a movement 'from ignorance to knowledge', as a movement 'from the phenomenon to the essence'. We stand before a valuable formulation. the way for which was diligently paved by the ancient philosophers and which was elaborated and enriched later within the system of philosophy's development. We remember for example, Descartes' third rule of scientific cognition, as formulated in his work 'Discours de la methode', according to which in cognition we must start from the simplest things and aspire to reach the most complex ones. This is also reminiscent of what the German classical philosophers said about the movement from the phenomenon to its essence. It is early to expect here the guess of the opposite move elaborated in most clearly on an idealistic basis by Kant and Hegel, on a materialistic basis by Marx and Lenin — namely that the complex, the supreme, is the key to understand the simple, the lower; that the deeper penetration into the essence helps understand a phenomenon better.

In the spirit of Proclus, Petrici focuses his attention on the interrelation between the single and the multiple, the singular and the plural, even the specific and the general. These are important dialectical categories, which in the darkness of Christian theology lose their value, because by the singular and the united he understands God and by the multiple and the plural — the world.

With Petrici 'the united is not a plurality, but produces plurality: the united is not a mind and soul, but generates them.' It is obvious that unity, the primary, resp. God, is what matters most. So Petrici's idealistically inconsistent ontological views are in contradiction with his materialistically upheld epistemological concept.

But, on the other hand, Proclus and Petrici's understanding of the united as a singularity of God, i.e. as identity between God and the world, testifies to a pantheistic orientation of thinking. It is beyond doubt that it is outlined in a Christian-philosophical way. Therein lies its shortcoming. But this is no reason for us to ignore the positive element contained in it, namely the fading, not to say the deletion of the features of the personally depicted image of God by medieval Christian priests.

Here we come to one of Petrici's strong points, because he lived in a time entirely different from that in which Proclus lived. Accord-

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ing to Leninism, every theoretical, philosophical interpretation must be at the same time a concrete historical one.

So the emerging philosophical tendency of negating the religious negation of nature was an important element which did not remain un-noticed by the dominant official Christian thought in Constantinople. Similar unconventional elements are also met with Psel, and especially Ital, from whom Petrici learnt and with whom he was closely associated. At that time the non traditional elements were rejected as heretical and their bearers were persecuted.

A step forward in the development of pantheism was made later by J. Bruno and naturally in more mature socio-economic and scientific theoretical conditions. Both with him and with Spinoza, and after them with Gothe, one can observe a saturation of pantheism with a materialistic content. With them God is completely dissoluted in the natural world. He is fully depersonified. Already Bruno outlined most clearly the contours of that whole in which God and nature, creating and created, are one and the same thing.[7]

With Petrici the really existing being is the foremost thing which engenders everything lasting, as, for example, the mind, the spirit, nature, etc. Panzkhava rightly notes in his study of Petrici that with him the creative strength of the real being permeates the nature of every creature. But it manifests itself specifically conditioned by the nature of things themselves. Thus, for instance, the creative strength of the real being in the inanimate nature is manifested as a fact of existence and in the animate nature — as vitality, and in the nature of man — as existence, vitality and reason. Thus the primary being appears as the cause of everything. But after its emergence, every thing develops and improves in conformity with its own regularities.

It has been established how Bruno evolved the thesis of the creating and created nature. But what is doubtless is that Prokles upheld the understanding of the world as producing and produced. This view is even more clearly expounded by Spinoza. For him substance is a causa sui. For us this aspiration of the Neoplatonists, one of whom Petrici was, is of importance.

Similar dialectical elements are found in his reference to black and white, life and death. But we must immediately underline the quite narrow and limited character of this understanding. We have in mind his claim that 'the bodiless creatures are not opposite to each other'. What is meant are the real phenomena which, as we know, are also unities of contrasts. Petrici failed to understand the inter relation between opposites as a transition from one another.

7 What is meant is pantheism on a materialistic and not on an idealistic basis

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as a negation and continuity, but understood only as 'destruction of one by the other', Even so, historically speaking, this understanding is important and deserves appreciation.

In this order of thoughts we should also mention Petrici's hylosoism, i.e. his efforts to prove that inanimate nature was animate, that the soul was 'animating the body'. His hylosoism is built upon an idealistic Christian basis. But in later times it became possible on a materialistic basis. Both are cases of pantheism.

In assessing Petrici we must take into consideration the epoch in which he lived. And the more distinctions we come across in his stand on official Christian views, the more significant he is. Even though not very far from the Neoplatonists of antiquity, his efforts to have an independent view of a number of questions, put forth by development itself and by the very atmosphere of the epoch in which he lived are of undeniable significance. This was an epoch of an organized official state affirmation of the Christian world outlook.

The reflections of philosophers like Petrici and many others, connected with the Bulgarian lands, with the history of Bulgaria during the epoch of Byzantine rule, are a bright expression of the socio-political and religious-philosophical upheavals. The progressive forces and trends in which Petrici poured out his energy, were then outlined under the sign of religion or, as Engels says, in the form of 'theological heresies'.

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VI

God in the Philosophy of Religion

Amulya Mohapatra

Antony Flew, R. M. Hare and B. Mitchell, all of them agreed in their discussion '*Theology and Falsification*' that religious language is factually meaningless. Their arguments are that religious language is unintelligible or meaningless, in the way that two explorers came upon clearing in the jungle, considering that he is an invisible gardner and secondly the concept of 'blicks' and 'dous' and finally the parable of 'stranger'. The factual vacuity which verificational analysis discovers to be intrinsic to theological discourse. God's necessary existence is logically incompatible. Therefore, Findlay confidently concludes, such a 'necessary being' does not exist. Thus theological discourse has utterly failed, according to verificational analysis. Wittgenstein says in his *Tractatus* that propositions can express nothing of what is higher (6 42). God is said to be higher and never reveals himself in the world (T6 432). A. J. Ayer states that "The nature of God is mystery which transcends the human understanding is to say that it is unintelligible. And what is unintelligible cannot significantly be described. Again we are told that God is not an object of reason but an object of faith" Ayer says that metaphysics is meaningless and has no sense. In that case the term 'God' is a metaphysical term and it cannot be even probable that God exists.

Verificational analysis has yet more startling techniques for exhibiting the logically necessary falsity of theological discourse. The logical techniques of this form of analysis no longer leaves room for attitude of (tentative surmise and doubts), according to J. N. Findlay. Not only can verificational analysis show that the language of theism must fail when it sets out to prove the existence of God, but turning the tables, it can be used to prove conclusively that the existence of such a being is logically impossible.

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The existence of God, Jhon Wisdon maintains is not an experimental issue, in the way it once was. Theists still pray and believe that their prayers make a certain result. But that is not a factual one. He finds' metaphysical difficulty and scientific difficulty' in believing the existance of God. According to Wisdom questions like 'Does God Exist', 'Do dogs think', 'Do animals Feel' 'Do flowers feel'? are partly metaphysical puzzles and partly scientific questions. He says ' he existence of a God is not one to future happenings then it is not experimental and therefore not as to the facts.

Thus Wisdom's arguments for characterizing the religious propositions and particularly the existence of God are non-sensical and without facts.

Does in the problem of evil prove that God does not exist ? J. L. Mackie in his article 'Evil and omnipotence' admits that evil exists in the world where there is no rational proof of God's existence is possible. Why is evil permitted by God, granting that God does exist ? Mackie states that the existence of God and there is evil both are logically incompatible, So the existance of God is false. But here I am not concerned with the problem of evil.

It should be clear that we can never use language literally when referring to God. All our words literally refer to some aspect of experience, relating it to other aspects. Our words are finite vehicles used by finite men to speak of some finite aspect of experience. All our words apply only to finite experience and hence not to God. From this premise the conclusion is drawn that the only way to speak is systematically to deny various predicates as applicable to him. Thus God is infinite, incomparable, immortal, inconceivable, absolute etc. This kind of negative language is found in the Bible.

People some times say that certain Christian beliefs are nonsensical How for example. can God be one person yet three persons ? Or three persons in one person ? God is 'Wolly other', yet God is in us ? Christ dies. yet lives. Are all these above sentences are absurd or non sensical ? If they are not then why not ? If they are, then how exactly is it that they are absurd or non-sensical. But do they then have some 'deeper meaning' which is not their literal meaning, do they make sense on a different 'level' from that of literal meaning ? And if so, what is this level and how is it different from the level of literal meaning ?

All these questions indicate a worry. There is a certain way out of this worry. It is this : There are somethings that just cannot be said, As long as no one tries to say them, there is no trouble. But if anyone does try to say there is trouble. We ought not try to express the inexpressible. The things that theologians try to say belong to the class of thing that just cannot be said.

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Rudolf Otto in his book '*The Idea of the Holy*' pointed out 'that what is most distinctive in religion cannot be put into words. This is the 'non-rational' part of religion non-rational' he equates with 'not capable of being conceptualized is the numinous' experience or creative feeling and it is equal to Wittgenstein's (the mystical or the mystical feeling) of religion'.

Our minds cannot understand God, nor is its concepts which can reach him. No concepts could apprehend God. He is in His very nature, unconceptualizable. To say that God is inexpressible or ineffable is to say that He is without qualities... And this implies that any statement of the form 'God is X' is false. Thus to the intellect He is blank, void, nothing. You cannot attach any predicate to Him, because every predicate stands for a concept, so that to affirm a predicate of Him is to pretend that He is apprehensible by the conceptual intellect. When we say God is inexpressible, here the term 'inexpressible' is not used grammatically as a predicate. This shows that 'God is inexpressible', is not really of the logical form, 'God is X', although it looks as if it were. Similary, saying 'King Arthur is fictitious' does not constitute attaching a predicate to King Arthur, although it looks as if it did. Hence is saying 'God is inexpressible', we are not required to do what we are declaring to be immpossible. Inexpressibility is not a predicate in the strict sense of the term. For to predicate inexpressible of x is really to deny something of X. Hence God is inexpressible asserts that an essential condition of its meaningfulness does not hold. But to say that X is inexpressible is obviously not to say that we cannot say anything about X in the sense of Wittgenstein say something about the unutterable uttered.

In religious literature there are many sentences connoting predicates to God. So also there are many sentences which have a declarative grammatical form and contain 'God' as subject. But if we examine them they will all turn out to be either negative or metaphorical. None of them express conceptions of God. We can speak only of extrinsic features of God, not of his intrinsic nature (Essential and Internal properties of Wittgenstein).

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VII

The Tragic Finale : Jean-Paul Sartre's Conception of Human Reality

G. Vedaparayana

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) is considered to be one of the prominent French existential thinkers. He is one of the very few modern thinkers to present us with a total system encompassing all the aspects of human reality. Indeed, his brand of existentialism — atheistic and unorthodox — is more than an unhappy reaction of France to German Occupation and post war distress. The important contribution that Sartre has made to the twentieth century thought is his phenomenological exposition of human existence in its totality. The present paper is an attempt to show how human reality, according to Sartre, is condemned to exist as an unhappy consciousness without remedy. The Paper is divided into Three Parts : The First Part deals with a brief description of the being-in-itself. The second Part is devoted to a detailed description of human reality as Sartre has expounded in his magnum opus *Being and Nothingness* (*L'etre et le neant*). The Third Part deals with the implications for the tragic finale of human reality in its vain attempt to unite itself with the being-in-itself.

I

Sartre distinguishes between the two kinds of being : (1) the being-in-itself (*l'etre en soi*) and (2) the being-for-itself (*l'etrepour-soi*). The former represents the being of things which are completely determined and unconscious while the latter represents the being of human reality which is freedom and consciousness.[1] Before going

1 Sartre uses the terms "human reality", "freedom", "consciousness", "man", "nothingness" and "for-itself" synonymously. All

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to describe the being of consciousness, in detail, it is better to describe the being-in-itself, in brief, as it would be great help in understanding Sartre's exposition of consciousness.

Sartre describes the being in-itself as follows : the being in-itself is a being which is never at a distance from itself; it is not in relation with itself; it is not separated from itself and does not have any connection with itself. But it is a being which is in absolute unity with itself, it is completely inherent in itself. As Sartre puts it, "It is an immanence which cannot realize itself, an activity which cannot act, because it is glued to itself".[2]

The being-in-itself is neither passive nor active by itself; it is a being neither of potentiality nor of possibility by itself; it knows neither affirmation nor negation by itself; it has everything "to be" while the being for itself has everything "to do'; it is a being which is in absolute identity with itself; it is opaque and dense to itself; it does not lack anything of itself; it is full of itself. it is substantial and solid (*massif*) and hence it does not desire to become something other than itself; it is a being which is in perfect equivalence with itself and it is beyond the notions like becoming, transition and negation. "It is full positivity. It knows no otherness: it never posits itself *other-than-another being*".[3]

Sartre describes the existence of the being-in itself as 'contingent', since its origin is inexplicable in terms of creation and causation. That is, the being in-itself cannot be said to have been created by God, since creation by God implies creation out of nothing (*ex-nihilo*) which is a contradiction. It also cannot be said that the being-in-itself is self-created (*causa-sui*). since self-creation implies the absurdity that the being-in-itself existed before its creation. Therefore, the existence of the being-in itself is without any meaning or significance. It simply 'is'. Sartre says, "Uncreated, without reason for being, without any connection with another being, being-in-itself is *de trop* for eternity".[4]

II

Unlike the being-in-itself. the being-for-itself or human reality or consciousness is a being which is always in relation with something other than itself. Consciousness is consciousness of something. It has no existence apart from its relation with the being-in-itself. It becomes an abstraction in the absence of its relation with the being-

these terms have the same meaning and therefore can be used inter-changeably.

2 Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Tans. Hazel E. Barnes, 9th Printing, Washington Square Press, New York, 1977, p. 27.

3 Ibid . p. 29.

4 Ibid., p. 29.

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in itself. It creates itself as a revealing intuition of the being-in-itself. In this sense, consciousness is intentional in its nature; it has no 'content' within itself and hence it is free to project itself towards something which is not itself. Sartre says, "All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something. This means that there is no consciousness which is not a 'positing' of a transcendent object, or if you prefer that consciousness has no 'content'... All that there is of 'intention' in my consciousness is directed towards the outside".[5]

This shows that consciousness 'derives' its existence from the existence of the being-in-itself. That is, consciousness has no existence independent of the being-in-itself. It has always a borrowed being since it is born 'supported' by a being which it is not. This is what Sartre calls the ontological proof of the existence of consciousness.[6]

Consciousness is a being of negativity. It comes into being as a negation of its object and the world. It is a being which generates non-being or nothingness in the world. Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of the being of consciousness. Hence consciousness comes into the world with 'no' and is aware of itself as an everlasting 'no'. That is, consciousness remains 'empty' of and separated from every existent with which it is related. It sustains itself as a non-being though it is in an ineradicable relation with its object. It exists always as a dissociation and at a distance from its object. This shows that consciousness is a being of non-substantiality in which appearance is identical to existence. It is because consciousness is pure appearance or non substantial or non-being that Sartre treats it as the absolute. Sartre says, "Consciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure 'appearance' in the sense that it exists only to the degree to which it appears. But it is precisely because consciousness is pure appearance, because it is total emptiness (since the entire world is outside it) — it is because of this identity of appearance and existence within it that it can be considered as the absolute".[7]

Consciousness, unlike the being-in itself is a being which is a presence to itself, since it is always separated from itself by a nothingness of which it is itself the foundation. Therefore the being of consciousness exists always as an 'elsewhereness' to itself. Its being lies outside of itself. It always finds not its being but its nothingness-of-being, Its being lies in being always other than itself. Therefore the being of consciousness is always a question, a suspense and a reprieve to itself. "Consciousness", as Sartre defines, "is a

5 Ibid., p. 11.
6 Ibid., p. 23.
7 Ibid., p. 17.

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being such that in its being its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself".[8]

The non-substantiality or the nothingness of consciousness can also be described as the not a-thingness or no-thingness of consciousness. That is, consciousness never exists in the manner of a thing. Consciousness is non substantial or nothingness in the sense that it never 'is'. It always is 'not'. It is a non substantial 'entity' the being of which is non-being Being-in-itself 'is' whereas consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is. Thinghood is entirely alien to the being of consciousness. Consciousness is itself is not being itself. Take for instance, the fact of suffering. Suffering is consciousness of suffering but not the in-itself of suffering. That is, consciousness sustains suffering without becoming the suffering-in-itself. It raises suffering into being without reducing itself to the *en soi* status of suffering. It plays without respite the drama of suffering.[9] So also a cafe waiter is a cafe-waiter in playing at being a cafe-waiter. A cafe waiter is not a waiter-thing. He sustains himself as a cafe-waiter only in trying to be a waiter in-itself which is impossible. A waiter cannot be a waiter as an inkwell is an inkwell. He happens to get his existence as a waiter only as a separation from himself as a waiter in-itself.[10]

This shows that consciousness is a being the content of which is not permanent and petrified. The content of the being in-itself is to 'be' whereas the content of consciousness is 'made-to be'. Therefore, when Sartre says that consciousness has no content he does not mean that consciousness is a non entity or an abstraction having no content at all. What he means is that there can be no consciousness without content but the content is not solidified but evanescent and constantly being changed. That is, consciousness cannot 'be' (anything) in the mode of the being-in-itself; it 'is' (something) only in the mode of making itself into what it is at any moment. This is what Sartre means when he describes consciousness as a being of totality which is constantly detotalised, a being of integration which is constantly disintegrated, and a being of equilibrium which is perpetually disturbed and perpetually re established. It is in this context that William Barrett compares Sartre's notion of consciousness or self with the Buddhist notion of self which is equally non-substantial. Barrett says, "The Self, indeed, is in Sartre's treatment as in Buddhism, a bubble, and a bubble has nothing at its centre".[11]

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8 Ibid,, p 24.

9 Ibid , pp. 142 43.

10 Ibid., pp. 102-03

11 William Barrett *Irrational Man — A Study in Existential Philosophy*. Heinmann, London, 1958, p. 220.

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Further consciousness, according to Sartre, is freedom. The being-in-itself which is substantial and opaque is not free whereas consciousness, which is a detotalised-totality, is free. Sartre describes consciousness as freedom, because consciousness, unlike the being in-itself, is 'not enough', because it perpetually wrenches away from itself and is separated by the breadth of nothingness from what it is and from what it will be, because it is what it is not and it is not what it is, because its present being is itself a nothingness in the form of reflection-reflecting, and finally because it is not itself but a presence to itself. To put it shortly, "Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is 'made to-be' at the heart of man and which forces human reality to 'make itself' instead of 'to be'."[12]

Consciousness, unlike the being in-itself, is temporal. To be conscious is to exist 'in' time. Consciousness and temporality are one and the same. That is, consciousness does not first exist in order subsequently to be 'in' time. Consciousness which does not exist 'in' time is inconceivable. The temporality of consciousness is three dimentional. That is, consciousness exists in past, present and future at a time. Sartre says, "It is impossible to conceive of a consciousness which would not exist in these three dimensions".[13] That is, consciousness in its present has its roots in the past and is projected into future. In its present it is a flight towards its past and future. The structure of consciousness is that it is what it is not (future), it is not what it is (past), and it is what it is not and it is not what it is (present). As Sartre puts it, "At present it is not what it is (past) and it is what it is not (future)".[14]

Consciousness, unlike the being-in itself, is a being of possibility. It always invents its possibles and projects itself towards them. But the fact is that consciousness, in projecting itself towards its possibles, projects itself towards itself, since the possibles are not 'given' but are invented by consciousness itself. The possibles are not independent realities. They do not have existence apart from consciousness. To be precise, the possibles are consciousness itself as projected into future Therefore the freedom of consciousness is such that it is a perennial flight towards itself. This is so because consciousness can never project itself towards a possible which it does not know. It can transcend only towards a possible which is itself. Therefore consciousness can never overcome the worst fate of its incessant transcendence towards itself. It is the 'facticity' of consciousness that it sustains itself by projecting itself into future in the name of inventing attaining the possibles. Sartre compares this

12 Jean-Paul Sartre, Op cit., p. 568.
13 Ibid , p. 196.
14 Ibid., p. 179

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plight of consciousness with that of an ass who is dragging a cart in the hope of seizing a carrot which is fastened at the end of a stick which, in turn, is tied to the shaft of the cart. The condition of the ass is miserable, for all its efforts to seize the carrot results only in advancing the whole cart and putting the carrot always as the same distance from the ass.[15]

Consciousness, according to Sartre, is a being of lack or incompleteness. As it is already said, consciousness is never full but loquacious. Consciousness does not exist first in order subsequently to lack. The very being of consciousness implies that it is a being of lack. "Thus the pure event by which humam reality rises as a presence in the world is apprehended by itself as its' own 'lack'. In its coming into existence human reality grasps itself as an incomplete being".[16] Since consciousness is a being of lack, it desires to become a being of completness. The ultimate desire of consciousness is to be God 'who' is complete and permanent. Consciousness assigns the highest value to the project of being God. Sartre says, "the supreme value towards which consciousness at every instant surpasses itself by its very being is the absolute being of the self with its characteristics of identity, of purity, of permanence etc , and as its foundation".[17]

III

To conclude, consciousneess is a project to become God by uniting itself with the being-in-itself. God, according to Sartre is "for-itself-in-itself" (*Pour et en soi*) which consciousness cannot attain, since God implies the impossible union of the two contradictory beings in one being. Consciousness cannot unite itself with the being-in-itself, since such a union implies the dichotomy of combining the two incompatible characteristics of the translucency of consciousness and the coincidence of self of the being-in-itself. Moreover, consciousness cannot attain the totality of "for-itself in-itself" while remaining itself as consciousness. It has to annihilate itself in order to become the being-in-itself. But consciousness never chooses to surpass itself towards its death and lose itself in the being in-itself Hence it can never become God. Thus consciousness is condemned to the freedom of existing in the perpetual presence of the totality. The tragedy is that consciousness can neither realize the totality nor be free from it. Its very existence lies in its being continuously haunted by the totality without ever becoming it. It is obligatory on the part of consciousness to project itself towards the totality without reprieve. The contingency of consciousness is that it exists as itself only as the perennial attempt and failure to be that

15 Ibid., pp. 277-78.
16 Ibid., p. 139.
17 Ibid., p 1

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totality. Sartre says, "The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being as perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it, precisely because it could not attain the in-itself without losing itself as for-itself. Human reality therefore is by nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state".[18]

Sartre is emphatic in saying that man can never become God, since Man God is a contradiction in terms. Man, in all his modes of being and doing, is constrained to exist as a being of unhappiness. He is abandoned to the freedom of unhappiness. He is thrown into freedom which is a curse. The very existence of man implies that he is free to be unhappy. He cannot choose to be free from it. Not-being-free is out of the question. Man is dreadfully free by ontological necessity and therefore any attempt to overcome it, is necessarily self-defeating. "Thus the passion of man", as Sartre echoes, "is the reverse of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose outselves in vain. Man is a useless passion."[19]

18 Ibid., p. 140.
19 Ibid., p. 784,

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VIII

Value Patterns of Secondary School Teachers

Kiran Deep & M. R. Kansal

Value system plays an important role in one's life. Every human being is motivated by some sense of values developed largely under the influence of very environment in which lives. In fact, every human action is the reflection of personal or social values. Lechy (1945) points out that values are integrated into the personality and act as barriers to the acceptance of new ones which might be in opposition to the values of the people. This also acts as a barrier to change. There is, therefore, a need to study the values and beliefs of the people, particularly the teachers who are torch bearers in the value system.

A considerable work has been done in the field of values by Sprinthal and Beaton (1966). The values, most popular with the sample in order of rank were aesthetic, theoretical and social. The least liked value-dimensions was economic followed by political. Sharma (1973) compared 122 male and 128 female B. Ed. teachers on the A-V-L value dimension scale. The following results were obtained :

Value dimensions	Com. group	Male teachers	Female teachers
Theoretical	39 26	42.1	36.2
Economic	41.21	29.5	43.3
Aesthetic	31.31	29.3	32 6
Social	43.80	44.2	43.00
Political	48.10	52 4	44.60
Religious	26.32	27.7	31.2

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Singh (1974) undertook the study in two phases with a sample of 517 higher secondary school teachers of the union territory of Delhi. The findings revealed that the teachers scored the highest on social and theoretical values and the lowest on economic and political. Joshi Madan Mohan (1978) studied the value-dimensions of the teacher, 180 males and 180 females selected at random from elementary schools, secondary schools and colleges of Patiala district. Results showed that teachers placed their highest esteem on political and theoretical values The least preferred values were religious and aesthetic. The present study has been undertaken to find out the value patterns of secondary school teachers.

Objectives of the study :

The study has been undertaken with the following objectives :

1. To find out the value dimensions of male secondary school teachers.

2 To find out the value dimensions of female secondary school teachers.

3. To find out significant sex differences (if any) in value-dimensions of secondary school teachers.

Hypotheses :

The study has been hypothesised as under :

1. Male teachers rank political value as the highest and the female teachers rank economic value at the highest.

2. Male and female teachers differ significantly in relation to their value-dimensions.

Sample of the study :

The sample of the present study consists of 200 teachers of secondary schools belonging to the secondary schools of Patiala district. Stratified random method of sampling was followed for the selection of teachers. Out of 200 teachers, 100 were male teachers and 100 were female teachers.

Instrument used :

The investigators made use of the Indian Adaptation of the Allport Vernon Value Scale.

Scoring of the Test :

The test is self-scoring. For scoring A-V-L scale of values, the instructions given in the manual were followed.

Statistical treatment :

The data collected through the administration and scoring of Allport Vernon Scale of values were given the following statistical treatment :

Raw scores of the teachers were converted into distribution and frequencies were laid. Mean, SD and SE of both male and female

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teachers were found out. The investigators then found out the t ratio to see if there is any significant sex-differences in value dimensions of secondary school teachers.

Discussion and Results :

The data thus treated lead to the following interpretation and conclusions :

Table 1 : Ranking order of the value-dimensions of male secondary school teachers.

Value dimensions	Mean	Rank
Political	52.15	I
Social	45.56	II
Theoretical	44.68	III
Aesthetic	39.68	IV
Economic	34.56	V
Religious	28.15	VI

Table 1 shows the ranking order of the value-dimensions of male secondary school teachers. From the ranking as shown in the table, it is found out that political value with mean-score 52.15 is the highly ranked value by the male secondary school teachers. Religious value with mean score 28.15 least preferred by them. This shows that teachers rank politics as the highest and religious as the lowest factor in their lives. Second preference goes to the social value with mean score 45.56. Although it is an age of rising prices and corruption is rampant in every walk of life, yet the teachers have not attached much importance to economic values with mean score of 34,56 as against the score of 52 15 for political values.

Table 2 : Ranking order of the value dimensions of female secondary school teachers.

Value dimensions	Mean	Rank
Political	51.00	I
Social	43.15	II
Theoretical	40.15	III
Aesthetic	37.15	IV
Economic	33 00	V
Religious	30.00	VI

Table 2 shows the ranking order of the valbe-dimensions of female secondary school teachers. From the above table, it has been found that female secondary school teachers give high esteem to the political values with mean score 43.15. Third, fourth, fifth and sixth preferences have been given to the theoretical, aesthetic, economic and religions values. Religious value is least preferred.

Table 3 : Mean differences in value dimensions of male and female secondary school teachers.

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Value-dimensions		Mean	SD	SED	t ratio	Results
Theoretical	M	44.68	6.17	.9	5.033	sig. at .01 level
	F	40.15	6.59			
Economic	M	34.56	4.87	0.651	2 395	Sig. at .05 level
	F	33.00	4.33			
Aesthetic	M	39.58	5.99	3.736	3.437	Sig. at .01 level
	F	37.15	4,30			
Social	M	45 56	6 26	0.781	3.085	Sig. at .01 level
	F	43.15	4.69			
Political	M	52.15	4.26	0.608	1 891	N.S
	F	51.00	4.35			
Religious	M	28.15	5 18	0.720	2.569	Sig. at .05 level
	F	30.00	5 01			

Table 3 presents the mean differences in value dimensions of male and female secondary school teachers. It has been found that both male and female secondary school teachers differ significantly in respect to their value dimensions except political value. In case of theoretical, economic, aesthetic. social and religious values, the difference between the mean scores is significant at .01, .05, .01, .01 and .05 levels of significance respectively. But as far as the political value-dimensions is concerned, both male and female teachers think identically and the difference between the two mean scores has not been found significant at any level of significance.

Although the two categories of respondents male and female secondary school teachers differ significantly, but if we look at Table 1 and 2, the rank order of the value dimensions is the same. Both categories prefer political value as a first preference and the religious value finds least score. Thus we find their difference only lies in intensity on the scores. The teachers differ significantly in the intensity of the score but the ranking order of values remain the same.

The hypothesis that male secondary school teachers rank political values as the highest and the female teachers rank economic value as the highest is partly accepted because both the categories of respondents i.e. male and female teachers rank political value-dimension as the highest. In the case of economic value-dimension it has been thrown at the 5th position. This is evident that women teachers attach importance to political value rather than to economic.

The second hypothesis that male and female teachers differ significantly in relation to their value-dimension is almost fully accepted as out of the six value dimensions, they differ significantly in relation to the theoretical, aesthetic, economic, social and religious value-dimensions. Views are identical with regard to political value dimensions.

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IX

A Consideration of Free Will and Determinism in Kant and Schopenhauer

Richard Sattelberg

The issue of determinism versus free will does not by any means originate in Kant, nor was it settled conclusively by his treatment of it in both of his Critiques In a long and thorough chapter in his *Essay on the Freedom of the Will*,[1] the man who considered himself to be Kant's successor, Arthur Schopenhauer, lists many of the outstanding personalities who have concerned themselves with this thorny problem: Aristotle Cicero, Clement of Alexandria, Nemesius, Augustine, Luther, Vanini, Hume, Spinoza, Priestley, Voltaire. Schelling, Leibnitz and, of course, Kant[2]. Not wishing to enter upon a restatement of the historical development, according to all of the figures just cited, I should like in this paper to examine Kant's concern with the problem of determinism and free will, represented in his *Critique of Practical Reason*,[3] consider some of Schopenhauer's points in his above cited prize-winning essay, and finally to arrive at some resolution of the problem in my own understanding of it.

I Freedom and Determinism in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

In this work which greatly expands upon the discussion of freedom introduced in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*,

1 Edited by Konstantin Kolenda, New York, 1960, The Liberal Arts Press.

2 This list is not at all complete in Schopenhauer. The latter should at least have mentioned Epicurus and Plotinus.

3 Translated by L W. Beck, New York, 1956, The Liberal Arts Press.

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Kant devotes his entire efforts to two themes. (1) Whether the will, which he identifies with practical reason can actually be practical and (2) How the will can be determined by reason.[4] The concept of freedom itself is introduced By Kant. along with two other postulates of pure practical reason, God and immortality. One is then repeatedly haunted by his references to the determining grounds of the will. Perhaps it is wise if we view the discussion of determinism throughout this paper. when applied to human beings, as one which subjects them to external causes from without, while still viewing them as self determining beings.

The moral law, holds Kant, shows us that there is such a speculative idea as freedom. allowing us to admit the other possible idea of God and immortality; thus, of the three ideas, freedom assumed frontal position. It is not enough however, that these ideas be considered *speculatively*, they must also rest upon the basis of reason being employed *morally*, otherwise their possibility cannot be sufficiently maintained.[5]

Can we then reach an understanding of what Kant means when he employs the terms free will and freedom ? Although these concepts are frequently referred to throughout this *Critique*, they are worded differently at times and often quite vaguely, i.e., "By a concept of an object of practical reason I understand the idea of an object as an effect possible through freedom."[6] In fact, one gets the impression from Kant that when a man is held to be free, it is freedom in a *relative* sense primarily, i.e., when he is free from the external causes of the world of sense, he is still subject to laws present in the intelligible world. Thus, one is always determined by something outside of himself and cannot really be said to be free, if we take freedom to mean being independent of causal determination:

"By this freedom the will of a rational being, as belonging to the sensuous world, recognizes itself to be, like all other efficient causes, necessarily subject to the laws of causality, while in practical matters, in its other aspect as a being in itself, it is conscious of its existence as determinable in an intelligible order of things."[7]

Kant maintains that reason determines the will and that we must go from the sense world to the intelligible world. This is also the case when we shift our attention of the moral law as the law of the autonomy of pure practical reason. The moral law itself is clearly separated from the empirical world : [The moral law] "is the fundamental law of supersensuous nature and of a pure world of the

4 Ibid., p. 47.
5 Ibid., Preface, p. 5.
6 cf. p 39.
7 p. 43

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understanding, whose counterpart must exist in the world of sense without interfering with the laws of the latter."[8]

Kant then proceeds to apply the term *nature archetypa* (archtypal world) to the former and *natura archetypa* (ectypal world) to the latter. The first we are said to know by reason and the second "contains the possible effect of the idea of the former as the determining ground of the will."[9]

He next distinguishes between two senses of one's understanding of will which provide us with a very concise view of his thorough going determinism. He points out that a will is subject to a system of nature or vice versa :

"In the former, the objects must be the causes of the conceptions which determine the will, and in the latter the causality of the objects has its determining ground solely in the pure faculty of reason, which therefore may be called pure practical reason."[10]

The freedom of an efficient cause may be allowed but, according to Kant, cannot be proved. It would even be impossible if it were not assumed via the moral law as a postulate.[11] To deny all freedom to an efficient cause would, it seems to me, also nullify ones performance of the moral law, for if a being is completely determined, as Kant thinks, not only in the sense world but also in the intelligible world, then how can one make choices or decisions, having a direct bearing not only upon his own future conduct, but perhaps also on the future conduct of others ? One has to have a measure of freedom or self determinism to make decisions or choices. This point is illustrated by the eminent psychiatrist and neurologist Dr. Viktor Frankl when he states :

> "We who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walked through the huts comforting others, giving away their last piece of bread. They may have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof that everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms — to choose one's attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one's own way."[12]

To me Kant often seems to be reifying causal laws when referring to the intelligible world and even the moral law itself. Indeed, there often seems to be a confusion in Kant to what actually is "real". We are not said to know physical objects only as appearance, and not as things in themselves (this can be compared to the eastern

8 p. 44.
9 p. 44.
10 cf. pp. 45-46.
11 p. 97
12 *Man's Search for Meaning* : An Introduction to Logotherapy, Boston : Beacon Press, 1962, p. 65.

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doctrine that all is Maya or illusion, vide Dagobert Runes, *Dictionary of Philosophy*). This distinction is one matter, but why go on to talk as he does about an object of the will, not to mention the ambiguous concept of the will itself ? Further confusion results when the reader learns that the will is identified with practical reason, for how can this be so if reason determines the will ? It makes more sense, I feel, to talk of man as a being who thinks, who acts, and although temporal nevertheless is not held like a puppet dangling from strings of determinism; and this is the impression one receives of reading the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

It is of interest to note that the subject, for Kant, only, has control over present actions (past actions, of course being out of one's control). But even though the grounds which determine one's actions are independent of one's present acts. every action which one does undertake is *actually* beyond his control (or shall we say beyond his self-determination ?); it is "necessary" solely because of these independent "grounds"[13] One is forced to confess that this is so because Kant has no intention of allowing for self-determinism. This is true of many passages in the *Critique* For instance, in one section he makes reference to man assuming that he could exist independently of any cause outside of himself, i.e., such as God. He rejects this assumption because it does not convert "natural necessity into freedom", because one is always compelled to action of something not under his control, i e., power.[14] I would say Kant gets into trouble by considering causality in a general sense, and not in particular instances. Is brushing my teeth determined by something "not in my power ?" Again an appeal to someone like Dr. Frankl is in order. "We have stated that which was ultimately responsible for the state of the prisoner's inner self was not so much the enumerated psychophysical causes as it was the result of a free decision."[15] However, Kant frequently states his position thus :

> "If one attributes freedom to a being whose existence is determined in time, it cannot be excepted from the law of natural necessity of all events in its existence, including also its actions "[16]

He therefore leaves no doubt that man is completely determined. The picture is virtually the same as it was for the early atomist Leucippus when he stated that "naught happens for nothing but everything from a ground and of necessity."[17] I think Kant should

13 p. 99.
14 p 98.
15 Frankl. op.cit., p. 69.
16 cf p. 98.
17 cf. Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, New York, 1945. p 66.

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have paid heed to the words of Spinoza: "I call him free who is led solely by reason."[18]

Kant feels at ease to jump from one use of will to another i. e, the will of a created rational being to that of the Divine will" without clearly distinguishing between the two usages.[19]

The relationship of the noumenal world to the phenomenal world is all too vague in Kant to permit us to clearly comprehend how the former acts upon the latter, and why freedom should be attributed to a realm which out of reach of one's capacity to observe it

Still a further insight as to whom Kant means by "free" can be gained in his discussion of "unconditioned causality". What, pray tell, does this reference signify? To me his argument can be rendered thus: Man is determined when he acts. But the basis of his empirical actions lies in an "intelligible world", where his actions are sensuously unconditioned. There is a direct relationship between the two realms which are geared to a human agent in such a way that when he acts in one, he automatically (deterministically) acts in the other as well. His reason determines his will in the intelligible world, which is then directly manifested by his actions in the phenomenal world. Thus, insofar as his actions rest in an intelligible world, they are said to be free, the concept of freedom itself transporting us to the intelligible world [20]

Kant's argument for freedom also leads us directly to the moral law. This principle seems to be "rock bottom" for Kant. The "principle of morality" is objective and, like freedom, is to be conceived of as apart from the sense world; thus it is a supersensuous principle. He then points out that reason needs nothing but the moral law for its determination Oddly enough this seems to be due to the fact that it lies embedded in man's very reason *per se*. His argument in this regard is quite nebulous to me, and I must confess that I find no solution to the problem of free will versus determinism in this *Critique*.

Kant thinks that "causality through freedom must always be sought outside the world of sense in the intelligible".[21] Note that he does not say that freedom *cannot* be sought in the world of sense,

18 Proof to Prop LXVII—*Of Human Bondage*. This is not to say that Spinoza is not a strict determinist, for in Prop. III *Of Human Bondage* he echoes Kant's views by stating: "The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes."

19 Beck, op. cit p. 74, first paragraph of "The Incentives of Pure Practical Reason."

20 Ibid. *vide* Kant's argument p 108.

21 P. 108.

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but if this were held it would lead us straight to an empirical basis for freedom which is plainly not Kant's objective. Where freedom originates is also a consideration for Schopenhauer and we will come to his views shortly.

It is also not clear to me how freedom can be attributed to the intelligible world, even if we must resort to this, maintains Kant, "for practical purposes" and not for theoretical consideration alone.[22] It seems far more appropriate to attribute freedom to a variety of things and not to some "unconditioned causality", and to locate it in the sense world among sensible creatures and not where one cannot observe it at all, or may be in doubt as to whether it could be discovered there in the first place.

II. A Few Insights from Schopenhauer

The word "necessary" appearing again and again throughout the *Critique of Practical Reason* receives a refashioning in Schopenhauer's essay. Since "necessary" is used by Kant in connection with things that are free it is of vital importance to our analysis.

Schopenhauer first disagrees with the definition of "necessary", typified by the words "that whose opposite is impossible, or which cannot be otherwise", as a mere "word-definition" or "paraphrase" of the concept, which, he says, does not at all add to our understanding of it,[23] Shelving this definition he offers his own as preferable, as one which is "real" and reversable, namely: "Something is necessary which follows from a given sufficient ground" This definition is also inclusive in that it can be applied to several grounds, logical, mathematical, physical, and in each case the notion of necessity will unvaringly be associated due to the respective consequents following from the given grounds specified.[24] This definition is in effect similar to Kant's usage, when the latter concerns himself with "the determining ground of the will," and "in discovering" the law which alone is competent to determine it necessary. Thus in both Kant and Schopenhauer the concept of necessity is vital We will return to it again when Schopenhauer cites passages from several of Kant's works on the empirical character of human actions.

Schopenhauer suggests, all too obviously, that if a will is free it is without any determinable grounds, because anything that does determine another is a ground [25] Kant also cannot conceive of a free will which is not determinable (even though he places the free will in a realm independent of sense conditions) and says that the only

22 P. 109.
23 Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 7.
24 Ibid
25 P 8.

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thing which can actually be this determining ground is the legislative form of a max.m.[26]

The issue of the empirical character of human actions arises as a crucial concept in both Kant and Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer finds it present in several of Kant's works, first in a passage in the latter's "Ideas Toward a General History:"

> "No matter what concept of the freedom of the will one may make for oneself, metaphysically, still the appearance of it, human actions, are determined according to general laws of nature like all other natural events."[27]

so far then as man is treated as just another object in nature, he has no freedom apart from its laws. The above passage is additionally paralleled, indicates Schopenhauer, by a similar view in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, highlighting also the concepts of antecedent and necessity :

> "Since this empirical character must itself be discovered from the appearances which are its effect and from the rule to which experience shows them to conform, it follows that all actions of men in the (field of) appearance are determined in conformity with the order of nature, by their empirical character and by the other causes which cooperate with that character; and if we could exhaustively investigate all the appearances of men's will, there would not be found a single human action which we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as proceding necessarily from its antecedent conditions. So far, then, as regards this empirical character there is no freedom."[28]

If these above two passages were not in themselves sufficient to show how completely man is determined, there is yet another we can draw upon to further illustrate that this is indeed the case.

> "It may be admitted that if it were possible for us to have so deep an insight into a man's character as shown both in inner and outer actions, that every, even the least, incentive to these actions and all external which affect them were so known to us that his future conduct could be predicted with as great a certainty as the occurrence of a colour or lunar eclipse."[29]

This above selection is noteworthy, maintains Schopenhauer because it is connected by Kant when distinguishing between two other key conceptions, "the intelligible and empirical character." Schopenhauer confesses that in regard to this distinction, he is in complete agreement with Kant, accepting it *in toto*.[30] This distinction is crucial he says, for any unification of freedom and necessity. Kant's

26 Beck, op. cit., p. 29.
27 Schopenhauer, p. 81.
28 London : 1950, p. 474. Trans. Smith.
29 Beck, op cit., pp. 102-03.
30 Schopenhauer, p. 82.

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distinction between the thing and itself and appearance is a prerequisite for understanding the empirical and intelligible character of his philosophy.[31]

It is one of the prime objectives for Schopenhauer to make freedom transcendental. This was also attempted by Kant. Schopenhauer is of the opinion that freedom cannot be discovered in the sphere of "simple actions" by any appeal to "demonstration."[32] How then does Schopenhauer undertake this task ?

He begins by maintaining that human action is under "the strictest necessity," and that no freedom can therefore be ascribed. By keeping this point in mind he feels that we are led to where we can comprehend freedom in a moral sense as a more elevated type, a "true moral freedom." This realization comes to us "another fact of consciousness", when we become aware that we are the ones who not only are responsible for but have actually done certain acts. We realize that what kept us from doing otherwise in a past situation was the fact that we were ourselves and not somebody else. We could have done something otherwise that was completely opposite to what we actually did; we realize therefore that we were responsible and that this same responsibility falls upon the nature of one's "character".[33]

Our nature, he suggests, becomes known to us when we make responses to causes; for everything acts in terms of its own nature. "Every man acts according to what he is, and the action which is accordingly necessary in each case, is determined solely by the motives in the individual case."[34] Thus, in addition to the causal nature of one's actions, there is an allowance to be made for one's motives. I think Frankl also had this factor of motive in mind when referring to the actions of prisoners under the most horroneous conditions imaginable.

Elaborating still further on his conception of freedom, Schopenhauer attributes it to *esse*; its *operori* results as a consequence of both it and motives. "From what we do we know what we are," he states, the morality of life and also one's consciousness of being responsible rests upon this statement and not upon any *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*.[35]

Schopenhauer considers moral freedom in a threefold sense (the other two being intellectual and physical freedom). He discusses moral freedom as an empirical concept typified by the words "I am

31 Ibid., p. 96
32 p. 99
33 pp. 93-94.
34 p. 98
35 Ibid.

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free when I can do what I will." But not stopping here he asks the further question : "Can you also will your volitions ?" Of course the answer is "yes" to both questions, but gives rise to yet another —"Can you also will that what you will to will ?" This in turn pushes us back still further looking for other previous volitions. Of course this process could go on and on unless we settled upon one basic self-dependent volition If we then accepted this as our answer, says Schopenhauer, we would have returned to our original position, having thus gone round and round about trying to solve the problem whether if we conceive of freedom in terms of our ability to will, can we then decide whether the willing itself is free ? In the last analysis we are simply left with the question "Can you will ?" Since we have not decided the issue, we are led to conclude the problem is unresolved and that unless we consider the concept of freedom as abstract, we will not be able to show that there is a direct connection between the concepts of willing and freedom.[36]

Schopenhauer tells us that freedom is originally an empirical concept, it is "derived from action," in this respect he is more honest than Kant who holds that we gain our knowledge of freedom through the priority of the moral law, and that an efficient cause cannot be thought of as free in "the world of sense."[37]

III. A Final View of the Problem

We have explored the relationship of free will to determinism in two gigantic figures in modern philosophy. As far as these giants of reason are concerned, there is no such thing as free will *per se*. They do not maintain that we have no freedom of choice in making decisions or choosing among possible alternatives, but only that when we act we are doing so according to a deterministic plan, i. e., all our actions can be attributed to pre existing causes, and that if we know the causes of our actions, we can predict the effects (n. b. self-determinism is certainly not emphasized in Kant).

In Kant we saw that we are subject to causal laws, but one receives the impression from him that these causes, i.e., when externally or sensuously considered are always outside the individual, whereas in fact, the immediate causes of our actions may lie within us. When we act, we usually think before we do so. Of course, this is not to say that men do not ever act from "impulse" but even this involves some degree of previous thinking or fore-thought. Sometimes our decisions require immediate action, i.e., avoiding an onrushing car, or catching something in a hurry (a ball). but in such cases we do so not "automatically", as is sometimes claimed but more commonly because we *want* to, or find it necessary as befitting

36 p. 6.
37 Beck, op. cit , p. 97.

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the occasion. There is often no law determining us, but simply our own thoughts. That we may be following certain physical laws is also not to be doubted, for this can easily be demonstrated by any competent student of physics, but that we are always individually conscious that we are acting in accordance with such laws cannot be maintained — this latter point may be a cause of confusion in many who have a habit of thinking *not* in terms of physics. There are many who feel that when they act they are not doing so necessarily, but as a result made by themselves alone, not *always*, but *occasionally* arrived at It may be a contradiction to maintain that man is determined and also free at the same time, but this I feel can be solved when one decides upon the various definitions and applications of "freedom" and "determinism". That a man has a measure of self determination cannot be denied, but neither can it be held that he is completely determined by conditions outside of himself. As for the term "free will;" I believe it to be a misnomer, since it does not seem to me to be a localized concept, similarly as did Lord Russell when he wrote, "I, for one, cannot find in myself any specific kind of mental occurrence that I could call will."[38]

This paper has not gone into such touchy theological problems as whether or not Adam freely chose to disobey God in *Genesis*. I leave this up to dogmatic theologians to solve. Perhaps Schopenhauer's own summation of his efforts in this respect should be considered, despite the fact that he appears to conceive of will as a discrete entity !

> "I have strictly separated the inner consciousness of the will in the self consciousness from the outer one, and considered each separately... Secondly, I have considered the will in connection with all the rest of nature, something which no one has done before..."[39]

38 Bertrand Russell. *Religion and Science*, New York, 1961. p. 166.
39 Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 83.

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Book-Reviews

Bhawani Shankar Upadhyaya : *Karl Gustav Jung—Vishleshantmak Manovigyan* (*Analytical Psychology*) Hindi., pp. 340 Published by Rajasthan Hindi Granth Academy, A-26/2 Vidyalaya Marg, Tilak Nagar, Jaipur (Rajasthan) India. Price Rs. 40/—

The author of this book Mr. Upadhyaya has been an old student of the Banaras Hindu University and studied Philosophy and Psychology with great interest and critical understanding Dr. Jung's contribution to the field of learning has been enormous and it is very well accepted by the recent developmentsin the field of Psychology. The author has very critically examined the views of Jung and has discussed them in detail in the Indian cultural context. It is really a great contribution and the book is an exhaustive study on Jung's Psychology with special reference to Mind and Its activities and has given a very nice introduction about Analytical Psychology and a biographical note about Jung and his works. This is one of the best books in Hindi which has thrown much light on Jung and his contributions to Psychology. The whole book has been divided into three sections I. General Introduction. Jung's Biography and outlines of his Psychology. In section II. he has elaborated many theoretical concepts developed by Jung in his thought such as Psyche-its structure and its activities, Mind and its nature, classification, importance and functions of unconscious, anima and animus, the Personal and shadow, Psychological Types, The Great Mother and the Old Wiseman. Participation Mystique, the Laws of Psychic Process, The stages of Life, the natural progress of the human personality towards religion and the wholeness. In the III Section he has very ably written on Dream analysis, Dream analysis and Active imagination, Psychotherapy. The speciality of Jungian Therapy, Psychology and Alchemy. Psychology and Poetry, Art and Literature, Psychology and Education, Psychology and Religion. Jung and India. In the end he has given quite and exhaustive references to quoted works.

Mr. Upadhyaya has very ably discussed all the concepts of Jung in quite and exhaustive book in Hindi. It is indeed a great work which gives all details about Jung and his work in one single volume. This book deserves to be published in all Indian languages and foreign languages in which Jung's works have not yet come out.

The whole book is very well written and deserves all praise for the author. We do not find much about the great Psychologist in one volume. In his last chapter Mr. Upadhyaya has very ably compared Jung's works in Indian Perspective and has shown much similarity with Indian culture.

The author as well as the Rajasthan Hindi Granth Academy has done a great service to the Indian Readers by bringing out in one volume important facts about Jung and his theories. We wish the Academy to acquaint Indian readers with important works in different fields.

Archana Roy : *Western Philosophy from Descartes to Kant*, pp. 204, Gitanjali Publishing House, New Delhi, 2/12 Vikram Vihar, Lajpat Nagar IV, New Delhi-110 024 Rs. 100/— (1985)

Dr. Archana Roy has been a long time Senior teacher of Philosophy in Lady Shri Ram College, University of Delhi. She has

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to her credit a book 'A Short Commentary on the Concept of Mind' and her several articles have been published in different Journals and in the proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress

In the present book she deals with almost all topics as pertain to the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume and Kant She has very carefully discussed critically all the issues which are important for students of Philosophy in Indian Universities. She has critically evaluated all the important philosophical aspects. The author claims that students of Philosophy both graduate and postgraduate will be enriched by her contribution and the students will be benefitted to think on philosophical issues which are most relevant to Western Philosophy. Dr. Roy writes in her preface that the she has made an honest attempt to deal with metaphysical and epistemological issues of these philosophers as clearly as possible. She has considered in the present work the difficulties of the students of Indian Universities and has tried to overcome them. We are sure the book will find readers and students who might derive advantage from this book It is somewhat different from other books published earlier on Modern Philosophy. Dr. Roy deserves congratulations for bringing out such a nice and well thought book dealing with philosophers from Descartes to Kant.

The price of the book which is meant for students seem to be much. It will be better if students editions are cheap so that students may own their copies instead of borrowing the books.

P. M Modi : *Aksara* — A forgotten Chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy, pp. 175, Shri Satguru Publications, Delhi. Distributors : Indian Books Centre, 40/5 Shakti Nagar, Delhi 110 007, Second edition 1985 Price Rs. 100/—

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The book has been edited an written by eminent Indian Indologist Prof, P. M. Modi and has been published by Shri Satguru Publications under Shri Garib Das Oriental Series No. 30. The publishers have done great service in reviving the Indian cultural heritage by republishing it after 53 years.

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I

The Golden Rule

A. Syrkin

The Christian tradition of the Golden Rule is reflected not only in Western literature. From the early centuries A.D. we find it in Syriac texts that, as a rule, can be traced back to Biblical sources. In one of the earliest, "The Book of the Laws of the Countries" (ca. III cent. A. D.), it is rendered thus "There are two commandments set before us, which are meet and right for free will: one, that we should depart from everything that is evil and we hate to have done to ourselves; and the other, that we should do whatever is good and we love, and are pleased to have done so also to ourselves".[51] Similar admonitions are found in the apocryphal "Acts of Thomas". in the 23rd Homily of Bishop Aphraates (IVth cent.), several times in the "Discourses on the Christian Life" (IX) of Philoxenus, Bishop of Hierapolis (485-519),[52] etc. We find it also in the translation of the Greek "Sayings of Menander" — this time evidently borrowed from the Hellenistic tradition. One can also draw some examples from other literatures, influenced by the Bible. In the Coptic "Gospel of Thomas", found in 1945 in the manuscript of III-V cent. in Nag Hammadi, Jesus teaches his pupils : "Tell no lie and whatever you hate do not do" (6).[53] The quotation from Matth. 7.12 is repeated in the Ethiopic version of the "Book of Thecla",[54] etc.

Continued from Darshana International Volume XXV, No. 1 January, 1985, p. 34.

51 King, p. 272, n. 5.

52 Cf. R.H. Conolly. A negative form of the Golden Rule in the Diatessaron?—"The Journal of Theological Studies", Vol. 35, 1934, pp. 352 sq.; Idem : A negative Golden Rule in the Syriac Acts of Thomas—Ibid., Vol. 36, 1935, pp. 353 sq.

53 Cf. J. Doresse. The secret books of the Egyptian gnostics, London, 1960, p. 356.

54 G. B. King. The "negative" Golden Rule. Additional note—"The Journal of Religions", Vol. XV, 1953, p. 59 sq.

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In order to mention some of the other traditions, we shall move again to the East, breaking the geographical order for the sake of chronology (corresponding examples are relatively late). Such are testimonies of Middle-Persian Zoroastrian texts. In the treatise "Sad=dar" ("The Hundred Subjects",), probably composed around the VII cent., the god Ormuzd teaches Zarathustra two commandments of pious conduct: (1) to prefer spiritual friendship to the worldly sort, and (2) to speak truly and act justly — or "whatever thou dost not approve for thyself, do not approve [another reading: "perform"] for any one else; when thou hast acted in this manner thou art righteous" (65.12). In "Dātas ī Denīk" ("Religious Solutions" 94.5) — a collection of decisions concerning ethico-religious questions, written by Manuscihr (IX cent.) it is said: "That nature only is good, which shall not do unto another whatever is not good for its own self."[55] In "Denkart" ("The Deed of Religion") a great compendium of religious and law institutions, compiled in the IXth cent., we read: "They held this too: That character is best, one who does not do to another that which is not good for himself (VI. 2)... They held this too: Be a friend to every one...Hold them as your own and this to you is religion" (VI. 3).[56] Further in the same compendium everyone is summoned to help his neighbour in need, "as though it happened to himself" (VIII. 19.53).[57]

In Islam the Golden Rule is sanctified by the name of Muhammad. According to tradition, when asked about the essence of the Faith, he advised everyone to do to others what one wishes to receive from them. and not to do what one does not wish to receive.[58] A similar thought belongs to the legendary Arabian sage Loqman, to whom a number of fables and sayings is ascribed. One of them quotes Sa'dī (1213 1292) in "Gulistān" ("Rose garden"). Loqman, being asked from whom he had learned civility, replied: "From those who had no civility because what appeared to me un-

55 Cf. resp. Pahlavi Texts. tr. by E. W. West, pt. III, Delhi, a. o. 1977, p. 330; Ibid, pt. II, 1977, p. 271.

56 See: The Wisdom of the Sasanian Sages (Denkard VI by Atur-pāt=i Emetan. Transl by Sh. Shaked, Boulder, Colorado 1979 (Persian Heritage Series, no. 34), pp 4 5. "They"—i.e. "The poryotkes, that is the ancient sages", "those possessed of the first knowledge"—ibid., p. 3 (VI. ia): p 226, n la 2. Cf. Ibid., p. 4. n 2 and p. 229, n. 2 3—parallels from Sayast=ne=Sayast —A Pahlavi text on religious customs, ed. J. C. Tavadiya, Hamburg. 1930 (XIII. 29); Andarz i Adurbad i Mahraspandān. S 5; Wāzag ecand i Adurbad i Mahraspandān, S 39 (both publ. by J. M. Jamāsp=Asānā in: The Pahlavi texts, I-II, Bombay, 1897-1913—nos. 58 and 148 respectively), etc.

57 Pahlavi texts (E. W West). part IV, 1977, p. 51.

58 Cf. A. M. As Suhrawardy, The Sayings of Muhammad, New York, 1941, p. 72.

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becoming in them I refrained from doing" (II. 21)[59] Sa'dī formulated the Golden Rule himself in one of his verses: "Do to nobody, O brother, the evil that you do not wish for yourself. If you love your own mother, do not abuse my mother". Another example from the Parsee Islamic literature of India can be found in the verses of Amī-Khusraw Dihlawi (1253-1325): "All that you consider inadmissible for yourself is inadmissible for others as well."[60]

One may note here that the Golden Rule, reflected independently in Hinduist and Muslim texts, is known also in Sikhism — a religious movement born in XV XVI centuries in India, on the basis of these two religions It was evidently included in the original collection of laudatory hymns (Asa ki var) sung by Sikhs, during morning and evening worship. One of its verses quotes Guru Angad (1504-1552), the successor of the famous founder of Sikhism, Guru Nanak: "Treat others as you want to be treated yourself."[61] Hinduism and Islam are combined together in the sermons of Kabīr (XIV-XV cc). To a Q.zī who desired that he should perform the usual Muslim ceremonies, Kabīr answered: "As thou deemest thyself so deem others; then shalt thou become a partner in heaven".[62]

Another testimony, doubtlessly isolated from the previous ones, is from the New World. In his history of the Incas — "Commentarios reales de los Incas" — Inca Garsilaso de la Vega (1539-1616) tells about the legendary founder of the Inca state in Peru, Manko Kapaka, who evidently lived before the XII century and was traditionally esteemed the first leader and teacher of his people. One of his admonitions persuaded them "to do unto one another as they themselves would be done by, so that there should be perpetual peace and concord among them and no ground for the kindling of envy and passion. They were not allowed to have one law for themselves and another for the rest" (I. XXI).[63]

Up to now we have been speaking about the written tradition. The oral one is also instructive. The Ba-Congo tribe in Africa say: "O man, what you do not like, do not to your fellows"; Moroccans: "What you desire for yourself you should desire for others";

59 The Gulistan or Rose garden of Sa'di, tr. by E. Rehatsek, London, 1964, p. 127.
60 Cf. Ja. I. Kalontarov. Tadzikskie poslovicy i pogovorki v analogii s russkimi. Dusanbe, 1965, str. 409 410; concerning other examples from Muslim tradition see also Philippides, S 57 sq.
61 The Sikh religion, its gurus, sacred writings and authors, by M. A. Macauliffe, Vol. II, Oxford, 1909, p. 29.
62 Ibid., Vol. VI, 1909, p. 205 (XVII).
63 Royal Commentaries of the Incas and general history of Peru pt. I, by Garcilaso de la Vega, El Inca, tr. by H. V. Liver more, Austin and London, 1966, p. 53.

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Tadjiks: "Do not wish to other what you do not like yourself."[64] The German proverb proclaims: "Was du nicht willst, dass man dir tu, das fug auch keinem andern zu".[65] We find variants of the Golden Rule in some collections of Russian proverbs: in V. N. Tatiscev's (ca. 1736): "Do not do to others what you do not wish for yourself"; A. I. Bogdanov's (1741): "Do not wish to others what you do not want yourself".[66] Vladimir Dal (1801-1872) gives other versions: "Do not do to a friend what you do not wish for yourself"; "Do not do yourself what you do not like an another". The latter is inserted by Lev Tolstoy in his "Calendar with Proverbs for 1887".[67]

Testimonies, concerning the Golden Rule, are not limited merely to ancient and mediaeval sources. Its history in our time deserves a special investigation. The most interesting, in this connection, is perhaps its fate within the European ethical and philosophical tradition. This tradition can be called "secular", though it is directly linked to the authority of the Bible, and the early Christian authors.

In the system of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1979) the Golden Rule is the summary of "immutable and eternal laws of nature". Hobbes stresses the practical value of the Golden Rule, which, though successfully limiting our selfish claims, contributing thus to social justice, is at the same time connected with definite egoism (reckoning upon the corresponding attitude towards you) As a result it impresses everyone and, because of its simplicity, can be easily grasped, even by ignorant and short-witted persons. It is formulated here in its negative variant: 'Do not do that to another which thou wouldst not have done to thyself". In accordance with it, Hobbes teaches how to estimate one's intentions concerning one's neighbour: "Let him imagine himself in the other man's place".[68] Hobbes' opinions are reflected in S. Pufendorf's (1632 1694) "De Jure Naturae et Gentrum". One of the first representatives of German enlightenment, Ch. Thomas (1655 1728), influenced by Pufendorf, saw in the Golden Rule the basis of human relationships. In his "Fnndamenta Juris Naturae et Gentium" (pp. 21-80), he discusses it from the points of view of honesty, decency and justice

64 Hertzler, p. 419; Kalontarov, str. 264.

65 H. Reiner, Die Philosophische Ethik, S. 186.

66 Poslovicy, pogovorki, zagadki v rukopisnyx sbornikax XVIII-XX vekov, Moskva Leningrad, 1961, str. 64, 116.

67 See respectively: V. Dal', Tolkovyj slover zivogo velikoruss kogo jazyka IV, Moskva 1955, str. 394; Idem. Poslovicy russkogo naroda, Moskva, 1957, str. 618; L. N. Tolstoj. Polnoe sobranie socinenij, t. 40, Moskva 1956, str. 36.

68 Leviathan, ch. XV, XVII; De cive, III, 26, etc. Cf. Th. Hobbes, Leviathan, L. 1914, pp. 82, 87, a. o.

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honestum, decorum, justum) which, according to him, constitute the conditions of a happy life. The principle of honesty suggests that everybody should do for himself that which, in his own opinion, another should also do for himself (i.e. what he approves in another). The principle of decency, therefore, is doing to another what you would like to receive from him; while the principle of justice is not doing to another what you would not like for yourself. Analyzing these variants, Thomasius examines each of them according to its capacity to restrain evil and promote good. In this respect, the first principle provides a minimum of evil and a maximum of good; the second, a middle degree of both; and the third suppresses the worst forms of evil, while promoting the good only to a small degree.[69]

The duty "to do as one would be done to" is, for J. Locke (1632-1704), "the most unshaken rule of morality and foundation of all social virtue".[70] According to his theory, Locke thinks this principle not to be innate but demanding substantiation, the latter being visible in the natural equality of men. Disputing with him, G. E. Leibnitz (1646-1716) in his "Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain" (I. 2. 4) thinks that the corresponding formula needs an explanation. For example, if a man happens to wish for superfluity it does not mean that he should act in such a way towards another. Leibnitz suggests the following formula: "ne faites a autruy que ce que vous voudriez qu'il vous soit fait a vous meme". According to him, the meaning of the principle is the necessity of accepting another's point of view, in order to judge justly (cf. Th. Gobbes).[71] S. Clark (1675-1729) in his "The unchangeable obligation of natural religion and truth" suggests such a periphrasis : "Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable for another to do for me, that by the same judgment. I declare reasonable or unreasonable, that I in the same case should do for him".[72]

Among the thinkers of the XVIIIth century, who mention the Golden Rule, we have Voltaire ("Essais sur les moeurs") and Rousseau ("Discours sur l'origine de l'inegalite" I). The secretary of the French Academy, Duclos (1704-1772), regarded the negative variant of the Golden Rule as the principle of honesty, and the positive one as that of virtue. He wrote : "Tout ce que les lois exigent, ce que les moeurs recommandent, ce que la conscience inspire, se trouve renferme dans cet axiome si connu et si peu deve-

69 Cf. Reiner, Die Golden Regel, S. 77-78.
70 Cf. J. Locke. An Essay concerning human understanding, Vol. I Oxford, 1894, pp. 68, 71 (I 2.4; 7).
71 Oeuvres philosophiques de Leibniz. T. I, Paris, 1866, pp 57-58; Cf. H. Reiner. Die philosophische Ethik, S. 189.
72 S. Clarke, Works, t. II, London, 1738, p. 619.

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loppe".[73] For I. Herder (1744 1803) it is the indisputable "Rule of justice and truth", rooted in our heart.[74] As we have already said, it is from the XVIIIth century onwards that this principle received the popular designation of the Golden Rule.

The problem of the Golden Rule, in respect to Kant's ethics, is of special interest. We mean here the categorical imperative, laid down by Kant in his "Fundamental principles of the Metaphysic of Morals" (2), the "Critique of Practical Reason" (I.1.1), etc: "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature".[75] In other words, the subjective principle of a separate person's behaviour (such is Kant's explanation of the notion of maxim) must be potentially applicable to everyone and must be the objective, practical law—such is the condition that makes the behaviour moral. At the same time, Kant stressed the aprioristic character of the categorical imperative and opposed it to empirical, moral imperatives (including the Gospels' admonitions) as pragmatic rules caused by utilitarian interests.[76] He also criticized the Golden Rule in its negative form, not seeing here, in particular, the principle "of the duties of benevolence to others (for many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence to them), nor finnlly that of duties of strict obligation to one another, for on this principle the criminal might argue against the judge who punishes him, and so on".[77] Nevertheless, the close tie between the cate-

73 "Considerations sur les moeurs" (IV). Cf. Reiner, Die philosophische Ethik, S. 189-190.

74 'Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit" (IV. 6.5). Cf. Herders Werke, 3 Bd.. Leipzig, [s aj, S. 127.

75 Cf. I. Kant. Fundamental principles of the metaphysics of Ethics, tr. by T. K. Abbott, London 1946, pp. 46, a.o.

76 Cf. Ibid., p. 30 sq.

77 Ibid., pp. 57-58, note 1. This critique (aimed only at certain variants of the Golden Rule) is based upon some of its logically possible interpretations and inversions partly already discussed (M. Singer, The Golden Rule—"Philosophy", Vol. 38, 1963. pp. 294. sq; P. Weiss, The Golden Ruls—"The Journal of Philosophy", Vol. 38, No. 16, 1941. pp. 421 sq., a o.; cf below) In the first case, the admonition "Do not..." is substituted by Let not the other do [for me] what I myself do not want to do [f r him]" and the purpose of abstaining from action turns here from result to cause. In the second case, the Rule is applied here by a man who has already violated it by his crime and violates is once more by the fact of such an argumentation. In other words, the cases constructed here are theoretically possible, but actually contradict the Golden Rule's constant tendency and all its known classical context. One has to remember that corresponding authors looked primarily for the clarity of their admonition and not for its logical analysis.

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gorical imperative and the Golden Rule seems to be indisputable.[78] It is also close to another principle, called by Kant the "practical imperative" ("Fundamental principles of the Metaphysic of Morals" (2): "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only"[79] —which resembles the precept to love one's neighbour as oneself. It is interesting that Kant's imperative, in its connection with the Golden Rule, was also judged by Schopenhauer. Among other things, the latter wrote, that the dependence upon egoistic is typical to the categorical imperative as well.[80]

The practical value of the Golden Rule was stressed by 'J. Mille (1806-1873); who saw in it an important condition of compromise between individual and society for attaining the maximum welfare for the maximum of people: "In the Golden Rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality". It helps to "place the happiness or...the interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole.'.[81]

In Russia, the Golden Rule was frequently cited by Lev Tolstoy in his collections of sayings, precepts and proverbs—with references to Confucius, Hillel, Jesus, etc.[82] It is repeated also in his ethical works. Words from Matth. 7,12 serve an epigraph to the article, "The Only Means" (1901) It is described here as "The Law of God" that is "simple and clear to everyone and evidently provides the greatest welfare accessible to man"; "The only means expressed by Confucius, the Jewish sage Hillel, and by Christ, that doubtlessly frees the majority of mankind from suffering".[83] It is "mutual to Brahmanism, Judaism, Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam — a general practical rule, common to all religious people" ("What the religion is, and what is its essence") (1901-1902).[84] In "Talks with Children on Morality" (1907) he again stresses the

78 Cf. particularly, Hirst, pp. 328 sq. H. Reiner (Die Goldene Regel, S 79, Anm. 13) suggests the following formula elucidating this tie: "Act so, as you would like everybody to act in similar conditions."

79 I Kant. Fundamental principles, p. 56.

80 Uber die Grundlage der Moral", S 7 (A. Schopenhauers Sammtliche Werke, 2 Aufl. Neue Ausg., 4, II, Leipzig, 1922, S. 158 sq.).

81 J. Mille, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, Toronto, 1969, p. 218.

82 L N. Tolsoj. Polnoe sobranie socinenij. t. 40, Moskva, 1956, pp. 36, 344; t. 41, 1957, p. 333; t. 43, 1929, pp. 8, 26, 123, 215; t. 44, 1932, pp. 78, 97; t. 45, 1946, p. 51, a. o.

83 Ibid, t. 34, 1952, pp. 257 sq

84 Ibid., t. 35, 1950, pp. 190 sq

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similarity of Confucian and Christian admonitions; in "The Law of Violation and the Law of Love" (1908), he writes concerning Matth. V. 39 40: "There are not and cannot be such conditions that could justify any deviation from the most simple love's first demand: "Not doing to anotoer what you would not like to be done to yourself".[86]

One more example: According to P. Kropotkin (1842 1921) the principle of treating others as one would like to be treated oneself. can be used for the establishment of an anarchic society.[88]

* * *

The Golden Rule is indeed universal. In the same or similar expressions, it is repeated over 2500 years in all parts of the world. At the same time, not with standing the correctness of certain comparisons (as we see, the corresponding precepts are often included in texts that are similar, in respect to their genre, and functionally close to each other), the genetic ties cannot be found here very often—as a rule, only in certain religious and regional traditions. Such, for example, is the evident influence of ancient Indian specimens on Ceylonese, Indonesian, and Tibetan texts; or of ancient Hebrew (possibly akin to Babylonian) on early Christian and—through its medium—Syriac and Ethiopic ones, as well as on Mediaeval and New European authors. In the case of the latter the influence of classical Greek texts is also possible; these texts could be connected with Judaic and Christian sources at the dawn of our era, and evidently influenced the Roman stoic tradition. Beyond these two areas the fact of borrowing seems to be rather dubious, sometimes impossible. For example, we have no reason to suggest any interaction between early Confucianism and Hinduism (the first cultural contacts between India and China are testified to much later); or the connection of ancient Indian testimonies and those relating to the Mediterranean area.[87] This independence becomes still more evident when we turn to ancient Inca laws or to the folklore of Ba Congo (in some cases, however, the oral tradition can certainly be connected with literary sources—e.g. the influence of the Bible on the Russian proverbs, cited above, or of Sadi on the Tadjik is very probable). It is natural to suggest that the Golden Rule could have appeared independently in certain religious and cultural traditions, including the relatively late and not so isolated ones (Zoroastrian, Muslim), yet the possibility of borrowing remains—e.g. through such widespread collections as Indian "Pancatantra" or Greek "Senterces of Menander". Sometimes we can trace different

85 Ibid., t. 37, 1956. pp. 35, 168.

86 Cf. P. Kropotkin. Nravstvennye nacala anarxizma, London, 1907, p. 28

87 Cf. Sternbach, p. 441.

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modes of influence within the frames of the same culture. The Roman Emperor Alexander Severus heard of the Golden Rule not from an ancient Greek source or from Stoics but from "a Jew or a Christian" (this was probably due to its greater importance within the Judeo = Christian environment, where it was included in canonical texts, sanctified by tradition, and was evidently repeated more often than among the "pagans", who perceived it in the frames of secular didactics—cf. above)

There were some attempts to trace the Golden Rule back to more archaic customs — in particular to the principle of retaliation equal to the transgression committed (Jus talionis). A. Diehle suggests such a sequence in the history of social ethics: retaliation by murder for murder — retaliation by good for good and by evil for evil — the principle of the Golden Rule.[88] This scheme, however, seems to be rather dubious.[89] The principle of reciprocity, common to all these stages, does not yet define their specific traits, nor does it allow them to ground their causal interdependency. Unlike Jus talionis, the Golden Rule by no means aims at punishment or retaliation; moreover, in its negative variant, it merely prescribes not to respond to evil with evil and to abstain from a similar deed. Furthermore, Jus talionis is the result of a certain action already performed, whereas the Golden Rule, according to its sense, is caused by the step anticipated or imagined. The first can logically be described as a certain inversion of the second: it summons to treat another not as *you* want to be treated by him, but as *he* wanted to treat you. We do not mention here certain variants of the Golden Rule (e. g. abstaining from doing things that one condemns in others), that can hardly be correlated with the Jus talionis at all.

The Golden Rule is usually expressed in one of the two variants, positive or negative: "(not) to do to another what you do (not) wish for yourself". A number of interpretations have been made, suggesting the comparative evaluation of both. Some authors are inclined to proclaim the moral superiority of the positive variant over the negative one, which merely implies abstention from action and fear of the wrong treatment. It has often been said that whereas the negative formula appeals only to justice, the positive appeals to compassion; that law and morality, restriction and incitement, etc. are, respectively, proclaimed here. Sometimes a specific motive can be detected in such comparisons: the attempt to stress the superiority

88 A. Diehle. Die Goldene Regel., Eine Einfuhrung in die Geschichte der antiken und fruhchristlichen Vulgarethik. Gottingen, 1962, S 80 a. o.

89 Cf. in this connection : Hertzler. p. 430: Singer, p 294; A. Lutz. Die Goldene Regel—"Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung", Bd. 18, 1964, S. 468 sq., etc.

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of the positive "Gospels'" variant over the negative, supposed to be more native to Judaism, Hinduism, etc.[90]

It must be said first of all that the nature of these variants does not correspond to religious or national criteria. In traditions where the Golden Rule is represented by a number of testimonies, it is usually expressed in different forms and quite often in both variants. Such a combination can be found, for example, in Hindu "Mahābhārata" and Jaina texts ("Sūtra-kritāṅga — "Yogaśāstra"). In ancient Greece we can mention, respectively, Thales, Pittakos — Aristoteles, and various speeches of Isocrates ("Nicocles" — "To Demonicos", "Panegyricos"). As we see, the Judaic tradition also knows positive variants of the Rule: in the "Letter of Aristaeus", the "Abot de Rabbi Nathan" and later in Maimonides who, likewise, made use of both variants. Independent of such a combination, the "negative" variant, as has already been said, was traditionally interpreted here in the "positive" sense of Leviticus 19.18. We find the same combination in the sayings of Muhammad.

Likewise, the "negative" Golden Rule has been used in Christianity not less often than the 'positive": in the "Acts of the Apostles", the "Didache", the "Lives of Fathers", the Ceptic "Gospel of Thomas" (where it is pronounced by Jesus), certain early Syriac texts, etc. There is yet another expression of the negative variant in Jesus' Sermon on the Mount ("Pass no judgment, and you will not be judged" — Matth. 7.1; cf. combination of negative and positive details in Luke 6.37-38).[91] The later European tradition is still more representative.

The difference between the two variants seems to be more rhetorical than substantial. Positive or negative statements concerning the desirable and undesirable, pleasant and unpleasant, etc. may certainly have a different meaning as regards concrete objects, but in respect to general principles such distinctions disappear and are preserved only in the form of expression. Not wanting another to lie or wanting him not to lie (in more general terms, not wanting X to happen and wanting X not to happen) is essentially the same. It is easy to show that practically speaking, the negative variant does not necessarily advocate abstention from action nor the positive encourage it. The appeals not to lie, or to tell the truth neither mean remaining silent, nor constantly uttering true statements of every kind; in fact, they preach the very same message: 'If

90. See e.g. Friedlander, pp 232 sq.; Hertzler, pp.429 sq.; E. Stauffer, Die Botschaft Jesu. Damals und Heute. Bern u. Munchen, 1959. S 55 sq., etc.

91 Cf. King, pp. 275 sq; G. Friedlander (op. cit., pp. 233, sq.) citing such instances, remarks that Jesus often uses negative formulas that remind one of the style of Hebrew commandments.

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you say something. tell the truth". This similarity becomes quite evident when we refer to certain blameworthy actions (cf. e.g. the clearly positive sense of the appeal: "Do not leave your neighbour in need if you do not want to be left so yourself").[92]

It is not right, however, to deny all difference between the two variants. These differences can be observed not only on the level of expression but also on the psychological and — one may add — the pragmatic level. We have already mentioned the affinity of the Golden Rule to the precept to love one's neighbour as oneself. The positive variant of the Rule seems to be a direct deduction from this precept, known in other religions too (e.g. in Buddhism). Furthermore, the precept of love can for its part be directly deduced from the more general formula, depicting the union of subject and object, "I" and "not I", adherent and Deity; in other words, the state of the highest spiritual illumination, known to the religious experience of different cultures, from the ancient Indian "tat tvam asi" ("That art thou"), to the "dissolution of ourselves in all others" in modern Russian poetry. The expression "That art thou", bearing the supreme mystic experience, descends, as it were, a step lower in its more concrete periphrasis — "Love your neighbour as yourself" — while the latter, as if continuing this descent, becomes embodied in the precept: do to another what you want to be done to yourself.[93] Thus an abstract formula having been imbued with emotion, turns to everyday life. And yet, from the point of view of psychological reaction and the ensuing decision, this positive variant often proves to be difficult in practice.[94] Good will and self-control are not always sufficient. It is here that the rule "Do *not*..." can help. Conserving the same sense, it appeals simultaneously not only to man's wishes but to his fears and his instinct of self preservation. Its violation more evidently endangers one's own security. The commandment became more visual and pragmatic.

It can be supposed that the concrete use of the corresponding variant can, in certain cases, be significative in defining the character of the system studied. Thus, the predominance of negative formulas in the Hindu tradition (in some Buddhist texts as well) conforms to its pragmatic attitude, clearly expressed in its combining different principles of life (cf. above), and their subsequent modification (for

92 Cf. Singer, pp. 304 sq.; King, p. 276. It is noteworthy that L. Tolstoy used to put both formulas together as equals (see e. g. Polnoe sobranie socinenij, t. 34, p. 257; t. 43, p. 215).

93 Compare with Nicolaus Cusanus' interpretation of the Golden Rule as the expression of universal equality and oneness [De conjecturis, II 17 (193)]. Cf. F. Edgerton. Dominant ideas in the formation of Indian culture" — JAOS, V. 62, 1942, p. 155.

94 Cf. Hertzler, p. 432.

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example, of dharma) according to social and family status, etc. (incidentally, one of the most pragmatic Hindu texts is the Bhagavadgītā, which encompasses the widest scope of behaviour and is also included in Mahābhārata). The same pragmatism was to a high degree native to Judaism and particularly to Hillel. Perhaps it is not by chance that negative variants predominate in admonitions intended for the socium rather than the individual, aimed first of all at social regulation — such is the tendency of some Chinese sources, or of King Alfred's Laws. Hobbes' commentary on the negative variant of the Golden Rule (cf. above) is very instructive. From the oldest times the negative style seems, in general, to be more common, and perhaps more effective, in the genres of commandments, institutions and precepts. An interesting thought from L. Tolstoy's "On every day" can be cited in this connection: "There is one thing that is most important for everybody. It is living good. And living good means not so much doing the good we are able to do, but rather not doing the evil we can abstain from doing. The main principle is not to do evil".[95]

On the other hand, the use of the positive variant tends to be associated more with preaching general and exalted ideals that transcend everyday life. Such, for instance, within the framework of the New Testament, is the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, which clearly contrasts with the more trivial and pragmatic atmosphere of the Jerusalem Council and the mission to the gentiles — two situations to which the two variants of the admonition correspond respectively.

The Golden Rule was more than once analyzed in respect to its meaning. H. Reiner, for example, tries to distinguish its different manifestations on the basis of its being conditioned by certain modifications of personal desire (eigenes Wollen).[96] The first, called by him the rule of "penetration", "feeling into" (Einfuhlungsregel) is based on the criterion of one's own wish "not to do to another what you do not want to suffer yourself". This wish is motivated here by one's personal interests and the corresponding kind of precept is the least praiseworthy. Examples can be drawn from "Mahābhārata", Epiktetos, Augustinus "Letter to Hilarius", etc. The second is the rule of autonomy (Autonomieregel) — "not to do what you condemn in others". It is more sublime, for it is based on moral judgment and is free from the selfishness and partiality of the former. We find it in Pittakos in Herodotos in "Sentences of Menander", etc.; according to H. Reiner it is relatively near to Kant's categorical imperative. The third kind is the rule of reciprocity (Gegenseitig-

95 L. Tolstoj. Polnoe sobranie sochinenij, t. 44, pp. 116-117.

96 Cf. Reiner. Die Goldene Regel, S. 79 sq.; Idem., Die Philosophische Ethik, S. 190 sq; Lutz, S. 473 sq.

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keits=regel): not to do to another what you do not want done to yourself" (evidently in both negative and positive variants). It is also motivated by one's own desire—not egoistic, however but positive and moral. We meet it in Judaic and early Christian traditions, in Ausonius, in the German proverb quoted above, etc. This form serves as a rule for social relations though in this point the classifications seem to be rather vulnerable and H. Reiner (as if anticipating possible criticism) remarks that it is many sided in itself.

It has been observed that the Golden Rule must suggest a community of interests (we have seen that such a community is postulated previously in some texts—e.g. in Buddhist "Garland of Birth Stories"), otherwise it becomes inapplicable.[97]. To put it more precisely, it can be effective only if we ourselves know what we want, if our wish is identical with what we ought to desire, and if we know that what is good for us is also good for others.[98] Such details are considered by M. Singer, who recommends formulating the Golden Rule not as "doing unto others *what* you would have them do unto you" (the particular interpretation), but: "doing unto others *as*..." (the general interpretation). In other words, "I am to treat others... on the same principle or standard as I would have them apply in their treatment of me".[99] As we see, some examples cited above (e.g. from the Gospels) coincide with this formula (though it is scarcely probable that the use of "what" instead of "as" could in practice lead to a misunderstanding: the corresponding contexts are still far from condoning individual vices or abnormal inclinations). One can observe that such a precision correlates the Golden Rule with the idea of a common principle of behaviour and thus shows its evident connection with the categorical imperative, suggesting a kind of intermediate link between them (cf. above, note 78, the formula of H. Reiner).

At the same time, according to A. Gewirth, M. Singer's general interpretation does not surmount the difficulties mentioned above. Due to an inevitable discrepancy between different persons' principles and wishes, it may be now "too permissive for the recipient and too restrictive for the agent" ("to the possible detriment of the agent's wishes"), now — vice versa[100] Therefore he suggests the

97 Concerning the problem of the Golden Rule's inversions M. Singer (op. cit. p 298) quotes the words of B. Shaw: "You should not do unto others what you would have them do unto you, because their tastes may be different". Cf. also K. Baier. The moral point of view, Ithaca, 1958, pp. 202 sq; G. H. von Wright. The varieties of goodness, London, 1963, pp. 201 sq; W. T. Blackstone, The Golden Rule. A defense — "Southern Journal of Philosophy", vol. 3, 1965, pp. 172-177; A. Gewirth The Golden Rule rationalized — "Midwest studies in Philosophy. Vol III (1978). Studies in Ethical theory". Minneapolis 1980, pp. 133 147, esp. pp. 134 sq.

98 Weiss, p. 422.

99 Singer, pp. 299 sq, 313.

100 Gewirth, op. cit., pp. 135 sq.

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generic interpretation of the Golden Rule, based on the "rational" (in a morally neutral sense of the term) approach and uses the notion of common *generic* rights (i.e. "rights to freedom and well-being").[101] The proposed formula, called by him the "Principle of Generic Consistency", sounds thus: "Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as yourself" (its logical equivalent or the "Rational Golden Rule" being: "Do unto others as you rationally want them to do unto you").[102]

The analysis of the Golden Rule leads different authors to similar conclusions.[103] It is the most effective means of satisfying both the individual and society; indeed, it is perhaps the best rule of conduct ever formulated. Capacious and laconic at the same time, it appeals directly to man's everyday needs and to his inward world as well. Simple and visual, it is addressed to everyone and requires neither intellectual effort nor special scholarship to be grasped. It presents, therefore, and ideal material for preaching and admonishing. All the appraisals of our own time coincide with many opinions that were expressed directly or obliquely from Confucius to Hobbes or Mille.

Here we perceive one more trait of the Golden Aule—a natural consequence of its ubiquity. This precept was preached and shared by the representatives of very different, and sometimes hostile, trends: Confucians and Mohists, Pharisees and founders of Christianity, Catholics and Protestants, by Hobbes and Leibnitz, and so on. We have seen at the same time that numerous textual coincidences are evidently not casual but sestemic. Repeating themselves almost verbally, they are also functionally related to one another, fulfilling analogous task in analogous writings, such as canonized sacral texts, collections of sayings, didactic treatises, etc. Most striking, however, is their role in those admonitions that aim at a brief and clear formulation of the essence of the corresponding doctrine. They appear here like a kind of a common denominator to which Confucians, Hindus, Jews, Christians reduce their Law—a quality perceived and proclaimed by the teachers themselves: Confucius, Hillel, Jesus The history of the Golden Rule abounds with legends, but it is not so important who proclaimed it first and when. Much more significant is the fact that different traditions sanctified it in the names of their greatest authorities.

As of thousands of years ago, the Golden Rule continues to impress us with its moral immutability and logical consistency. Existing under different names, though in similar expressions, this Rule—perhaps better than any other testimony—helps us to feel and live through the unity of ethico-religious experience. For when this experience had to be summed up, men who performed different rites, spoke different languages, and never heard of each other pronounced the same words.

101 Ibid. p. 143.

102 Ibid. pp. 140, 141, etc.

103 Cf. e.g. Singer, p. 310; Hertzler, pp. 428, 436; A Cadoux, The Implications of the Golden Rule — "International Journal of Ethics", Vol. 22, 1942, pp. 283, 287; S. G. Champion (ed) The Eleven religions and their proverbial lore. London, 1944, pp. XVI sq.; Gewirth, op. cit., p. 133, etc.

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II

Tantra Shastra and Mental Health

M. S. Kalanidhi

Like other systems of Indian thought, our ancient Tantra Shastra contain materials of immense psychological value in the realm of mental culture and training. The unbiased reader of Tantra Shastra can easily observe that everything in Tantra is based on psychological principles. Tantra shastra is referred to as a pratyaksha Shastra — a science which like medicine and astrology is verifiable at every step. The science of Tantra is interested in the world as it is now and help mankind to attain material happiness and it goes still further to liberate it from the hold of ignorance and attain the highest goal of mankind that is Nirvana or Liberation. Tantra Shastra provides the most practical and sure ground for achievement of material and spiritual unfoldment of mankind. This is done by a gradual process of spiritual self education of the mind and body to exercise control and mastery over the elements and environmental forces at work. In this process of inner exploration, he learns all the secrets of the human mechanism — its strength and weakness.

The Tantras have divided the worshippers into three classes according to the predominance of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. There are three kinds of Bhavas namely : (1) Pasu Bhava, (2) Vira Bhava, (3) Divya Bhava. Men of Pasu Bhava are those who attempt mastery over their passions and impulses but have not yet attained self control. Men of Vira Bhava are those with heroic temperament who have complete control over their senses and hence fit enough to practice Panchatattvas. Men of Divya Bhava are those with Divine tendency and propensities. From the birth upto sixteenth year one has Pasu Bhava, from the sixteenth year to fifteeth year one has Vira Bhava and afterwards Divya Bhava. Through mental cultivation and training one can pass from one stage to the others finally to reach the integrated state of mind-that of Kulachara. The Kulachara is con idered as the highest among the acharas. He makes no

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difference between a son and foe, between a palace and a hut. He is supposed to practice Samatva and perceive divinity in everything around.

From the point of view of preparation for Tantric Sadhana, certain norms are laid down for the conduct of the house holder as well as the ascetic. In the sacred Mahanirvana Tantra, there are lists of qualities prescribed for the householder and the ascetic, especially for the performance of the Shakti puja with all its details and for the four Varanasrama Dharmas respectively. According to the natural inclination of the four groups, conduct is also prescribed there in with an equal emphasis on Dharma and truth for all. The basic tenet of the Kuladharma is the cultivation of a detached frame of mind amidst enjoyment of material comforts.

It is commonly held that enjoyment and liberation are opposed to one another. In fact, it is rather difficult to conceive of enjoyment as something contributing to Liberation. But it is otherwise held by the Shaktas that nature is the instrument for the realization of the spirit. Tantric Yoga controls, but does not frustrate enjoyment. It helps man to adjust his inner process with restraint and direct them upward consciously and permit enjoyment within limits. In the psychophysical rites of the Shaktas, the body and its functions are used as the means of liberation and not as obstacles to liberation. In practicing all these rituals, the mind of the Sadhaka is continously occupied with the supreme power. His Bhava or disposition become purified and divinised so far as that can be in the world. Practice makes the mind illuminated with the knowledge and detachment and through yoga, it becomes perfect.

An essential element in Tantra worship is Bhuta Shuddi—the purification of the elements of the body. By Yogic and tantric discipline, the kundalini is roused and is led up through the spinal column observing all the physical and psychical centres and unites with Shiva as consciousness in the centre known as the thousand petalled lotus. The body is then drenched with and renewed by the nectar as a result of the divine union. Another characteristic feature in Tantric worship is the use of Nyasa and Mudras. Nyasa means placing the hands of the Sadhakas on different parts of his body with appropriate mantras imagining that by his action, the corresponding parts of the Divinity are placed there. During this imagination it is presumed that the man of sin is burnt in mental fire. Mudras refers to movement of the hand and body in any worship which required external action. They emphasize and intensify and externalise the thought process. The body is made to move with the thought. In Tantra worship, Pranayama is an indispensable aid in meditation. The object of Pranayama is to bring the involantary

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act of breathing under control which in turn controls the mind of the Sadhaka. Japa is recital of a chosen Mantra which is itself Divinity in sound form. The technique of Mantra japa is to use the power of sound as to bring about changes in the state of one's own consciousness, to invoke and draw upon the higher states or power of consciousness through the agency of sound. The Gayathri is one such great Mantra with excellent psychic potentialities at its disposal. In Mantra worship, there is invariably the use of Yantra — which is a mystic diagram on metals drawn on earth to represent the deity at the time of worship. The process of Avahana of the Deity, prāna-pratishtā and visarjana followed in magnificent details make the whole event of worship so realistic. It is indicative of a conscious transformation of consciousness of the worshipper at the time of performing the puja rites.

According to Tantra, outer worship is fruitless without inner worship. In the Mahanirvana Tantra, it is said that first he should offer his heart lotus for Her seat and then offer Amrita flowing from Sahastrara for the washing of Her feet. The mind should be offered as Arghya — the restlessness of mind as the dance. The following ten flowers should be offered subsequently — Non egoism, non attachment, non vanity, non delusion, non arrogance, non enemity, non malice and non covetousness. The five qualities of ahimsa, control of the senses, mercy, forgiveness and knowledge also should be offered. These mental dispositions represent the Bhavarupa of the worshippers. Bhava is the quality of the mind. In fact it is only on this principles of Bhava that the offering of the pancha tattvas should take place. They are symbolic representations for wine, meat, fish, rice and women. It appears to be a paradox that the very objects or stimuli of distraction are chosen as the ideals in worship. In Tantra Prayoga, the act whether that of drinking wine or union with shakti are part of worship and not for the satisfaction of the lust. A conscious self purification takes place before the actual offering either in reality or symbolically. It is needless to mention that these five tattvas can be offered only by vira Sadhakas who have a detached frame of mind to seek liberation through enjoyment. He is a hero who has controlled his senses and is a speaker of truth, who is ever engaged in worship and has sacrificed all lust and other passions. It is on this account that the Vira Sadhakas is chosen as the initiate in Tantric discipline by the Guru concerned.

The psychology of Guru — Sisya a relationship is clearly illustrated in the Tantra Sastra. In the Kularnava Tantra—the following qualities are considered as unworthy for Sisya. Physical deformity, very inactive, mean minded, wanting in loyalty, given to exaggerated improper and obscene talk, wanting in feeling for others, with no will of his own, ready to receive initiation and do other acts not out

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of any particular desire of his own but at the instigation of others, cunning, impure, given to the performance of acts prohibited by the Shastra and omitting to be those which it enjoins, divulging secrets, mischievous, self conceited, crane like in nature, deceitful, ungrateful, spying other secrets, treacherous, rebellious, sinful, criminals, one eyed, of ill repute, who bear false witness, a deceiver of people, liar, crucel, indecent in speech, talkative, wrong judgement of men and things, quarrelsome, rebuking people without reason, one who slanders people behind their back and speak well of them before their face, and envious.

In the Gandharva Tantra, the following qualifications of a Sisya are mentioned: Very sweet of tongue, stainless in body and speech, wearing white cloth and pure in habits, incapable of speaking ill of others or of showing disrespect to Devadas, never covetous of others food, wives and land, unwilling to give pain to others, kind to all creatures, sharp witted, a master of his senses, a believer, devoted to Guru, pure, calm minded without avarice, constant in his friendship, firm devotion to Guru Mantra and Devata.

But for such of the qualities, it will not be possible to do Tantric Sadhana in an uncorrupted fashion Success in sadhana is indicated through Siddhi of the Mantras, which in turn is possible only through the Guru and the unflinching devotion and faith of Sisya towards the Guru, Mantra and Devata. Siddhis are psychic powers, which are extension of ones natural faculties. They are peculiar mental faculties by which the mind sees things or imposes itself upon and controls or affects others, such as in the process of clairvoyance, hypnosis, thought reading, and so forth. It is a material force of the mind, a power emnating from the extension of consciousness. It is a truism to state. that as a man thinks that he becomes. The Sadhaka's continuous contemplation of the Divine, repetition of the thought, and participation of the body in the mental operation—all these produce a lasting and good impression in the mind and effects the transformation of the worshippers in to a likeness with the Divine that is being worshipped. Thus the Tantra Shastra is aimed at transforming and divinising the mind and body and its ultimate liberation through a conscious but detached enjoyment of the material world. By means of a constant contemplation of the Divinity, its Mantra and the initiater of the Mantra, the appetities are gradually restrained, senses controlled, the bonds of action are slowly weakend and unchained leading to ultimate liberation or the knowledge of the Brahman.

The altruistic philosophy of the Tantrics have thus a great contribution to make towards the mental and physical health of modern man. Tantric discipline lays stem on positive thoughts, righteousness of behaviour and a healthy frame of mind. Mental

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health qualities are fundamental preconditions for eligibility to sadhana. The entire process of Sadhana aims at achieving mastery of ones mind and the senses.

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III

Objectivity and Revealed Truth

Kai Nielsen

"I have tried to be objective, I do not claim to be detached"
C. Wright Mills

I

I am grateful to Justin Miller for his examination of my "Comparative Religion and Revealed Truth", though in Candor I should say that I find his response at least as unsatisfactory as he found my short piece.[1]

Miller correctly quotes me as saying that the religiously orthodox cannot accept a central idea behind some comparative studies of religion, "namely that the world's disparate cults and traditions are sufficiently equal, or even similar, to be studied comparatively". He then chastises me for not elucidating the meaning of the word 'equal' in that context. But what is involved is clear enough, even in my short text, namely the claim of some comparativists that the various religions are of more or less equal value and that they are all differing but equally valid (legitimate) perceptions (intimations) of the Infinite. I then made the obvious point that the orthodox of the various faiths could not possibly accept such a conclusion Over this crucial point, Miller actually agrees with me, though he utterly fails to draw the proper conclusions from this acceptance. He recognizes that the orthodox cannot believe that all religions are of equal worth and credence or that they are all equally true. They, as he puts it, virtually all have a conception of special revelation — of Revealed Truth — and even where the revelation is "relatively non-exclusive", as in the case of Hinduism, there still is a doctrine or the

1 Kai Nielsen, 'Comparative Religion and Revealed Truth", *Religious Humanism*, Vol. XII, No. 2 (Spring, 1978), pp. 89 90. Justin Miller, "Objectivity and Impartiality : A Reply to Kai Nielsen", *Religious Humanism*, this issue.

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religion within which such a conception occurs of higher and lower truth with Hinduism having firm control on the Higher Truth. Each of the various religions regard their own distinctive faiths as the guardian of religious truth — Revealed Ultimate Truth — that is just given to the faithful. But, be that as it may, the situation we actually find ourselves in is that of these differing religions (differing faiths) all appealing to their own claims to Revealed Truth where these claims are often, at very key points (key points from the point of view of the religions involved), making claims absolutely essential to their respective religious faiths, faiths which are either conflicting or incommensurable, unless they are to be radically demythologized and, in effect, secularized. Either, to take an example, Jesus is the Son of God or He is not. Anyone who is even a reasonably orthodox Christian must believe He is and no Jew or Moslem can believe that he or anyone else even could be the son of God, except in the weak sense that we are all children of God. It cannot be the case that both the Christian and the Jewish-Islamic claims are true. To avoid, in our hopefully tolerant and pluralistic age, such embarrassing questions by de mythologizing Jesus into a griping moral symbol, is to abandon anything like Orthodox Christianity and, to, in effect, secularize and radically transform what has historically been a central claim of Christiandom. It is, to put it bluntly, simply to abandon a central Christian claim to Revealed Truth.

To say, taking a standpoint of comparative religion, that these differing claims to Revealed Truth are of equal value because they are all simple differing legitimate perceptions (intimations) of the same Infinite — as if they were different languages talking about the same reality — is not something, as Miller recognizes himself, that the Orthodox can accept. It would imply that there was some perspective from which revelations (putative revelations) could be compared and assessed. But this, from the standpoint of the various religions themselves, is deemed to be impossible, for, so treated, they wouldn't be revelations As Calvin and Barth recognized, it is not man, with his use of science or philosophy or theology, who is to judge the Word of God, it is God who judges man and provides him, if He chooses, with the Truth and the Way. In His Holy Word and through His acts, God provides us our measure of truth and life. A revelation that could be assessed simply wouldn't be a revelation.

Our situation is this, we have these various alleged, often conflicting or incommensurable, revelations all claiming to be genuine revelations, but without even the possibility—given what revelation is—of attaining criteria acceptable to the faithful in virtue of which we could decide which is the Truth, or the Highest Truth, and the Way. If comparative religion tries to intervene and either rank

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religions or claim they are all differing orticutations of the same Ultimate Reality, it adopts a perspective which is foreign to the religions in question and could not possibly be accepted by them without their abandoning their claims to Revealed Truth. But to abandon that, in effect, is to abandon their respective faiths.

What bothers Miller the most, what seems to him wrong headed, *a prioristic* dogmatism on my part, is my claim that to the extent that comparative religion is a genuine social science, it must regard claims to Revealed Truth as mistaken. My grounds for this, perhaps startling, claim are rooted in my perception of the differing conceptions of the various religions, on the one hand, and science, on the other, as to the source and ground of truth-claims. As a social science, comparative religion must use empirical criteria of assessment and develop scientific methods of appraisal. It must so constrain itself to remain a science. But it, as the very term 'comparative' connotes, purports to compare the various diverse faiths of the world either in an attempt to rank them or to show they are differing expressions of the same 'Ultimate Truth'. To make these claims, as we saw above, comparative religion, as a social science, must use criteria which are unacceptable to the orthodox—the Orthodox of the World's great religions. This Miller, in effect acknowledges. But the other side of this coin, is that the Orthodox, in appealing to Revealed Truth, appeal to criteria of truth—revelation—that the scientist *qua* scientist cannot accept as truth determining or normative for belief. What is not checkable by scientific methods is not something he can accept as true in the corpus of science or even as making something which could be a truth-claim in that corpus, for otherwise he must allow that science could accept as knowledge or warranted belief something which was scientifically uncheckable. Such a Revealed Truth neither could be a scientific claim—a part of the corpus which claims to be scientific knowledge or belief—nor could it be an extra-scientific axiom, simply accepted as *a truth*, from which a part of science, namely comparative religion, could commence.

However, it might reasonably be responded, that this is only to show that science is science and religion is religion. Moreover, how can the comparativist be so certain that there cannot be sources of truth other than the scientific? Isn't that the crudest sort of scientific dogmatism? It isn't! The knight of faith to use Kierkegaard's phrase, when he looks at the world he lives in, with the fact of different and often conflicting or incommensurable claims to Revealed Truth with no possibility of rationally assessing their different claims and yet he still, to be a knight of faith, must plunk for one as The Truth and the Way. To simply, without any reason, as Kierkegaard and Barth do, accept Christianity as the Unique

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Revealed Truth or any other alleged revelation as such a Truth is, in such a circumstance and with such background knowledge, irrational, for we have a groundless and arbitrary appeal to something said to be true with no possible way of ascertaining in an objective way (if that isn't a pleonasm) whether that claim is so.

I say 'No objective way' for the following reason. If there are conflicting putative Revealed Truths of systems of salvation, A. B. C. D and E, together with a claim by a believer in A that his putative revelation is the Ultimate Revealed Truth, and a claim by a believer in B that his putative revelation is the Ultimate Revealed Truth and so on for C, D and E, we have conflicting claims to Ultimate Truth by the various participants, where, even in principle, none can supply a single reason for accepting his claims over those of the other faiths. Yet, as believers, they each must claim that their putative revelation is the Ultimate Truth or at least the more Ultimate Truth. In *such a circumstance and with such knowledge* to persist in claiming that one has the Truth and the Way is pure dogmatism, a dogmatism that is, through and through unacceptable to anyone with a commitment to thinking in a scientific manner. To take any one of these putative revelations as true is something (a) a social scientist, *qua* social scientist, could not do and (b) deliberately to break this methodological restriction and make such a claim all the same is in effect to abandon the impartiality and objectivity that the social sciences must strive to attain. To claim A is true when in the very nature of the case there can be no more ground of a scien i-fic or an empirical sort for believing A, rather than B, C, D or E, is to do something which can have no scientific warrant.

It might be responded that, after all, it still has a ground, though not a scientific one, for it has the warrant of God or one's highest religious authority. To so respond, if one does it with a full understanding of the ab ve conditions, is to make an irrational response. It is irrational to make such a claim for one's belief — one's commitment in faith — in the face of the fact that there are a mass of divergent and often conflicting or incommensurate putative religious authorities each one of which claims his system of belief is The Way and the Truth and yet none of them, with their bases in alleged revelations, can give any external justification for his belief, such that we have any reason at all for accepting one of the putative revelations rather than another. This is particularly evident if we have a good anthropological understanding of how many religions there are and of their not inconsiderable diversity. To claim, in such a circumstance, truth for one's own system of salvation is both hubristic and irrational.

I am not claiming, absurdly, that all believers are either, but I am saying that a believer who clearly had the above considerations,

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together with their implications, before his mind and who remained a believer would be so criticizable. Knights of faith are shielded from irrationality either by ignorance, by a failure to see the implications of their positions, or by self deception.

My point is that there can be no objectivity or impartiality in such a religious commitment made with such background knowledge. Such a leap, made with such knowledge, is not only subjective but irrational, given what anthropological studies have shown us about the great diversity of religious faiths and given that there is no ground for claiming one faith to be superior to another. Kierkegaard and Barth saw the scandal to the intellect here and embraced it, though Kierkegaard leaves the 'out' that one needs to make that absurd leap to make sense of one's tangled life. But this is precisely what one need not do. One can make sense of one's life in purely secular terms.[2] And, even if, contrary to fact, that were not so, one does not need, *pace* Kierkegaard, to embrace Christianity or any particular religion as the sole source of *Weltanschauung*-stability, for all the various religions have provided stable sources for orienting one's life, at least when they were at their historical prime. It is typically the case that a believer can believe (at a given time) in only one, but, to paraphrase Eisenhower, any one will do at least during their periods of cultural ascendency and for people firmly socialized in that culture. That Christianity is no longer doing this so well suggests that we should perhaps speak of the Christianity of our time as 'late Christianity', in the way we speak of 'late Capitalism'. But that rather tendentious point aside, to claim that only one true revelation can make sense of our tangled lives is to fly in the face of reason and to lose a grip on one's capacity for impartial appraisal. Kierkegaard would no doubt quip in return that to speak, as I have just done, is to take a world historical outlook and to fail to become genuinely subjective. There are, however, many ways of becoming subjective. Kierkegaard needs to give us some slight reason for thinking that the commitments of the Christian Knight of faith give us Ultimate Truth while the other commitments can in some way be legitimately discounted as genuine claimants for that role. Without that, the leap, and the living with that leap, no matter how sincere, is irrational.

II

Miller believes that the social scientist *qua* social scientist can make no judgments about the viability or truth of religious belief or any other social belief he studies. This reveals a particularly scientific and old fashioned positivistic conception of social science. Surely a first job of a social scientist, who does comparative religion,

2 Kai Nielsen, *Ethics Without God*, (Prometheus Books : Buffalo, New York, 1973).

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is to do something comparable to the social anthropologists' studies in ethnology. Just as the social anthropologist attempts to describe tribal mores so the comparativist should try, as accurately as possible, and as neutrally as possible, to describe the different faiths. (That they are a special kind of tribal more shows how very much, at the initial stages, the comparativist's task is a specialized ethnographical task.)

Though it is more difficult to do this in such a manner than is typically realized, it is perhaps at least possible in principle to do this neutrally without raising issues about the viability of the beliefs in question. To say what the beliefs of religion X are is not to say they are true or false and it is not to say, at least not directly, whether they are coherent or incoherent. There is simply in such 'ethnography of religions' an attempt to do a neutral descriptive job. Some anthropologists tell us about kinship systems, tell us about religious system in the various tribes (including our large tribe). But the telling here need not be normative or critical and it may be only minimally interpretive.

However, social science also categorizes, explains and interprets and in doing these things it unavoidably makes judgments about the rationality and coherence of what it judges. This is bound up in how it categorizes, explains and interprets them. In examining the Azande's belief in witches, social scientists do not really search for witches. They start by assuming there are no witches, indeed they typically assume that there can be no witches. The type of categorization and interpretation of these beliefs presupposes that background. When Evans-Pritchard, after his magisterial and impartial study of Azande Witchcraft practices, denied that there could be witches, it did not follow that he was thereby not regarding their beliefs impartially or objectively.

Miller says "To deny the fundamental claims of a religion...is not to regard it impartially or objectively". But it surely would not be correct to say "To deny the fundamental claims of Witchcraft or magical cults is not to regard them impartially or objectively". Whether or not such a denial was or was not impartial and objective would depend on how the denial was made and on the intellectual sophistication and knowledge of the people making that denial. Similar things should be said about the denial of the fundamental claims — the truth-claims — of religion. The social scientist, if he goes beyond ethnology. must make such judgments. He can do so in various ways. My point was that, given a proper ethnology of religion across cultures, the comparativist can hardly, if he is at all clear-headed about his task, accept, at their face value, the claims to Revealed Truth of any of the religions. He simply must reject something which is most crucial to the faithful, to wit their claims

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to Revealed Truth. He could hardly, knowing what he knows, reasonably believe in the uniqueness or finality of Christian revelation or any other revelation and that, if you will, *qua* social scientist.

There is absolutely nothing in my account which commits me to the scientific myth, ascribed to me by Miller, that only science can be objective or impartial. I was rather concerned specifically to deny that status to the claims to Revealed Truth. These arguments are not at all countered by Miller. Neither objectivity nor impartiality implies detachment or forbids the taking of a position and in that sense taking sides. A good judge or a good examiner is objective and impartial, but he must also render judgment and he can and indeed must, to fulfill his function properly, do so impartially and objectively. But he finally takes sides. It is simply a confusion, though a rather widespread one, to believe that objectivity and impartiality imply neutrality.[3] 'An impartial assessment' is not a contradiction in terms.

Miller thinks that a humanist student of religion of my ilk cannot be impartial. Such a humanist will hardly be neutral or detached about the great religions of the world, but it does not follow from this that he cannot be objective and impartial. He may not be, but that is another matter. I may unwittingly have failed to attain the impartiality I seek but there is nothing in the logic of the situation which prevents me from being impartial simply because I have my convictions and am prepared to make certain value judgments and judgments about what it is and what is not rational to believe. A person who denies that there is any Ultimate Truth, revealed or otherwise, which any religion can attain, does not thereby deny that there is truth or else his own claim would be self-refuting. It is Truth with a capital T to which he objects. Moreover, even if he is mistaken in his denial, it does not follow that he has not been impartial and objective. Many things have been reasonably and objectively believed which have later been found to be mistaken. Fallibilism is neither scepticism nor a denial of objectivity, but it is an essential attitudinal set of a scientific temperament and a modern sensitivity which has been schooled by it and the discipline of philosophy. Such an attitudinal set sits poorly with any belief in Revealed Truth. I say, objectively and impartially, though possibly mistakenly, that given what we know now any acceptance of any allegedly 'Revealed Truths' is irrational.

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3 Alan Montefiore (ed.) *Neutrality and Impartiality* (Cambridge University Press).

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IV

On the Early Spiritual Ties Between Ancient India and Antique Greece

Pancho Roussev

Each epoch is a historically fixed part characterized by one socio economic condition and ideological and spiritual trends of development, or another. Upon the arsenal and fertille soil of these conditions and existing tendencies new questions and solutions arise in the spiritual sphere or old ones are changed and updated.

At the same time, these sets of questions and solutions do not represent pure native phenomena, nor do they remain in some isolated episodic state. On the contrary, as a social and epistemological reflection the spiritual phenomena bear a number of lasting elements of the past and sparks of future trends of development.

Neither their continuity nor their further development should be understood as a closed zonal situation, but as a complex process of mutual influence among countries and peoples. The magnitude of these phenomena depends on the value charge which they carry and thanks to which they leave lasting traces not only in their native land, but also exert a considerable influence beyond its borders. This was observed already at the dawn of ancient spiritual culture, as projected in mythology.

1. Having arisen in certain historical conditions, mythology is an imaginary overcoming of the forces of nature and society, an imaginary domination of man over them. In this way these forces

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become 'already modified by people's imagination in an unconsciously artistic way' (Marx).[1]

The mythological presentation of reality is the earliest organized expression of its real presentation in a fantastic way. Nature and society are the objective content of mythology. The objective is not divine, nor the opposite, but only a basis of the divine. The latter is the highest degree of individualized spirituality.

Each mythological definition of the above-mentioned natural and social forces takes on the image of one creature or another, or more exactly, it is the embodiment of some zoological or anthropomorphic species. These embodiments of gods and deities are 'knowing' and 'able' in their divine world. The common mortals treat them with awe as an expression of expected compensation for their own helplessness. That is why the mythological presentation of reality also contains a number of normatives for regulating behaviour.

The earliest projection of the logos in human history as a means of elucidating the causal determination of processes and the structural character of their way of movement, its chief characteristic, as stressed, is the personification perceivable through contemplation. It shows how the gods and deities 'not only stand before us by themselves, but also act upon nature and human happenings' (Hegel). They are a kind of intermediary spiritual individualities between nature and man.

Their suitableness to act and intervene in any situation within the boundaries of their world in accordance with the expectations of the needy testifies to the presence of something common in the divine individualities. At the same time, the personal character of each deity and its own image prove the presence of peculiarities intrinsic to it alone.

The gods and deities, taken as an early manifestation of the logos, are neither an expression of a pure commonness, nor of an abstract peculiarity. They possess a natural and social power and

1 Here we should mention some authors and titles out of the abundant literature on questions of mythology : O. M. Freudenberg, Myth and Literature of Antiquity; Mythology of the Ancient World, edited by V. A. Jacobson, M., 1977; N. A. Kuhn, Old Greek Legends and Myths, S., 1967; A. F. Lossev, Antique Mythology and its Historical Development. M., 1957; S. Radhakrishnan. Indian Philosophy, M., Vol I. 1956; Max Muller, Indien in seiner weltgeschichtlichen Bedeutung. Leipzig 1884; Richard Garbe. Beitrage zur indischen Kulturgeschichte, Berlin, 1903; W. Bender, Mythologie und Metaphysik, 1899; F. Lipps, Mythenbildung und Erkenntnis, 1907; K. Kerenyi. Einfuhrung in das Wesen der Mythologie, 1941; M. Nestle, Vom M. zum Logos. 1942, etc.

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various facets as common determinants, but along with that each god and deity as a constituent whole in its own right and stands in a simple union with itself. As a dialectical combination of the common and the specific, the mythological gods and deities contain charges of philosophical presentiments. It is common knowledge that things can be grasped correctly only when perceived in their profound commonness. But it should not be forgotten that the latter is impossible without and outside the specific.

With the increase of the real dominance of man over the natural and social forces in the process of labour productivity development, the mythological interpretation of these forces begin to disappear. The mythological images as a whole gradually recede to the background, giving way to philosophical principles.

2. In global and historical terms, the appearance, efflorescence and decline of mythology is a movement on the highway of common regularities. But taken concretely for the individual countries in different epochs, a number of specific peculiarities are observed. In turn they are not isolated, but are in one or another form and degree in a state of interaction as a negation and continuity, preservation and development.

The question is not confined to revealing the common lines of movement or development on a socio-historical and ideological and spiritual plane, namely that the first class system for the different zones of the ancient world was the slave system, that mythology was a spiritual prerequisite which assisted the appearance of philosophy by carrying in itself some of its elements, etc. It is necessary to stress the socio economic peculiarities determining the differences in the sphere of spiritual culture, whose values have a relative independence to the point of evoking fascination even when their historical life has long ago become a distant past. It is a question about the lasting, the intransient which they contain, and which is animated in one way or another in the different mythological characters created by the peoples of the ancient world.

The mythological notions of the old East and especially in India are less individualized and have the character of common ideas when compared with those of the Greeks, which are more markedly individualized. While Hegel noticed this difference, he was unable to specify what had conditioned it.

The much earlier emergence and the much slower development of the eastern military-patriarchal form of ownership did not provide that scope of the subjective manifestation which we know to have existed later in faster developing antique Greece. Such a shortcoming as the pale individualization of mythological images in the ancient East (Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva), which was the reason for

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them to acquire the outlines of general notions, eventually becomes a philosophical advantage. Hegel did not fail to notice that precisely for that reason they 'look like philosophical notions, philosophical thoughts'.

The weaker artistic form of individualization in the mythological world of the eastern countries and especially in India, helped it remain there longer and proved a favourable ground for the presence of more philosophical elements in that mythological life. The Bulgarian Indologist K. Kannev rightly points out that, for example, in the Vedas, where apart from religious, idealistic, spiritualistic and mystic teachings, trends and views, there are also many materialistic and atheistic views, conceptions and theories.[2]

The faster development of antique Greece which appeared much later than in the countries of the old East, determined the greater differentiation of social life and the greater activity of the subjective factor. All this reflects in the mythology sphere as a more personified individualization of the images. This in turn hampered the inception of a philosophical life in the heart of mythology in a way we know from the ancient eastern countries and especially from India. That is why the transition of mythological images into philosophical principles in antique Greeee was more radical.[3]

From the avove said it does not follow that Greek mythology does not contain aesthetic, moral, philosophical and other ideas. Like all others, Greek mythology also was a spontaneous artistical attitude of people to reality (natural and social), to their spiritual and corporeal nature. In those times it was the only knowledge which contained all conceivable ideas in its entirety.

3. The rich content of mythology was by far not a chaotic composition, but a unique whole providing an answer as to the substantial basis of the world. This is the main thing, because it was believed that everything emerged out of it. Unlike philosophy, which endeavours to find out the truth in this respect, mythology solved this question in an imaginary, untrue way. In this sense the ancient eastern countries precede antique Greece.

At the same time Soviet historian V. Sergeyev sees one of the reasons for the boom and wealth of Greek mythology, thanks to which it achieved supremacy over all the rest in the fact that 'unlike the ancient East, in Greece the priest caste, endeavoring to unify the ideological images and notions, was less developed '[4]

2 K. Kannev, The First Indian Philosophical Doctrine of Being (Sat-Vada). S., 1976, p. 27.

3 P. Russev, 'Philosophical Notions of Man in Antiquity', S., 1984

4 V. S. Sergeyev, History of Ancient Greece, S., 1950, p. 186.

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As is known, thanks to the more accelerated early division of labour into animal breeding, crop raising, crafts, etc., the disintegration of the primitive communal system in the Aegean region took place much faster, producing a greater wealth of peculiarities and nuances than in the eastern countries. This helped the appearance of relatively more peculiar in geographic and historical terms Aegean zones of the early slave-holding society than in the big eastern countries, where a common patriarchal system of slave ownership in this form of despotism existed.

The faster development of material production in the Aegean-world in the second and especially in the first millennium B.C., expressed in the progress of handicrafts and trade and in the shipping and colonialization connected with them, led to a number of social changes in the situation of the hereditary landed aristocracy and in its old ancestral customs and ways In this way the hegemony of the old clans or the 'nobles' began to weaken by the middle of the first millennium. The merchants and craftsmen began emerging rapidly in the foreground.

The social-economic development of the comparatively independent Aegean zones thus outlined conditioned, on the one hand, the vast abundance and marked distinctness of the Greek mythological images and, on the other, the faster separation of the philosophical germs from mythology and their shaping as an independent direction of thinking.

4. Compared with Egypt, Persia and a number of other ancient countries, India was closest to Greece by the degree of development of mythology and philosophy, which came after it. It is not accidental that scholars like Deussen and Glasenapp call Indian philosophy a sister of the Greek one, and the two philosophies are called Indo European [5]

The presence of common elements characteristic of the ancient eastern and western countries, have led a number of philosophers like Eduard Roth, Gladish and others to the conclusion about a continuity from east to west.[6] Explaining the common on a psychological basis as a certain 'homogeneity of man's ancestral mind', other authors like Ludwig Stein maintain the conception about an independent emergence and development of the religious and philosophical views in the countries of the East and the West.[7]

5 Vgl. Walter Ruben, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Berlin, 1954, S., 23, 24.

6 Vgl Eduard Roth, Geschichte unserer abendlandischen Philosophie, Bd. I, 1846, Bd. II, 1858; Gladisch, Die Religion und die Philosophie in ihrer weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung, Breslau, 1852.

7 Ludwig Stein, Geschichte der Philosophie, Pleton, Munchen, 1921.

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While upholding the thesis of elements of continuity, one cannot say that what happened in India found its repetition in Greece. Not challenging the parallel of development of thinking on a socio-ancestral and individual psychological plane, one must not quite ignore the socio-economic reasons for and the imanently logical line of this development either. Ignoring them would lead to the acceptance of the understanding of a compulsory appearance and development of one and the same mythological and philosophical views among Indians and Greeks, which is not correct.

The parallels between the ancient East and old Greece construed as a succession over a lengthy span of time and continuity are a quite different thing.

It is not a matter of the continuity observed between Roman and Greek philosophy. The powerful influence of the latter on Roman philosophy was not only an ideological and spiritual reflection, but also a simple transfer and pale repetition, accompanied by more or less new tints and elaborations.

For us it is important to stress also that the philosophical problems of the old Greeks were known to the thinkers in the old eastern slave-holding countries much earlier. Friedrich Uberweg recalls some of the references in this respect made by Gladisch: the revival of the consciousness (the world outlook) of the Indians by the Eleats, of the Chinese by the Pythagoreans, of the Persians by Heraclitus, of the Egyptians in Empedocles, of the Israelites in Anaksagor, etc.[8]

Without dwelling in detail upon this thesis, we shall call the similar position of Gomperz[9] who accentuates the achievements of the ancient East, which helped the further development of the philosophic ideas of the old Greeks. It is also emphasized by Paul Deussen in his own way.[10]

The Europocentrism, upheld in recent times by Hegel, Zeller, etc., retreats these days to the rear. This is convincingly proved by many contemporary authors.

Even where the ideological influence of the older slave-holding countries on the thinkers of ancient Greece is doubtless, Hegel aims at its speculative refutation. He does not care about the spreading

8 Vgl. Fr. Uberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Erster Teil. Die Philosophie des Altertums. Berlin, S 5. In Bulgaria this conception is defended by Iv. Georgov (comp Iv. Georgov, History of Philosophy, V.I, S., 1925, p. 312)

9 Theodor Gomperz, Griechische Denker, B and I, Leipzig, 1903, S. 36.

10 Vgl. Paul Deussen, Allgemaine Geschichte der Philosophie mit besonderer Berucksichtigung der Religion. Erster Band, Leipzig, 1907, Zweiter Band, Leipzig, 1911.

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in Greece of such ideas as the immortality of the soul, its transmigration, etc., known to the Egyptians, and upheld later by Pythagoras, Plato, etc.

Engels writes that nearly 300 years B. C. the ancient Jewish letters were also used as numbers. So that this was not a monopoly of the Greeks and especially of the Pythagoreans. It is difficult to say in this case which came first, or which influenced the other.

An Engels states in his study on early Christianity, monotheism had to make concessions to polytheism from times immemorial, beginning with Zend-Avesta (i.e. the 9th century B. C.) in order to become a religion. 'And even Christianity, after replacing the eternally equal to himself Judaic God with the internally differentiated, mystic, triune deity, could remove from the masses the cult of the old gods only by means of the cult of saints... The contemporary bourgeois epoch with its Protestantism is again eliminating the saints and is at last taking the differentiated monotheism seriously,' writes Engels.

5. The important thing about the ancient East, and especially about India and antique Greece as regards mythological notions, is the outlining of the deities' individualities not only as concretized universalities expressing the objective forces, but also as spiritual realities protecting these forces. But both these forces and their divine personifications intended to govern them, are subordinate to the historical power of time. In other words, they have undergone changes. An important role in this respect has been played by social conditions, which are far more changeable in comparison with things in nature. In this case it is a question of transition from the primitive communal order to the slave-holding system.

On the one hand, the gods' individualities reflect the lasting and permanent, mostly as natural in reality and, on the other, the transitory, the changeable contained in it, predominantly as something social.

It is well known from Plutarch that the ancient Egyptian gods Isis and Osiris 'had as their content more natural elements than the corresponding Greek gods'. We already know that with the Greeks the natural was not divine, but a basis for the divine. With the Greeks the divine contained an even bigger human charge.

A movement towards an estrangement from the early abstract natural-spiritual relations and a still more active approach towards the later concretely deified human relations was at hand. This is true on a universally-historical plane from the ancient East towards the ancient Greek mythological notions; it is also true on a concretely-historical plane for each individual country.

The natural element of old retreated to the rear, and the social one came to the fore. So that the enriching human personification

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was by far not a purely formal, but a profoundly meaningful change. Gradually the ancient gods of nature, as Avdiev says,[11] became god-protectors of the state. For example, Indra was originally worshipped as the god of storms, thunders and lightnings, but later he was revered as a protector of the aristocracy, the state and royal power. Zeus the Thunderer also acquired the qualities of a ruler concerned increasingly with ruling over gods and people.

An essential question pertaining to the spiritual ties between ancient India and antique Greece is that about the fire cult. The high respect towards fire as something divine in ancient India existed also with other peoples, and especially later, though in another form, with the ancient Greeks. The cult of the home and celestial fire among the ancient Indians, is met as an expression of reason among the old Greeks. After he stole the fire from Zeus, Prometheus taught the people how to use it and so he pushed forward their cognitive attitude towards reality.

It is the same, though not so clear, with the principles for the supremacy and greatness of Vishnu, Brahma and Indra which were later attributed to Zeus. The same can be said about the principle concerning the participation of the gods in the phenomena of nature and human activities, like it was with the ancient Greeks, well known among the Indians, etc

We treat the appearance of Buddhism In India, which took place at the time of the further economic development in that big country, as having come to life, in order to counter Brahmanism and the caste order, as an early curve in the spiral of development, parallel to Christianity, and as its peculiar predecessor. A number of common elements between them are a proof of this.

Facts proving the continuity from East to West in antiquity can also be found with regard to other countries. In contradiction with himself, Hegel points out at the end of the first volume of his 'Aesthetics' that the Greeks found their gods in all nations and accepted the foreign ones. He even cites the view of Herodotus, according to which the Greek gods were closely linked with the Egyptian ones, etc.

Our concern was the connection between ancient India and antique Greece, its historical line of movement. And it was not accidental that Ionia, which was situated on the Asia Minor coast of the Aegean Sea, was the first philosophical centre of antique Greece — a transition link from the East to the West in the early times of antiquity.

11 V. I. Avdiev, 'History of the Ancient East', L., 1948, p. 503.

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V

Evolution and Involution

G. R Sharma

The present paper is an attempt to analyse the concepts of evolution and involution as employed in philosophical discussions by some Indian thinkers. In their philosophical discussions, Swami Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo and S. Radhakrishnan have made important references to the concept of evolution. The concept of involution has also inevitably come in as a logical corollary in their expositions. Before we take up their discussions we propose to deal briefly with the western scientific conception of evolution as it has developed from time to time.

The manner in which the Darwinian theory of evolution contributed to a materialistic, indeed a mechanistic interpretation of cosmology and of animal or human life, may be noted, to start with. We may begin by giving some references to the writings of C. E. M. Joad first to illustrate the latter (nature of life). He wrote that the essence of biological theory for those who were interested in the root cause of the evolutionary process was the origin of variations. Once these had occured, then the Darwinian postulates of natural selection and the survival of the fittest constituted reasonably adequate explanation of what happened to them, explaining whether they survived or were eliminated in the struggle for existence. The point was: how did they occur ?

Darwin could not tell how or why the variations occured; what he could do, and did, was to emphasise the factors struggle for existence, survival of the fittest and so on. But, even if the origin of variations remained undetected or were to be attributed to chance, it was generally agreed that their appearance had no relation either to the history of the parent or to their value to the offspring. In this context Weisman was believed to have shown that the germinal

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material in which they arise is practically independent of developments in the organism which acts as its host.

De Vire's substitution of sudden and abrupt mutations in place of the gradual accumulation of small variations as the primary factors in the formation of new species, did not materially affect the position.

The only other theory in the field attributed variations to the influence of the external environment. As the environment changes owing to climate or other changes, it produces an effect upon the organism living within it. This effect may be explained as the organism's response to a stimulus, the stimulus consisting in the change in the environment. When the response of the organism is such as to adapt it to the circumstances of the changed environment, it survives and flourishes; if not, it perishes In the former case the variation in respect of which it survives is perpetuated.

"Both views have one important feature in common; in accounting for the formation of new species they both reject the intervention of mind and disclaim the notion of purpose. The appearance of life upon the earth, the evolution of life through an infinite variety of forms, the whole of the process which begins with the amoeba and ends with man is explained not in terms of the operation of some purposive force or spirit, but as the result of the action of purely haphazard external agencies; the dens *ex machina*, in fact, is either chance, or the influence of a physical environment.

"It follows that changes which occur in living organisms never spring from within, but are always imposed from without. In order to account for them we need postulate no spiritual force or purposive will, whether operating within the organism or directing it from outside..."[1]

This leads to a materialist cosmology. We find ourselves in the midst of a universe in which life is of profound unimportance. Life is a chance product of material forces. It appears under certain conditions and disappears when those conditions are no longer present. This materialistic way of thinking was reinforced by geology and astronomy. Geology opened up a long stretch of time dating far back to the past and astromy vastly expanded space. For innumerable ages it was known that the earth had been lifeles; through the limitless expanses of space ours was the only planet upon which life was known to exist. "Thus in the vast immensities of geological time and astronomical space life seemed like a tiny glow, flickering uncertainly for a brief period before its ultimate and certain extinction. Once the earth had been too hot and too moist to maintain life; in course of time it would become too cold and too dry. When

1 C E M. Joad, *Guide to Philosophy*, (1935), p 523.

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this condition was reached, life would finish to pointless journey with as little significance as, in the person of the amoeba, it began it. The existence of spirit was not, therefore, a fact of cosmic significance, a signpost pointing in the fundamental character of the universe to something friendly and vital which underlay its apparent chaos and deadness and with which spirit was continuous; spirit was a chance passenger across a fundamentally hostile environment, in which the alien and the brutal conditional and determined at every point the mental and the vital "[2]

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan had occasion to observe: "The detailed structural affinities between man and the higher apes and the astounding evidence of the blood test prove a close consaguinity between man and anthropoids. The animal character of a man is clearer from the facts of his origin, prenatal development, birth, growth, decline and death. We cannot dismiss these facts as an elaborate jest on the part of Nature simply to pull the legs of biologists. It is fairly certain that we are descended from the apes or their cousins."[3]

In this context the following remarks of Dr. Radhakrishnan are also noteworthy: "The gradual evolution of the human species under the influence of natural forces shows that man is of a piece with the rest of nature. His religious institutions are only the dreams of a being with an ape pedigree. So cautions a thinker as Darwin observed in his *Autobiography* (1887): 'But then arises the doubt, can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions ?' The human mind is a product of the struggle for existence. It is a total making food-seeking instrument which learns the right adjustment by a process of trial and error. Its working is experimental, its devices are utilitarian and its views tentative."[4]

The insignificance of life from the cosmological point of view as brought out by science has also been emphasised by Radhakrishnan. He observed: "What is life in our solar system. It exists on earth and may possibly exist in Venus and Mars and yet its great importance on earth seems to distort our general view of the universe. From the cosmic perspective life is a by product, a minor derail in a large scheme with no definite or direct relations to our hopes and fears. It exists only in our planet and there perhaps only on our planet. Life, which is such a merely local and superficial peculiarity, cannot be the end of the universe, as some of us are inclined to believe."[5] In this context Radhakrishnan gives an appropriate

2 *Ibid*, p. 525.
3 S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*. (1932), p. 28.
4 *Ibid*, p. 31.
5 *Ibid*, pp. 23-24.

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quotation from the writing of Sir James Jeans : "It seems incredible that the universe can have been designed primarily to produce life like our own; had it been so, surely we might have expected to find a better proposition between the magnitude of the mechanism and the amount of the product."[6]

The above quotations bring out ways of thinking which run very much counter to idealistic thought-trends. Such idealism was very prominent in the philosophical tradition of India typified in Vedantic doctrines. Swami Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo and Dr. Radhakrishnan were leading spokesmen of the idealistic Vedantic thought in modern times. Each one of them had of course his own distinctive style of thinking, but to a large extent they also covered a common ground in their philosophical disquisitions. The important point that we have to consider is, how can we reconcile their idealism with the scientific theory of evolution specifically and with the other scientific standpoints generally ? Before we turn our attention to this problem, we may, however, consider some recent philosophical thought-trends among western scholars on the subject of evolution.

First of all, reference may be made to Henri Bergson's *Creative Evolution*. Bergson gave a new and unexpected turn to evolutionist thought. His standpoint was unique, but it had to be viewed against the background that we have broadly indicated above. To recapitulate briefly, the whole thing was conceived as a mechanical process wherein fitness of the organism for the environment was the criterion for survival. "Of mind and its role in evolution, and of purpose as a guiding factor in determining the nature of species, we need take no account. Mechanistic causation which has proved its worth in the realm of Physical Science is adequate for explaining phenomena in the biological sciences too. Such is the attitude of mechanistic biology which Bergson challenged on purely scientific grounds."[7]

In his book *Creative Evolution* Bergson collected examples from all levels of organic life to show that mechanistic explanation of evolution was an utter failure. One important specific point that he made was that if the idea of mechanistic evolution were really valid, evolution would have ceased long ago. "There are many lower organisms perfectly adapted to the environment. 'Why did not life stop wherever it was possible ?' asks Bergson, 'Why has it gone on ? Why indeed, unless it be that there is an impulse, driving it to take even greater risks towards its goal of an ever higher and greater efficiency ?' This impulse, this elan vital, this life urge is postulated

6 Sir James Jeans, *The Mysterious Universe*, (1930), pp. 5 6.

7 *History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western, Volume Two*, (Sponsored by Ministry of Education, Government of India, 1967), p. 356.

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by Berfson as the only possible explanation of all the baffling facts of evolution. This is Bergson's most outstanding contribution to the philosophy of evolution."[8]

In other words, the operative forces in evolution, according to Bergson, is not material factors or ingrediness, as suggested in the mechanistic explanation, but it is life-force itself, and this life-force has to battle hard against matter and overcome its opposition. We have to note the following : "... in creative evolution, we have to take account of the explosive force of the *elan vital* and also of the resistance offered to it by matter. Under the tremendous urge of *elan vital* life grows enormously, but it has to meet and overcome the opposition of matter While the explosive force is under the control of life itself, he resisting matter is not. This latter is alien to life."[9] How is the opposition of matter overcome by life-force ? Life has at its disposal the power of intellect, but a power superior to intellect, according to Bergson, is instinct. And instinct transforms itself into the still higher power of intuition. In plain language this signifies that consciousness operating through 'instinct', or rather 'intuition', fortifies life force with equipments which enable it to resist and overcome matter, and there is consequent discernment (through intuition) of the whole secret of the evolutionary process. We may note the following sum-up of Bergson's position : "... the secret of this great creative adventure can be probed into only by intuition which ordinarily lies dormant in us and requires to be awakened. An unbiased student of evolution placing himself at the heart of the evolutionary process must see for himself that Bergson's characterization of life movement is nearest the truth."[10] It will not be an exaggration to say that Bergson countered the mechanistic concept of evolution and took a most significant step towards a spiritualistic interpretation of evolution.

Next we may refer briefly to C. Lloyd Morgan's theory of emergent evolution. It takes us another step forward, Morgan sought to harmonize naturalistic or mechanical evolutionism with creative evolution. His position in this regard may be characterized as follows : "Evolution advances...under the guidance of two principles : the resultant principle and the emergent principle. The former unfolds what is already there, but is hidden, latent and not yet patent, the latter brings something absolutely new into existence at certain critical stages in the advance of nature. These cannot be predicted before their advent. The emergent cannot be 'predicted from the data afforded at the level below that at which in due course it emerges.' In this way life emerges out of matter and mind out of

8 *Ibid*
9 *Ibid*, p. 358.
10 *Ibid*, p. 359.

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life. Along the line of evolution, therefore, Morgan marks out two critical stages. At the first stage life emerges, and at the second mind..."[11] But the point is not made clear as to why there is this emergence. When we try to find out the why and wherefore about it, we arrive at some sort of spiritual interpretation of evolution. "The fact is that spirit or mind is not only antecedent to matter, is not only the organizer of matter, but matter is merely an organ of spirit."[12]

The concept of evolution has been further elaborated by Western philosophers like Samuel Alexander and B Whitehead. But we need not go in for a more elaborate discussion of scientific or philosophical subtelties in this regard. Our main object is to consider carefully the stand of some Indian philosophers in regard to this concept of evolution. We have to begin by pointing out that this concept was well known to ancient philosophers of India. It is quite explicit in the Samkhya system of thought and it is also discernible in Upanishadic thought.

The Samkhya system is associated with the name of the ancient sage Kapila. The basic contention of Samkhya is that the world evolves out of *Prakriti* through the interplay of *gunas*. *Prakriti* is constituted by three *gunas*—*Sattwa*, *rajas* and *tamas*. *Sattwa* is the quality of serenity or repose. *Rajas* stands for activity or movement. *Tamas* is inertia. When these three are held in equilibrium, there is a static condition. There is no creation, no evolution. The *gunas* now exist as a homogeneous mass. Then *rajas*, the principle of activity, sets the ball rolling! and thereafter starts a competition as it were between the three *gunas*, each trying to dominate over the others. Creation or evolution is now in full swing.

The Samkhya system is based upon a concept of causation which is called *sat karya-vada* According to it, the effect exists in the material cause before it is produced. The effect existed in the cause in an unmanifested form. The former was latent in the latter. Otherwise by no power could the agent produce the effect. Could seed be pressed to produce oil unless it was already present in the seed ? This shows that the effect somehow exists in the cause. If it were not so, any effect could be produced from any cause Further, if the effect be not existent in the cause, then we have to say that when the effect comes into existence, the non-existent comes into existence. That is, something comes out of nothing, which is absurd.

Dr. Radhakrishnan writes : "Prakriti is the fundamental substance out of which the world evolves... Prakriti evolves under the

11 *Ibid* p. 360.
12 *Ibid*, p 361.

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influence of purusa..."[13] The relation between *prakriti* and *purusa* in the Samkhya system is some-what mysterious. The following observations of Radhakrishnan are also noteworthy: "The most perplexing point of Samkhya system is the problem of the relation between *purusa* and *prakriti*. Prakriti evolves a world full of woe and desolation to raise the soul from its slumber. The unrolling of the tragedy of the world is said to be necessary for the self, which remains inactive, though it sees all that is presented to it... The evolution of prakriti implies spiritual agency. But the spiritual centres admitted by Samkhya are incapable of exerting any direct influence on prakriti; the Samkhya says that the mere presence of the purusas excites prakriti to activity and development. Though purusa is not endowed with creative might, prakriti, which produces the manifold universe. is so on account of its union with purusa. Prakriti is blind, but with the guidance of purusa it produces the manifold universe. The union of the two is compared to a lame man of good vision mounted on the shoulders of a blind man of sure foot."[14]

While Radhakrishnan hints at a spiritual agency operating behind the evolutionary process as envisaged in the Samkhya system, Prof. D. P. Chattopadhyaya is inclined to interpret Samkhya evolution in materialistic terms. He writes: "... it needs particularly to be noted that... Primeval matter itself was concieved by the Samkhya to have had all the potential for motion or *rajas* and even of intelligence or *sattwa* Like the five gross elements or *mahabhutas*, the *buddhi ahamkara*, *manas* — in short everything that was concieved as psychical evolved ultimately from nothing but primeval matter itself. Understood from this point of view, the Samkhya contained serious potentials for materialistic philosophy."[15]

We have to note that Swami Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo and S. Radhakrishnan gave idealistic interpretations of evolution. They were no doubt influenced in some measure by Samkhya ideas, but were much more under the spell of Upanishadic idealism. In this connection they connected evolution with involution, which latter they considered to be a logical corollary of the former. We begin with an analysis of Swami Vivekananda's exposition. First, we have to note the following points made by him: "... it has been said in the Vedas, 'Knowing one lump of clay we know the nature of all the clay that is in the universe'.[16] Take up a little plant and study its

13 S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Volume Two, (1962), p. 266.

14 *Ibid*, pp. 287-88.

15 D. P. Chattopadhyaya, *Indian Philosophy*, (1979), p. 111.

16 Reference is to *Chandogya Upanishad* where Svetaketu is given spiritual instruction by his father. VI. I. 4.

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life, and we know the universe as it is. If we know one grain of sand, we understand the secret of the whole universe. Applying this course of reasoning to phenomena, we find, in the first place, that everything is similar at the beginning and end. The mountain comes from the sand, and goes back to the sand; the river comes out of vapour and goes back to vapour; plant life comes from the seed and goes back to the seed; human life comes out of human germs and goes back to human germs. The universe with its stars and planets has come out of a nebulous state and must go back to it. What do we learn from this? That the manifested or the grosser state is the effect and the finer state the cause. Thousands of years ago, it was demonstrated by Kapila, the great father of all philosophy, that destruction means going back to the cause. If this table here is destroyed, it will go back to its cause, to those fine forms and particles which, combined, made this form which we call a table. If a man dies, he will go back to the elements which gave him his body; if this earth dies, it will go back to the elements which gave it form. This is what is called destruction, going back to the cause. Therefore we learn that the effect is the same as the cause, not different. It is only in another form ...

"... Next, we learn that all these forms which we call plants, animals, or men are being repeated *ad infinitum*. rising and falling... Each wave has its hollow, each hollow has its wave The same law must apply to the universe taken as a whole because of its uniformity. This universe must be resolved into its causes; the sun, moon, stars and earth, the body and mind and everything in this universe must return to their finer causes. disappear, be destroyed as it were. But they will live in the causes as fine forms. Out of these fine forms they will emerge again as new earth. suns, moons and stars."[17]

Vivekananda next proceeds to introduce the modern concept of evolution, but he points out that evolution must be supplemented by the parallel concept of involution in order to complete the picture. He goes on to say: "This coming out of the fine and becoming gross, simply changing the arrangements of its parts, as it were. is what in modern times called evolution. This is very true, perfectly true; we see it in our lives. No rational man can possibly quarrel with these evolutionists. But we have to learn one thing more. We have to go one step further. and what is that? That every evolution is preceeded by an involution. The seed is the father of the tree, but another tree was itself the father of the seed. The seed is the fine form out of which the big tree comes, and another big tree was the form which is involved in the seed The whole of this universe was present in the cosmic fine universe. The little cell, which becomes

17 *The Complete Works* of Swami Vivekananda, Volume II, (1968), pp. 205 206.

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afterwards the man, was simply the involved man and becomes evolved as man."[18]

Vivekananda goes further and says: "The whole series of evolution beginning with the lowest manifestation of life and reaching up to the highest, the most perfect man, must have been the involution of something else. The question is: The involution of what? What was involved? God."[19]

But an important question arises. God is nothing if not the very quintessence of intelligence and wisdom. In the evolutionary process, however, intelligence is not found at its early stages: indeed it comes at a very late stage after millions of years when higher animals and man come into existence. If supreme intelligence was already there — involved — why should it be so slow in manifesting itself? Vivekananda squarely faces this question as follows: "This objection of the evolutionists does not hold water, as we shall see by applying our theory. The tree comes out of the seed, goes back to the seed; the beginning and the end are the same. The earth comes out of its cause and returns to it. We know that if we can find the beginning we can find the end. *E converso*, if we find the end we can find the beginning. If that is so, take this whole evolutionary series, from the protoplasm at one end to the perfect man at the other, and this whole series is one life. In the end we find the perfect man, so in the beginning it must have been the same. Therefore, the protoplasm was the involution of the highest intelligence. You may not see it, but that involved intelligence is what is uncoiling itself until it becomes manifested in the most perfect man. This can be mathematically demonstrated. If the law of conversion of energy is true, you cannot get anything out as machine unless you put it in there first. The amount of work that you can get out of an engine is exactly the same as you have put into it in the form of water and coal, neither more nor less ... There cannot be added in the economy of this universe one particle of matter or one foot-pound of force be taken out. If that be the case, what is this intelligence? If it was not present in the protoplasm, it must have come all of a sudden, something coming out of nothing, which is absurd. It therefore follows absolutely that the perfect man, the free man, the God-man ... that man called the 'Christ-man' by the Christians, and the 'Buddha-man' by the Buddhists and the 'Free' by the yogis — that perfect man who is at one end of the chain of evolution was involved in the cell of the protoplasm, which is at the other end of the same."[20]

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18 *Ibid*, pp. 207-208.
19 *Ibid*, p. 208.
20 *Ibid*. pp. 208-209.

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Next we have to note that Sri Aurobindo, the great thinker and mystic, also believed that evolution by itself could not explain the mystery of life and creation: it had to be buttressed and rounded off by the concept of involution. The analysis made by him brings into close agreement with the standpoint and perspective presented and upheld by Vivekananda. He writes : "We speak of the evolution of Life in Matter, the evolution of Mind in Matter; but evolution is a word which merely states the phenomenon without explaining it. For there seems to be no reason why Life should evolve out of material elements or Mind out of living form; unless we accept the Vedantic solution that Life is already involved in Matter and Mind in Life because in essence Matter is a form of veiled Life, Life a form of veiled Consciousness. And then there seems to be little objection to a further step in the series and the admission that mental consciousness may itself be only a form and a veil of higher states which are beyond Mind. In that case, the unconquerable impulse of man towards God, Light, Bliss, Freedom, Immortality presents itself in its right place in the chain as simply the imperative impulse by which Nature is seeking to evolve beyond Mind and appears to be a natural, true and just as the impulse towards Life which she has planted in certain forms of Life. As there, so here, the impulse exists more or less obscurely in her different vessels with an ever-ascending series in the power of its will to be; as there, so here, it is gradually evolving and bound fully to evolve the necessary organs and faculties. As the impulse towards Mind ranges from the more sensitive reactions of Life in the metal and plant up to its full organisation in man, so in man himself there is the same ascending series, the preparation, if nothing more, of a higher and divine life. The animal is a living laboratory in which Nature has, it is said, worked out man. Man himself may well be a thinking and living laboratory in whom and with whose conscious cooperation she wills to work out the superman the God Or, shall we not say, rather, to manifest God ?"[21] The plain implication of all this is that the Superman or God was involved even in the earliest phase and operation of the evolutionary trend and urge; He will become manifest — fully revealed — in the later and culminating phase of evolution as a crowning fulfilment. That is the sure hope and legitimate aspiration of humanity — according to Sri Aurobindo. And all this means, what was involved deeply and secretly becomes evolved openly and unmistakably.

Lastly, we turn to Radhakrishnan's thoughts on the topic under consideration. In the Taittiriya Upanishad, Radhakrishnan points out, the seeker after *Brahman* or Ultimate Reality carries his search through matter, life, mind and intelligence in succession and finally

21 Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, (1951), p 5.

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arrives at spiritual freedom and delight (*ananda*). The progress through different forms of existence or levels of reality — matter, life, mind etc. is suggestive of evolution, but it points to no more mechanistic or materialistic evolution of the type that we discussed at the outset. Radhakrishnan writes: "The evolution of life in the context of matter is produced not by the material principle but by the working of a new life-principle which uses the conditions of matter for the production of life. Life is not the mechanical resultant of the antecedent co-ordination of material forces, but it is what is now called an emergent. There is an element of the incalculable, Life emerges when the material conditions are available, which permit life to organise itself in matter. In this sense, we may say that matter aspires for life, but life is not produced by lifeless particles. So also life may be said to be aspiring for or be instinct with mind, which is ready to emerge when conditions enable it to organise itself in matter. Mind cannot be produced from things without mind. When the necessary mental conditions are prepared, intelligence qualifies the mental living creature. Nature is working according to this fundamental intention, which is being accomplished because it is essentially the instrument of the Supreme Being."

The following observations of Dr. Radhakrishnan are also noteworthy: "There is a purpose working itself out through the ages. It is a view which modern science confirms. By interpreting the fragmentary relics of far remote times, science tells us how this earth in which we live was gradually adapted to be a place where life could develop, how life came and developed through uncounted centuries until animal consciousness arose and this again gradually developed, until apparantly, man with self conscious reason appeared on the scene. The long record of the development of the human race and the great gifts of spiritual men like the Buddha, Socrates, Jesus make out that man has to be transcended by God-man."[22]

Thus Radhakrishnan not only gave a highly spiritualistic version of evolution, but he also claimed that this version was confirmed by science.

Elsewhere Radhakrishnan writes: "Evolution is no explanation. It does not say why the process should have ever occurred, why life should occur at all. Survival of the fittest does not carry us far. Life has little survival value as compared with matter from which it is supposed to have sprung. A rock survives for hundreds of millions of years, while even the oldest tree is only a few thousand years old. If survival was the aim of nature, life would never have prepared. A strict science of biology merely notes the facts that in life we have a different set of phenomena and novelties occur right

22 *Ibid.*

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through, that plants and animals are not fixed, and have evolved or developed from other forms, and that in fact the whole organic kingdom has suffered a gradual evolution, moulded by inner urge and pressure of outer circumstances."[23]

And, Radhakrishnan forcefully emphasises, that at the human level evolution is governed and dominated by the power of spirit in man, not by material forces. At this stage the grand and magnificent vision of emergence of 'Super-man' (a prospect so much emphasised and so earnestly cherished by Sri Aurobindo) looms large before mankind. Radhakrishnan says: "At the human level the secret tendency of man's nature to be a superman is found at work. The destiny of man is to manifest this secret aspiration."[24]

We conclude with the highly optimistic and sagacious observation made by Dr. Radhakrishnan: "The spiritualised man is a new genus of man exhibiting a new quality of life. His self becomes as wide as the world itself, as he feels that the one spirit is present in all minds, lives and bodies. The supermen, the masters of life, enter into conscious possession of this truth and act from it. They represent the eternal norms of humanity."[25] So, we uphold the idealistic, and not the materialistic, view of evolution.

23 S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, (1932), p. 257.
24 *Ibid*, p. 302.
25 *Ibid*, p. 303.

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VI

'The Mystical' In the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

P. K. Roy

> "There are indeed things that cannot be put into words, they *make Themselves* manifest. They are what is Mystical "L. Wittgenstein *TLP* 6522".

In the preface of the *Tractatus Logico — Philosophicus* that represents his early philosophy, Wittgenstein writes :

> "This book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence."[1]

The earlier part of the *TLP* is devoted in expounding the logical nature of such language and its relation to the world. Summarily then, in the words of Fann :

... (1) *Language consists of propositions.*

(2) All propositions can be analysed into elementary propositions and are truth — functions of elementary propositions.

(3) The elementary propositions are immediate combinations of names, which directly refer to objects; and

(4) elementary propositions are logical pictures of *atomic facts*,

(5) which are immediate combinations of objects. Atomic facts combine to form facts of what ever complexity which constitute the world. Thus language is truth — functionally structured and its essential function is to describe the world.

1 Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Tractatus Logico* — Philosophicus London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963 p 3.

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(6) Here we have the limit of language and what amounts to the same, the limit of the world."[2]

He acknowledges his indebtness to frege's works and to Russell's writings for stimulating his thoughts.

The later — part of the *TLP* that is also known as his account of 'the Mystical' throws light on what he means by the 'limits of the world' and by the 'limits of the language' through his attempts to express the inexpressible i e. the propositions of logic, metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics. However. in his later work *The Philosophical Investigations*,[3] he realizes that 'meaning' is not the same as 'naming', the meaning of a word is its *use*; and that there is nothing sublime about the 'forms of logic' (P 189) and the 'forms of fact'. There corresponds a form of language to every form of life (activity) (P 123). Thus we can meaningfully talk about any activity of life. *But* his philosophy seems to be fading into mysticism again. The forms of language are so deep — may be they are 'mystical' (p 111).

This paper is an attempt to discuss Wittgenstein's concept of 'the mystical' as given in the *TLP* Via[4] understanding the connection between the logically perfect language and 'the mystical' to which the logical framework of that language is not supposed to apply: and to review *it* in the light of doctrines of his later view developed in the p. 1

The main thrust of the system is in the direction of providing us with an account of logically perfect language—a language in which sentences mean something quite definite, and also that it provides logical presuppositions of empirical knowledge (asserting or denying facts). Thus the rules of syntax should provide two types of conditions : (a) the conditions for sense rather than non-sense in the combination of symbol, (b) the conditions for uniqueness of meaning or reference in symbols or combination of symbols.[5]

The propositions specifies the syntactical features of the system and provides 'epistemological formalism' of stating only—(not for

2 K T Fann *Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969, p. 2.

3 Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Philosophical Investigation*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968 Herein after cited as *PI*

4 Hacker attaching Zemach argues "... to think that the so called 'mystical' parts of the book are 'a culmination of the work reflecting back on everything that went before'" is very strong claim about the relationship between the 'earlier' and 'mystical' parts of the *TLP*. The relation is neither 'terminus', as claimed by Hacker, because there exists a very *important relation* between the two parts. It is from the earlier parts of the book that Wittgenstein derives his riterion of 'what can be called mystical, and it is to the later parts of the book he applies this criterion. P. 78.

5 L. Wittgenstein, TLP. P. X.

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any metaphysical assertions). This category of logical propositions excludes the other two categories of logical expressions : the Taulogies—the expressions which have the value[1] (true) for any value of their variables; and the contradictions—the expressions which have the value (false) for any value of their variables. For a proposition 'to have a meaning is (a) to show its form' (*TLP* 313), (b) to represent a situation. 'Expressing a formal structure' is accidental one. (because a situation can be represented by one of the various possible aspects of a given fact). This distinction made between 'essential' and 'accidental' features of a proposition seems to be parallel to the distinction made by Aristotle between two kinds of predication,[6] one of which may be called 'synonymous' and the other 'homonymous'. The first is that predication in which both name and the definition of the predicate are predicable of the subject, for example 'man' is predicable of individual man in this sense. This type of predication makes known those attributes of the subject which are proper to it. For Wittgenstein 'form' is predicable to a logical proposition in the sense. The formal structre of the proposition makes 'shown' the essential attributes of a proposition. The second is that in which only the name, but not also the definition, of the predicate is predicable of the subject, for example 'white' is predicable of a body in this way, 'the situation' is represented by a proposition in this sense.

The *terms* used in 'elementary propositions' and 'logical propositions' are 'observational terms' and 'symbolic terms' respectively. In both cases terms function as a name and fulfils the condition of uniqueness — two different elements do not receive the same name. For example, if a universe 'U' contains elements □ and □, these elements will be respresented by marks □ and □ respectively, and designated by the words 'black' and 'white'. Thus it includes the possibility of 'theoretical terms' and 'metaphysical terms' to be the constituent parts of a proposition, because this entitles such terms denote are not the possible constituents of 'state of affairs'. Perhaps Wittgenstein, implicitely assumed the possibility that theoretical terms like 'atoms', 'objects' etc. can derive their empirical and logical (may be partially) meaning by means of certain rules of correspondence, that could relate certain sentences containing the 'theoretical terms' with the sentences containing the 'logical or observation terms because the sentences using such terms are no where refered as 'the mystical', since the sentences; using the metaphysical terms' as 'God', 'will', 'I', 'my world', and the 'ethical terms' like 'ought', 'good', 'bad' etc., don't designate any observable objects or properties, and Wittenstein's system does not provide with any logical postulates these can connect such sentences with

6 Aristotle categoriae. 5, 2a 19-24.

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logical propositions, hence, all such sentences and terms are excluded from the system of talking sense and refered as 'the mystical'.

The propositions do not stand in any 'external relations'. Thus he excludes the possibility of their being an 'objective constituent' in any sentence containing 'propositional verbs' with a subordinate noun 'that' clause in which truth value is not a function of or dependent on the truth — value of subordinate clause. Thus all metaphysical, ethical and aesthetical propositions are excluded from this group of propositions because 'truth — values' are not predicable to the former in the sense they are predicable to the latter. Thus it is legitimate to say that 'A knows that P is the case' because here the truth — value of the whole sentence is determined by the truth value of the objective constituent'. Also, because to say that 'I know it, but I may be wrong' is a logically contradictory statement. But it is illegitimate to say that 'A believes that P is the case' because the use of believe' presupposes the possibility of the objective constituent 'as' possibly not to be the case'. But it cannot be possible in the case of a proposition because the truth-value of a proposition is independent of the propositional verb

The propositions supply the epistemological framework for any system that is to make truth claims about the facts. 'We picture facts to ourselves' *TLP* (21). 'A proposition is a model of reality as we imagin it' (TLP 4.01). 'It represents the facts that objects stand in a determinate relation to one another (TLP 2031—2032) "Propositions can represent only 'how things stand'" (*TLP* 3.211). All these quotes show that a proposition is a form of representation. In other words, it provide us with a formal structure for interpreting the experience in such a way that knowledge statements becomes possible. 'The simultaneous presence of two colours at two different places in a visual field of a person' is an epistemological assertain because it expresses logical possibility, in other words, it could be represented by the logical form of consistency. On the other hand 'the simultaneous presence of two colours of a person' at the same — place in a visual-field' is not an epistemological assertion because it expresses logical impossibility. 'Contradictions' lack sense because they don't refer to any fact.

The possibility of making truth claims about the facts, presupposes the possibility of relating propositions with the observation language. How can propositions tell us *this* is not the same colour as *that* or that 'this' and 'that' refer to different points in the given space. Wittgenstein has given an answer to this question. In order to be able to say 'This point' or 'that point' I must first know when a point is refered to as 'this' or 'that' (TLP 4063).

One could object: if propositions specify 'what it is to be an object of experience', how can the account of the applicability of the

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propositions be other than circular? The objection seems acceptable. If there is a system by means of which we understand facts we cannot be said to know *via* that system anything at all about the facts to which it applies. Wittgenstein himself insists that we can have no independent knowledge of facts — about their existence and structure (TLP 6.124). That is 'the mystical'.

Thus we can say: *'The Mystical' is the same as 'that which cannot be* subsumed under the concept of a proposition'. From it follows that it include the whole of logic and philosophy. The validity of Wittgenstein's arguments in Favour of this thesis has to be judged It seems appropriate here, first to quote his direct statements about 'The Mystical':

M1 "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. they *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical" (*TLP* 65223)

M2 "It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it... exists" (TLP 644)

M3 "To view the world sub specie acterni is to view it as a whole — a limited whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole — it is this that is mystical" (TLP 645).

There are many more statements, refering to religion, ethics, art, the realm of personal. concerning with 'what cannot be said', to which I shall be referring to in the following parts of the paper.

'The logical form' as 'The Mystical' is not represented in a proposition but can only be *shown* or mirrored in the expressions of that proposition. (TLP 4121) Wittgenstein here is arguing that 'The language of logic' is the same as 'the language of forms' (TLP 6.1224), whatever can be said about 'the language of forms' cannot be said interms of the language of forms. It can merely be *shown* in the structure of that language. 'Shown' used in this sense *needs to be distinguished* from 'shown' used for mirroring 'what cannot be spoken of '— that is *assumed to be given*, e.g. by Fann[7], in the world beyond the world of facts. If we say 'God shows itself; values shows themselves; self shows itself' we could mean that God, values and self show themselves through certain 'feeling expressions'. Thus 'feelings' would not 'show' themselves through 'feeling expressions' the same way as the 'forms would express themselves through 'formal expressions'.

Retreat to the point: The logical forms' merely 'show' themselves through the formal structure. Let us see what arguments Wittgenstein puts forward to prove that they are 'mystical' in this sense. Referring to the attempts made to explain the 'concept proper', with the help of the higher level concept—formal concepts',

7 K. T. Fann Op. Cite. P. 24.

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Wittgenstein argues that "when something *falls under* a formal concept as one of its objects, this cannot be expressed by means of a proposition. Instead it is shown in the very sign for the object" (TLP 4126). Most probably he is attacking Frege's idea, let us see what Fregc has to say about the "expressing of the relation—falling under' " :

> "— 1 is a number less by 1 than a number whose square is equal to its double. This expresses the fact that—1 falls under a concept."[8]

The careful analysis can show that what Frege is saying, does not contradict with what Wittgenstein has said about the inexpressibility of a formal concept by means of a proposition because : (a) the formal concept here is expressed in a language, other than the language of forms. In other words, formal concept is not represented by a proposition. (b) Admitting that Frege makes such a distinction between properties as :

> "Some are properties of the expressions for concepts and the expressions for objects, and some are properties of concepts and objects themselves."[9]

Then what Frege is trying to express by that formal concept is not the properties of the expression of the object (—1) but the properties of the object (– 1). The problem for Wittgenstein is that he does not make such a distinction. the distinction that seems to be a valid one. For example, let us table the following two expressions :

1 (3—2) = 1
2 (4—3) = 1

now in one sense (in the sense of the properties of the object 1) both express the same thing. But in another sense (in the sense of the properties and of the expression of object 1) both express different expressions Wittgenstein and Frege won't contradict on this point.

Wittgenstein has one more point to prove his thesis that 'the logical form' is 'the mystical'. Formal concepts cannot be represented by means of a function, as concepts proper can :

> ',For let us suppose that the function F (fx) could be its own argument : in that case there would be a proposition 'F (f (fx)', in which the outer function F and the inner function F must have different meaning, since the inner one has the form (fx) and the outer one has the form (θ(fx). Only the letter 'F' is common to the two functions, letter by itself signifies nothing" (*TLP* 3 333).

Wittgenstein is trying to show that ' ' is not representing 'θ'. and both ' ' and 'θ' are equal level concepts with distinct meanings.

8 G. Frege, *Philosophical Writings*. Trans. P. Geach and M. Black. Oxford : Basil Blackwell. P. 30.

9 J D. B. Walker *A Study of Frege*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, P. 20

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Frege would say that the equal levelled functions can again be divided into first-level and second-level ones.[10] We can say that this relation of 'higher' to lower' is merely the relation of 'outer to inner'. Hence it proves Wittgenstein's point each concepts represents itself through its own form.

In M2, Wittgenstein argues that to say 'The world exists' is mystical (1) 'world' is not a name of a simple element, therefore, cannot refer to or signify any fact (state of affairs). 'World' taken as a complex term, in order to be meaningful, must signify, via other (simple) signs—the sinns those serve to define it (the *TLP* 3261). 'World' in this sense is not defineable, because it has no parts. So we fail to give meaning to 'world' in the statement 'The world exists' since 'world' does not signify anything, 'exists' is not predicable to it because 'existence' is predicable only to those signs which express the possibility of becoming the constituents of a proposition (TLP 2012). Secondly, it is logically impossible to move from 'how' statements i.e. to the statements about 'observable properties' and 'relations', to 'that statements i.e. to the concluding statements expressing the existence of objects which are supposedly in the capacity of producing 'the state of affairs'. For example: from a conditional like "for any X, if X is copper and is heated, then X would expand" we can never deduce any existential statement like 'there is' X and 'X' is copper, etc. actually, Wittgenstein is questioning the move here, because its seems mystical to him. This form of phenomenalism has its historical roots in the writings of Berkeley, Hume and J.S. Mill. Earnst Mach; Kare Pearson, Bertrand Russel (in one phase of his development). P. W. Bridgman, and Herbert Dingle also belong to this group. Let us see what Pearson says speaking on sense impressions:

> "Of what is beyond them, of things — in themselves——— we can know but one characteristic —— (the) capacity of producing sense — impressions. There is no *necessity*, now there is want *of logic* in the statement that behind sense-impressions there are things-in themselves' producing sense impressions".[11]

A. J. Ayer in his Language, Logic and Truth defends the same thesis. In M3, Wittgenstein argues that in the language of logic we cannot say "the world is a limited whole" or "the world has this in it, and this, but not that" (*TLP* 561) because this statement is an answer to an *external question* — the type of question with which logic can't deal, how can it test the validity of answer to such questions logic can answer only *internal questions*[12] which fall within

10 G Frege, op. cite P. 40.

11 K. Pearson *Grammer and Science*. London: Everyman, 1937. pp 60 62.

12 R. Carnap *Meaning and Necessity*. Chicago University of Chicage, 1956 pp. 206 207.

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its own framework. Hence such statements are mystical. I can say 'I feel that the world is a limited whole'. This again is mystical because this statement expresses a dyadic relation — the relation between the 'subjective constituent' and an 'objective constituent' consisting of an entity named by noun 'that' clause. This relation is not explainable in terms of propositions.

'My World' is mystical (the TLP 562). Interpreting 'my'[13] as a tie — world in the sense of belonging, and 'belonging' as a case of imagining: I can say 'my world is the world *as I imagine* it', contrary to the world that is the objective reality and represents itself in propositions. Then further question could be asked: 'what sense of 'imagining' this relation of imagining' could precisely have? can it have one of the three senses Annis Flew distingushes:

> "—— One in which (the context makes clear that) the word used to report the occurance of mental imagery; second in which 'imagined' is used as substantially equivalent to 'thought'; and a third in which imagine 'is used as substantially equivalent to suppose'."[14]

Wittgenstein cannot use 'imagining' in the sense of 'thought', because 'what we can think, falls in the given universe of discourse. (the *TLP* 561). Neither can he use it in the sense of 'suppose', because 'suppose P taken in the sense of 'propositional entertainment' can be transformed into 'logical possibility that P'. The 'logical possibility that P' also falls with in the linguistic frame work. 'Imagining' seems to be used in the sense of 'reporting of the occurances of mental imagery'. Hence 'my world' cannot be represented in the language of logic.

In another statement 'I am my world' he seems to identify 'I' with 'my world' so his argument could be put as following: "'I' = 'My world'" "My world" = 'mental — occurances'". Thus 'I' is reducible to mere, 'mental-occurances' so there is no such thing as thinking 'I' (the TLP 5631). He is attacking Descartes, in the manner of Hume, Kant and Ryle. He seems to be still wondering about 'I' as a metaphysical subject. 'I' does not signify in the sense, a simple sign does because it "shrinks to a point without extension" but "there remains a reality co-ordinated with it" (TLP 564) like Ryle.[15] Wittgenstein rejects the belief 'I' or 'mind' denote an entity but there is a difference in their approach. Ryle asserts dogmatically that the 'mind' does not denote a separate entity: where as Wittgenstein's claim is that if 'mind' or 'I' denote a non physical entity, we don't know it. It is the mystical.

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13 J King Farlaw "Mine and the family of Human Imaginings" *Inquiry* Vol 12 p. 226.

14 Ibid., p. 229.

15 G. Ryle *Concept of mind.* London: Hutchinson's 1955, p. 51.

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"Values" can't be spoken of because they do not belong to the domain of what can be spoken of, and 'value judgments' can't be formed because no logical framework is provided for such propositions. *But* in ethical arguments, such *moves are made*, for example, a move from ethical law of the form "Thou shalt ....." to the factual statements like "..... is doing" or to the act of doing (*TLP* 6422) Wittgenstein seems to be attacking the deductive approach to ethics. Assuming that Wittgenstein implicitely used the intermediate of a particular fact stating premise, we can say that his attack is directed towards the type of logical argument (practical inference) given by Aristotle :

> "When the two premises are combined, just as in theoretical reasoning the mind is compelled to affirm the resulting conclusion, so in the case of practical premise you are forced at once to do it.[16]

He has given a full example of a practical syllogism in the third chapter of the seventh book of *Ethica Nicomachea*. The two premises are "All sweet things ought to be tasted" and "that thing is sweet" then, instead of stating the conclusion in words—"that thing ought to be tasted". Aristotle goes on to say that you are bound, if able and not prevented, to taste the things immediately. So, for Aristotle, the conclusion of practical syllogism is an *action*. By questioning the move from 'action' or 'fact statement' to 'value statement'. Thus seems to be attacking the inductive approach to ethics. It is the same problem that Hume recognised :

> "... of the last consequence. For this *ought or ought not*, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconcervable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it."[17]

This is what Kant has to say about this :

> "Where as, so far as nature is concerned, experience supplies the rules and is the source of truth, in respect of the moral laws it is, also the mother of illusion. Nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what *out to be* from *what is done*...."[18] What Wittgenstein, with Hume, Kant and many others, seems to be suggesting is to restrain from forcing value arguments into the inadequate moulds of logical propositions.

'Value terms' like 'good', 'bad' 'happiness' 'unhappiness' signify properties of different kind i.e. non-descriptive, therefore cannot be

16 Quoted from the Leob classical Library translation by H. Rackham.

17 David Hume, A. Treatise on Human Nature. Selby-Vigge edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958. III—I—I.

18 I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. Norman Kemp Smith, Trans. B 375.

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related or identified with the terms signifying descriptive properties. By doing so, we shall be committing in the terms of G.E. Moore, a naturalistic fallacy. Wittgenstein would not assert or deny such position but would simply say that the relation seems mystical Wittgenstein takes three statement about God and tries to prove, by applying his criterion, that they are all mystical.

1 God reveals himself in the world. 'God' is not 'factuality' or 'the formal structure of the facts or propositions'. If it were, it could have 'shown' itself the same way as 'forms' can show themselves. Therefore, God does not reveal himself in the world (TLP 6432) It refutes Zemach's argument that God is 'factuality'.[19]

2 God as the cause of the logical world. (TLP 3031) Wittgenstein argues that the relation between the logical and 'something that can be spoken of 'and the relation between the illogical' and 'something that cannot be spoken of' is apprehensible and expressible but the relation of God being the cause of the logical properties of the world is not expressible, hence 'mystical' (*TLP* 3032).

3 Laws of God are inviolable (TLP 6.372) If we say that by 'acknowledged terminus' he means 'the limits of our language' then surely he is taking the terminus. We cannot say anything about such a statement.

He seems to be puzzled "The facts all contribute only to settling the problem not to its solution" (*TLP* 6.4321). At this point if an atheist, like Marcel[20] argues "if the fact God is transcendent means that the usual standards of correctness and rigour derived from science and mathematics—does not apply to it." But to what? Reply me Mr? Wittgenstein would reply," that is what, I don't know that is what, about which I can say nothing—that is "the mystical". Wittgenstein speaks more like an agnostic.

He deals with the other metaphysical problems about 'meaning of life' 'death', will etc. by applying the same criterion.

It has been argued that has not Wittgenstein himself said for too much when he used words like 'God', 'will' 'the meaning of life', 'the Mystical' etc. Is not it inconsistent with the aim of the *TLP* 'what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence' (TLP 7). But he has also said, one understands this (whatever he has said about God, will etc.) properly only if one perceives that it was not really possible to express all this in the given language. The real understanding of his approach has resulted in stimulating the quest (even in him as expressed in the *PI*) for new way of conceiving language and its relation with the world and men. *The later Wittgenstein* realizes that the sentences do not get their meaning

19 E Zemach, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of the Mystical" *Review of* Metaphysics, Vol 18, 1964 — P. Ai.

20 G. Marcel, "Philosophical Atheism," *International Philosophical Quarterly*. Vol. (Dec. 62) pp. 501-514,

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essentially in one way, namely through "pecturing", but there are countless kinds of uses of "symbols", "words" and "sentences" (PI 23) Any language does not essentially have the clear and firm structure of the formulae in a logical calculus. There are various forms of language. The language is used not just for one purpose, the stating of facts—on the contrary forms and uses of language are inexhaustibly flexible and various; a language is not a game, but like a whole family of games. "To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (PI 19).

The comparing of the last lines of the preceding paragraph with the lines : "It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have *something*—a form in common with it" from the *TLP* (2022), shows that his basic thesis about, there being something common between 'the forms of life' and 'the forms of language' remains unchanged in his later work. In both works—The TLP (4022, 313) and the *PI* (512), the 'imagining of form' is determined by the forms of logic and the forms of facts. These "forms" are given appriori. The truth value of propositions is determined a posteriori. On the contrary in the *PI*, Wittgenstein *seems to have discovered*, through analytical approach to the language of philosophy, that the forms of language are arrived at through agreement (PI 246)—on agreement that has to be consistent with the given form of life (*PI* P. 226) this given could be conventional or natural or both.

How could this latter discovery be relevent to his concept of 'the Mystical'. There is no direct statement in the *PI*, about 'the Mystical'? But we may say that the 'discovered parts of the universe of 'the mystical of the *TLP*', are 'no more parts of 'the mystical' of the *PI*. Hence 'the mystical' in the *PI* is that, that cannot he subsumed under any form of language (with a corresponding form of life).

In conclusion of this paper, I may say that in the *TLP*, there is one universe (U), consisting of two universes i.e. the 'U', (the logical) and 'Ui' the 'Uii' (the mystical), The 'Ui' consists of totality of facts (propositions' and 'state of affairs), and the 'Uii' consists of 'the inexpressible. Hence 'the logical' and 'the mystical' stand in relation of exclusion, that is a symmetrical relation. This relation can be symbolically expressed as : if we let 'E' stand for 'excludes' 'L' for the 'logical' and 'M' for 'the mystical', then we can say—E (ML) DE (LM), In the *PI*, there are a number of universes i.e. 'U'... Un. : each consists of a certain form of language with a corresponding form of life. Thus we may infer that 'the mystical' stand as a dyadic relative term—E.g. If 'Ui' is mystical to 'Uii', then 'Uii' is mystical to 'Ui' : If 'Uii', is mystical to 'Uiii' then 'Uiii' is mystical to 'Uii' and so on. Apart from this discovered universe (Ui...un), there is an *undiscovered universe* (XI...xn). This undiscovered universe may be called 'The mystical' outstanding relation of exclusion to the discovered universe. This undiscovered universe' is still a mystry. It is not describable because its form of life and the corresponding form of language is *not yet discovered* But it is a *possibility*, that can be actualized with further *discoveries*.

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VII

The Class-System of Plato and the Bhagavad Gita : A Study

D. R. Bhandari

Class is one of the significant Phenomena in a social organisation. Every social set up is, in one way or the other, based on class-system. The study of a social set up of a particular period necessitates the examination of its class-system. Nevertheless, the study of a class-system remains incomplete if the "individual" is not given due consideration, for, the individual is the 'core' of a society, and, moreover, classes are composed of individuals.

If we try to study the concept of class-system in the perspective of the Gita as well as Plato, we see that where as the Bhagavad Gita throws a flash on the then prevalent and later on highly influencing class system, Plato too builds his ideal society on the very basis of the class-system which variegatedly left its imprint on the sociological concepts and analysis of coming living system. To bring out the similarities and dissimilarities after a thorough study of the deliberation of both these schools of thought is the subject of this attempt.

First of all we take cognizance of Plato's concept of class-system. His is a system based on one of the economic considerations which is the division of labour. Three main elements of human psychic—Appetite, spirit and Reason — activate the formation of respective classes in a social organization. They spur human beings to form the fabrication of a three class society; appetite to producers or artisans, spirit to warriors or auxiliaries, and reason to rulers or Philosopher-kings. As B. Jowett elaborates Plato's concept in an analysis of The Republic :

> "And now, at last, we have reached firm ground, and are able to infer that the virtues of the state and of the individual are the same. For wisdom and courage and justice in the State

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are severally the wisdom and courage and justice in the individuals who form the State. Each of the three classes will do the work of its own class in the State, and each part in the individual soul; reason, the superior, and passion, the inferior, will be harmonized by the influence of music and gymnastic. The counsellor and warrior, the head and the arm, will act together in the turn of Man soul, and keep the desire in proper subjection. The courage of warrior is that quality which preserves a right opinion about dangers inspite of pleasures and pains. The wisdom of the counsellor is that small part of the soul which has authority and reason. The virtue of temperance is the friendship of the ruling and the subject principles, both in the State and in the individual"[1].

Further, E. Barker vehemently affirms the same idea, "To the tripartite soul will correspond a three class polity; to the rule of reason will correspond a system of communism and the rule of philosopher-kings. Government will become a philosophic autocracy, to which the economic and military classes, of the State will be subordinate, as appetite and spirit are subordinate to the rational part of the mind."[2]

Plato believes that a man's profession is decided by his natural inclination which is inturn motivated by his inherent psychic trait. The pressing force of this factor guides an individual mind to select a particular profession or job. In this way all the three classes of producers, warriors and philosopher-kings are developed on the basis of functional specialization. The concept of Plato is based on the following assumptions :

1 Heredity forces the thinking of an individual mind to remain in the same class.

2 All men are not naturally equal in respect of their capacity.

An individual of one class does not generally enter into another class and so likes to remain in his parent class to which he belongs by birth. Plato also points out an exception that an individual who possesses extra ordinary qualities other than that of his own parent class should be given an opportunity to show his worth. If he shows a commendable performance the individual must be accepted in the other class. Plato expresses this principle in the form of a myth, 'the myth of metals' :

"And God proclaims .....that if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of a brass or iron, than nature requires a transposition of ranks; and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards his child because he has to descend in the scale to become an husbandman or a artisan, just as there may be others sprung from the artisan class who are raised to honour, and become guardians and auxiliaries."[3]

1 B. Jowett, '*The Republic*', 441-42 (Analysis).
2 Ernest Barker, "*Greek Political Theory*", p. 173.
3 B. Jowett, '*The Republic*', 415-C.

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Nature, in plato's views, has made men not only different in respect of their capacities for various accomplishments, it has made them unequal in respect of their capacities to attain virtue. This being so, it is clearly disastrous not only to the state to place an inferior man in a position for which Nature has not qualified him, it is ruinous for the welfare of the inferior man also.

Let us now study the concept of class-system propounded by the Gita. The Gita too, divides social classes on the basis of 'Specialisation'. The four-fold order (Chāturvanya) of the Gita reveals that the Brahmanas are those who are related to the profession of imparting education. The Kshatriyas are responsible for providing protection and to rule over their subjects. The Vaishyas are engaged in trade and commerce. And the Sudras perform miscellaneous patty services to the community. The Gita believes that the division of classes is always exactly in accordance with man's character and aptitude. The Gita distinguishes that an individual who has potentialities to serve other professions which are not parental may avail of these opportunities and thus enter into the other profession. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan also emphasises upon this concept of the Gita: "'One becomes a Brahmana by his deeds not by his family or birth, even a Chāndāla is a Brahmana if he is of pure character'. Some of the great Rishis worshiped by the Brahmanas are half-caste and hybrid. Vasishtha was born of a prostitute, Vyasa of a fisher-woman, Parasara of a Chāndāla girl. Thus conduct counts and not birth."[4]

Again the Gita speaks: "Because, O Partha: taking Shelter in me, Women, Vaisyas, Sudras, and others born in a sinful class (such as lowest classes etc.) obtain the highest state... . ..."[5] Manu also supports this idea when he says that caste is a question of character.

II

Thus, after considering the essentials of both Plato and the Gita, we discern that both these theories have their moorings in the concept of "Specialization". Further, all the classes performing their respective functions decidedly form various strata of society and hence establish the superiority of one class over the other in the hierarchy of a social set up. Plato and the Gita both give importance to the first two classes; Plato to the Philosopher-king and auxiliaries, and the Gita to the Brahmanas and Kshatriyas. Plato's Philosopher-king has political power and the auxiliaries (warriors) are to assist him. The Kshatriya of the Gita "warior-ruler" has the political power, and the Brahmanas are advisors to him.

Plato speaks little for the third class of producers which is motivated by appetite. The author of the Gita does speak about

4 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, "*The Hindu view of Life*" p. 121.
5 Tilak, B G., "*Gita Rahasya*" (1936) IX, 32, p. 1059.

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the third class of Vaishyas but he gives lesser importance to it in Chaturvarnyas, and the fourth class, the Sudras, is given the least importance. This class is like slaves devoid of any political right, socially degraded and economically dependent upon all the higher classes. The Sudras have much duties but no rights. In the Platonic society we do not find this class as such, but Plato sometimes speaks about slaves. He never recognises this segment as a separate class in his ideal society but he states that we can enslave the barbarians who attack our ideal community and they would be deprived of any social or political right.

Exception apart, both these schools of thought advocate that a man engaged in one profession does not generally enter into another profession. But both contend that an individual who possesses the requisite qualities to enter into a better or higher class should be allowed admittance there, and, if found successful to serve within that class, the individual must than be accepted in that class by the society. If we do not accept exceptional abilities of an individual and remain rigid, it will cause dissatisfaction in the individual and thus destroy his otherwise blooming abilities. This may sometimes lead to unnatural conflicts in society.

> "The three classes of Plato's society and the four-fold order of the Bhagavad Gita imply a social pyramid at the top of which stands the man of purity or reason. The other can mount to the top of the social pyramid. There is no bar to this ascent, except lack of aspiration and of the will to become. Its path cuts across all the natural and artificial barriers created by heredity, tradition and social environment."[6]

Agreeing upon the theory of specialisation both show dissimlarities in other quarters of class-system. While Plato divides society into three main parts, the class system in the Gita comprises of four divisions. Plato offers two different classes — the ruler and the soldier — charged with entirely two different functional occupations. The ruler is to rule and the soldier to protect and provide security to society as well as state. On the other hand, the Gita Advocates that it is prerogative of the ruling class itself to provide security to society and state. For, according to Gita what is a ruler who only rules but can not protect. The Gita calls this class of rulers cum soldiers the 'Kshatriyas'. While Plato believes that the ruler is a philosopher and not a soldier and so is not functional as a ruler-soldier, for, he is a philosopher-king only; the Gita on the other hand arms the rulers as a complete soldier (Kshatriya) also. Says thus the Gita, a soldier has all the rights not only to fight and protect but also to rule. The Brahman in the Gita performs the philosopher in society which Plato attributes to the king. The Brahaman, except

6 K. M. Munshi, "*Bhagavad Gita and Modern Life*", p 64.

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this function in society, remains aloof from the rest according to the Gita.

The class which performs the function of teaching is not clearly described in the writings of plato. He remains indistinct when it comes to the question as to which class should we ascertain the function of teaching. Plato leaves it on a philosopher-king to see in to this problem as to whom this assignment should be attributed, but he does not allow a separate identity for teaching class as such. On the other hand, The Gita very distinctly offers an altogether separate class of Brahman which should devote itself in imparting teaching. The Gita requires this class to be highly learned and devoutly immersed in the waters of erudition. The Gita regards the Brahmana not only as a teacher or advisor but as a spiritual mentor also who has an inherent right to perform this function by birth.

III

Certain conditions of individual life right since the primitive age upto the modern one must have fed the class-system with the phenomenon of functional specialisation as a working force underneath. Moreover, it was the principle of the division of labour which served as a firm basis behind specialisation. Socio-economic conditions and development of a social order depend upon the ability and attitude of an individual. This thought acted as a governing factor in both Plato as well as the Gita. Both aver that the proficiency of an individual depends upon the fact that he is given a task only according to his attitude and competence. Only thus an individual will bring about better results than when his aptitude is assigned inversely.

To which Plato calls the aptitude or inclination of an individual, the Gita gives it the name of 'Svadharma' of an individual. To elabrate it further, it means natural propensity, disposition or innate nature of a man inspired of which he works. Thus speaks Lord Krishna in the Gita :

> "Thus I get a complete picture of my truth. Every one is tied down to the task which his individual nature dictates. My nature bids me to undertake a task. My task is ordained by my nature; it is my 'Svakarma', self task. To perform it as my nature induces me is my duty, being the law of my 'Svadharma'. The pursuit of that law is the pursuit of my Truth. To stake my life on this pursuit is the highest achievement."[7]

According to Plato when an individual finds his self task according to his aptitude and qualifications, "Justice" prevails in society or an equilibrium of harmony is maintained. This state of individual

7 K M Munshi, "*Bhagavad Gita and Modern Life*" Part II, Chapter III. p. 52-53.

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satisfaction and communal harmony in society is the state of "Dharma" according to the Gita. Then every individual and every class of society as a whole will perform his best and to the satisfaction of every requirement. Ideal societies are possible only in so far as each of their individual member exhibits self-restraint towards his fellows and refrains from doing or getting all that he has not the ability to do or the power to get.

In the end, we may say in the light of both Plato and the Gita that a society can perform its all functions perfectly and upto the expectation of all standards where each and every class works according to its specialisation without interferring into the performances of others. Somehow, Plato's concept of society has never been actualized in its total form but it had influence over almost all the social set ups. Whereas the Gita gives us a well knit theory which is based on the then prevalent social living practices and so it has been the way of life particularly of Indian society for centuries to come. Psychologically the class-system propounded by both the Gita as well as Plato has its reflections even in the most modern societies too.

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VIII

Impact of Gandhian Philosophy on Rural Development

Rama Mitra

1. INTRODUCTION

Seventy five percent of the Indian population live in villages. If one wants to see India to develop in real sense then its villages have to be developed. Gandhiji realised this situation and he rightly remarked in 1936 that "If the villages perish, India will perish too". The real Indian character is actually preserved in villages. Before political 'renaissance' in the Indian arena the socio-economic structure of the villages did not change much since the Mahabharat period. From different accounts we find that in ancient India the villages which were known as 'Janapada', were highly developed and the village people used to participate in their local affairs without any external interferences even by the state. The state was responsible for the protection and safeguard of the rights of the individual, and in turn, the state used to get the taxes. All these informations one can find in the accounts of Megasthenes, Fahiyans and Huensung etc.

The villages were neatly woven under the sovereignty. Naturally, each individual of the village had to practice the social norms of tolerance, truthfulness and non-violence. All their activities were governed by the ethical teaching of Gita or other religious enacts, which had the deep root of Indian Philosophy of detachment. Gandhiji realised this fact and his philosophy of rural development was based on these principles.

After the foreign invasion, when there was Muslim rule then there was a crisis in Indian administration and the villages were isolated from the mainstream. The foreign rulers were able to

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change the administrative structure but the rural structure remained as it were. Although the institution of self-government by the villages were uprooted by the foreign invadors, yet they used to survive in the localised way under the patronage of local landlords or leaders. Still they were able to deal with their own problems locally. Under the early British rule they did not have grip over the rural society. The rural society was exploited and tortured by the indigo planters with the help of local stooges. The real dissatisfaction among the rural people was prevalent due to exploitation of rural people and lack of co ordination between the administration and the people. There was no developmental work in these areas, consequently the people were unwilling to pay taxes.

On the advice of Lord Rippon, the recommendation of Royal Commission on Decentralisation was implemented through Indian Council Act of 1909, in which the Act made the provision of village Panchayat on electoral system, which would act as unit of local self-government. The village panchayat would look after their affairs and pay taxes through Taluka and Tehsil. This Act did not satisfy the people and hence the act became non-operative.

In 1919, another Indian Council Act i.e. Montague-Chemsford Reform Act was passed in which village panchayat was made state subject instead of central and was under the supervision of popular Minister. But due to lack of finance and under dyarchy administrative system this remained only in files.

In 1935 according to Provincial Autonomy the popular government was established. The Minister took much interest to establish Gram Panchayat but due to the resignation of Provincial Government, this work was stopped.

2 Gandhian Philosophy on Rural Development

Gandhiji, the father of Indian National Movement recognised the role and potentiality of Indian villages and he always remained by the side of the rural masses whenever they were oppressed by the British ruler, the indigo planters or otherwise Gandhiji had widely toured and acquainted himself with the problems of villages. He recognised the virtues and evils of the village community and propounded this philosophy of non exploitive, non-violent and survodaya samaj to safeguard the rural population, Gandhiji's philosophy was towards self-reliance and self sufficiency Gandhiji not only advocated his theory but he himself practised it. He used to procure all his necessities by his own efforts and not depending on external agencies. One of his article in 'Harijan Sevak' on 30 6-1938, he expressed his ideas stating that when each of the seven lakhs Indian villages became prosperous democratic republic, there would be no illiteracy, no unemployment and every body would get nutritious

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food and decent airy houses and sufficient clothing to cover oneself. Every villager would follow the civic rules. The villagers would be self suficient and procure their own needs. Gandhiji strongly believed that when Panchayati Raj came into play then the public opinion could do anything and everything. With these ideas, Gandhiji wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru in October 1946 'I am convinced the people ..... to live in the villages'. Thus Gandhiji insisted to incorporate the villages as the basis unit of reconstructing Indian societies to much annoyance of the veterans of the constituent assembly like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Sri Ambedkar. Intervening the constituent assembly debate, the main architect of the constitution Sri Ambedkar argued for the acceptance of Individual as a unit of society and planning as against villages which he referred as den of ignorance and illiteracy, a habitat which perpetuate both physical and mental ill health.

2.1 Directive Principles of State Policy

However, after much debate, the Indian constitution in its article no. 40 incorporated the Directive Principles of State Policy in which it directs the state to establish village panchayat on the basis of Gandhian Philosophy.

According to the article, the new sovereign constitution has alotted the rural development under local self government to the state list. In Indian constitution, the directive principles of state policy stated — 'State shall take steps to organise village panchayat to endow them to function as units of self government'.[1]

Since the inception of new constitution of 1950 special attention had been drawn towards rural development as more than 3/4th of the Indian population live in rural areas.

2 2 Post Development Programme (1950-57)

After independence in 1947, the modified rural development scheme known as 'Janapada' scheme was adopted as experimental basis by the Central Provinces Legislative Assembly by its enactment of Berar local government act, 1948 and for its economic side local Finance Enquiry Committee was set up in 1949.

The Janapada scheme of central Provinces was an innovation and it had an essence of rural local government which was later on incorporated by Balwantraj Mehta Committee.

In the year 1952 the community development programme launched under Indo-U. S. Technical co-operation programme. The goal of the Community Development Programme was

(i) To increase substantially the agricultural production of the country, improved national communication system, health, hygiene and education in the villages, and

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(ii) To generate and direct a process of integrated social and economic and cultural changes with the ultimate aim of transforming socio-economic life of the villages.[2]

It was planned to cover the whole rural areas of the country under the scheme at different phases. But as the planning was from the top so it did not cater the needs of the rural people, and within three to four years it lost its momentum. It was noticed that the community programme, instead of being peoples programme with government assistance was becoming more and more government's programme and it failed miserably.

2.3 Balwantrai Mehta Committee

In order to have significant participation of rural people, the national development council constituted a committee on a rural development under the chairmanship of Sri Balwantrai Mehta in 1957.

The Mehta team recommended setting up of a 3-tier(Three-Tier) system of elected and organically linked democratic bodies namely Gram Panchayat on village level, Panchayat Samity on block level and Zila Parishad on District Level. This was accepted by the national Development Council in 1958. The scheme was known as Panchayati Raj Scheme.

The scheme ensures the participation of rural masses with the interest of their own developmental programme. The principles as laid down by Mehta team was more or less accepted by all over the country for implementation of the scheme of democratic decentralisation. The Panchayati Raj Scheme was very near to Gandhiji's concept of democratic decentralisation on rural development.

2.4 Achievements

Since the inception of Panchayati Raj scheme it appears that there was positive all round development. There was distinct improvement which can be cited as :—

(i) gross production of food grains have increased from 55 million tons in 1951 to 108.9 million tons in 1980. The yield per acre for some of food crops had increased 20%[3].

(ii) In order to have self sufficiency of clothings, khadi product got boosting. The union government formed the khadi and village industry commission in 1952. The average earning of a weaver increased to Rs 2000/- in 1978-79 in comparison to Rs. 300/- in the year 1973 74.

(iii) Dairy industry was developed on Gandhian orientation. The Dairy co-operatives were constituted. It uses modern methods to increase the production of milk which is being supplied to the urban community. The Dairy industry helps the rural employment and also increases the income. The National Dairy Development Board launched the operative Food-I programme in the year 1970 to cover the whole country.

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(iv) In the field of education, primary education has been made compulsory below the age of 15 year. Gandhiji believed that right type of education was essential for building and maintaining the society of his dreams[4]. So he formulated a new type of education known as Nai talim (Basic education). This Nai talim is the corner stone of Gandhiji's socio-political edifice. It should be mentioned that in recent years in the primary education the concept of Gandhi has not been accommodated.

To remove the mass illiteracy, the government of India launched a programme of adult education in the year 1978 Though it is claimed that there is a wide coverage under the scheme yet its result has to be seen.

It is to be noted that literacy level was 30% in the year 1961 which improved to 41% in 1981[5]. That means 59% people were illiterate after 35 years of independence — a very poor performance in this field of education indeed.

3 Rural Development Schemes — Under 20 Point Programme

Under 20 point programme the following four important schemes are being taken seriously for rural development. In these schemes the financial burden is shared equally by the state and the centre (i.e. 50% — 50% share). The Government of India adopted the following four important schemes on rural development :—

(i) Integrated rural development programme (IRDP)[6]

To remove the prevailing poverty, unemployment of the rural masses, the government has undertaken the programme of IRDP to help financially some of the families who are below the poverty line. All the blocks have been taken under its purview. It is intended that all villages under the poverty line will be covered phase wise under the scheme The marginal farmer, village craftsmen, landless labourers, schedule caste and schedule tribes who are below the poverty line are covered under the scheme.

In Bihar 58% blocks came under the scheme in the year 1982-84. 600 families below the poverty line will be benefitted per year under this scheme In the year 1983 84, 4, 30, 245 families were benefitted out of which 114679 were of scheduled caste and 61245 were of schedule tribes.

(ii) National Rural Employment Programme (NREP)

The objective of the scheme is to provide employment to the unemployed villagers which will create permanent asset of the community. This, in turn, will develop rural economy. Under the scheme the construction of wells, digging of community tanks, construction of roads, construction of schools and panchyat buildings, minor itrigation etc. are undertaken.

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(iii) Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP)

Under this scheme such areas are taken which are prone to drought. In these areas minor irrigation, land conservation, forestation and development of animal husbandry and farming are developed.

(iv) Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP)

This scheme was introduced on the 15th August, 1983 by the then Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. This scheme gives a guarantee of employment of one member of each family of the villages. Atleast one member of the family of landless villagers would be employed for hundred days in a year.

4 Discussion

From the above study it has been seen that the rural development programme would get support of the rural masses only when the democratic decentralisation became operative.

The concept of decentralisation is inherent among rurul masses as was rightly recognised by Gandhiji. The contemporary great Indian thinker like Sri Aurobindo also emphasized on the rural Institution of villages as the carrier of the Indian cultural tradition which can offer the leadership for the Indian political renaissance. In 1908 Grudev Tagore also felt the same spirit as Aurobindo and Gandhi and he took up the rural developmental work in eight villages in Kaligram Parganas in west Bengal. Later he founded the Santiniketan in 1921 with a view to bring about an alround transformation of village life. Although the constitution of India incorporated Gandhiji's philosophy of rural development and formulated article 40 of Indian constitution as mentioned in text, yet, the process of democratic decentralisation was effective to some extent only after implementation of Balwantrai Mehta Report.

A cursory view of the 5th plan in India reveals that during the first to three five year plans, the relative emphasis gradually shifted from decentralised to centralise planning and from the 4th plan onwards the same trend could be observed but in a reverse direction i.e. from centralisation to decentralisation.[7]

However, inspite the implementation of five year plans the village institution could hardly grow as desired by Gandhiji. The villages were lacking self sufficiency, hygiene, communication and employment for which there is a continuous influx of rural population to the urban areas creating urban problem like slums etc. This will be evident from the official records which show that the rural population 93% in the year 1919, 82 7 percent in 1951 76% in 1981[8].

It should be mentioned that many other non-official voluntary organisations under the guidance of Jayprakash Narayan, Acharya

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Binoba Bhave and other Sarbodaya leaders who tried to bring a fundamental change in rural structure, keeping in view the ideal panchayati Raj envisaged on the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi, could hardly get success due to lack of consciousness amongst the rural mass.

Gandhiji's conception of ideal social model is that of Ramrajya. Gandhiji defined Ramrajya as 'sovereignty of the people based on moral authority[9]. Ramrajya is hard to achieve as ethical and moral values are gradually receeding under the impact of modern material cultural (i. e. scientific culture) even in the rural masses. Consequently the corruption is creeping in all walks of rural life. Unless until the moral values are restored among the rural masses, the panchayati Raj is bound to collapse like house of cards. Gandhiji's dream of Ramrajya will remain as his dream.

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IX

The Concept of Liberation in Sankhya Yoga

Aruna Goal

The concept of liberation is the greatest original contribution of Indian philosophy to the global philosophical thought. This can ensure freedom from all pains and sufferings visible in this world. Today, the progress in science and technology has brought humanity to a stage which it has never witnessed before. It has reached that point where the possibility of its annihilation cannot be ruled out. The root cause of this calamity lies in our ignoring the spiritual values. The materialistic out-look, which invariably carries with it the wordly pains, is dominating the world. A turn towards spiritualism is the greatest need of our age. It is only spiritualism which can save the suffering humanity. Other attempts to remove pains as such are as futile as an attempt to attain oil from the sand particles.

The ultimate aim of all the systems of Indian philosophy is to show us the means for the attainment of liberation to ensure beautiful life in this world and after that. That is why a philosophical system in India is called moksa-sastra. the science of liberation. Moksa has been rightly called by Dr. S. N. Dass Gupta "the pivot on which all the systems of Indian philosophy revolve"[1]. Professor Hiriyanna writes, "The conception of moksa marks a definite advance in the search for the ideal in Indian thought and the step which India took in this is unique in the whole history of human thought"[2]

The term moksa or mukti has been derived from the root Moksa or Muchha respectively, which means 'to be free from'. Thus the

1 Dr. S. N Dass Gupta : Yoga Philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian thought, p. 316

2 Prof. M. M. Hiriyanna : The Quest after Perfection, p. 70.

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inherent meaning of moksa is to be free from the circuit of birth and death, and consequently from all kinds of wordly desires and attachments and ultimately to pains. Lord Buddha says "Painful is the birth again and again".[3]

All the systems of Indian philosophy are in consonance when they hold that the liberation of soul consists in knowing the Reality beyond the phenomenal world. Each system represents a particular stand point from which this reality is viewed. T. R. V. Murti writes, "Each philosophical system embodies and emphasises a valuable view of reality; its fallacy, however, lies in its extremism, obstruction from other aspects"[4]. Shri N. V. Thadani also writes, "they are all but different points of view from which we can survey the great problem of life. Life is too large to be seen from one angle and so the ancients conceived the idea of examining it from six different points of view".[5]

However, we shall concentrate here on the conception of moksa according to Sankhya Yoga. Really speaking, Sankhya and Yoga are not two different systems of philosophy. They jointly form one system of philosophy, known as Sankhya yoga. The relation of Sankhya and yoga is that of theory and practice. Sankhya provides the theory of reality, the nature of liberation etc; and the yoga depicts the path for the realisation of the ultimate reality. Thus, both jointly form one system known as Sankhya-yoga.

The ultimate goal of this system like all other systems of Indian philosophy is also to be free from bondages which degenerate into all sorts of sufferings. These sufferings are of three kinds :—

1 Adhyatmika—those pains which are caused by the psychological nature of man, such as, the disorders of mind, body etc.
2 Adhibhautika—those pains which are the result of the manipulation caused by the external world, such as. men, beasts and other external elements of nature.
3 Adhidaivika—these are the pains generated by the super natural agencies, such as, the pains caused by the planets etc.

The bondage, according to Sankhya, is caused by ignorance or wrong knowledge. It is failing to discrimination between Purusa and Prakrti. The Purusa is reflected in the intellect (Buddhi), and wrongly identifies itself with its own reflection. When this wrong identification disappears by right knowledge, the Purusa is absolutely isolated from Prakrti and her evolutes. This is the state of liberation which is also named isolation (Kaivalya).

Now, the question arises that what is the nature of this right knowledge ? How can this help in separating Purusa and Prakrti :—

3 Dhammapada., p. 153.
4 Prof. T. R. V. Murti : Central Philosophy. p. 126.
5 Shri N. V. Thadani : Introducing to Mimamsa, p. 15.

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It is through d scriminative knowledge which is not of the nature of 'I am not', 'Naught is mine' and 'not I'[6] 'I am not' does not mean that I (Purusa) am non existent. What it really means is that I am not now what I presumed myself to be under the delusion during the state of bondage. During the state of bondage I forgot myself completely, and identified myself with Prakrti and her evolutes.[7] Through discriminative knowledge, now, I found that I am neither Prakrti, nor any of her evolutes. Now I have attained the knowledge of myself as distinct from Prakrti. 'Naught is mine' does not mean that I have no content, that I am a bare undifferentiated unity. It really means that my present contents are entirely different in kind from those which I thought myself to have during the state of bondage.[8] Those contents are not mine which I had in the state of bondage. 'Not I' does not mean that I am now extinct or dead. What it really means is that I am no longer a selfish egoist, my particular individuality has been completely transformed into the universal personality. My deluded and confined self—the self under bondage—is now dead, and what now lives is the delivered and free self.[9] So, what is denied is not the true selfhood, but only the selfish individuality.

When the Purusa gets the discriminative knowledge, it comes to know that it was liberated. The task of Prakrti, which Sankhya believes is the liberation of Purusa, is done for the particular Purusa, and she ceases to function for that particular Purusa[10]. The Purusa thinks that 'she has been seen by me' and loses all interests in her evolution. 'I have been seen' thinks Prakrti and ceases to act for particular Purusa; and though the connection between the Purusa and Prakrti is still there, there is no motive further[11]. Prakrti is so shy that she never appears before the Purusa who has seen her[12]. Just as a dancing girl retires from the stage after entertaining the audience, Prakrti retires after the liberation of that particular purusa[13]

According to Sankhya, liberation is the state of consciousness devoid of bliss. The obvious reason of this difference is that, according to Sankhya, bliss is a product of Sattve Guna, a constituent of Prakrti. So it cannot be granted to Purusa in the state of Kaivalya, which is a complete isolation from Prakrti and her evolutes.

6 Sankhya-Karika 64.
7 A. K. Mazumdar: Personality, page 117.
8 Ibid page 117.
9 Ibid, page 117.
10 Sankhya Karika-65.
11 Sankhya-Karika 66.
12 Ibid, 61.
13 Ibid, 59.

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Sankhya believes in the conception of Jivanmukti and Videhamukti both is liberation while embodied, and also liberation after being disembodied. After the realization of discriminative knowledge, the Purusa remains embodied for a while to exhaust the prarabdha karma, just like the wheel of a potter revolves for a while, due to previous momentum, even after the potter ceases to move it. At this stage, though the Purusa is embodied, it loses all interests in the body. So, the actions done by the body in this state do not bind the Purusa[14] when the prarabdha karmas are exhausted by experiencing, the Purusa gives up the body and attains eternal absolute isolation[15]. It is isolated from prakrti and her evolutes. The released Purusa also perceives Prakrti but now it is no longer deluded by her. "Bondage, migration and release are ascribed to Purusa in the same manner as defeat and victory are attributed to a king, though actually occuring to his soldiers. It is Prakrti which binds herself and it is Prakrti which releases herself."[16]

Now, the question arises that what are the means to attain isolation according to Sankhya Yoga Like Buddhism and Jainism, Sankhya holds that Vedic rites involve the violation of moral principle, viz the law of Ahimsa. When we perform a sacrifice, we kill animals for our benefit. The rituals can lead us only to heaven, from where one has to return when his merits are exhausted. Thus, Vedic rituals are not helpful for the attainment of Kaivalya[17]. Actions, good and evil, can lead us to heaven and hell, but not to liberation. Sankhya does not believe dogmatically in the existence of God and according to this system, devotion to God does not help in the attainment of Kaivalya. The cause of bondage is ignorance, and ignorance can be removed by knowledge alone. It is discriminative knowledge—knowledge of duality that I am purusa and that is prakrti. The practice of astanga-yoga is helpful for the dawn of discriminative knowledge according to Sankhya, but according to Yoga, it is an indispensable means for the attainment of discriminative knowledge.

Before we estimate Sankhya Yoga conception of Kaivalya, let us have the comparative glimpse on this topic by other systems of Indian philosophy.

The approach of the Nyaya Vaisesika to the problem of liberation is purely realistic. According to this system, our every day experience shows that all pleasures are mixed with pains which follow them immediately. No pleasure is unmixed. So, according to Nyaya-Vaisesika the state of liberation is not a state of bliss.

14 Ibid, 67.
15 Ibid, 68
16 Sankhya Karika-63.
17 Ibid, 2

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Liberation as a blissful state brings two difficulties, viz. pain will follow the bliss. hence it cannot be called liberation; and secondly, it would require some sense organs to experience the bliss. So they reject all sorts of experiences in the state of liberation. It is simply the cessation of the-circuit of rebirth and consequent pains, and nothing more. Thus, the Nyaya-Vaisesika grants only existence to the soul in the State of liberation. The soul is devoid of consciousness and bliss It is unconscious, indifferent pure existence like a stone.

According to Sankara-Vedanta, the Brahman is Saccidananda (Existence, consciousness and bliss), The Jiva in its ultimate analysis is not different from Brahman. So the essence of it consists in existence, consciousness and bliss. According to Vedanta, our bondage consists in not knowing that the world and the souls are non-different from Brahman Liberation consists in removal of this ignorance in knowing that "All is Brahman". So the liberation according to Sankar-Vedanta also is neither merely negative State (cessation of the Circuit of rebirth and consequent freedom from all kinds of pains as it is for Nyaya Vaisesika), nor it is only a State of consciousness devoid of bliss as it is for Sankhya. It is a state in which the souls enjoy omniscience, omnipresence and bliss with Brahman. There are many sruti passages which declare that the very nature of soul is existence, consciousness and bliss. The soul in the state of liberation simply realises its true nature. So the liberation is the experience full of consciousness and bliss.

A critical estimate of Sankhya Yoga concept of Kaivalya reveals that Sankhya Yoga initiates the task where Nyaya-Vaisesika left it. In addition to Nyaya Vaisesika conception of Liberation as merely cessation of all kinds of pains, Sankhya believes that it is a state of consciousness, but it cannot enjoy bliss; because the bliss is the result of Sattva guna which is a constituent of Prakrti. So, it cannot be ascribed to Purusa. The error at the root of this belief is that the Sankhya mixes the bliss with empirical pleasures. Wordly happiness may be a product of Sattva guna which is a constituent of Prakrti, but this is not true about the bliss enjoyed by the liberated soul. It is not an accidental quality. It is the very nature of soul. Moreover, there are many Sruti passages which emphasize that the liberated soul enjoys bliss. Thus the Sankhya view that Purusa does not enjoy bliss in the state of Kaivalya is not upheld by Sruti as well.

We think that liberation is, negatively, freedom from all kinds of pains and the cessation of the cycle of rebirth; and positively, it is to realise oneself as non-different from the Saccidananda-Brahman. In this context Sankhya yoga, for which the liberated is only conscious, represents the second stage in the development of the conception of liberation The first stage is represented by Nyaya-vaisesika, according to which the soul only exists devoid of consciousness and bliss. The highest stage is represented by Sankar-Vedanta, according to which the soul realises itself as non-different from Saccidananda Brahman.

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X

Persons and Roles

Koyeli Ghosh-Dastidar

My aim in this paper is to consider the distinction often drawn between an individual as a person and the individual as a role-player. Can an individual be a person apart from all the roles he plays, or is it rather the case that a person's behaviour always has both 'personal' and 'role' elements interwoven in it ?

In the Western philosophical tradition a person is considered to be one who is capable of the autonomous exercise of his own reason in practical as well as in theoretical contexts. To be a person is to be capable of deciding for oneself and of acting in accordance with one's own decisions. A person is thus considered to be one who is capable of governing his conduct by rules; indeed, in so far as the concept of person becomes linked, as it did with Kant, with an essentially universalistic conception of morality, to be a person is to be capable (at least potentially) of guiding oneself by adopting rules that are valid for all men.

Various strands and sub strands are intertwined in the modern Western concept of person. Overall, this concept seems to have two main strands — the 'moral' and the 'metaphysical' intertwined in it.[1] This way of distinguishing between them may seem in modern times to be traceable back to Locke[2] (although Locke did not mention the distinction as such) The metaphysical strand in the notion of a person, roughly speaking, is that of a being capable of exercising his

1 D. Dennett, 'Conditions of Personhood' in A. Rorty, *ed.*, *The Identities of Persons* (University of California Press, Los Angeles 1976). p 176.

2 'Person', according to Locke, 'is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of a law, happiness and misery.' *Essays* (George Bell & Sons, London, 1908), Book II, Chap. XXVII, p. 480

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or her reason. The moral strand is the notion of a person as a being who is accountable, who has rights and responsibilities. The distinctive endowment of being a person in the 'moral' sense is to be self-determining, to be capable of making self-conscious choice, of deciding 'for oneself' and of being ready to live through the consequences of one's own decisions.

An important aspect of treating an individual as a person means treating him not as a mere set of roles. Respecting an individual as a person means, so it is said,[3] drawing a distinction between considering him solely under this or that title and considering him as *one who has* that title. To respect an individual as a person means judging him not by the criterion of technical success or social status but by what he is apart from this or that role that he is expected to play. Respecting a person as a person does not mean excluding a person's role-performance but seeing him as a person distinct from his role-performance.

The topic of role is, of course, a vast area in socio-anthropological discussions, and it is not possible to discuss all its aspects within the scope of this paper. The issues that concern us here are those that have a bearing on the distinction between role-playing and being a person as such. The concept of role refers not to any concrete, unique individual, but to an individual considered as a 'bundle' or qualities that he is required to demonstrate in various tasks. That which the role-player is expected to contribute to society is constant, while the individual who plays the role himself may vary; the role is only a part that he, one individual or another, is expected to play. The concept of role is thus basically a 'type' or a class concept: the idea of a type that an individual is expected to exhibit is central to the concept of role.[4] The concept of role, however, has certain characteristics by which it is distinguished from the concept of class, the latter being broader than the former. The concept of role always refers to behaviour or differential behaviour, and thus to what Nadel calls 'achievement' properties, that is to say, dispositional properties considered as responses to normative demands. In this respect, the role concept differs from the class concept, which can refer both to achievement properties and to 'contingent' properties or to properties over which the individual has no control, like inherited physiological characteristics, personality traits etc. The role concept may, indeed, refer to 'contingent' properties, but only in so far as they are conjoined with behavioural

3 B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', Laslett & Runciman, *ed*, *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, 2nd Series (Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 1962) p. 115.

4 S. F. Nadel, *The Theory of Social Structure* (Cohen & West, London. 1962) p. 20.

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properties. The second characteristic that distinguishes the role concept from the class concept is that the kind of behaviour denoted by the role concept is always behaviour both in regard to others and in regard to how others behave towards the role player. A third distinguishing feature of the concept of role is that is always refers to 'purposive' and 'constant' behaviour. The kind of behaviour that is characteristic of a certain role-player is something that other role-players can reckon with and on the basis of which they themselves will act purposively. Acting in response to the behaviour of others can be a characteristic of class concept as well. (The example Nadel mentions is that of a boxer, who acts in accordance with his knowledge of the strength of his opponent.) What is peculiar to the role concept is that the conformity it demands is basically a *normative* conformity in the sense that the behaviour of the role-player is determined by what are recognised as social norms. 'Role' is thus basically a normative concept.[5]

As a normative concept, 'role' has also been distinguished from 'role performance' or 'role-enactment' which is the way a particular individual acts when he is carrying out his duty. Another concept often used in discussions about role is 'commitment'.[6] An individual becomes committed to his role when he is forced to pursue a particular course of action (or to refrain from pursuing a different one) because of the institutional arrangements relating to his role. Distinct from 'role-commitment' is 'role-attachment', which, as Goffman points out, refers to the desire and expectation, on the part of the role-playing individual, to see himself in terms of role-performance. Although in many cases of role-performance, commitment and attachment may go together, in many other cases they may not. Role-performance, in many cases, may take place with detachment, shame or resentment.

So far I have been discussing various concepts used in role analysis concepts which it is necessary to explain in order to understand the distinction between a person *qua* person and a person as a role-player. There is another concept, namely, the concept of 'role-distance'[7] which brings us to the heart of the distinction between a person *qua* person and a person as a role player. Role distance is a kind of stepping back from the role that a person is playing, a sort of creation of a gap between the person himself and his role. A role, as has been pointed out earlier, is a *type* concept A role is a 'typification' of performances, and the individual performing a

5 R. Harre & P. F Secord, *The Explanation of Social Behaviour* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1972), p. 133 4.

6 E. Goffman, 'Role distance', *Where the action is* (Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 1969), p. 42.

7 Ibid p. 61.

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role is considered to be variable in the sense that a role will continue to be the same role, which ever individual, competent to do the expected task, performs the role. Roles are thus, in a sense, independent of the individual performances and their accompanying variations. The possibility of role-distance arises when an individual performing a role reflects on his role-performance. An individual places himself at a distance from his role, when he, conscious of himself as a performer of this role, ceases to identify himself with the role he is playing. What the individual is doing here is not to deny the role he is expected to play but to detach himself from his role.

Let us now take a closer look at the distinction between an individual *qua* person and an individual as a role-player. While most thinkers of the socio anthropological tradition tend to accuse philosophers of the modern liberal tradition of paying negligible attention to social factors of morality, and of considering a person as what he is apart from his relation to his roles, the latter, on the other hand, tend to accuse the former of eliminating the *person* by identifying him with his roles. But however sharp the differences between the two traditions might seem to be on the surface, basically they do not seem to part from each other on this issue. What I shall try to show how is that the idea that a person apart from a role is an abstraction just as is a role apart from a person, is absent neither in the socio-anthropological thoughts nor in the individualistic thoughts of the modern liberal tradition. In his essay 'A Category of the Human Mind'[8] Mauss has shown how the modern concept of person has gradually developed through many centuries. The word 'person' was derived from the Latin word *persona* which originally meant a mask through which the sound of the actors' voices used to come out. Later it came to mean a role in drama (*dramatis persona*) and then a social role. The individuals, for the Romans, was then, more than a name or the right to a role: he was a *person* in the eyes of the Law. A significant addition to the Roman notion of person was made when the Stoics introduced the notion of the individual as a moral agent. Later still, the notion of a person was greatly enriched by the Christian emphasis on a person as a bearer of rights in the moral community. The history of the development of the concept of person suggests that in its traditional use, there was no sharp antithesis between an individual *qua* person and an individual as a role-player.

Another point to which attention has been drawn in the literature is the way in which the concept of role has been gradually

8 M. Mauss, *Sociology and Psychology* (transl. B. Brewster, Routledge, London, 1979)

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picked out in the course of philosophical developments.[9] The concept of person itself can be seen as a role concept, as the gradual development of the concept of man as one who has a particular role to play, namely, the role of human being as such. This is what is supposed to have taken place in Greek ethical thought. A person was seen as one who had this or that particular role to play. But he was also seen as one who had to play the role of human being as such. This may be seen as the distinction between person *versus* role and person *as* a role. To the Greek moralists the significance of someone, say a doctor, was supposed to lie in his function of being a particular role-player, namely, the doctor, and his virtue in his being a 'good doctor'. The concept of function was extended when questions were asked not only about someone's being a good doctor or a good farmer and so on, but also about someone's being a good man. A good man was considered to be one who carried out well the function of being a human being, one who 'lived well'. The scope of the concept of role remains restricted so long as normative questions revolve around the differentiation of duties that an individual has to carry out as a member of society. The scope is broadened when normative questions are raised about the individual as such This passing from one question to another has not been abrupt but gradual.

Every role performance has what may be called both personal and impersonal aspects. A role-performance refers to a situation where 'role' stands for the impersonal aspect and 'performance' stands for the personal aspect. There can be a personal element even in a highly impersonal relation and an impersonal element even in a highly personal relation. Performances of the same role can create different impressions on an observer corresponding to the different personalities of the different performers. So also, not every action in a situation of personal relations is done with a personal touch of warmth or out of personal considerations. What a role-performance shows is not a rigid separation between the personal and the impersonal elements but a constant interplay between them, the 'role' influencing the 'person' and the 'person' influencing the 'role'.

In the concluding remarks of his essay 'Role distance', Goffman has expressed his opposition to the tendency to divide individual conduct into what he calls the 'sacred personal' part and the 'profane social' part. But although Goffman dislikes a rigid division of individual conduct into the personal and the social, he takes care to add that if a person wants to show what he is *qua* person, he is likely to do it by placing himself at a distance from his role. An individual, Goffman says, manifests role distance because he is a multiple role-player. He has many commitments and attachments to a number of roles. Many studies in role analysis, Goffman says, assume that once one starts studying a particular person in a particular sphere, that person will always be preoccupied with a main

9 D Emmet, *Rules, Roles and Relations* (Macmillan, London, 1966) p. 179.

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role. But this sort of preoccupation with a central role, Goffman says, is quite rare: in most cases one hardly finds an individual sticking firmly to a single role. Thus although, Goffman's studies seem to suggest that there is no 'person' in addition to role playing, he does not seem to have completely erased the image of a 'person' moving from one role performance' to another. This point has been emphasized by A. Macintyre[10] in his critique of what he calls the 'democratised self'. This modern self is supposed to be one who can stand back from any situation in which one is involved. Macintyre mentions Sartre as one of the leading exponents of this modern view of the democratised self'. For Sartre, the identification of the self with its roles is a central error. Sartre explains this point with the famous example of the cafe waiter.[11] The cafe-waiter cannot be immediately a cafe-waiter in the sense that an 'inkwell is an inkwell' or a 'glass is a glass'. The person, for Sartre, can never *be* the role-player; he can only play *at being* the role player, can imagine to himself that he is so. The cafe-waiter *is* in a sense a cafe-waiter, that is to say, in the sense that he is not something else, say, a doctor or a lawyer. But to behave as if he were nothing but a cafe-waiter, is to act in 'bad faith'.

Macintyre's comparative study of Sartre and Goffman suggests that however different the approaches of Sartre and Goffman might be, with Sartre seeing the identification of the person with his roles as an act of 'bad faith', and Goffman merging the person into his role-playing, they have much in common. Goffman's studies, as pointed out earlier, still contain traces of a 'person' flitting from one role-performance to another. In the case of Sartre, on the other hand, the 'for itself', considered however distinctly from its roles, is nevertheless seen as a set of perpetually open possibilities. However autonomous the 'for itself' is, it always finds itself in one situation or another. The world where the 'for-itself' finds itself engaged is an 'already meaningful world'. The 'for itself', says Sartre, can exist only as engaged in the 'in-itself'. The 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself' are abstractions. The fundamental reality is being-in-the-world.

Sartre's attack against the identification of a person with his roles has been criticised by D. Emmet[12] as a failure to see that it is possible to carry on role-performance seriously without immersing the 'person' in his 'role'. Emmet argues that Sartre is not right in saying that society demands that a grocer limit himself to his function as a grocer.[13] 'Society', in general, she says, is an abstrac-

10 A. Macintyre, *After Virtue*, (Duckworth, London, 1981) p. 31.

11 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (transl. Hazel E. Barnes, Methuen, London, 1969) p. 59.

12 D. Emmet, op. cit. p. 154.

13 The behaviour of the cafe waiter, Sartre says, appears to us as a game. 'The game is a kind of marking out and investigation... .....This obligation is not different from that which is imposed on all tradesmen.....The public demands of them that they realize it as a ceremony; there is the dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they endeavour to pursuade their clientele that they are nothing but a grocer, an auctioneer, a tailor.' *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit. p. 59.

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tion. A grocer does not appear *qua* grocer to all people at all times. He is a grocer to those who play the role of costomers, whereas to some others he might be something different, say, a member of a family, a friend or a fellow member of a church, council and so on. Sartre, Emmet points out, seems to think that there is only one role with which a person can identify himself, whereas in fact a person can play *different* roles and can have correspondingly different obligations to carry out. Emmet is right in pointing out that the individual who plays the grocer can indeed be a multiple role-player, but she seems to have overlooked the point that the grocer *qua* grocer cannot be a multiple role-player, and that in this respect it is perfectly possible to maintain that a society demands that a grocer *qua* grocer limit himself to his function as a grocer.

What is remarkable about the controversy about persons and roles that we have discussed so far is that both sides, the socio-anthropological tradition and the liberal individualistic tradition, seem to show themselves as having not much difference from each other. Both traditions seem to agree in their own ways, that a person is distinct from his roles, although a person apart from his roles or roles apart from a person are abstractions. 'Personal morality' and 'role morality' are at best distinctions that one can draw: in actual life one finds that both 'personal' and 'role' elements are interwoven. The self consciousness of a person, as G. H. Mead[14] points out, develops through the individual's ability to call out responses in himself as well as in others. The approval and support from other people are closely bound up with our own awareness of ourselves as agents. This is not to say that a person is nothing but a collection of roles. The point is rather that the awareness of the person as distinct from his roles develops through his various relationship to others. The concept of person can develop only among individuals who are members of a certain society, and who are familiar, in some way or another, with role-behaviour. And the concept of role, in its turn, cannot develop unless a person is capable of detaching himself from what he does, of seeing himself as an agent capable of doing this or that. Both concepts have developed gradually and have interacted on each other in the course of their development. The rudiments of the modern concept of person are not absent in primitive societies, just as traces of role behaviour cannot be completely erased from what is highly valued as 'personal' in modern societies.

Role can be of diverse kinds, some involving 'personal' elements more than others. Parental or marital roles, for example, involve 'personal' elements more than the role of grocer. The former are good examples of how 'personal' and 'role' elements can be closely knit together. Some other roles, say that of an executioner or a judge passing death sentences, are such that a too close identification with the role might lead to certain consequences not desired by the person himself. The degree of detachment demanded by different kinds of roles can vary enormously. Identification with roles as such cannot therefore be regarded as a refusal to see oneself as a person.

14 G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, C. W. Morris, *ed.* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934), pp. 156-7.

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Book-Reviews

K. Satchidananda Murty : *Philosophy in India — Traditions, Teaching and Research.* pp. 237 Publishers : Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi and Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi Price Rs. 90/- (1985)

The author of this book Professor K. Satchidananda Murty is one of the most distinguished Professors of Philosophy who has been teacher of Philosophy for about 35 years. He has been associated with the Andhra University as a teacher of Philosophy. He has lectured in several Eastern and Western Universities and has been Visiting Professor at Princeton University (U. S. A.) and at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla; a U. G. C. National Lecturer and National Fellow: Vice Chancellor of Shri Venkateshwar University Tirupati. He was General President of the Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad in 1963 and of Indian Philosophical Congress in 1968 and has been the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress since 1980. At present Dr. Murty is a National Fellow, Indian Council of Philosophical Research. He is the recipient of Dr. B. C. Roy National Award, Padmabhushan, Hony. D. Litt from four Universities. He has to his credit about twenty books on various aspects of Philosophy, Peace, Culture, Comparative Philosophy and Religion.

The present book before us is the latest book by Dr. K. S. Murty. The learned author has divided the whole book in seven chapters which are as follows : 1. The Meaning and Role of Philosophy in Indian Culture, 2. History of Philosophical Thinking in India I, 3. History of Philosophical Thinking in India II 4. Philosophy in Modern India, 5. The Present Philosophical Situation in India. 6. Problems of the Profession and 7. Prospective and Agenda for future. Besides these seven chapters, Preface, Notes, Bibliography, Name Index and Subject Index have been provided.

On the Unesco's initiative Dr. Murty prepared the first draft of this book. A 'country report' on teaching and research in Philosophy in India, based on a 'distinctly formulated questionnaire and specific guidelines' provided by it. This work's first version was sent to Unesco in August 1982. Afterwards several revisions took place,

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and lastly drastic abridged report was submitted at the meeting of the philosophers of Asia and the Pacific, convened by the UNESCO at Bangkok, from 21st February to the 25th February 1983.

In the first chapter The meaning and Role of Philosophy in Indian Culture different conceptions have been considered from the 9th century B. C. to the 5th Century A. D. In chapter 2. History of Philosophical Thinking in India I includes the study of Upanishads, Jainism. Lokayat, the Buddha, Early Buddhist Schools: Sthavirvada, Sarvastivada Sautrantika, Sammitiya, Mahasangika, The Mahayana Utras, Madhyamik. Vijnanavada, The Mahabharat, the Bhagwadgita, Hindu Darshanas: Sankhya, Yoga, Vaisheshika, Nyaya, Mimamsa and Vedanta.

In chapter 3. History of Philosophical Thinking in India II comprises of Tamil Mysticism, Saiva Siddhanta, Tamil Cosmopolitanism, Kural Ethics, The Sahajiya and Siddhas, The Mathas, Vira Saiva, Sarvajna, Advaita, Bhakti and Human Equality in Maharashtra, Mysticism and Egalitarianism in Andhra, A Popular Kashmirian synthesis, North Indian Santa and Bhaktas (Ramananda and Kabir etc., Sikhism. Late Medieval Vishnava upsurge, The Bauls, General Estimate and Indo Muslim Philosophy.

In chapter 4 Philosophy in Modern India, the chapter has been subdivided into: Outside the Universities: The Mahanirvana Tantra, Ram Mohan Roy, Dayananda, Narayan Guru, Vivekananda, Tilak, Aurobindo, Iqbal: Philosophy in the Universities. Four Important philosophers: Aurobindo, S. Radhakrishnan, K. C. Bhattacharya. S. N. Dasgupta. Five later philosophers: N. V. Banerjee, T. R. V. Murti, P. T. Raju. Kalidas Bhattacharya, T. M. P Mahadevan. Muslim Philosophy. Indian Christian and Parsi Philosophers. Modern Indian Philosophy: Characterization and Classification.

Chapter 5 deals with the present Philosophical Situation in India: Sources, Structure of Courses, Situation in Eastern Region; South India; West India; North India and Far Northern Region, Immigrant Indian Philosophers.

Chapter 6 deals with the Problems of the Profession. The author has dealt with several aspects of problems connected with the teaching of the subject. In chapter 7 Dr. Murty has suggested agenda for the future for the study of Philosophy. How the Government machinery should deal with the subject so that it adopts a uniform policy for the development of Philosophy in our country.

It is really a very good book which has taken into consideration several aspects of Philosophy in India — Traditions, Teaching and Research. It is one of the first preliminary survery which has covered several aspects of Philosophy in India. The author has very ably confessed that the book by a single author cannot be

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completely exhaustive. The author deserves praise for all what he has discussed and included in this book to make it comprehensive.

Dr. Murty has done a commendable work by writing a book which covers many aspects of traditions, Teaching and Research in Philosophy in India Certain drawbacks in our opinion have come in this book. Some important works of Indian Philosophy and culture have been deleted, several recent movements and schools have not been incorporated which have much influence even today in Indian scene and the names of many eminent teachers of philosophy who have contributed in different Indian Regions and Indian Universities have been omitted. The names of persons like Padmabhushan Dr. B. L. Atreya, (Maximum Research Work done under his supervision in his time at the Banaras Hindu University) Dr. J. N Sinha. Dr D. M. Datt, Dr. D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Dr. S. C. Chatterjee, Dr. R. D. Ranade, Dr. N. N. Sengupta, Prof. H. D. Bhattacharya, Prof. A. C. Mukerjee, Prof. Hari Mohan Jha, Dr. Gopi Nath Kaviraj and their works, should have found place in the chapter Philosophy in Modern India.

Dr. Murty deserves appreciation for systematically bringing to light the status of Philosophy from the beginning to the present day in India. The Indian Council of Philosophical Research and the publishers Motilal Banarsidass also deserve thanks for getting this book printed and published. I am sure further editions will bring before us much needed informations in a systematic manner. Several statistical presentations need thorough checking such as number of Ph.D.s (Poona University might not come 6 h in order of producing Ph.D.s, Bihar University came into existence later, Patna University tops the list in Bihar for producing maximum Ph.D.s in Bihar State, p. 132). We are sure the next edition will be more exhaustive and informative.

Dilip Kumar Roy : *Six Illuminates of Modern India* pp. 200, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 400 007, First Edition 1982 Cardbound Rs. 35/- and Clothbound Rs. 45/-. Foreword by Shri H. V. Kamath.

The author of this work is Dilip Kumar Roy, who has earned an enviable reputation as a singer, composer and writer. He has been a great spiritual thinker and has written about a good many yogis. A friend of Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, Romain Rolland and Bertrand Russell, an English thinker and a disciple of Sri Aurobindo. He has more than 70 books to his credit in English and Bengali. Dilip Kumar Roy passed away in January 1980.

The author selected Six Illuminaries for this book which impressed him. They are : Sri Aurobindo, Rabindra Nath Tagore,

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Sri Ramana Maharishi, Mahatma Gandhi, Sant Gulab Singh and lastly Mahayogi Anirvan. He has selected different aspects from the lives of these great men. First of all he has written on Sri Aurobindo and the different aspects covered are i. Minstrel of Light and Dharma, ii. Minstrel of Faith and Love, iii. Minstrel of Harmony and Immortality, iv. Minstrel of Vision and Intutiotion and in chapter v. he has compared Sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath; In chapter vi Rabindranath. the Poet vii Rabindranath The conversationalist and viii Rabindranath, The Letter-writer. ix. Shri Raman Mahrishi, x. Mahatma Gandhi, The Human Spirit, xi. Sant Gulab Singh and xii. Mahayogi Anirvan. In the end Epilogue. Appendix to chapter xi, Appendix to Chapter xii and Postscript have been provided.

Shri Dilip Kumar Roy has been a distinguished writer and has attained eminence both in English and Bengali. It is a very well written book on six spiritual leaders of our country who came in contact with the great author. His style is very impressive and has put forth all his knowledge and experience about all the six illuminates of Modern India. We greatly admire the spiritual outlook which he has brought forth in his impressive language. It is indeed a great work and our modern generation must take advantage and should go through this book which is remarkable in many ways.

Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan is doing a great service to the cause of Indian Philosophy and culture by bringing out such nice books for common man.

G. L Chaturvedi : *The Concept of Self Luminosity of Knowledge in Advaita Vedanta*, pp. 198+42 First edition 1982 Price Rs. 50/- Publishers: Adarsha Prakashan, Aligarh.

Dr. G. L. Chaturvedi is Research Fellow at the University of Lucknow. This present work is his Ph. D. Thesis on which he has earned his Ph.D. Degree from the Lucknow University. The whole book has been divided into eight chapters as follows :
i. The System of Deductive utterances forming the core of the Vedanta The Concept of Self Luminosity in the Upanishads subdivided into ii Experience Conceived as a principle of revelation, iii. A corroborating anylysis of the states of experience. II The Problem of self luminosity in historical perspective subdivided into : i. Introduction, Examination of the doctrine of self luminosity by Kumarila, ii. The problem of self luminosity in the systems of spiritual philosophy, iii. The Vedanta View, distinguishing features and presupposition: III The concept of knowledge as a Principle of Revelation subdivided into i Introduction, ii Elucidation of the Revelatory concept of knowledge, iii A coroborative analysis of the wakeful, Dreaming

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and Dreamless states of experience, and iv Some basic concepts of the Vedanta Philosophy of Experience, IV Revelation and Self-revelation (The Problem of Self-luminosity with reference to the Witness Self and the Absolute; V and VI Self luminosity of Cognition. VII Exposition of the Concept of Self-luminosity in Tattvapradipika (Chitsukhi) and lastly VIII Critical Resume.

Dr. Chaturvedi has thoroughly examined the concept of Self-luminosity of Knowledge in Advaita Vedanta and discussed both ontological and epistemological conceptions involved in it. The present work emerges as a constructive survey of the Vedanta philosophy of experience. The author has critically examined the views of different Vedantic writers and has put forth both ontological and epistemological problems in this connection. Dr. Chaturvedi deserves congratulations for such a thorough investigation of the concept of Self-luminosity of Knowledge in Advaita Vedanta.

Dr Chaturvedi has given references chapter wise with the original Sanskrit quotations and made his study a thorough one. He has also provided a Bibliography of 36 Sanskrit Texts and 25 other works and in the end given the detailed list of Abbreviations used by him in his book. The book is really an addition to the existing literature on the Advaita Vedanta.

M. Winternitz, Ed. *The Mantrapatha* or *The Prayer Book of the Apastambins*, Shri Garib Das Oriental Series No. 27, pp. 110, The Satguru Publications, 1st Floor, 40/5 Shaktinagar, Delhi 110007, First Edition 1985 Oxford University Press, Reprint Delhi 1985 Price Rs. 70/—

The Mantrapatha contains the Mantras or Prayers to be recited in connection with the domestic rites and ceremonies as taught in the Apastambiya Grhyasutra. The Editor Prof. Winternitz, a great Western scholar wrote scholarly introduction to this great work mentioning about the justification of the Title, The materials for the edition of the Text, Grammatical irregularities, Relation of the Mantrapatha to the Apastambiya Grhyasutra, Relation of the Mantrapatha to the Taittiria, Rigveda and Atharvaveda Samhitas, Date of the Mantrapatha, Orthographical Notes.

One full page of the List of Abbreviations have been provided. The whole Text of the Mantrapatha with Critical notes in 94 pages have been provided. The editor has very ably given critical notes along with the mantras which makes the meaning clear and helps in understanding the meaning of Mantras. Critical notes supplied help in understanding the Mantras thoroughly. In Appendix A Synopsis of the Mantrapatha and the Apastambiya Grhyasutra have been shown parallell in the Appendix A, In Appendix B Synopsis of Parallel passages showing the Relation of the Mantrapatha to the

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Vedic Samhitas have been provided. Index of Mantras have also been provided which are very helpful in finding out the correct position of Mantras in the Mantrapatha. In the last Index of Important words have been provided.

The whole book is a very thoroughly and critically compited with notes by a great Western scholar well known Indologist Dr. Winternitz. He deserves our most heartfelt thanks for compiling so nicely the Mantrapatha and the publishers also deserve thanks for getting such a nice book printed.

T. Ganapati Shastri, Ed. *Asvalayana Grhya Sutra*, with the Commentary Anavila of Hardattacharya, pp. 216+12) published by Sri Satguru Publications, 40/5 Shaktinagar, Delhi 110 007 Price Rs. 100 Reprinted in 1985.

This book was originally printed as first edition in 1923 in Trivandrum Sanskrit Series and now being reprinted after 62 years by Sri Satguru Publications. The publishers deserve our heartfelt thanks for publishing this book which was not available for past many years.

The edition of the work is based on the following five palm leaf manuscripts (i) The text with a portion of the Anavila running to the third khanda in the second Adhyaya belonging to Mr. Subramanyan Namburipad, Kaduthuruthi, Vaikom (ii) The text with the Anavila belonging to Mr. Narayanan Bhattathiri, Mulamana Illam, Thukalasseri, Thiruvella (iii) The text with a portion belonging to Mr. Yajnasubrahmanya Srauti, Trivandrum (iv) The text with a portion belonging to Mr. Sankara Bhattathiri, Kuzhikkattu Illam, Thukalasseri, Thiruvella (v) The text with a portion belonging to Mr. Thuppan Haridasan Namudripad, Poonnorkottu Mana, Netunthuruthi.

The whole book is divided into four Chapters which is subdivided agin as follows: The first part into 21 sections, second chapter is divided into 10 parts; third chapter into 9 parts and last chapter IV is divided into 10 parts.

The publishers deserve thanks for bringing out this important publication available to the scholars and thus helping the cause of Indian culture. Many extinct books deserve reprinting

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I

India — Far Away And Close to Bulgaria

Pancho Roussev

The geographic distance between India and Bulgaria is measured in thousands of miles, setting them far apart from each other. The historical destinies of their people are a proof to the different vicissitudes which they have experienced in time.

But none of these differences can impede the friendly relations between the two countries and their common struggle for defending peace and prosperity of the people. Both follow the road of progress on which big and small nations are marching, surmounting all distances.

We highly esteem the cultural achievements of other nations. With an unconcealed satisfaction we can emphasize that India occupies one of the leading places in this respect. It is one of the biggest centres of world culture whose beginnings can be traced as far back as the dawn of civilization. The wealth of Indian mythology and philosophy and the abundance of monuments of spiritual creativity dating from several milleniums B. C. are still not very well studied and esteemed by merit by the scientists, largely because of the Eurocentrism which prevailed until recently.

India is becoming increasingly better known to the workers in the field of scientific and extra-scientific cognition. This fact favours friendship with it, especially on the side of the socialist countries.

In Bulgaria the interest in Indian culture—ancient and modern—keeps growing. The first translation of Indian stories relating to the exploits of the Benares and Casal kings was made in Bulgaria as early as 1889. These followed some twenty translations of Rabindranath Tagore's works: 'The Gardener' (1918), 'Gitanjali' (1920), 'Home

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and World' (1922), 'Citra' (1923), 'Ruin, My Childhood' (1958), 'Gora' (1961), 'Letters about Russia', and many others.

Widely known in Bulgaria are the Indian 'Vedas', 'Mahabharata', Ramayana (1921, 1972). Here we should also mention 'Selected Pages of the Code of Man' (1921), the novels 'Nirmala' by Prem Chand (1959), 'The Old Woman and the Cow' by Mulk Raj Anand (1962), his short stories 'Chandu' (1968), the stories 'Snake Stone' by Prem Chand (1961) and, above all, 'The Discovery of India' by Jawahar Lal Nehru (1955), which underwent a second edition in 1983 under the title 'The Awakening of India', 'A Poem about Georgi Dimitrov' by Gopal Singh (1972) and many others.

We must stress that during the past 40 years since the victory of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria, the interest towards India and Indian culture has tremendously increased. The number of works by Indian authors translated into Bulgarian and those supplied in foreign languages has gone up. Most of the latter are available in Russian or English. Among them we can mention the studies on theatre and dance in India by Belvant Gargi (1963), the history of Indian culture from ancient times to the present day, a monograph by B. N. Lunia (1960), 'Ancient Culture in the Indus Valley' by E. Mackey (1951), 'The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India' by D. Kossambi, 'Ancient Indian Literature' by I. Serebriakov, 'The Music of India' by L. Singver, the publications on Indian philosophy by D. Chattopadhyaya, works by S. C. Chatterji and D. M. Datta, S. Radhakrishnan and many others, most of them in English.

Ancient Indian philosophy has always provoked a lively interest in Bulgaria. As early as 1925 the Bulgarian bourgeois historian of philosophy Prof. I. Georgov published an extensive study devoted to the ancient philosophical teachings of the Orient in which the earliest philosophical teachings of India are given due prominence.

The Bulgarian scholar makes a detailed review of Indian social and economic relations in ancient times, reveals to the reader the great world of the Indian religious-mythological structures, representing a source of ideas for the earliest philosophical teachings. For his impressive investigative work Prof. Georgov collected abundant material from eminent European Indologists as Deussen, Glasenapp, Roth, Gladisch, etc., and took into consideration the ideas of such leading historians of philosophy and culture as Windelband, Gomperz, Muller and others.

The analysis and assessments which this Bulgarian scholar makes of the religious mythological images, and of the theoretical-philosophical conceptions, even though originally not disjointed, speak in favour of a scientifically honest approach to the ample contribution of ancient Indian culture to the treasure house of world civilization.

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A wide range of interconnections and directions of a religious, philosophical, aesthetical and other nature is revealed before the mental vision of the reader. This saturated world of ideas is objectively presented on a genealogical plane: emergence and development, continuance and change, on the one hand, internally, as an interaction among ingredients of the already different forms of social consciousness and, on the other, externally, as a continuity, an enrichment and influence upon the other countries of antiquity.

Being captive to the German bourgeois-idealistic thinking, Georgov avoided to show the valuable materialistic, dialectic and atheistic situations in ancient India. The rightness of this is proved by the elimination of the earliest philosophical atheistic Lokayata-Carvaka school, and also the flashing elements of a valuable progressive nature contained in the other works of the ancient Indian spiritual heritage.

In Bulgarian philosophical literature this gap was filled up much later, during the years of building up socialism in this country, when favourable conditions for a full and free application of the dialectical-materialistics, methodology in the investigation of the historical and philosophical heritage of different countries and nations from the different epochs were created.

What we have in mind is, in the first place, the monographic study work of our distinguished indologist K. Kunnev, 'The First Indian Doctrine of Being (Sat Vada)', a 1976 publication of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Interest in it was shown by publishing houses, magazines and scholars from a number of countries — India, USA, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., where excerpts of it were published and positive reviews and comments appeared.

In this work K. Kunnev examines in great detail the ontological, epistemological and spontaneous dialectical aspects of the doctrine of the ancient Indian sage, naive materialist and spontaneous dialectician Uddalaka Aruni, the earliest philosopher in mankind's recorded history.

It is well known that K. Kunnev was the first in world philosophical literature to come up with a new interpretation of the *Sat* category. Before that it was interpreted on a religious, idealistic plane, i.e. as *God* or *Atman*. The Bulgarian scholar convincingly proves that Sat is the eternal, animated, qualitatively indefinite supreme reality or being and at the same time a substantial primary basis and omnipresence in the universal variety. The hylosoistic elements contained in this conception enhance its naive materialistic foundation. The latter is enriched by Uddalaka Aruni with spontaneous dialectical facts which are also treated for the first time in world literature.

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A parallel phenomenon is observed comparatively later in antique Greece, doubtlessly as a remote reflection from ancient India. Thales, the founder of the Ionean school, looked in a similar way for the primary basis of the world, though as some sort of matter construed as a guiding principle. The understanding of materialism as a philosophical current shaped earlier than idealism and brought to life in the struggle against deeply rooted religious prejudices is enhanced ever more convincingly. The author himself does not come to this conclusion, but the logic of his study presupposes it. He is right in pointing out that the earliest signs of the struggle between materialism and idealism can be discerned already in the Vedic hymns, the Upanishads, Mahabharata and Ramayan. Materialism and atheism are upheld best by Lokayata-Carvaka school which is regarded as a great achievement of ancient Indian philosophy.

The Bulgarian indologist has also published 12 works on Yoga in which he treats a number of philosophical and formal-science problems. On the basis of a scientific analysis of ancient Yoga sources, K. Kunnev is the first to advance and uphold the conception that the Yoga system is a union or unity between the human body and mind, between the subject and the object of concentration by samadhi.

K. Kunnev successfully distinguishes between the scientifically useful and the mystically harmful in Yoga. He makes exceptional efforts to explain the apparatus of Yoga categories, to elucidate its complex principles and evaluate the significance of the applicability of this philosophical, theoretical, prophylactic and therapeutical system in our times. To this end he published the book 'Yoga: Basic Terms' (1984).

K. Kunnev offers convincingly his own philosophical definition of the term Yoga as a relation between the material and the spiritual, between the subject and the object of cognition. According to him, until recently Yoga was a concession to spiritualism and religion alone. What is more, it was maintained that without the presence of a religious view it was impossible to grasp the Yoga system in a theoretically correct way and to practise it. In his publications, including the Yoga dictionary which is now in print in Bulgaria, K. Kunnev with irrefutable arguments proves the inconsistency of this contention, and also that as a rule, i. e. since ancient times *Yoga* has been intended for all.

According to the Bulgarian explorer the term samadhi is no less contentious. In this case, too, many authors maintain that the only and ultimate aim of the Yogist samadhi was a sort of 'confluence' or fusion of the mind (citta) or intellect with the spiritual (Brahman, the god Ishvara, etc.), or some mystical self-knowledge

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and 'release'. According to K. Kunnev, however, the final aim of the Yogist samadhi was not a 'confluence' or 'communication' with the transcendent, or a mystical 'trance' but mainly a conscious coordination and guidance of man's physical and spiritual (resp. cognitive) activity. Or, in other words, the specific Yogist samadhi presumes the conscious directing of the human mind (citta) towards superactive work with the aim to penetrate deeper into the substance of the objects of mental concentration, resp. cognition. This Marxist interpretation of the Yogist samadhi has been deservedly appreciated not only in Bulgaria, but also by some foreign scholars as, for example, the Indian philosopher Prof. Dr. J. P. Atreya, the Soviet scholar A. Kondratov, and others.

Equally commendable is K. Kunnev's scientific interpretation of all the other Yoga terms of major significance which have been included in the already mentioned dictionary about to appear in Bulgaria soon.

A great popularity is also enjoyed by K. Kunnev's monograph 'The Humanism of J. Nehru', released by the Indian publishing house Darshana International in 1976, parts of which have also appeared in Bulgarian, including 'J. Nehru—Philosophy, Humanism' (Narodna Prosveta publishing house, Sofia, 1983). These two books of K. Kunnev introduce the reader into the spiritual and emotional world of an eminent son not only of India, but also of contemporary mankind, who fascinates with his progressiveness, honesty and humaneness in thinking and behaviour.

In his analysis of J. Nehru's humanism, the Bulgarian author specifies correctly its sources : the Indian humanist traditions, socialism as his social ideal and science as a revolutionary factor. There follows an assessment of the characteristics of J. Nehru's humanism as a real union of thought and action, irreconcilable towards obscurantism, social demagogy, imperialism and fascism. The great champion of peace was one of those who formulated the so-called 'five principles' known all over the world as 'Panca Shila'.

Generally speaking, the contributory significance of these works lies in the overall characterization of the philosophical views of J. Nehru as realistic, of his active humanism, of his democratic and anti-emperialistic line and of ideological and statesman-like attitude towards reality to which he devoted his whole life.

K. Kunnev qualifies the philosophical views of J. Nehru as realistic. It is well known that nowadays there are both materialists and idealists who use this philosophical category. J. Nehru was one of those influenced by both idealism (through Vedantism) and materialism (resp. Marxism-Leninism).

It should be noted that with J. Nehru this terminological indication has its favourable conceptual aspects and nuances. In the

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first place, we should note in the spirit of our Bulgarian colleague's reasoning—the aspiration of J. Nehru to lean on real facts and the living reality, his counting on experience, or experimental truthfulness, also his negative attitude as a philosopher, theoretician, statesman and politician to indefinite formulations and unverifiable abstractions. We should also stress his critical attitude to religious suggestions and his rejection of mysticism, spiritualism and other pillars of philosophical idealism. While J. Nehru was not a radical opponent to the latter, but, under the influence of Marxism, he was not his orthodox advocate, either.

The philosophical investigations of K. Kunnev in the rich arsenal of Indian heritage are not an end in itself, but a planned work linked with the struggle of a Indian people for progress. The materialistic current, dialectical interpretation and atheistic views are powerful scientific-theoretical weapons in India's fight for a new life, in the struggle for a proper shaping of the social consciousness of people from other countries as well, for prosperity of this big and peaceful country in Asia. Irrefutable are also other valuable facts in K. Kunnev's works, as evidenced by reviews and personal letters from scholars from various countries.

Works of a number of Indian authors appeared in Bulgaria recently : 'For Peace in the World', selected speeches and articles by R. Chandra, 'Mahabharata and Ramayana', etc.

The integration between the philosophic and other cultural institutions in Bulgaria and India is increasing. Far away India is becoming better and better known in Bulgaria. Bilateral political relations in the name of peace are growing stronger. Naturally, the cultural exchange and cooperation between the two countries and their people contribute and will contribute ever more actively to big friendship.

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II

A Very Brief Summary of Disclosures from Jnana Yoga Combined with Modern Science

U. A. Asrani

Jnana Yoga discloses by scientific arguments, that: 1. Apparent multiplicity of separate individuals is Sankara's MAYA——2. There is in reality, only one all pervading Cosmic Self (Brahman) everywhere; though in our analytical language, we can not prove its cosmic integration. That is the limitation of language itself, and of our Aristotelian logic, that we apply to it. Nature does not obey that logic, even in the tiniest particle of matter, called an Electron. It obeys Erich Fromm's Paradoxical Logic, instead. There are in the world, apparent individuals; yet they are so deeply inter-connected, and inter-acting, that it is difficult to say, how it could be MANY (All this is proved, by scientific arguments, in U. A. Asrani's —'*Yoga Unveiled*' Part II-awaiting publication).

A wide survey of the present scientific position, discloses, on the other hand, that there is hardly any interference, in the working of natural laws, of evolution, on the part of any transcendental authority, like the Creating God, Brahma of the Hindus, or the Allah of the Muslims, or the Father-in-Heaven of Jesus, etc. etc., even in the interests of the noblest of creation, MAN. Darwin's Theory of Evolution, of Plant and animal species, indicated an uninterfered struggle for existence, and survival of the fittest. Carbon and Oxygen cycle, established the co-existence of plants and animals by the help of sunlight[1]. Except the dissident voice of P. T. de Chardin—a Jesuist Fossil scientist, who attributed Evolution to

1 *Science Today*—Bombay, December 1982.

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'Direction by some Single gigantic Organism'— nobody else has disputed it. Chardin is also not regarded seriously by other scientists. There are further evidences besides, of a *deeper evolution, which has been spontaneous* :— e.g How Life spontaneously evolved out of Dead Matter[2]. It speaks of shifting *Paradigms* of Science itself; i.e. progressive philosophies of Science itself. Just as the Geocentric view of the ancients was replaced by the present Helio-centric View. Heat was once regarded, as a substance; now it is regarded, as only one type of Energy. Grof explains how newer paradigms of Science explain, how life can arise spontaneously out of Dead Matter, and how it can evolve upto the highest consciousness, possible for Man. This was proved by researches of Prigogene and others. Raja Ramana, the present Head of the Atomic Energy Commission Govt. of India, has confirmed this point, in Bhawan's Journal, Bombay. Aug. Sept. 1978. P Tiwari of Atomic Energy Commission Trombay, has gone further still. He has advanced a new theory of spontaneous evolution of Matter itself—i.e. Electrons and positrns—from vortices in practically massless, vacuum-Space, as a result of sunlight. He has predicted, the formation of a new planet, between Mars and Jupiter, in the Solar System[3]. We have also the research of uninterfered evolution and decay of Stars[4].

From the above history of Science, it appears very likely that all Evolution is spontaneous, right from Space to Man, or even from stars and planets to Man. Dogmatic faiths, like Islam or Christianity, have put in the minds of their believers, the anthropomorphic idea from infancy, that there must be some Potter, somewhere in Heaven, who places each soul, like a New Pot, suddenly and mysteriously of this Earth. We have never seriously considered, the alternative idea that, that Sunlight, playing on our Earth, may have played this entire drama of Evolution, right from Space to Man. Observation of Nature discloses to us, that Nature follows the latter idea. All anthropomorphic notions, still persisting in our so called 'Religions', are not Nature's Reality; they do not deserve to be dogmatically followed or fanatically propagated.

The present position of Science, gives a cleaner chit to cults like Hinduism, which search for Reality, with an open mind. We need not look to any text, for guidance. We must regulate our human conduct, in such a manner, as to secure, our own welfare-physical, social, psychological, psychosomatic, and spiritual; or our Total

2 Stanislav Grof's Presidential Lecture—Trans-personal Psychology Conference Bombay, February 1982— 'East and West—Ancient Wisdom and Modern Science'.

3 *Pioneer* Lucknow, 22.1.1984.

4 Chandra Shekhar—N. L. 1983.

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welfare as we may call it. It was on this account that the great German Sanskrit Scholar, Max Muller, appreciated Indian Culture.

The Nobel Laureate, Rabindranath Tagore, met the great scientist, Einstein and had a debate with him, in 1930, in the U.S.A. on 'What is Reality' Einstein thought that Reality is Absolute; we may succeed one day to define it. Tagore emphasised, on the other hand, that Reality is relative; it is pragmatic. It is, what benefits us as Men—constituted, as we are.[5]

Other so called 'religions' are only methods of securing political power. They are worked up very often, by Super-powers, for political purposes. Hinduism alone, with its unfettered enquiry into Truth, is Real Religion. Others dwarf man's mental/rational and scientific-enquiry aspects, of human culture; and these are the very aspects, that are characteristic of our present culture, according to the internationally well known, Dr. Jean Gebser, Prof. of Comparative Studies of Civilizations, at Salsberg, West Germany.

Hinduism includes in its free open enquiry, not only, Bhakti, Jnana, Patanjali Yoga, Hatha Yoga and Karma Yoga; but also atheistic cults, like Buddhism and Jainism. It includes also, others like *original* Sikhism, Tantricism. etc. They are all, groping hits of mystic, Master-Minds of the past, for what the behavior and life pattern of man should be, so that he may secure, as quickly as possible, his Total Welfare—Just as modern man, tries by various pathies, to secure his disease-relief—e.g. by Naturopathy, Hatha Yoga—therapy, Accupuncture etc. etc. In short Hinduism is that ever progressive, *World Aryan Culture*, which is based on Jnana Yoga, as well as the Sciences.

But in case, we decide to disregard all texts of dogmatic faiths we must define, Total Welfare, and each one of its aspects. For other aspects, we may trust to pages of History :— What has historically served us best, on the whole; but spiritual welfare is difficult to define. So also are terms like, Liberation and self-realization etc. However, these terms concern man only—the first discriminating, and discriminatively acting animal, evolved by Nature. Nature meant it seems, to advance the process of evolution itself, with the help of Man's special cultural characteristics.

To the writer's mind, the following lines of cultural advance are possible for Man, for his own benefit :— (1) Adoption of a Philosophy of Life, like the Vedanta or the Samkhya, so that undesirable events in practical life do not *pinch* (2) Self-actualisation of one's latent potentialities, of various types, physical, mental, spiritual, artistic etc. (3) Formation of a complex-free personality. Psychologists think, that complexes in the unconscious, are like un-exploded

5 *Darshana International* Moradabad-April, 1984.

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emotional dynamite—ever ready to explode, whenever they happen to get tickled. Thus they tend to prevent properly discriminated thought and action. Jung has recognised, fanaticism and egoism also, as complexes.—Such a Complex-less personality, consequently becomes, not only perfectly unselfish, and tolerant, but he develops himself besides, as free from all *emotionally biting* desires (Vasana). He becomes more or less like the Emotionally Stable (Sthita-Prajna) person of the Gita Chap. II— *Inspite of being active*—not always in Samadhi[6] A. J. Schindler of Munroe Clinic, U. S. A., has proved in his book-How to Live 365 days a Year—that such an emotionally stable personality is also, what the psychologists call a 'Mature Personality'—free from all restraints of the psychotherapist, or of the Guru, and even of God. (Compare, for instance, the utterances of the Sahaja Jnani Kabira. (4) The biography of Ramana Maharshi, suggests besides, that a person should have the capacity to relax all thinking altogether. The writer can do it only for a few seconds, or minutes. With Ramana it appears to have been habitual. The writer knows, atleast one more man in Lucknow—a householder—who says he can also do it. Ramana Said, he thought, only when needed. Otherwise his thought was relaxed. This capacity has a high significance, from the point of view of the Two Lobe-Theory of the brain. (5) On a different level altogether, stands the capacity to awaken and to raise the Serpent Power, Kundalini; for, research appears to show that, that changes the very structure of the brain itself, so as to make intuitions, and even predictions possible[7] He died very recently at Srinagar-about 1. 8. 1984, at the age of 81).

But capacity, No. (2), must be utilised only for humanist or unselfish purposes. Similarly, mere positive thinking-as of a scientist, or an industrialist, or mere development of Will Power or mere exercises of miraculous powers, by a Tantricist etc. are all ruled out of inclusion into Spiritual Welfare. Each one of them has its likely adverse reaction, on *mankind, as a Whole*. Exploitation of others; egoistic rivalries, subjugation of others, by personal Will Power, and above all, the Stress of our present day so called 'Civilized Life' are examples of such adverse reactions. All individual selfish actions, works like a 'Boomerang' adversely on the individual himself as well. It causes, Psychosomatic Disease. —The above solution, as to what constitutes our Spiritual Welfare, has been referred to two psychologists, in Varanasi, and a third in California, for comments.

Several Lines of Research Get Opened Under The Guidance of This Combination of Jnana Yoga, and Modern Science

(a) How Indian Yogis can contribute, to some extent atleast perhaps, in the direction of International Peace. India is non

6 Gita-II v. 52 72, and III v. 22.

7 Pt. Gopi Krishna's Researches on the Kundalini.

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aligned; and Jean Gebser has suggested, that Sahaja State Jnana, which he calls Integral Culture, is the possible next stage of advance, of human civilisation. Hence Indian Sahaja Jnanis (or Kundalini Yogis) may tour abroad, even upto the U. N. O , for propagating their ideas of unselfish co-sharing, among all nations, small or big—Super-Powers included. They should share their wealth, resources, even experience skill and knowledge, for the benefit of Mankind as a whole. Rupert Sheldrake's Research (Andhra-Hyderabad) on 'A New Morphogenetic Evolution Field' given in his book-A New Science of Life-1983-shows that any trick of Evolution, once learnt by a species, anywhere on Earth, is learnt very very much easier, by the same species, elsewhere on Earth. That shows the likelihood, of the success of the above proposed Propaganda Tour of Yogis abroad.[8]

(b) What are the defects of Indian Character, that we have tolerated slavery under the domination of foreign dogmatic and fanatic faiths, for so many centuries. Even now, there are minority problems of a very serious nature. Hinduism, which permits an unfettered enquiry into Truth, is losing ground everywhere. Dictatorship, even dynasty rule idea, appear to be gaining ground. Corruption, unrest, unsound education, and unemployment, seem to be prevailing all round. Capitalism is growing of course; but at the cost of Healthy Democratic Norms, propagated originally by Gandhi and Nehru. 'He who Steals our conscience, steals Everything' (Shakespeare).

Hinduism at present is broken up into a hundred different narrow and egoistic cults. No attempt at Synthesis and no strength to face the challenges of the present situation. Even internal defects, like mere tradition-following, caste barriers, dowry burdens, remain still unsolved. To the writer's mind, egoism stands at the root of the problem. We can not even brace up courage enough, to go so far as the *limited unselfishness*, of a scientist viz :—Whatever results, of experimental trials disclose, or whatever, actual or historical, or practical life observations, indicate, as unmistakeable facts, we should accept them, without demur, atleast for the time being. Wholesale personal unselfishness would be still better.

REMEDIES

To the writer's mind, several remedies and quite practicable, even in the present very wayward times; provided we vigorously persue them. e.g. spreading far and wide the *consciousness and the pride*, that our unfettered enquiry into Truth, is the only progressive line for mankind. The great German-Sanskrit scholar Max Muller,

8 see for details, the article, by U. A. Asrani, in the Audh Univ. Journal, 1982 on 'Yoga and the World'.

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appreciated it long back. All other so called 'Religions' are merely fanatically dogmatic. We should propagate this idea, in all our private educational institutions, in all our private Satsangs or religious study circles, and even in enlightened family prayer circles.

We had in India, even in historical times, the pride and vigour, of our Yogic Aryan culture. It is reported, that Aristotle the Greek Philosopher, asked the invader, Alexander, to bring back, from India, not wealth, but an unselfish, humanist minded Yogi Alexander's chronicler records, an episode, somewhere in the North West of India, where only 300 mercenary soldiers from Bharat, were employed by a small ruling prince. They refused point blank, to help the invader, in his further march to their Aryan homeland. At the end of that day's fighting, not one was captured alive—not even a women or child; they also helped, by throwing stones, at the invader's men and horses. The loss to the invader's army was relatively high.

Besides the above consciousness and pride, we should propagate the idea, that we must face the challenges of the present times, unitedly and organisedly, *ourselves just* as Sri Rama and Sri Krishna, faced their problems *themselves*, in the days of Ramayana and the Mahabharata.

PRACTICAL REMEDIES

(a) Supplement ordinary school education, in all private schools, so as to make it more or less like Mahatma Gandhi's Basic Education. Take the students out frequently, for observation of actual life, and explain to them, how faulty, our present day police work, democratic assembly work, and even courts of justice are, as regards the real welfare interests of all people—Rich as well as the poor. Real Education is meant, not merely for cramming Information and passing examinations, in order to secure money and position for purely personal benefit. Really sound education besides giving information, should build character; firing every student with an ideal to build a society, better than the present one. We should take the students out, to election meetings also and explain to them, what should be the procedure, so that, honest and patriotic persons alone, are elected as peoples' representatives. With elderly students, the teacher should often have discussions on these topics.

(b) Credit should be given in all private schools and colleges, for any voluntary work, done in the service of the poor, or in service of society.

(c) Internal school or college examinations, in all private institutions or periodical tests, should be so taken, that there is no copying. Students should be made to understand that it is in their own interests, that it should be so.

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(d) For Character-building purposes, we must catch the children while they are still young. Take even the primary school children, out, in open mouthed rallies in the public—shouting out — Corruption is bad; it defiles our conscience; and it makes life more difficult.

(e) Girls and Women's private educational institutions should propagate the following ideas :— (1) 'A child of your Own Choice' is the personal privilege of every husband and wife, Only prayers of preferably both together, before conception, or atleast after it. The effect of such prayers has been observed even in the present times.[9]

(2) Marriage reforms, casting aside traditional superstitions, caste barriers, undesirable dowry demands etc. etc. are now a young man and young woman's *own responsibility*. They should *organisedly* work in that direction, by forming 'New Life-Social Reform Societies'. Late pandit Madana Mohan Malaviya used to say 'Sanghey Shakti Kaliyuge' i.e. Strength in our Kali Yuga is got by organised work.

(3) Superstitious idolatory should also be brushed aside. It is all right for child minds; but as the child grows, it should be replaced by, proper Jnana Yoga and psychosomatic hygiene.

(4) The very wrong slur on the Hindu Society, that we are merely worshippers of Brahmins, the cow, and the Ganges should be brushed aside. We respect those Brahmins only, who carry on our traditional Aryan ideals, by their learning, and not merely help us in rituals. We respect the Ganges, wherever, its water is still unpoluted, for the sake of its inherent benefits. We similarly value the cow, for inherent benefits of its milk.

QUICKER REMEDIES

are ofcourse possible, if (1) Governments of the day take favourably to the Yogic ideas of unselfish action. The central Government, may be persuaded to do so; or unselfish minded opposition parties, capture power in some states. (2) Universities reform their curriculum—so as to make the following subjects compulsory for pre-graduate classes—Lessons from Indian History; Healthy democracy and how it should be conducted; Democracy and Capitalist Exploitation etc.

UNSOUND OBJECTIONS

(1) Some people, particularly, Yogis, fight shy of all politics, they call it 'dirty';, but in the hands of a man like Mahatma Gandhi, politics, may become equivalent to Karma Yoga.

(2) Some people object :— Let me be perfect myself; then I will attempt to reform the world. But perfection may take hundreds of

9 Psychic-International, Moradabad-Nov. 1964. Scientists have recently confirmed this point. 'Unborn Babies can hear', in the womb—Pioneer Supplement 2. 9, 1984.

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rebirths. It has taken Y·gis, centuries to perfect themselves; and Bharat has yet to find solutions for a Healthy democracy. Why not combine both the ideas. Unselfish work, in service of society, expands consciousness; and thus helps a Yogic Sadhaka to perfect himself also. Medical students help the patients also, under the direction of the professor in charge.

(3) Some Yogis object, that we reform individuals; and society consists of individuals; so society will automatically reform itself—However, we can see, that a highly centralised Government can upset the work of millions of such individual-reformers in one minute. Mrs. Indra Gandhi cancelled Morarji's prohibition in one minute.

(4) Some Yogis object that our country's problems are so stupendous, that we actually need an Avatara to solve them. But are we all mere dumb driven cattle; we must, each of us, contribute his/her little mite to the solution. M. K. Gandhi was aclaimed an Avatara much afterwards; he started as a very moderate politician in India.

A SYNTHESIS

of different cults and sub-cults of Hinduism, becomes quite possible, if we sit together, along with Depth Psychologists, to judge each cult or sub-cult, by the following criterion—How far or how quickly, its cultural benefits, advance Biological Evolution itself? For instance Jnana Yoga makes the following two claims— (1) On the basis of Guyton's Physiology latest edition, 1981 that the Pituitary gland helps the Jnana Yogic votary, to maintain his emotional Balance in emergencies, by sending pituitary Hormones in correct quantity and quality, if the emotional balance—Sthita Prajna—happens to be disturbed. (2) On the basis of Clinical trial of Jnana Yoga Therapy that Trans-personal (Or Deha-Abhimana rahit) elevation of personality is possible, within a few weeks or months, provided, no organic defects happen to be mixed up—These two claims can be tested experimentally.

The writer has given his own diagnosis, as regards some international or national problems—Others may give different diagnosis. Let us sit together with open minds, without any prepossession for any cult and examine them scientifically.

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III

On Some Correspondences Between Ancient Hindu Classifications

A. J. Syrkin

The device of classification, superimposed upon the elements of our experience, has since ancient times played a prominent and often decisive role in different types of description—not only scientific, but also artistic or didactic. One does not need to explain the importance of the analysis of such classifications, as regards their semantic and functional traits, for understanding the mentality of a corresponding culture better.[1] We shall concentrate here on a number of terms, most of which were united, already, by the ancient Indian tradition in stabilized groups of notions and which encompassed a sufficiently broad sphere of classical Indian culture. We are not going to present a detailed description of these concepts, in general or in certain separate sources, but shall try to display their characteristics on the basis of a definite set of distinctive features, whose pertinence is explicitly expressed by text evidence, and which seem to suffice for this paper's purpose. Separate terms are regarded here, according to their traditional rendering in Sanskrit sources, i.e. within the framework of certain traditional groups and in the generally accepted order of their enumeration.[2] Such a dependence upon

1 Cf. E. Durkheim, M. Mauss. De quelques formes primitives de classification — "Annee sociologique", v. YI, Paris, 1901-1902, pp. 1 72; E. Cassirer. The myth of the state, New Haven, 1961, pp. 14 sq; M. Chatterjee, On types of classification — an essay in comparative philosophy — ' Philosophy East and West. Essays in honour of Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan". Bombay a.o. — 1976, pp. 63-75, etc.

2 In other words, the corresponding regularities are deduced with respect to a set of concepts, represented as a system already established, and thus pertain to the synchronic aspect of the study. Separate parts of this article appeared in Russian in the following publications : K sistematizacii nekotoryx ponjatij v

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traditional schemes does not appear to be an obstacle for our investigation — on the contrary, it rather facilitates the arrangement of corresponding evidence in a certain logical order. One can be reminded, in this connection, of a peculiar tendency of classical Indian texts to base description on a number of closed and often isomorphous groups, which include a certain number of elements, mentioned, as a rule, in a definite order within the corresponding group.[3] One can suggest that Indian classifications are marked by certain regularities, with respect to their semantic structure, and the present study will perhaps help to elucidate these regularities.

I. The first group considered here includes the four main principles of the human activity, traditionally prescribed to higher castes (varṇa) — brāhmaṇa, kṣatriya and vaiśya. These principles were called "four goods", "four things" (caturbhadra, caturvarga etc.). They include :

1. Dharma[4] (dhar — "to hold", "support") — "something established", moral duty, law. It signified, first of all, the performance of different family and social duties, religious rites etc. (cf. the collection of corresponding admonitions in "Laws of Manu" — Mān, ca. IIc. BC — IIc. A.D.)

2. Artha ("object", "essence", "purpose", "utility") — the acquisition of material values and their appropriate utilization; in a wider sense of the word, the strategy of sound reasonable behaviour in different situations (cf. with respect to the state policy-A, a treatise ascribed to Kautilya ... IVc. B. C.)

3. Kāma ("love") — striving for sensual pleasures, for arousing and satisfying different senses. As a rule, physical love is meant here (cf. K, a treatise of Vātsyāyana — ca III IVcc. A.D.).

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sanskrite — "semiotika i vostocnye jazyki", Moskva, 1967, str. 146 164; O sravnitel' noj verojatnosti nekotoryx tipologiceskix parallelej — "III letnjaja skola povtoricnym modelirujuscim sistemam. Tezisy". Tartu, 1968, str. 12 17; Nekotorye problemy izucenija upanisad, Moskva, 1971, pp. 232 sq.

3 See e g. B. Heimann, Studien zur Eigenart indischen Denkens, Tubingen, 1930, S 185 sq. The examples of early Upaniṣadic texts (CU, BU etc) are very suggestive—the description operates here with separate sets of notions, each of which includes an equal number of elements; the elements of different groups are characterized by the one-to one correspondence to each other. Cf. A. Syrkin, Nekotorye problemy, str. 150 sq.

4 See e g. P. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, vol. I, Poona 1930, p. 1 sq. The details of the usage of the words in different sources, as was noted, go beyond the scope of the present article. It is sufficient for our purpose that in the classical Sanskrit texts each notion should preserve its main meaning, testified in the corresponding classification.

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4. Mokṣa ("deliverance")—release from the bonds of mundane existence, attainment of the highest enlightenment and sanctity (cf. e.g. precepts of Mbh— the XII Book of Mbh).[5]

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5 One can suppose that mokṣa was added to the first three principles somewhat later (cf D.H. Ingalls, Dharma and Mokṣa —"Philosophy East and West", v. 7, no. 1 2, 1957, p. 45); in any case, it is not found in separate sources where only the "three goods" (trivarga) are mentioned — cf. A 1.3.7.; K 1.1; collections of fables (the genre of the "frame story") like Pañc (though one can find here all four principles as well. See e.g. The Panchatantra, Text of Pūrnabhadra, ed. J. Hertel. Harvard Oriental Series, XI, Cambridge (Mass.), 1908, p. 257 7), Śūkasaptati etc. Cf. also the classification of jain Haribhadra (VIII c. AD) who distinguished between three kinds of narration (arthakathā, kāmakathā, dharmakathā — cf. Tantrākhyāyika, ub v. I. Hertel, Th. 1, Leipzig, Berlin, 1909, S. 5 sq) One can observe that the order of the first three principles (mokṣa is always last in the list), unlike the elements of other groups considered below, varies in different sources: Pañc V.1 (loc cit.): dharma — artha — kāma; another MS. variant of this evidence (The Panchatantra... Harvard Oriental Series, XII, 1912, p. 160): artha-dharma-kāma; K 1.1: dharma-artha-kāma; K 2 2 sq.; artha-kāma dharma; K 58.5: artha-dharma-kāma, etc. (cf. SW 1, S. 433). The evidence of K 2.2 sq. correlating such an order with the sequence of the human life periods ("learning and other matters of artha in childhood, kāma in youth, dharma and mokṣa in maturity") seems to be very instructive (cf. below) Concerning caturvarga, see A. Danielou, Les quatre sens de la vie et la structure sociale de l'Inde traditionelle. Paris, 1963; U. Tahtinen, Indian philosophy of value, Turku, 1968; A. Sharma, The Puruṣārthas: A Study in Hindu Axiology, Michigan, 1982; etc. Cf. also with respect to corresponding notions: J. van Buitenen, Dharma and Mokṣa — "Philosophy East and West", v. 7, no. 1-2. 1957, pp. 33 40; Ingalls, pp. 41-48; K. Potter, Dharma and Mokṣa from a conversational point of view — ibid., v. 8. no 1-2. 1958. pp. 49-63; D. White, Mokṣa as value and experience—ibid., v. 9, no. 3-4. 1959, pp. 145 161; L. Dumont, World renunciation In Indian religions — "Contributions to Indian sociology", no. 4, April 1960, pp. 33-62 (especially 41; cf. also: Symposium: The contribution of Louis Dumont — "Journal of Asian Studies" vol. 35, no. 4. 1976, pp. 589 sq ; 597 sq. etc.); J. Basu, The concept of dharma and the Hindu society — "Journal of the Bihar Research Society", vol. 47, 1961, pp. 201-210; P. Hacker, Dharma in Hinduismus — "Zeitschrift fur Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft", Bd 49. 1965. S. 93 106; R. Prasad, The concept of mokṣa — "Philosophy and phenomenological research", v. 31, 1971, pp. 381-393; J Koller, Puruṣārthas as human aims — "Philosophy East and West", v. 18, no. 4, 1968, pp. 315 319; Idem, Dharma : an expression of universal order — ibid., v. 22, no. 2, 1972, pp. 131-144; G. Larson, The trimūrti of dharma in Indian thought : Paradox or contradiction ? — ibid., pp. 145 153; A. Greel, Dharma as an ethical category relating to freedom and responsibility — ibid., pp. 155-168; Idem. The re examination of dharma in Hindu ethics — ibid., v. 25, no 2, 1975, pp. 161 173; Ch.

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The evidence of Mān already shows that the principle of dharma encompassed a large scope of behaviour touching upon such spheres of activity as learning, family life, trade, government, seclusion etc., i.e. the domains that refer in fact to other principles.[6] One must, however, take notice of a specific trait distinguishing this classification — separate notions can designate, here, not so much the concrete spheres of behaviour as the aspects of attitude towards these spheres.[7] In this context the main characteristic of dharma is the opposition of "proper" — "not proper" (or "lawful" — "not lawful"); it is, first of all, the moral, ethical (as well as the legal) attitude towards corresponding action. This aspect constitutes the essence of dharma, no matter what kind of activity is meant — whether family relations, service to the master, mental work etc.[8] The aspect of artha can be reduced to the pragmatic evaluation of the action, and to following a definite strategy of behaviour. It can be expressed by the opposition of "profit" — "damage".[9] The next principle, kāma, estimates the action with respect to the satisfaction of senses and can be described, first of all, by the opposition of "pleasure" — "displeasure".[10]

Malamoud. On the rhetoric and semantics of puruṣārtha — "Contributions to Indian Sociology". New Series, vol. 15, Nos. 1 2, 1981, pp. 33-54; etc Cf. regarding their importance for contemporary Indian ethics: M. Yamunacharya, The concept of dharma and its implications to the new society — "Proceedings of the 28th Indian philosophical Congress, Baroda 1953", Madras, 1953, pp. 33 sq.; A. Greel, Reformulating dharma in contemporary Hindu ethics (Ph. D. diss), Yale University, 1959. Here we do not consider rarer combinations of these terms with other concepts (as e.g. dharma kāma-artha-bala etc. — cf. SE 384), that are relatively less important for Hinduist dogmatics.

6 See also concerning a broader sense of dharma: Buitenen. pp. 36 sq.; Koller, Dharma, p. 132; Greel, Reexamination, p. 164, etc.

7 Separate admonitions of K, especially in chapt. 58 where the author evaluates the courtesan's artha (gain) sub specie artha dharma and kāma, are very instructive in this respect.

8 One can certainly specify some other distinctive features, pertinent for actions described by dharma ("truth" — "lie", "compassion" — "cruelty" etc) These pairs, however, either detail the main characteristic of dharma or reflect more general situations relating to artha or to kāma as well.

9 It can be similarly detailed, e.g. with the help of the evidence of A as "gain" — "loss" (cf. titles of the first two books of Pañc. that functioned as a "science of worldly wisdom"), "richness" — "poverty" etc.

10 Cf. also "love" — "enmity", "youth" — "old age", "beauty" — "ugliness", etc. Such examples show that the semantic fields of dharma, artha and kāma are partly intersected. One may note that the corresponding pairs of opposites ("proper" — "not proper", "profit" — "damage", "pleasure" — "displeasure") or

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Passing to mokṣa we can observe that this notion is marked by the neutralization of the opposites, pertinent to the first three principles. Signifying, by definition, deliverance and rejection of worldly attachments, mokṣa is characterized by its indifference to the main values of dharma, artha and kāma, that is, to family duties, proprietary relations and sensual experiences. While the first three usually presuppose the active response of an individual to his environment-i.e. the acceptance of this environment, a kind of conformity — the fourth principle minimalizes such a response. The corresponding behaviour is characterized by the tendency not to accept the environment or by a kind of escapism.[11] The opposition, resulting from the conformity of the first three principles, can be logically replaced here by a new pair of opposites that unite these principles on the one hand with the fourth principle on the other — this time at another semantic level. It is the "acceptance" — "non-acceptance" of the world (or "conformity" — "escapism").

II. The next group of notions refers to the four periods of life (āśrama) prescribed for brāhmaṇa.[12] The first āśrama, brahmacārin ("chaste"), is a pupil who studies vedas in his teacher's house and renders service to his master-looks for sacrificial fire, etc. The second, gṛhastha ("staying at home") is the head of family who earns the means of existence, begets children, performs ritual procedures, etc. Then follows the state of a recluse, vānaprastha ("gone

ethic, pragmatic and hedonistic characteristics, respectively, can prove useful as a set of distinctive features in describing any deed or a sequence of actions from the Hinduist point of view.

11 Concerning this opposition cf. e.g. F. Edgerton, Dominant ideas in the formation of Indian culture — JRAS. v. 62, 1942, pp. 151 sq., 154, n. 8 The author defines here the first triad and mokṣa as "an ordinary norm" and "an extraordinary norm" respectively. It does not mean, however, the incompatibility of corresponding notions One should make a reservation concerning the proximity of certain dharma and mokṣa situations — i e. the intersection of corresponding semantic fields (see the previous note). At the same time, within a broader framework of Hinduist dogmatics dharma can be justly regarded as an instrument for mokṣa. Cf. concerning this proximity; Yamunacharya, p. 39; Ingalls, p. 35; Varadachari, pp. 219 sq ; Koller, Dharma, pp. 132 sq ; Greel. Dharma, pp. 162 sq.; Idem, Reexamination p. 164, etc. About different aspects of their interrelation, see also other works quoted above (n. 5). This interrelation, however, appears here to be more complicated since various authors often regard these notions (especially dharma) not so much as one of caturvarga elements, but rather within a broader scope of their traditional usage. See also on corresponding principles in ancient and mediaeval Europe: J. Taubes, Virtue and Faith (a study of terminology in Western ethics) — "Philosophy East and West", v. 7, no. 1 2, 1957, pp. 27 32.

12 Cf. on āśrama duties corresponding evidence of Mān; A 1.3 etc.

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to woods"), who gives himself to pious reflections, observes abstention and certain rites (cf. Mān VI, 1-32). The last āśrama is a wandering mendicant, saṁnyāsin, who "renounces" the world. He does not associate with people, is deprived of property, lives on alms etc. (cf. Mān VI, 33 sq.)[13]

As we can see, a certain set of duties (also traditionally designated by the word dharma) was established for every āśrama. Numerous evidence (e.g. of Mān) show that, for brahmacārin, such distinctive features as "knowledge" — "ignorance", "abstention" — "satisfaction", "piety"—"impiety", "subordination" — "dominance", etc. are pertinent. The state of gṛhastha adds the oppositions "acquisition"—"loss", "love"—"enmity", etc. to them. The notion of vānaprastha implies a lesser quantity of such features though, living in a forest, one still has to choose between "abstention" and and "satisfaction", "acquisition" and "loss", etc. Thus, in the first three āśramas the opposites, characteristic of the first three principles (dharma-artha-kāma), usually remain pertinent. To specify this correlation, one must note that in the first āśrama the principle of dharma prevails (cf. K 1 2); in the second, the equilibrium of all the triad is expressed most clearly (cf. Mān VI. 87 about the householder as the "source" of other āśramas); in the third, dharma prevails, while the basic principles of artha and kāma are evidently avoided. It shows that this āśrama already presents an absence of interest in life's various goods, i.e. certain elements of non-acceptance and escapism are explicitly expressed to the full in the fourth āśrama.

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13 From the diachronic point of view one can note, similarly, the lack of precise definitions of separata āśrama and the absence of the fourth one in relatively earlier sources (e g. brāhmaṇas and upaniṣads — cf. BU III. 4 1; VI. 2.15 sq.; CU II 23; V. 10; ŚU VI. 21 etc.). See in this connection: M. Winternitz: Zur Lehre von den Āśramas — "Festgabe H. Jacobi", Bonn. 1926, S. 215-227; Idem. Geschichte der indischen Literatur, Bd. I, Leipzig [s.a.], S. 202; F. Weinreich. Entwicklung und Theorie der Āśrama =Lehre im Umriss — "Archiv fur Religionswissenschaft", Bd 27, 1929, S. 77-92; L. Skurzak, Etudes sur l'origine de l'ascetisme indien Wroclaw, 1948, pp. 35 sq ; A. Syrkin, Nekotorye obozna-cenija aśram v upaniśadax — "Ksiega pamiatkowa ku czci E. Stuszkiewicza", Warszawa, 1974, pp. 229-233; J. F. Sprockhoff. Saṁnyāsa. Quellenstudien zur Askese im Hinduismus. Wiesbaden, 1976; P. Olivelle Contributions to the semantic history of Saṁnyāsa. — "Journal of the American Oriental Society", Vol. 101, no. 3, 1981, pp. 265 274; W O. Kaelber. The *brahmacārin*: homology and continuity in Brāhmaṇic religion — "History of Religions". Vol. 21. No. 1, Aug. 1981. On the other hand, we find the notions of caturāśramin, caturāśramya in Mbh (see SW II, 929; 987; SE 384; 392); cf. also A 1.3; Mān III, 78; VI, 33 sq; 87 sq. a. o.

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The ascetic (saṁnyāsin, yati) is characterized by the complete rejection of values pertaining to social life, family and ritual institutions—in other words, by the situation of the second level mentioned above with respect to caturvarga's analysis. As mokṣa neutralizes the oppositions pertinent to the first three principles, so the relevant features of the first three āśramas are neutralized for saṁnyāsin.[14] The words of Mān VI. 33 are very characteristic: "He may live as an ascetic during the fourth part of his existence after abandoning all attachments to worldly objects" tyaktvāsañgān). In what follows (Mān VI. 35) the duty of samnyāsin is explicitly connected with the fourth principle: "let him apply his mind to (the attainment of) final liberation"[15] (mokṣa). We can thus state certain regularities in the relations between these two groups (certain variations in the order of the elements of level I are introduced below in order to show more appropriately the intersection of corresponding semantic fields):[16]

I			II
acceptance			non-acceptance
kāma	artha	dharma	mokṣa
	brahmacārin		
gṛhastha			
	vānaprastha		
			saṁnyāsin

14 Cf. Greel. Dharma p. 163 sq.

15 The Laws of Manu. tr. by G. Buhler, Delhi. a.o. 1967, p. 205. Cf. Mān VI. 45: nābhinandeta maraṇaṁ nābhinandeta jīvitam — "let him not desire to die, let him not desire to live" (The Laws, p 207). See also BU III. 5.1: etaṁ vai tam ātmānaṁ viditvā, brāhmaṇāḥ putraiṣaṇāyāś ca vittaiṣaṇāyāś ca lokaiṣaṇāyāś ca vyutthāya, atha bhikṣācaryaṁ caranti — "The Brāhmaṇas, having known that self, having overcome the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, the desire for worlds [i.e. the objects of dharma, artha and kāma], live the life of mendicants" (The Principal Upaniṣads, ed. by S. Radhakrishnan. London. 1953, p. 221); cf. ibid. IV. 4.22. See in this connection H. F. Halck, Some observations on the motives and purposes of ascetism in ancient India — "Asiatische Studien". XXIII, no. 1-2. 1969. pp. 4[illegible]-57.

16 The distribution of some notions between the gaps in vertical lines is intended to show the pertinence of separate principles of behaviour to corresponding āśramas, or the "borderline" situation that can be suggested with respect to some semantic fields. Unfortunately certain imperfections (mostly technical) in this table in my article (K sistematizacii, p. 152) led to misunderstanding (cf. Malamoud, p. 152). In particular, brahmacārin is certainly connected first and foremost with the principle of dharma (though the sphere of artha does not remain totally alien to him — already by the virtue of his duties towards the preceptor; cf. also K 1 2); kāma, naturally, should not be placed outside the gṛhastha's domain (cf above); etc See also below, note 32.

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We shall pay attention now to some concepts that were connected with the above groups, within the framework of different contexts and with respect to their semantic traits. This connection is confirmed by the corresponding characteristics in which the opposites, pertinant for the first three elements of these groups (level I) and for the levels I–II relationship ("acceptance" — "non acceptance") are neutrallized as well. The new state is opposed here to the previous states at the new level III. So, for example, in BU III.5.1 after the description of the wandering mendicant's (bhikṣu) life we read: tasmād brāhmaṇaḥ pāṇḍityaṁ nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhaset; bālyaṁ ca pāṇḍityaṁ ca nirvidya, atha muniḥ; amauniṁ ca maunaṁ ca nirvidya, atha brāhmaṇaḥ — "Therefore let a Brāhmaṇa, after he has done with learning, desire to live as a child [the state corresponding to level I]. When he has done (both) with the state of childhood and with learning, then he becomes silent meditator [muniḥ, also "ascetic" — the transition from level I to level II]. Having done with (both) the non meditative and the meditative states, he becomes a Brāhmaṇa" (here the latter evidently means not the varṇa but a certain supreme state).

As we can see, the neutralization of the oppositions is not limited by the sphere of the first three principles — the brāhmaṇa rejects both ascetism and not ascetism, "the non-meditative and the meditative states". He thus neutralizes the opposition of "acceptance" "non-acceptance", pertinent for levels I-II. Characterizing the relation of those levels to the new one, we can suggest the opposition of subject and object (which includes both "acceptance" and "non-acceptance" of levels I-II) and the identity of subject and object (level III) or S≠O—S=O. The second part of this opposition is expressed directly in different texts — cf. the famous "great saying" (mahāvākya) tat tvam asi — "that art thou" (i.e. thou art one with Ātman — CU VI.8.7 sq); aham brahma asmi — "I am Brahman (BU I.4.10); cf. also the descriptions of such situations as the union with the Absolute, the grasping of the highest reality etc. (cf. below).[17] A further example presents an explicit neutralization

17 One can find interesting analogies in Buddhist canonical terminology. Such are e g. the notions of bhikṣu (pāli: bhikkhu) admitting of parallelism with saṁnyāsin, or of arahant, brāhmaṇa, evidently close to brāhmaṇa in BU III, 5.1 a.o. A noteworthy evidence is found in Dp XXVI, 420: yassa gatiṁ na jānanti devagandhabbamānusā khīṇāsavam arahantaṁ tam ahaṁ brumi brāhmaṇam — "Him I call indeed a Brāhmaṇa whose path the gods do not know, nor spirits (gandharvas), nor men, whose passions are extinct, and who is an Arhat (venerable)" (The Dhammapada, tr. by F. Max Muller, Delhi, a.o. 1968, p. 95). The uncertain unpredictable character of arahant's behaviour is proclaimed here — a kind of logical consequence of the level III semantics: the uncertainty naturally increases in the course of

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of different oppositions: atra pitā 'pitā bhavati, matā 'matā, lokāḥ alokāḥ, devā adevāḥ, vedā avedāḥ; atra steno 'steno bhavati bhrūṇahābhrūṇahā, cāṇḍālo 'cāṇḍālaḥ, paulkaso 'paulkasaḥ, śramaṇo 'śramaṇaḥ, tāpaso 'tāpasāḥ — "There (in that state) a father is not a father, a mother is not a mother, the worlds are not the worlds, the gods are not the gods, the Vedas are not the Vedas. There a thief is not a thief, the murderer is not a murderer, a cāṇḍāla is not a cāṇḍāla, a paulkasa is not a paulkasa, a mendicant is not a mendicant, an ascetic is not an ascetic" (BU IV.3.22).[18] This evidence preaches the insignificance of all that results from distinguishing between the subject and object; The only opposition is left here, it is pertinent for level III and unites it with I II: S≠O—S=O.[19]

III. The notions discussed above are found in ancient Indian texts. One can ask if these texts, on the whole, can be subject to similar approach, i.e. applying to them the corresponding semantic classification. In this connection we shall briefly mention some basic traditional characteristics of the Indian canonic literature. The latter was called śrūti ("heard") — a revelation delivered to legendary sages (ṛṣi) from above (distinguishing it from the literature of smṛti, "remembered", i.e. transmitted orally and attributed to certain authorities).[20] The śrūti was classified by ancient Indians with respect to the two "axes" The axis of ritual suggested distinguishing the four vedas: Ṛg-veda, Sāmaveda, Yajurveda and Atharvaveda — according to the functioning of the text in one or other of the ritual procedures (recitation, singing, offering, etc.). The second axis, that of the text, was based on the peculiarities of the genre and content (the invocation itself, its different interpretations, etc.). We

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transition from level I to level III — the process is accompanied by the gradual neutralization of pertinent distinctive traits (see below).

18 The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 263.

19 See examples drawn below. Cf. in this connection the fourth grade of knowledge — the complete union with the object in the doctrine of Patañjali (Yogasūtra, I. 42-44). We shall briefly mention here another traditional group — the four grades of human conscience: 1. jāgarita sthāna — waking; 2. svapna sthāna — dreaming; 3. suṣupta sthāna — deep sleep without dreams; 4 turīya, verbally "the fourth" — a transcendental state of the emergence of the highest reality. Cf BU IV. 3; MtU VII. 11. etc. See B. Heimann, Die Tiefschlafspekulation der alten Upaniṣaden, Munchen, 1922; E. Abegg, Indische Traumtheorie und Traumdeutung — "Asiatische Studien", XII, 1954, S. 5 sq; A.-M. Esnoul, Les songes et leur interpretation dans l'Inde — "Les songes et leur interpretation", Paris, 1959, pp 209 sq., etc. It is easy to observe that 1 2 grades are correlated with the acceptance of the world (I) 3 — with non acceptance (II) and 4 — with the identity of subject and object (III).

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are interested here in the second classification, which suggests the following four genres :

1. Saṁhitā, "put together" — the ritual texts themselves: hymns, sacrificial formulae, incantations

2. Brāhmaṇa, "relating to Brahman" — texts like Aitareya, Kauṣītaki, Jaiminīya, Śatapatha etc., containing different explanations of saṁhitās, mythological digressions, etc.[21]

3. Āraṇyaka, "the forest [books]", intended for those who left their houses and went into the woods (i e. for vānapratha — see above).[22] The corresponding admonitions appear to be speculative rather than practical — the hermit living in the forest no longer needed to observe the complicated set of domestic rituals.

4. Upaniṣad, the admonition received by a pupil "sitting at the feet" of his master. Though paying a certain tribute to traditional ritualism, the upaniṣads at the same time contain a rather abstract interpretation of the ritual — an interpretation proclaimed here to be the true ultimate knowledge.[23]

As was observed, with respect to the third and the fourth āśramas, the semantic fields of the last two terms — āraṇyaka and upaniṣad — also intersect. Some of the upaniṣads were formally included in the texts of brāhmaṇas and āraṇyakas, bearing the same names (Aitareya, Taittirīya, etc.), and began to function as independent texts somewhat later.[24] They were also called vedānga (the concluding part of the veda).

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20 See evidence of Mān II. 10; Mbh XIII; 3670 etc. (SW VII, 388; SE 1101). The chronology of different śrūti texts is rather obscure. One can suggest that the last period of saṁhitā's codification and the composition of brāhmaṇas took place about X-VII cc B C.; the composition of the early upaniṣads — VIII-VI cc. B.C.

21 According to Sāvana's (XIV c) traditional explanation they comprised prescriptions of definite behaviour (vidhi) and the explanations of hymns themselves (arthavāda) — cf. SW V, 154; SE 741.

22 Cf. Mān IV. 123; Mbh I 258; Yājñavalkya saṁhitā I.145; III.110, 309 (see: The dharma śāstra texts, Vol. I, Calcutta, 1908, p. 13 sq) etc.

23 Cf. on the specific meaning of this term, S. Schayer, Uber die Bedeutung der Wortes Upaniṣad — "Rocznik Orientalistyczny", t. III, 1927, pp. 57 sq.

24 The title of Bṛhadāraṇyaka — the upaniṣad included in the text of Śatapatha brāhmaṇa — presents a significant example. We do not dwell here upon the historical aspect of the problem and regard the traditional division of śrūti texts as established already (cf. above, note 9).

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Considering the criteria of the classification accepted here, we should make a reservation: each of the genres mentioned above contains evidence relating to different semantic levels. Nevertheless, concerning the main tendency of separate genres, one can observe some specific traits. Saṁhitā can be regarded as the basic source of religious duties, constituting dharma. It completely preserves its pertinence for the first three āśramas; in particular it is the main object of brahmacārin's studies. Brāhmaṇas, as rules of a more practical character, regulate a broader sphere of behaviour (family, ritual etc.). The corresponding admonitions also touch, to a high degree upon the life of gṛhastha.[25] Āraṇyakas most evidently correspond to the notion of vānaprastha (araṇya = vana) — the third āśrama of the forest recluses. Upaniṣads, like other parts of the vedas, could be studied practically during all the stages of life;[26] their highest goal, however, corresponds to the principle of mokṣa, realized, as we have already seen, in the fourth āśrama (saṁnyāsin).[27]

A certain isomorphism can thus be established between the previous groups and the last one. The first three parts of Veda are connected, to a great extent, with the first three āśramas and with the realization of the first three principles (above all — that of dharma). At the same time, the fourth part — upaniṣads-is correlated, respectively, to the fourth elements of these groups; that is to say, the neutralization of definite oppositions pertinent for level I and transition to level II (and, consequently, to level III), is also being explicitly testified to here. This parallelism, however, goes

25 Cf. Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda, ubers, v. P. Deussen, Leipzig, 1938, S. 3.

26 So e.g. Mān VI 29 prescribes to a brāhmaṇa living in the forest (vipro vane vasan) to observe the admonitions of the upaniṣads.

27 The corresponding classification of non canonical sources was actually presented in the classical tradition — with respect to different texts (see above, note 5 on Haribhadra's classification) or to the contents of separate works. Such is the fourfold division (corresponding to caturvarga) or some aphoristic anthologies (e.g. of Sūrya Kaliñgarāya's Sūktiratnahāra), the threefold division (worldly wisdom, nīti—love's passion, śṛñgāra—renunciation, vairāgya; resp. artha and dharma—kāma—mokṣa) in Bhartṛihari's Satakatraya etc. A number of examples are presented by the didactics of sūtra and sāstra that can be regarded as a later development of the brahmaṇa genre and were often correlated with the definite life's principle or āśrama. Cf rules of domestic ritual—gṛhyasūtra (āśrama of gṛhastha), Mānavadharmaśāstra, Arthaśāstra, Kāmasutra, etc. As an example of a broader pragmatic approach, encompassing all the four elements of these groups, a part of Mbh VI— Bhagavadgītā can be mentioned. Texts on mokṣa, touching upon the III level, constitute a prominent part of the Buddhist canon, of the later medieval bhakti literature and so on.

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further, displaying itself in the partial intersection of the semantic fields of the third and the fourth elements, within the frames of each separate group. Moreover, the notion of upaniṣad (like those of mokṣa and saṁnyāsin) goes beyond level II and touches upon level III. Corresponding examples (partly given above) of characteristics applied to the highest subjective and objective principles (resp. ātman and brahman) are very suggestive. One can distinguish here between several variants of description. They are sometimes connected with each other in the same context.[28]

A. The direct combination of the opposite qualities :

BU IV. 4.5: sa vā ayam ātmā brahma...tejomayo 'tejomayaḥ kāmamayo 'kāmamayaḥ, krodhamayo 'krodhamayo, dharmamayo 'dharmamayaḥ — "That self is, indeed, Brahman, consisting of... light and no light, desire and absence of desire, anger and absence of anger, righteousness and absence of righteousness". CU. III.14.3: eṣa ma atmantar hṛdaye 'ṇīyān vrīher va ... eṣa ma ātmāntar hṛdaye jyāyān pṛthivyaḥ ... — "This is my self within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice [etc.]... This is my self within the heart, greater than the earth [etc.]". MuU III 1.7: bṛhac ca tad divyam acintya=rūpaṁ sūkṣmac ca sūkṣmataraṁ vibhāti. dūrāt sudūre tad ihāntike — "Vast, divine, of unthinkable form, subtler than the subtle. It shines forth, farther, than the far yet near at hand" Cf. also KU I.2.20-22, ŚU III 19 20; IV 3; ĪU 4 5; from later upaniṣads: Kaivalya 20; Mahānārāyaṇa VI 20; Paiṅgala IV.9; Brahmabindu 6; Atharvaśiras 1; Nṛsiṁhottaratāpanīya 6, etc.

B. The motif of surmounting corresponding opposites (which can be regarded as an "unfolded" variant of A) :

BU IV 4.22: sa na sādhunā karmaṇā bhūyān no evāsādhūnā kārīyān — 'He does not become greater by good works nor smaller by evil" Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad 1.4: aho=rātre paryavekṣetaivam sukṛta=duṣkṛte sarvāṇi ca dvandvāni, sa eṣa visukṛto viduṣkṛto brahma=vidvān brahmaivābhipraiti — "even so he will look at day and night, at good deeds and evil deeds and on all the pairs of opposites. Thus one, freed from good and freed from evil, the knower of Brahman goes on to Brahman". Cf. also BU III.5.1; CU VIII. 4.1 etc.

C. A set of negations :

28 Cf. respectively, the Principal Upanisads, pp 272, 391-392, 688, etc. (A); 279, 757, etc. (B); 232, 263, etc, (C); see Syrkin, Nekotorye problemy, str. 156 sq. Concerning one of the main devices used here—that of "coincidentia oppositorum" cf. C. Pensa's apt remark : "La bi polarita sembre essere una categoria capillarmente, omnipervadente certe concezioni filosofico-religiose dell' India" (Coincidentia oppositorum and bipolarity in Indian literature—' Studi in onore di G. Tucci", v. *II*. Napoli, 1974, cf. "East and West", v. 24, 1974, p. 454).

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BU III. 8.8: asthūlam, anaṇu, ahrasvam, adīrgham, alohitam, asneham. acchāyam, atamaḥ ... — "It is neither gross nor fine, neither short nor long. neither glowing red (like fire) nor adhesive (like water). (It is) neither shadow nor darkness [etc]. Cf. ibid. III 9 26; IV 2.4; 3.22 (see above); CU VIII. 4.1; KU 1.3.15; ŚU III 9; IV 18 20 etc.; from later upaniṣads: Subâla III. 1; Brahmabindu 9; Ātma 3 etc.[29]

Separate groups of notions have been regarded here, as was said, with respect to definite distinctive features whose pertinence could serve a basis for distributing corresponding terms among different semantic levels. The hierarchy of these levels is represented below (signs "+" and "—" denote here the pertinence of corresponding opposition. realized in the first or in the second part, respectively, "O" — the neutralization of the opposition) :

Levels / Oppositions	I	II	III
those resulting from the acceptance of the world	+ —	O	O
"acceptance" — non = "acceptance"	+	—	O
"difference" — "identity" (S ≠ O — S = O	+	+	—

As we have already seen, there is a certain isomorphism in the distribution of separate groups among the semantic levels. The preciseness of this distribution appears to be somehow limited — so e.g., semantic fields of separate notions touch upon levels I and II or II and III simultaneously.[30] It is worth nothing, however, that

29 Cf. also Tu II. 9.1 on incomprehensibility, in principle, of the Brahman's bliss by words and by mind (vaco...manasā). It is easy to see that B and C can coincide with each other and also be semantically equal to A. Cf. below some parallels from other traditions. One can find here a particularly interesting analogy with the principles of linguistic description in the Buddhist philosophical texts (Ratnakīrti) as a complex of negative relations and, consequently, with some ideas of modern linguistics. Cf. S. Varma. Analysis of meaning in the Indian philosophy of language—JRAS, 1925, p. 31; J.R. Firth, The technique of Semantics—"Papers in Linguistics", I. London, 1957, p. 26, etc.

30 Such an imperfection of the present scheme, based upon the double sense logic, appears to be a natural result of a more general quality of semantic continuum, whose elements on the whole constitute a continuous rather than a discreet sequence (cf. e.g. A. Rudskoger, Fair, foul, nice, proper. A study in polysemy, Stockholm, 1952. pp. 12 sq Ju D Apre jan, Leksiceskaja semantika, Moskva, 1974, str. 180 sq., 252 etc).

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this conditionality itself appears to be reflected symmetrically in corresponding elements of different levels — cf. similar intersections for dharma—vānaprastha—āraṇyakā (I II), or for mokṣa saṁnyāsin upaniṣad (II-III).[31] All these correlations can be summed up in the following table (the notions that were included in above-mentioned traditional Indian classifications are underlined) :[32]

Certainly the criteria, accepted by us,[33] suggest only one of the possible descriptions. It must be stressed, however, that all the correlations stated here were established without breaking the traditional Indian canons. Thus, the above regularities cannot be regarded only as the result of a certain procedure, accomplished "from without" by an application of the investigator's scheme to the object of investigation. We can suppose that these regularities

31 One should add that similar parallelism can be observed here, as regards the ways of formation of corresponding groups; in other words, there is a certain analogy of diachronic order. As it was already said (see Notes 5, 13, 24) within the frames of caturbhadra, mokṣa (II-III) was added later to the first three, being to a certain extent deduced from dharma (I II); among the four āśramas saṁnyāsin (II III) held apart from vānaprastha (I II); among the śrūti texts upanisads (II III) held apart from brāhmanas and āranyakas (I II). Cf. on relative chronology of separate opposites in its more general mthodological aspect :V.V. Ivanov, V. N. Toporov. Slavjanskie jazykovye modelirujuscie semioticeskie sistemy, Moskva, 1965, str. 216.

32 It should be stressed that the present table is intended, in particular, to show a certain i omorphism between the *aggregates* (triads) of elements within the frames of the first level, as opposed to the fourth elements of corresponding sets. For typographical reasons it was difficult to avoid placing here separate notions of the I level one under another (as e.g. kāma gṛhastha artha-brahmacārin, etc.) which, however, by no means suggests (as was assumed and criticized by Ch. Malamoud — op. cit. p. 152) any special (or "one-to one") correspondence between them (cf. note 16). The same must be said of texts mentioned here, inasmuch as they relate more or less precisely to different principles and types of behaviour (the borders between separate genres, resp. contents, being still more conventional—see above, and note 24).

33 Speaking of these criteria in connection with our scheme (which can be regarded deductively as a consequent concretization of the most general distinctive feature S=O—S=O) one might be reminded of Max Born's remarks : "The world is composed of the ego and the non ego, the inner world and the outer world. The relations of these two poles are the object of every religion, of every philosophy. But the part that each doctrine assigns to the ego in the world is different. The importance of the ego in the world picture seems to me a measure, according to which we may order confessions of faith, philosophic systems, world views rooted in art or science, like pearls on a string" (from Introduction to his "Einstein's theory of Relativity" — See: M. Born, Physics in my generation, London, 1970, p. 1).

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Levels	I			II	III	
Distinctive features	differentiation between subject and object (S=O)				identity of subject and object (S=O)	
Classes of notions	acceptance of the world (conformity) with the opposites resulting from it			non acceptance (escapism) with limited number of qualities	absence of any opposites connected with S=O	
principles of behaviour	*artha* ("profit"—"damage")	*kāma* ("pleasure"—"displeasure")	*dharma* ("proper"—"not proper")	*moksa*		
Stages of life	*brahmacārin*	*grhastha*	*vānaprastha*	*saṁnyāsin* yati muni bhiksu	brāhmana arahant (=brahman,, ātman)	
States of conscience	*jāgarita*	*svapna*		*snṣupta*	*turīya*	
texts of sruti	*saṁhitā*	*brāhmaṇa*	*āraṇyaka*	*upaniṣad*		
examples of other texts	Arthaśāstra	Kāmasūtra	Manavadharmasāstra Bhagavadgītā (Mbh VI)	Dhammapada		

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are, to a certain extent, inherent in the object regarded "from within"; in other words, due to their specific qualities, separate Indian classifications present a rather convenient substance for such an approach. In particular, we refer here to the tendency to enumerate separate notions, with respect to the decrease of the number of their distinctive features and to the characteristics of level III situations. Thus, our scheme can be regarded as a kind of supplement to traditional Indian description, a supplement realizing and fixing some of its trends.[34] Such a correlation of different complementary descriptions (not reducible to a single one) seems to be an important point of scientific research.[35]

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34 In this connection we can mention, e.g., such number complexes as the triad and the tetrad which predominate in the above classifications. These latter, in particular, present an example of a noteworthy regularity in the relations between these complexes — we mean the transition from triad to tetrad (realized synchronically, as well as diachronically) by somehow adding the fourth element motivated by the first three — as their common symbol, their positive (as mokṣa) or negative antithesis, etc. (one can speak here of the operation 3+1 as a particular case of a more general formula n+1.) See in this connection, A. Bergaigne, La religion vedique d'apres les hymnes du Rigveda, t. II, Paris, 1883, p. 123; E. Cassirer, The philosophy of symbolic forms, vol. II, Mythical thought, New Haven, 1955, pp. 146 sq.; C. G. Jung, Versuch zu einer psychologischen Deutung des Trinitatsdogmas — "Symbolik des Geistes", Zurich, 1948, S. 323 — 446; E. F. Edinger, Trinity and quaternity — "Der Archetyp. The Archetype, Verh. des 2 Intern. Kongr. fur analytische Psychologie, Zurich 1961". Basel — New York 1964, pp. 16 29; Ivanov, Toporov, str. 30, n. 1; 36, n 23; 46; 85-89 etc ; A J. Syrkine, V. N. Toporov, La triade et la tetrade — "Tel Quel". 1968, no. 35, pp 27 sq.; J Gonda, The Hindu Trinity — "Anthropos", 63, 1963, pp. 212 226. idem Triads in the Veda. Amsterdam, 1976; D. Bhattacharya, The doctrine of four in the early upanisads and some connected problems—"Journal of Indian philosophy", vol. 6, No. 1, 1978, pp. 1 34; J. Naudou, L'analyse ternaire de la nature dane is pensee Indienne—"Revue de l'histoire des Religions, t. 197, fasc. 1, 1980, pp. 7 26; Malamoud, pp. 35 sq.; etc.

35 Concerning the application of the principle of complementarity to the humanities, cf. N. Bohr, Physical science and the study of religions—"Studia Orientalia Ioanni Pedersen", Hauniae, 1953, pp. 385-390; Idem, Atomphysik und menschliche Erkenntnis. Braunschweig, 1958; A.A. Zaliznjak, V. V Ivanov V. N. Toporov O vozmoznosti strukturno tipologiceskogo izucenija nekotoryz modelirujuscix semioticeskix sistem—"Strukturno-tipologiceskie issledovanija", Moskva, 1962, str. 139 sq. We should remember that ancient Indian authors were evidently aware of the fact that their own description had definite limits, that there are certain states in which the object of discussion cannot, in principle, receive an exhaustive description with the help of the classification proposed by them, and thus needs a

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Some additional remarks can be made, concerning our scheme. It is easy to observe that the levels suggested here differ from each other, with respect to their informative value. On the one hand, the contextual characteristics of separate notions undergo certain changes. At level I these notions are directly dependent upon ethical, pragmatic and aesthetic factors, closely connected with the complicated system of corresponding cultural values. Level II suggests a simpler context, since these values are regarded here more negatively — as the values already surpassed and rejected. Consequently, level III-characterized by the states of deep contemplation, trance or ecstatic rapture is usually described by an even more limited number of expressions (the identity S=O explicitly proclaimed; the neutralization of oppositions in the highest state; more oblique devices such as, e.g., the combination of opposite features, etc. — see above). On the other hand, the steady decrease in the number of pertinent oppositions (i.e. factors that define corresponding behaviour) can, in some cases, increase its uncertainty (cf. in this connection an interesting evidence of Dp XXVI. 420 mentioned above, note 17).

One can suggest the applicability of this scheme to the evidence of other traditions. Cf. e.g. European notion of "layman", corresponding to the whole complex of the level I institutions; the idea of rejection of these values in the state of a monk, a hermit (=II); definite states of enlightenment, ecstasy, etc. reminiscent of level III.[36] One can possibly apply here principles more effective than those derived from ancient Indian sources. Yet, some aspects of the study can, in our opinion, justify such a proposed application. In particular, it enables to define whether the compared elements belong to the same semantic level, or to similar "borderline" situations (cf. above) and thus provides an additional argument for the correctness of the comparison. The correlation being established, one can determine later the probabitity of finding parallels. This probability is evidently connected with the character of information presented at the corresponding level and, consequently, with a more

complementary description. So e.g. K 8 32; 10 6; etc., in a noteworthy parallelism with N. Bohr's views, contain remarks on the complementary character of rational (kramaḥ, gaṇanā) and irrational (rati, rāga) types of behaviour. Cf. A. Ja. Svrkin, Notes on the Kāma Sūtra — "Semiotica". 11. no. 1, 1974, pp. 38-39.

36 Cf. particularly the example of the "fool for Christ's sake" (like Symeon in Byzantine hagiography) whose behaviour is marked by unpredictable excesses, while preserving at the same time infallibility. Cf. on this latter and on the application of the present scheme: A Svrkin, On the behaviour of "fool for Christ's sake" — "History of Religions", vol. 22, No 2, Nov. 1982, pp. 150 171.

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or less restricted sphere of possible coincidences. Several examples can be added here to the above remarks.

In order to be correct, one should establish correspondence at level I, so that it would be based on the analogous position that the elements, we describe, occupy in their systems. In other words, the isomorphism (at least fragmentary) of corresponding structures seems to be an important condition here — without considering those semantic correlations which provide a context for the units compared, their combination proves at times to be incorrect. One can recall certain correspondences, which became stable enough in scientific literature but, in fact, rather distort the reader's adequate understanding and demand additional definitions (like dharma — "law", kāma — "love", brahmacārin — "pupil", etc.). We can thus suggest that the level I elements appear to be most specific, while the corresponding analogies are conditional and comparatively rare. At level II, which is connected with the rejection of mundane values, the context of each element seems to be restricted considerably for, as a rule, it is limited by a set of institutions that regulate the state of escapism (saṁnyāsin, bhikṣu, monk, etc.). Thus, observing the same principles of comparison, we come upon a greater probability of coincidences, with respect to concrete notions as well as to the character of separate speculations. One can mention, for example, the similar interpretations of leaving the world and overcoming mundane attractions as a therapeutic process which cures inner suffering ... cf. the well known analogies to the Buddhist "Four noble Truths", Philo's etymology of Therapeutai in describing their sect[37], etc.

Due to the character of level III the specificity of notions referring to it is, least of all, dependent upon the corresponding system of cultural values. Here we find a somewhat limited set of expressions. The rules of their construction can be traced easily enough and coincidences, sometimes verbal ones, appear rather often. E.g. the motif of love for God is proclaimed in different sources (neoplatonic, bhakti, sufic, etc.) to be either a necessary condition for entering level III or its attribute. The motif of union with God, Universe, etc. repeats itself in numerous instances — sacral as well as secular.[38] These coincidences can be found particularly in all the above variants (cf. notes 28, 29). Such are (to quote but a few examples from ancient and mediaeval Europe) the simultaneous combinations of opposite qualities (Heraclites, Fragmenta 62; 65; Philo Alexandrinus Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 207); the evidence on surmounting and neutralizing these opposites (Heraclites Fragmenta 50; 60; Nicolaus Cusanus, De filiatione Dei 3); sets of negations (Plato,

37 See Philo Alexandrinus, De vita contemplativa 2. Concerning this interpretation cf. G. Vermes, The Etymology of "Essenes" — "Revue de Qumran", 1960, t. 2, no. 7, pp. 427 sq.; Idem, Essenes and Therapeutai — ibid., 1962, t. 3, no. 12, pp. 495 sq.; etc. (we do not dwell here upon corresponding discussion).

38 Cf. e.g. in Russian poetry: A. K. Tolstoy's opposition between the mundane love "fallen to pieces" and the final fusion "in one love" ("Sleza drozit..."). B. Pasternak's "the fusion of ourselves in all others" ("Sv'd'ba"), etc.

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Symposion. XXIX — on K ov; Plotinus, Enneadae I. 8. 1; Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 1.14); etc. The last variant finds a logical completion in the idea of pure negation (cf. famous "na iti, na iti" in BU II. 3.6; numerous Buddhist parallels; etc.)[39].

These principles by no means enable us to find any quantitative characteristic of the probability discussed here. Nor do they appear to be the only factor regulating this probability. The latter is evidently subject to variation (particularly within the framework of the same level) with respect to certain other circumstances, such as the character of tradition, which conserved corresponding evidence; the genre of the source; etc. Nevertheless, in establishing separate typological parallels the above regularities can, in our opinion, prove to be methodologically useful — e.g. for the evaluation of a broader cultural importance, presented by such parallels. It can possibly serve as one of the arguments in judging to what degree the corresponding conclusions are grounded. The same refers to those cases in which the proposed analogies are interpreted in terms of genetic relations, for the latter's probability, ceteris paribus, evidently decreases with the transition from level I to level III.

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39 See O. Franke, Der Negativismus in der alten Buddhalehre — "Aufsatze sur kultur=und Sprachgeschichte vornehmlich des Orients, E. Kuhn... gewidmet", Breslau, 1916, S. 336 sq.; C A F. Rhys Davids, Buddhism and the negative, — "Journal of the Pali text Society", 1924 1927, pp. 237 sq ; B. Heimann. The significance of negation in Hindu philosophical texts, — "B. C. Law volume", pt. II, Poona, 1946, pp. 408 sq ; A. Wayman. The Buddhist "Not this, Not this" — "Philosophy East and West", v. 11, no. 3, 1961, pp. 99 sq Cf. the Scotus Eriugena's saying: "Deus propter excellentiam non immerito Nihil vocatur"; the teachings of Maimonides ("Know that the negative attributes of God are true attributes... He has no positive attribute whatever" — "Moreh nebuchim" I, LVIII — The guide for the Perplexed by Moses Maimonides, tr. by M. Friedlander, N. Y. 1956, pp. 81 sq), etc. Cf in this connection preaching silence as the most adequate form of comprehending and worshipping the highest Being — in the teachings of Candrakīrti, Śaṁkara, Meister Eckhardt, Giordano Bruno, a.o. up to L. Wittgenstein's theses on "things that cannot be put into words" (Tractatus logico-philosophicus, tr. by D. F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, London 1974: 6.42; 6.522; 7). "It is especially the cult of mysticism, in all ages and among all peoples, that grapples again and again with this intellectual double problem — the task of comprehending the Divine in its totality, in its highest inward reality, and yet avoiding any particularity of name or image. Thus all mysticism is directed toward a world beyond language, a world of silence"(E. Cassirer, Language and Myth, transl. by S K. Langer, New York 1953, p. 74, cf 79). Cf. also T. Organ. The language of mysticism — "The Monist", vol. 47, No. 3, 1963, pp. 436 sq.; B. Matilal. Mysticism and reality: ineffability — "Journal of Indian philosophy", vol. 3, No 3-4, 1975, pp. 217 252; M. Gene Blocker. The language of mysticism — "The Monist", vol. 59, No. 4, 1976, pp. 554 sq., etc.

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IV

Inverted Time as a Principle of Thought Emotion and Action

Raja Ram Shastri

The problem of extreme secrifices for moral objective is not solved on purely social grounds and religious mysticism has thus had ample ground for recognition in this sphere. To obviate or clarify this mysticism, it seems necessary to go into the social evolution of mankind and gradual emergence of an yet unconscious idea with a tendency to place what is past into the future. The question is what do we gain by martyrdom or dying for a moral cause. The answer seems to be that we have already reaped the fruits of this type of sacrifice in the shape of cohesion of our society down the ages and, in future too, shall secure the existence of society only by unconditional sacrifices, as and when the need arises. Let us remind ourselves of the story that once upon a time, a demon used to make raids on a population of men and take one or two of them for his meal. In course of time after experiencing years of misery, people thought that in order to get rid of perpetual fear and uncertainty of life, which makes it impossible for all of us to live in peace and stability, why not change this disorder into as much order as possible by our own initiative; and after some deliberation, decided to offer one of themselves everyday for the demon's meal, thus pacifying him and securing for themselves some order and relative peace in their community life. Although in actual terms, they made the same sacrifice as they did before this arrangement, but psychologically they thus introduced certainty and peace in their lives.

Now suppose some one of them whose turn it was to be offered to the demon on a certain day stood up and questioned 'what do I gain by sacrificing myself', is the question admissible? Does it lie smooth in his mouth to ask this question and run away from paying

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the price of the security of life, for however limited a period, which he had already enjoyed ? What would the community do in face of this resistance ? They can use their joint force against such an individual and offer him to the demon in order keep the social system intact. But this would not be a very perfect arrangement. The man may abscond, forcing the community to offer the next man in his place to honour the contract. One or two such cases may not very seriously disturb the system, but an increasing number may. So external force will have to be substituted in course of time by a strong public opinion and ultimate internalization of this opinion in the conscience of the members of the society which would emerge on of a number of experiences of the breach of conformity under which every body had to suffer. In course of time this in-built mechanism of moral imperative would be left intact more or less in different members of the community while the historical background providing the reason for the development of the categorical imperative would be forgotten, so much so that people, on demand of reason, would have to look afresh into the question and devise new answers in conformity with the climate of thought developed in the period.

Now what is the state of philosophic thinking prevailing in our own times ? Apart from mystic reasons for believing in the immortality of human existence in some form or other, psychology has discovered a strong wish in man for immortality which he fulfils in imagination and projects into external reality in defiance of direct experience to the contrary. He has, thus, to devise a world beyond this world, not available to direct experience, wherein human existence continues its progress after physical death in this world. This other world is mythologically conceived by various religions in different forms as transmigration of souls, detached from the bodies, by the religions of Indian origin; heaven and hell to be allotted on the day of judgement 'Qayamat' by the religions of Biblical origin and so on. Philosophers, on the other hand, do not believe in transmigration to this very world or in heaven and hell which are only a replica of this world with the only difference that they provide compensations of the deficiences of this world. In stead, they conceive a noumenal world behind the curtain of the phenomenal world which alone is accessible to the cognitive faculties of man. The noumenal world, the 'Thing in Itself' or 'Things in themselves', constitutes the final, absolute and permanent reality of which the world of appearances is only a shadow and in which all things including men are rooted and have their ultimate being. Although this reality cannot be experienced directly, all experience points to it, in fact, presumes it, As time, space and causality belong to the phenomenal world, the Absolute reality is timeless and man's existence being rooted in it is eternal in this aspect. Thus both

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predominant, religions and philosophies concur on human existence being essentially immortal in the noumenal world.

Now this imortality of human existence, however conceived, provides a handy reason for operation of causality in the moral field. No action need belief causality-without which one cannot think-as any action which could not be compensated in this world would be compensated in the other. This formulation is so simple, so reassuring and satisfying to human understanding that it hugs it and sticks to it inspite of the philosophers' assumption that causality does not work in the noumenal world. The principle of causality is born of phenomenal experience wherein cause invariably precedes effect. So causality, aided by the theory of immortality, provides a complete rational justification for moral action in the shape of rewards and punishment unavoidably meted out in this world or the other; and human thinking on this account rests satisfied. And thus an inversion of the actual sequence of action and its consequence has taken place in the human mind; and moral sacrifice which should have been regarded as repayment of cultural debts incurred in the past has come to be looked upon as a new act to be rewarded in future, and a sin committed today to be expiated tomorrow.

Once this temporal inversion of the past becoming the future or, in terms of causality, the cause becoming the effect, is achieved and entrenched in the human mind, the need is never felt of going over cultural history to detect how the moral principle itself developed gradually in the course of evolution of human societies and how historical experience gradually led people to the discovery of the law that those societies whose members could make necessary sacrifices for their preservation won the race against other societies; and self-sacrificing individuals came to be regarded by their own societies as highly valued people and were jealously preserved. By setting a high value on the virtue of self-sacrifice, societies secured their preservation; and the individuals who held within their personality and life the promise of its realization were endowed with a privileged position in society. Thus in course of time the moral principle was established in all civilized societies and enshrined in their code of conduct to be followed by their members to the best of their capacity. Through cultural inheritance it was incorporated into people's conscience and became the categorical imperative/ dictating and judging all their actions from within.

But this historical achievement was, under the impact of prevailing philosophical and psychological ideas, projected into the future by the instrumentality of temporal inversion to comply with the law of causality which proceeds from cause to effect, from past to future.

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Once we catch hold of the idea of temporal inversion, we can easily see how deeply entrenched it is in our minds and how many other phenomena of life are explained by it. Take for instance the tragedy of love lost. Muslim poets specially show more concern for lost love than for its fruition. Whatever may be the cultural reasons behind this obsessional emphasis on the frustration aspect of love, the phenomenon itself is by no means rare and is part of the story in all cutures. It is only for the extreme intensity of emotion expressed by them, that the muslim poets are an apt example to gain an understanding of the problem, particularly interesting in this regard is the picture they draw of their condition after death. Two features are noticeable. First, they imagine that their beloveds may repent, too late though, and come to their graves to offer flowers as a token of their appreciation of the sincerity of love. Second, that once they have lost their love in life, their grief and misery is endless and they would be writting in their graves till the Doom's Day. The first aspect is partly explained by the psychology of wish fulfilment in the shape of a pleasant expectation that the beloved would repent, though late in the day, and their love would ultimately be rewarded. In imagination this wishful thinking is quite understandable in life, but when it is extended to the grave, it certainly takes recourse to th mechanism of temporal inversion in transfering the whole experience of frustration in life as already lived together with the aspiration for and expectation of a positive response from the beloved, to an unknown future. In this the belief in a life after death is evidently helpful. But the second feature does not possess this compensation aspect and seems to be purely tragic, unless we take the Doom's Day itself to provide the final judgement of the sincerity of love when the beloved would have an occasion to repent and accept genuine love. Leaving aside for the present this farfetched notion, and dwelling on the purely tragic aspect of the idea of eternal frustration, in life after death, the only rational explaination of it would seem to be the realisation that with the loss of love all is over with the lover. nothing worthwhile remains in life. As love over powers all other interests, life loses all its meaning and becomes equivalent to death. The intensity of grief is so over brimming that the present is incapable of containing it and it has to still over to an unending future. Even suicide does not hold any promise of peace. Evidently the idea of immortality here offers a support to life and a defence against suicidal tendency, although in a negative way. Thus this second aspect of frustrated imagination, though more tragic, is more realistic and mature. It seems to provide the stuff real tragedies in act and literature one made of. Any way, in so far as it imagines a life after death. it also projects the whole emotion and thought of life as actually lived. to an indefinite future. The mechanism of temporal inversion and projection of past into future is evidently at work.

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A third aspect of frustrated love may also be mentioned briefly. In fact it is one of the off shoots of the second aspect. In the sense that it is a way of bearing a life of complete frustration. It is a sort of withdrawal from reality and substituting the image of the beloved in place of the real beloved and carrying it through life as a constant companion, poets say that even the psychosis of disappointment has a positive aspect in the it constantly holds the image of the loved one in its lap. In fact the image is more satisfactory as it can be carried over to the future irrespective of changes of mind and body occuring in the original. Of course, complete withdrawal from reality into the world of imagination is a condition precedent and the idea of actual frustration becoming one's inexorable destiny which pursues one in future life or lives for good lends a helping hand to withdrawal from the real world. In fact it is a substitute for suicide.

Now from frustrated love, we come to positive love, the depth, the intensity and the ideas it generates regarding the personality of the love-object have not yet found their rational explanation, as there is no basis for their justification in reality. The divinity, the selfleseness, the timelessness, the exclusive mutual consonance and the discovery of this "mind for each other" situation by destiny attributed to genuine love by the lovelorns is sharply in contradiction to the historicity, the limited choice, the factor of chance in discovering each after, the changing personality of the loved one, and the changing intensity of the emotion itself observed in real life. It seems that the divinity or spirituality pertains to the emotion itself and not to the persons experiencing it or to the situations in which it is experienced. As it is sex-love which perpetually goes on recreating the world of living beings and in a sublimated form brings individuals together and become a creative and binding force for societies, it is absolutely necessary for the continued existence of all living beings, particularly for the socio-cultural progress of man with its unlimited possibilities. Such a positive and constructive emotion which gathered force for ages, from one stage of evolution to another, from one generation to another, proving its usefulness all along and getting stronger and stronger in the process is bound to overwhelm the individual when it descends on him, or rather, when the individual chooses to attract it, with its intensity and other-wordliness, for it was developed for cosmic purposes, not solely to serve any particular individual. once it comes to the individual, it naturally projects its cosmic purpose, its pervasiveness and its timelessness to the individuals experencing it and to the situations in which it is experienced. Apart from this, it is and remains a force for permanent and exclusive intensity as far as it is consistent with the changing conditions in actual life of the individual. Now from this diagnosis again we realize that the absoluteness and permanence attributed to genuine love is a projection of past history of the emotion to future by the mechanism of temporal inversion.

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The principle of temporal inversion comes to its own in the field of knowledge itself. For can we think without the law of causality? And what is the law of causality if it is not the condensed experience of the past? In the past all things have invariably behaved in certain ways and these ways are the laws of nature. The law of causality is one of these laws. Certain things or events called effects have invariable been preceded by certain other things or events called causes; and we have been habituated to expect a cause to every effect and an effect to every cause. This mental habit becomes the logical law of our understanding of all things once we project our internal habit on to external reality andtake it for granted that the law is physical rather than psychological and is followed by all things in the world of experience independently of our minds. The law itself and the concomitances it summarises, its universality or eternality cannot be substantiated by any means availnble to human understanding other than itself. So it has been and so it shall be-the projection of past into the future. The principle of temporal inversion is observable in this field in a naked form, although it is more easily acceptable to common sense which is helpless withnut it in all its operations. One special feature of it is to be noted here. It does not require the belief in a life after death for its operation But once the idea is developed, it extends itself to that field too to demonstrate the operation of causality in the spheres of moral action and love-life to assure that virtue and genuine love are bound to be rewarded. The principle seems to have its natural origin in the field of congnition of truth to operate later as a basic assumption in the fields of love emotion and moral action strengthened by the development of the notion of immortality.

Incidentally, what about the ultimate Reality from which the moral imperative, the aesthetic inspiration and intuition of truth emanate? The foregoing analysis forcibly brings us to the idea that ever developing culture with its unlimited possibilities is the real Absolute assumed in all human thought, symbolised in art, mythologized in religion, and idealised in ethics. It is in its preservation, continuance and enrichment that human individual finds the meaning of his life, and in contributing his mite to it, he has his fulfilment. With it is involved his identity. He is a wave in the current, a component of the totality, and shares its eternality, beauty and clan.

The moral law in the light of this discussion would assume the shape of complete freedom for the individual to contribute to the progress of human culture according to his own understand and to decide, in a particular situation, how best his action would contribute to its development while dealing with another individual, a community, a situation, an ideology or a movement. He would not be hampered either by the golden rule 'to do as you would be done by' or by Kant's practical translation of the categorical imperative in the form Do what you like everybody todo'. Although the golden rule and the principle of action that can be socialised are very helpful in making a moral decision, they do not take into account the peculiarity of a historical situation and the individuality of the decision maker who may be called upon to make a decision which may not be socialised and may go against the golden rule or modified ideals of conduct like, truth, non-violence, non-acquistition etc.

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V

The Concept of Gnostic Being in the Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo

K. P. Verma

According to Sri Aurobindo the being endowed with supramental consciousnes is called the Superman or the Gnostic being. He distinguishes five levels of consciousness. These five levels are in the ascending orders. Mind-Higher mind illumined Mind-Intuition-Overmind and Supermind. The first level, above our human intelligence is the level of higher mind, "a mind no longer of mingled light and obscurity or half-light, but a large clarity of the spirit."[1] In a sense it is the level of luminous thought-mind. Then comes the level of illumined mind which does work primarily on thought but by vision "thought is here only a subordinate movement expressive of sight." At this level the luminous thought mind is further illumined by vision. By the joint efforts of thought and sight a representative image of truth is created at this stage. But the very possibility of visualizing Reality is dependent on intuition-the third level. The first two stages primarily draw the knowledge from the intuitional source and they turn that into thought and sight. Sri Aurobindo very nicely compares the flashed of supramental truth revealed in intuition with an edge of a blade. "Intuition is always an edge or ray or out leap of a superior light, it is in us a projecting blade, edge or point of a far-off supermind light."[2] But "the flash of intuition is quickly replaced or intercepted, before it has a chance of manifesting itself by a rapid imitative mental movement."[3] So we can not depend upon this tiny nucleus and we have to rise still

1 Sri Aurobindo, The life Divine, Vol. II, p. 985.
2 Ibid, p. 996.
3 Ibid, p, 999.

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ot wards, of course we should not forget that this intuition marke "the beginning of higher knowledge."[4]

The next level of consciousness after intuition and before supermind is the level of Overmind. "Sri Aurobindo calls it the first parent of ignorance. It is the opening into the cosmic consciousness."[5] This Overmind is a Superconscient cosmic mind in direct contact with the Supramental truth consciousness. This is the source from which intuition draws its plight. We may describe this stage as the glass made boundary-wall between knowledge and ignorance." When mind reaches this stage of overmind it gets the glimpse of supramental gnosis, the supreme truth consciousness, it cannot in itself develop this into full integration. The indivisible unity of Sat, Chit and Anand, in supermind, is lost here and it can at best cognize the "seemingly differences together in a reconciling vision"[6] Supermind conciousness is thus the perfect knowledge. It is the culmination and consummation of all inframental and supramental consciousness.

The supermind transmute man into a divine being because the supermind is the consciousness-force of satchchidanand. With the grace of the Absolute/satchchidanand the supreme realization is possible in man. According to Sri Aurobindo the descent of Divine is never one sided affair. No human effort can compel the Divine to descend. Divine descent is possible only when there is a proper preparation on the part of the human being to receive. When the ground is prepared the supermind or the Divine descent will be possible. This descent radically will transform all existence material, vital and mental Human beings will be transformed into gnostic beings.

Thus the supreme realisation makes the individual a divine being, a superman. a gnostic being. The destiny of man is to become a gnostic being, a divine being a superman. The supreman or gnostic being is like a god on the earth. It possesses the divine consciousness, power, truth etc. It possesses a divine body, a divine life, a divine mind. Sri Aurobindo says "The gnostic individual would be the consumation of the spiritual man; his whole way of being, thinking, living, acting would be governed by the power of a vast universal spirituality. All the trinities of the spirit would be real to his self awareness and realised in his inner life. All his existence would be fused into oneness with the transcendent and universal self and Spirit; all his actions would originate from and obey the supreme self and Spirit's divine governance of Nature, All life would

4 Ibid, P. Vol. I. P. 418.
5 Bhattacharya, A. C. Sri Aurobindo and Bergson A Synthetic Study. Jagabandhu Prakashan, Gyanpur (Varanasi) 1972 p. 63.
6 Sri Aurobindo, The life Divine, vol. I pp. 428-29.

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have to him the sense of the Conscious Being, the Purusha within, finding its self-expression in Nature; his life and all its thoughts, feelings, acts would be filled for him with that significance and built upon that foundation of its reality."

The gnostic being is in the world and of the world. He also exceeds it in his consciousness. He lives in his Self of transcendence above it. He is in the universe but free in the universe. He is individual but not limited by a separate individuality. He is not an isolated entity; his individuality is universal. He individualises the universe. He is the perfect and complete individual. "In the lower grades of gnostic being, there would be a limitation of self-expression according to the variety of the nature, a limited perfection in order to formulate some side, element or combined harmony of element of some Divine Totality, a restricted selection of powers from the cosmic figure of the infinitely manifold one. But in the supramental being this need of limitation for perfection would disappear; the diversity would not be secured by limitation but by a diversity in the power and hue of the Supernature: the same whole of being and the same whole of nature would express themselves in an infinitely diverse fashion; for each being would be a new totality, harmony, self-equation of the One Being.i"[7]

The gnostic being, having the will of action, known what is to be willed and the power to effectuate its knowledge. It is not be guided by ignorance to do what is not be done. Its action does not seek its fruit. "Its joy is in being and doing, in pure state of Spirit, in pure act of Spirit, in pure bliss of the Spirit."[8] The knowledge of the gnostic being is not an ideative knowledge but the Real-Idea of the supermind. It is the instrument of an essential light of Consciousness. He possesses a truth-conscious control of the realised spirit's power over its physical world. He also possesses the full power of the mental and vital places. This greater knowledge increases the power of instrumentation of the gnostic being. He is a sign of an evolution, the consciousness of the ignorance into the consciousness of Sachchidananda. The spiritual man knows his self. He has discovered it. He is always conscious of it. He can turn our ignorant becoming into a luminous becoming of knowledge and a realised power of being. Attachment and bondage are not there because at each step there is the ecstacy of delight of existence.

The gnostic being uses Matter but without material or vital attachment. He feels that he is using the Spirit for its own purpose. There is a sense of respect for them. He uses them with great care. He takes a care for a perfect and fau'tless use of his divine materials. According to Sri Aurobindo the gnostic being does not reject

7 Ibid, p. 973.
8 Ibid, p. 976.

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Matter. Life and Mind. They are preserved in his personality after transformation. He respects the lower forms of existenee as they are also Brahman in a veiled form "The Spirit has made itself Matter in order to place itself there as an instrument of the well being and joy. yogaksema, of created beings...[9] Sri Aurobindo further says "The supramental transformation, the supramental evolution must carry with it a lifting of mind, life and body out of themselves into a greater way of being in which yet their own ways and powers would be. not suppressed or abolished, but perfected and fulfilled by the self exceeding."[10]

"The gnostic being (vijnana maya) is in its character a truth-consciousness, a centre and circumference of the truth vision of things, a massed movement or subtle body of gnosis. Its action is self-fulfilling and radiating action of the truth power of things according to the inner law of their deepest truest self and nature."[11]

Sri Aurobindo maintains that the gnostic or supramental individual is a self without personality. He can be said an impersonal Purush. There are many gnostic individuals having self without personality. They are same in being and nature. Personality and impersonality are not taken opposed to each other in supermind consciousness. They are inseparable aspects of one and the same reality. This reality is not the ego but the being, who is impersonal and universal. Impersonality is something fundamental and universal. It is an existence, a force, a consciousness which takes on various shapes of its being and energy. Though they are impersonal and universal but they are taken by the individual as material for the building of his personality. In this way impersonality is of the Being in the original undifferentiated truth of things. In the dynamic truth of things it differentiated its power and constitute by their variations the manifestation of personality. Personality of the person means his expression in nature status and nature action. It is the form of himself that he puts forth as his manifestation developed natural being or self in nature. In the formless individual it is his personal expression of what is personal. In his formless unlimited self he is not that. But he gives to them his own turn in the manifestation so that each among the many is a unique self of the one Divine. "The Divine, the Eternal expresses himself as existence, consciousness, bliss, wisdom, knowledge, love, beauty. and we can think of him as these impersonal and universal powers of himself, regard them as the nature of the Divine and Eternal; we can say that God is Love, God is Wisdom, God is Truth or Righteousness; bnt he is not himself an impersonal state or abstract of states or qualities;

9 Ibid, p. 987.
10 Ibid, p. 982.
11 Aurobindo, Sri—The Synthesis of Yoga, p. 557.

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he is the Being at once absolute, universal and individual."[12] The gnostic being, being the nature of Divine, repeats in himself his natural mystery of existence.

A supramental gnostic being is a spiritual personal. He is not a personality having the fixed qualities, determined character. He cannot be that because he is a conscious expression of the universal and the transcendent. The gnostic being identified his self, his will with the universal self and universal will. The dualism and conflict of mine and thine is not there. Sri Aurobindo observes "...He would act in a universal awareness and a harmony of his individual self with the total self, of his individual will with the total will of his individual action with the total action."[13]

The nature of the gnostic person is an infinite and universal being revealing. The consciousness of the gnostic person is an infinite consciousness. Thus all the character of the life and action of the gnostic being is self-determined. There is no separate problem of ethics. There is no problem at all. The Vedanta also observes that the essential character or liberation means to rise beyond virtue and sin, good and evil. Liberation means an emergence into a true spiritual nature of being where all action is the automatic expression of that truth and there can be nothing else. "All ethics is a construction of good in a Nature, which has been smitten with evil by the powers of darkness born of Ignorange, even as it is expressed in the ancient legend of the Vedanta."[14] Liberation attained by an evolution of the spiritual being is to grow into this nature of our true being, a nature of spiritual truth and oneness. Once this is done the virtue, dharma all disappears. There is no law of conduct. "All becomes a self flow of spiritual self-nature. Swadharma of Swadhava."[15]

The gnostic being lives in the consciousness of the Infinite. He creates his own self manifestation as an individual. He does so as a centre of a larger universality and at the same time a centre of the transcendence. The individual nature is not separate but a current of the supernature. The knowledge and action of the gnostic being have the wideness and plasticity of an infinite freedom. This grasps its object. It is bound by the integral truth of the whole. The supramental gnostic being possesses knowledge self determined by the will of the Infinite in the supernature. This self-determining knowledge is the very law of the existence of gnostic being. Truth of spirit and life become one and cannot vary. The two principles

12 Aurobindo, Sri-The Life Divine, p. 993.
13 Ibid, p. 974.
14 Ibid, p. 997.
15 Ibid, pp. 997 98.

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of freedom and order are seem to be contraries in mind and life. But it is not so if freedom is guided by knowledge and order is based on truth of being. They are in supermind consciousness native to each other and fundamentally one. Both (freedom and order) are inseparable aspects of the inner spiritual truth. Hence their determinations are one. The gnostic being does not feel his liberty infringed by the imperative order of his thoughts or actions. He feels both his liberty and the order of his liberty to be one truth of his being. His liberty of action is not a license to act upon wrong will. This is alien to his being. Here it can be said that the supermind knowledge will of the gnostic being has a perfect control of the mind, heart, life and body. This is true only in the transitional stage. The transitional stage is that when the supernature remoulds these members to its own nature. Once this transition is complete there will be no need of control.

In the gnostic being there is no ego; there is no unfulfilled desires of his own. His desires are transformed in the desires of the Sachchidananda. The Sachchidananda, the Brahman has no desires. In the words of Sri Aurobindo "... there can be no aim of being except to be, no aim of consciousness except to be conscious of being, no aim of delight of being other than its delight; all is a self-existent and self-sufficient Eternity."[16]

In a gnostic being there is no conflict between self-affirmation of the ego and a control by super ego. In his action of life he expresses himself. He knows the Divine as his true self. The Divine is the source and constituent of his spiritual individuality. The will of the self of the gnostic being is one with the will of the Ishwar. It is not a separative or contrary self-will. In the mental nature there can be an opposition between self-effort and obedience to the Higher Will but in the supramental nature there is no opposition, the person is being of the Being. The action of the person is the action of the Ishwar. Thus the Divine knowledge and Force act through the gnostic being. This unity gives him his liberty. There is no question of selfishness or altruism. The principle of supramental life is the knowledge by identity. The gnostic being lives his own life without any contact with a life of the Ignorance. All his actions in the world are enlightened by a truth of vision. He is in close consciousness of the self of others. He acts not out of a surface sentiment of love and sympathy but out of his close mutual consciousness. He sees a divine working everywhere. There is no separative ego in him. He does not live for a separate ego, nor he lives for the purpose of any collective ego. "He lives in and for the Divine in himself, in and for the Divine in the collectivity, in and for the Divine in all beings"[17]

16 Ibid, p. 980.
17 Ibid, p. 1030.

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The gnostic feels a single consonant Force of supernature acting in all. He feels his harmony with the whole gnostic life around him. "The gnostic being would be in union and communion with the Consciousness-Force that is the root of everything: his vision and his will would be the channel of the supramental Real-Idea, the self-effective Truth-Force; his action would be a free manifestation of the power and workings of the root Force of existence, the force of an all determining conscious Spirit whose formulations of consciousness work out inevitably in Mind, Life and Matter."[18]

The gnostic being takes the world of Life and Matter and turns it to his own truth and purpose of existence. He possesses the secret of a spiritual creation. He is in communion and oneness with the creator within him. In inmost existence the gnostic being is alone with God, one with Eternal. Sri Aurobindo observes "A change would begin with its firm appearance; that change would be consummated when the supramental evolution become complete and rose into the greater fulness of a supreme manifestation of the existence-consciousness-Delight, Sachchidananda."[19] In "Savitri" Sri Aurobindo says—

"When superman is born as Nature's king
His presence shall transfigure Matter's world:
He shall light up Truth's fire in Nature's night,
He shall lay upon the earth Truth's greater law;
Man too shall turn towards the Spirit's call."[20]

Sri Auronbindo's conceptions of superman will not be complete if we do not compare it with the superman of Nietzsche. Sri Aurobindo's superman is quite different and opposed to Nietzsche's superman. Nietzsche believes that the superman is the fittest in the human race. According to Sri Aurobindo the superman is a perfectly spiritual being. According to Nietzsche the superman is an embodiment of a titan or asure and not a god. The new race of superman is an incarnation of Asura type of man. He is possessed of the qualities of physical strength. He is powerful, egoistic, cruel and hard hearted. In this way Sri Aurobindo's superman is a godman (Sura) and Nietzsche's superman is a Titan (Asura). Nietzsche's superman condemns the traditional morality. He struggles with his fellow being and surpasses them. But Sri Aurobindo's superman is the medium through which the divine light is spread in the universe. This comparison shows that Nietzsche's superman is a miserable creature. He is really a super animal a blonde beast. He has no Divine consciousness. Instead of divinization he destroys the

18 Ibid, p. 1039.
19 Ibid, p. 1014.
20 Aurobindo Sri—Savitri, Book Eleven Canto One, p. 796.

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humankind. Sri Aurobindo observes "Any attempt to highten inordinately the mental or exaggerate inordinately the vital man, — a Nietzschean supermanhood, for example, — can only colossalize the human creature, it cannot transform or divinise him. A different possibility opens if we can live within the inner being and make it the direct ruler of life or station ourselves on the spiritual or intuitive planes of being and from there and by their power transmute our nature."[21]

On the contrary to Nietzshe's view the gnostic being of Sri Aurobindo is a Divine man. He observes that they are "not an egoistic supermanhood seizing on a mental and vital domination over humanity, but the sorevereignty of the Spirit over its own instruments, its possession of itself and its possession of life in the power of the spirit, a new consciousness in which humanity itself shall find its own self exceeding and self-fulfilment by the revelation of divinity that striving for birth within it."[22]

Bergson also comes very close to Sri Aurobindo when he describe the notion of Grands Mystiques. Though Bergson does not call his 'Grands Mystiques' as superman or Gnostic being yet like Sri Aurobindo he believes that we human beings with our body and mind, can soar up to the ethereal region of divinity and exist in the nature of the divine and still continue our earthly existence as men but superior to those whom we call men. Those who reach the goal are called by Bergson as great mystics or Grands Mystiques. The Bergsonian Grand Mystique has none of the Asurika or demonic nature of the superman of Nietzsche. Love and humility as opposed to non-compassion and Cruelty are the essential attributes of his great mystics. "In this elevation", Bergson says, "he (the mystics) feels no pride, great is his humility." Divinity, according to Bergson, consists in love and mystic soul will have a thorough love and not an instinctive cruelty, for the whole world. This view of Bergson corresponds with Sri Aurobindo's ideas of the life divine. Sri Aurobindo also says that in the beginning of the supramental dawning, only the eleveted souls will ascend to the supermind consciousness. The inferior world which is still far inferior in perfection are to be transformed by those leaders or Gnostic beings. The function of the great mystics and the gnostic beings in the first stage of the supramental dawning becomes almost the same. There might be some difference between them in this respect that Bergson does not, like Sri Aurobindo, emphasize so much on the cosmic transformation of everything of the world into devine nature. But none the less, the word radical transformation which Bergson repeats so many times can be interpreted in this sense.

21 Aurobindo Sri—The Life Divine, p. 722.
22 Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine, Vol. I pp. 28-29.
23 Bergson, H. The two sources of morality and religion p. 221.

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VI

The Classic Patanjali-yoga
An Attempt for A Marxist Interpretation

K. D. Kanev

SOME INTRODUCTORY WORDS

To write a monographic work on Yoga is both a difficult and responsible task. And from the fact that publications on Yoga go already into uncountable numbers, logically at least two main conclusions have to be derived : the practically impossible undertaking to get acquainted even with some of the most important of them, and the reasonable doubt that something entirely new could be said in this field.

Interpretations of Yoga (as an Indian original and unique theory and practice) so far, have been mainly in the sense of idealism (spiritualism and mystics), with a theologic directedness, in the first place because of the fact, that in the class-antagonistic societies (in the past and nowadays) Yoga could be used for ideologic conclusions in their favour. In general Yoga has been their concession until recently.

But in spite of all this, we decided to go daringly into the unique labyrinths of Yoga's theory and practice with the reason and feeling of the scientific duty that it is high time to make some attempt for a deeper interpretation of Yoga also in the light of the scientific-Marxist methodology. At the same time this will also be a peculiar response to the appeals of UNESCO to scholars all over the world in regard to the necessity of a deep investigation in the field of Yoga too. But we are inspired also by the positive appraisal on the side of some foreign scientists for our theoretical treatment of some of the cardinal problems of Yogism.

Our investigation on Yoga is accomplished in two directions: study of the Sanskrit classic Yoga texts and their relative comments, and a critical analysis of publications at least by some of the distinguished Yoga-adepts and other authors nowadays.

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Our object of this study are the classic "Yoga-Sutras" of Patanjali, which will be realised in two parts (the first part; translation and philosophically-methodological analysis of the relevant aphorisms, and the second part; a critical survey of contemporary interpretations on the cardinal problems of the Yogist theory and practice.

I take this opportunity to express ma hearthy thanks to the world-known Indian scientist and philosopher Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, as well as to the Dep. Director of the Indian National Library — Dr. Harish Gupta, in connection with the afforded possibility to use a number of valuable classic and modern publications on Yogism.

THEORETICAL RECAPITULATION OF SOME MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS

In fact this investigation is a first attempt for a Marxist interpretation of the classic "Yoga-Aphorisms". It is traditionally thought that the author or compiler of this first Yoga-compendium is the ancient Indian sage Patanjali, who lived between the IVth and IInd centuries, A.D.

Primarily fixed in one of the oldest, richest and most difficult languages — the Sanscrit (in Devangari writing), the first Yoga-treatise consists of 196 aphorisms, set out in four sections (*Padas*),

The first section is entitled *Samadhi Pada*, which literally translated means "Section of Concentration", and contains 51 aphorisms.

The title itself of this section suggests, that the central problem in it is the concentration of mind (*Samadhi*). But parallelly with it are postulated a multiplicity of other cardinal problems of Patanjali Yoga, which in different aspects are dealt with in the other three sections.

One of the multitudes of discussion problems here is the first definition of the term "Yoga", set out by Patanjali as early as in his second aphorism, by the Sanscrit phrase, "YOGA CITTA VRTTI NIRODHA".

The discussions about the translation and interpretation of this key aphorism begin from ancient times and still go on these days. The own translation-interpretation of the author reads : "Yoga is control (direction, curbing, detaining) of the modifications of mind".

Simultaneously the author holds to the standpoint, that the word "Yoga" is a derivation from the Sanscrit root "iuj", whose archaic meaning is "harnessing" or "curbing". Thus in the Yoga literature Yoga begins traditionally to be translated as "union", tying together", "uniting", "unity", "concord", etc.

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But to proceed only from the etymology of the word "Yoga" is not enough, because it does not become clear what a "unity", "concord", etc. is meant. As for example the mysticist-idealist Yajnavalkya (who lived between the IXth and IVth centuries B.C.) speaks about the unity between universal spirit — Brahman, and the individual spirit — Atman. But this conception is not accepted even by the Vedantist Madhavacaria, because Patanjali would at least have quoted this.

The endeavour of the author towards an objective translation and interpretation of the aphorism, as well as the interpretation of "Yoga" as "unity", "concord", etc. gives him reason to make a first attempt for a Marxist philosophically-methodological determination of the term "Yoga" as it follows: (1) in a tighter meaning of the word "Yoga" means "unity", "concord", etc. between the physical and the spiritual in man; (2) in a broader sense of the word "Yoga" "means "unity", "concord", etc. between the subject and the object of concentration.

According to the author not less discussionable is also the term "*Samadhi*" (with its two basic stages: *Samprajnata* and *Asamprajnata*). In this case too, the followers of idealism and religion defend the point of view that the end purpose of the yogist Samadhi was a peculiar "confluence" or uniting of mind (*citta*), or of the intellect with the spiritual (Brahman, the God Ishvara, etc.), or as a mystic self knowledge and "liberation" According to the author however the end purpose of "Yoga"s *Samadhi* has not been to assure a "confluence" or "intercourse" with the transcendental, or to realise a mystical "trance", but mainly and on the first place, consciously and aimingly to direct and coordinate the physical with the spiritual (resp. cognitive) activity of man. Or in other words, the specific Yogist *Samadhi* supposes the conscious directedness of man's mind (citta) towards a superenergetic activity in respect of entering into the deeper crux of the mind concentration objects, resp. its cognition too. The first Marxist interpretation of Yoga *Samadhi* was deservingly appraised also by some foreign scholars (e.g. by the eminent Indian philosopher Prof. Dr. J. P. Atreya and the Soviet Cand. of Phil. Sc. Kondratov).

The problem of the gist, role and significance of God Ishvara in Patanjali Yoga is also an object of continuing discussions. Both the objective translation of the relevant aphorisms, and the standpoint of a number of eminent authors or Yoga-adepts, give reason to the author to support that there are no grounds Yoga to be characterised basically as a religious system. Ishvara is not a god in the traditional sense of the word, but rather an indefinite abstraction that could (according to the intimate intention of Patanjali) also be

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used by the religious believers as an object of concentration, i.e. a peculiar mantra, and nothing else.

This section also postulates a multitude of other deeply principal problems, to which the author endeavours to give a scientific, that is to say Marxist interpretation.

The second section is entitled "*Sadhana Pada*" (which literally means "The Section of Practice"), consisting of 55 aphorisms.

One of the many cardinal problems here is the one about the "degrees" and "means" for realising the special Yoga mind concentration, or *Samadhi*. In Patanjali's model a number of eight such "degrees" or "means" are postulated, with which Patanjali-Yoga becomes world famous as an "eight-stage Yoga" or *Ashtangayoga* These stages are: *yama, niyama, asanas, pranayama, pratyahara, dharana, dhyana, samadhi*.

Yama and *niyama* are specifically Yogist moral-ethical principles; *Asanas* — are Yoga bodily positions, *pranayama* — is the Yoga controlled breathing, *Pratyahara* — is the control over the influence of senses-feelings on mind, *Dharana* — is the Yoga mind concentration, *Dhyana* — is the specific Yoga meditation, and *Samadhi* — is the full Yoga mind concentration. Here *Samadhi* is not only the last "degree" or "means" of the Yoga mind concentration, but also the last aim of Yoga. Each of the relevant "degrees" or "means" are postulated and are the object of examination together with the corresponding aphorisms.

Patanjali speaks in this section also about the so called "additional means" (however not in the sense of obligatory ones, but as possible means for practice). Such "means" for example are the "worship towards Ishvara", provided especially for religious believers as one of the eventual objects of the specific Yoga mind concentration. Other "additional means" are the so called *ascesas* or *tapas*, supposing superphysical or mental efforts with the aim to achieve physical and mental effects includingly effects of the mind.

In the aphorisms of this section a number of other specifically Yogist principles or problems are simply only posulated or more detailedly examined.

The third section bears the title *Vibhuti Pada*, which literally translated means "The Section of Powers" (*Siddhi*), containing 56 aphorisms,

The object of a comparatively more detailed examination here are the last three "degrees" or "means": *Dharana, Dhyana* and *Samadhi*. As a matter of fact these are also the most complex states or modifications of the mind (*citta*). And always in this connection it is also spoken about the specifically Yogist three-unit term *Samyama* (which includes *Dharana, Dhyana* and *Samadhi*). According

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to Patanjali and also to the commentator of his aphorisms, and also according to a great many contemporary authors, the successful practice of the specifically Yogist *Samyama* leads to a multiplicity of natural and parapsychological phenomena which are implied in nearly 30 of the aphorisms. So for example, Patanjali stresses verbatim that by practising *Samyama* on one or another object, one could stop the feeling of hunger; one could reach an amazingly physical and mental strength; one could achieve different hearing, seeing, smelling and other perceptions. Since ancient times and up to now the arguments on the questions of levitation or overcoming gravitation; telepathy, clairvoyance; walking on fire or water, and a lot of more do not cease. But some of these are practised since a very long time in this country too (e. g. fire dancing, clairvoyance, etc.). The Yogist *Samyama* has a relation to other paradoxical facts, as : the yogin can swallow a strong poison (for example potassium cyanide, etc.) without being poisoned; by controlling inhalation, exhalation and by retaining his breath (in a state of *Samadhi*) he can spend a certain time buried in the earth, etc. Suggestopedy, as practised in this country, can also be ascribed to the specific Yogic self-relaxation or *Savasana*, representing a peculiar application of Yogist mind concentration. And with all the abovementioned phenomena, according to the author, it is a question of real concentration of mind or attention, and not of some fallacious concentration etc., with which some authors speculate in explaining a number of parapsychological phenomena.

The circumstance that Patanjali dwells in his "Yoga-Aphorisms" more detailedly upon the effects of *Samadhi*, may—according to the author—create a false impression, that he has paid an extraordinarily great importance to the shown results. In fact, however, Patanjali aimed with this at illustrating mainly and extremely only the huge and incredible power, role and importance of the Yogist concentration of mind. In general *Samyama* and the ensuing effects have not been a self-purpose of the yogins. Just the opposite. Patanjali himself stresses word for word that "these are hinderances for the full Yogist concentration (*Samadhi*)", but that "they are powers of the state of earth" (III. 37). Why and how some of these effects are "hinderances" of the Yogist mind concentration is quite known and stressed by the author in the course of his exposition. But for us the fact that Patanjali considered *Samyama* and the ensuing practical effects as "powers of the state of earth" and not as supernatural phenomena, which a number of erudite authors allege even up to this day, has a more essential significance.

The last section bears the title "*Kaivalya Pada*" (which literally translated means "The Section of Independence" or "The Section of Liberation"), containing 34 aphorisms.

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Here again a series of problems are involved, which are mentioned in other sections but are examined there in quite another aspect.

Already in the first aphorism it is said that the "Siddhis" (the para-powers—K. K.) are acquired by birth, by means of drugs, mantras, self-curbing (ascesis) and Samadhi. In fact Patanjali informs by that, that besides by means of the specific Yogist *Samyama* for achieving some of the mentioned paraphenomena, there are other methods too, which are mentioned already in ancient literary sources.

A central problem in this section are the nature and forms of the spiritual "independence" or "liberation" (*Kaivalya*). Aiming at a maximally exact translation and objective interpretation of the involved problems, the author adheres to the standpoint the Patanjali's *Kaivalya* has nothing to do with the inter-pretation given to it only by idealism and religion. The latter have always traditionally sustained that real "liberation" can be achieved barely by "merging" or "uniting" the individual soul with the universal spirit of God.

The circumstance that Patanjali adhered to the philosophic dualist conception for the simultaneous existence of two supreme or substantial principles—the matter (*prakrti*) and the spirit, or soul (*purusha*) is, according to the author, a sufficient proof that the sage Patanjali has suffered the influence of idealism and religion. But one can not challenge the influence of materialism too, because just according to it, inherent to the matter (*prakrti*) are its three basic qualities or characteristics, the so called *gunas* (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) through which the creation of the whole universe variety, incl. the modifications of mind (*citta*) can be explained. Having all this in mind, the author adheres to the standpoint that Patanjali had no other possibility to make his *Ashtanga-Yoga* more admissible for the then conditions, in which idealism and religion were governing.

The author's opinion is that the real spiritual "independence" or "liberation" (*Kaivalya*), in fact presumed for Patanjali the deep knowledge of the visual and the hidden in man himself and in the universe, the deep mental penetration into the crux of objects or phenomena in universal variety. And as the only means to achieve all this Patanjali shows the specific Yoga mental concentration (*Dharana*), meditation(*Dhyana*) and the unique *Samadhi*, representing the apogee of Yogist mental concentration resp. knowledge, too.

In the concluding part of his monographic investigation the author accentuates on two moments, having the same significance. The first refers to the rational in the gnosseo-perceptive aspect of

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the Yogist *Samyama*, which (as well as a psycho-physiological method) has been used by nearly all basic ancient Indian philosophic systems. *Samyama* (like dialectics) can even today be used simultaneously by the followers of materialism, idealism and religion. In general the non-scientific and mystic must be put aside, evaluating the rational and taking the useful out of the Yogist *Samyama*; this is the task of our Marxist socialist science. Naturally, such must be our attitude towards Yogism altogether.

The second moment accentuated by the author is connected with the health prophylactic and therapeutic effects, which are a unique consequence of practising the specific Yoga meditation (*Dhyana*). But all this is intimately connected not only with Raja-Yoga, where *Samyama* is a central problem, but also with the later established sections of Yogism (resp. Hatha-Yoga, Laya-Yoga, Mantra-Yoga, etc.) which are comparatively more details exposed in the later works of the Yoga classics (Goraxa-Sathaka; Gheranda-Samhita; Hatha-Yoga Pradipika; Shiva-Samhita; Yoga-Vasishtha; "Bhagavad-Gita", etc.). But for the author the "crown" of Yoga-classics are the earliest and here contemplated "Yoga-Aphorisms" of the sage Patanjali.

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VII

Society and Culture Depicted in the Vamana Purana :

Sunil Kumar

The Vamana Purana is one of the eighteen Puranas. Its position in the list of the 18 Mahapuranas as given in the Visnu Purana[1] is fourteenth. But according to Dr. R. C. Hazra it is an up-Purana and not a Mahapurana[2], because the contents of this Purana do not agree with the Five Characteristics[3] of Mahapurana. The Kurma Purana[4] and the Garuda Purana[5] also mention the Vaman among the up Puranas.

Like a few other Vaisnava Puranas the Vamana Purana is named after one of the Avataras of Visnu, so it is a Sattvika Purana. According to Matsya Purana[6], it is also Sattvika Purana. But according to Padma Purana it is a Rajasa Purana. Dr. Dikshitar has classified it as a Saiva Purana and according to Dr. Hara Prasad Sastri, it is a Sectarian work. But in my opinion, there was no sectarian bias at all.

The frame-work of the Vamana Purana is formed by the dialogue between Narada and Pulastya. Narada asks questions whose answers are given by Pulastya.

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1 Visnu Purana, 3.6.23.

2 Hazra R.C., Studies in Puranic records on Hindu rites and customs, p. 77.

3 Visnu Purana, 3.6.25.

सर्गंच प्रतिसर्गश्च वशमन्वन्तराणि च ।
सर्वेष्वेतेषु कथ्यन्ते वशानुचरित न यत् ।।

4 Kurma Purana, 1.1.19.

5 Garuda Purana, 1.227.19.

6 Matsya Purana, 53.58.

सात्विकेषुपुराणेषु माहात्म्याधिक हरे :

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The vamana Purana is mainly given to the glorification of Kurukshetra[7] and the adjoining holy places[8] and in connection with this glorification legends of demons and Gods have been narrated. Besides this it deals in Chapter eleven with hells, in Chapter twelve with Karma Vipaka in Chapter fourteen with duties of Castes and Ashrama, general customs, Purification and impurity, in Chapter sixteen with Vratas and sins worship, and in chapter ninety four with Visnu worship.

The greater importance of the social-structure can not be neglected in socio-cultural study under which fell, caste-system, behaviour of the different units, interrelationship, their religious notions and practices, superstitions-customs and ceremonies, viz. marriage, family-status etc.

In this article I have tried my best to throw light on a few direction of flow of life most lay, as topic-wise given below.

Varna–System :

In the study of the Indian social structure, the study of the caste is very important[9]. The terms used to denote the caste are generally Varna or Jati. The Varna occurs as early as the Rgveda[10], where it means[11] 'colour' or 'Complexion' or 'light'. The four varnas viz. Brahmana, Rajanya, Vaisya and Sudra are mentioned in the 'Puruśa — Sukhta'[12] It states that "the Brahmana was his month, his arms were made into the Rajanya, his thighs were the Vaiś'ya, from his feet the Sudra was born". The same account is repeated in the Vamana Purana with slight modifications, i.e. the word Kshatriya has been used instead of the word Rajanya[13]. The Brahmana are associated with the Vedas, the Kshatriyas with conquering the earth, the Vaiś'yas with wealth and Prosperity and the Sudras with happiness[14]. A Section of Brahmanas were specialized in different branches of knowledge[15].

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7 Vamana Purana, Chapter 21, 22, 4, 36. 37. 38, 40, 50 etc.

8 Ibid, viz; Prithudaka. chapter 21, 22, 50;
Sthanutirtha, chapter 22, 51, Banaras chapter 3, 15, 51 and Vindya, Chapter 9. 18 etc.

9 Dutta N.K., Origin and Growth of castes in India, Vol. I Chapter I.

10 Rgveda, 1 73.7, 2 3.5; 9.77.15.

11 Macodonell and Keith, A.B., Vedic Index, Vol. II, p 246.

12 Rgveda, 10 90 13.

13 Vamana Purana, Sara-Mahatmya 1 21.23.

14 Ibid, 10 91.
ब्रह्मणो वेदम् अपनोति क्षत्रियो जयते महीम ।
वैश्यो धन-समृद्धम् च सूद्राः सुखम अवापनुयात ।

15 Ibid, 3.19 24.

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Ashrama-System :

Varna as well as ashrama systems are also the important features of Indian social organization. The traditional system dividing the life of the individual into four stages, viz. Brahmacharya (student), Grihastha (householder), Vanaprastha (forest hermit), and Sannyasa (an asce ic), is reflected in the Vamana Purana[16]. Every ashrama constitutes a stage of life in which one has to train oneself for a certain period, to qualify for the journey of life.

The stage of student :

The life of the individual started from the performance of the sanskara of Jatakkarma. At the birth of the Vamana incarnation of Visnu, from Aditis womb, Brahman performed the Jatakkarma and the rites associated with it.[17] Reference is made to the Sanskaras of Jatakkarm ᵉ of the Kshatriya Prince Kuru[18].

The next important sanskara is the upanayana. The performance of the upanayana ceremony provides an entrance to the first stage of life. It marked the beginning of his Vedic Studies at the teacher's home where he had to lead quite a disciplined and regular life engaging himself in attendance on fire, bathing and wandering about for alms and always eating food after informing his teacher and obtaining his permission[19].

The Vamana Purana mentions in detail the rules and regulations governing the life of a bramacarin. After attaining a particular age Vamana asked Bharadvaja, to act as a Purohita in his upanayana ceremony[20]. A special feature of this ceremony is that gifts are offered to the brahmacarin, probably those which he needs during his student life. The Sacred thread, white garments, yellow and silken cloth, broom made of Kuśa-grass etc. are offered to Vamana at the time of his upanayana[21]. The subject of study of the Brahmana Students were the Vedas, the Sastras, the Sankhya and Yoga systems etc.[22]

The Stage of a House Holder (Garhastha) :

After completing the period of Studentship, an option was offered to the student to select the next stage of his life[23]. He might

16 Vamana Purana, Chapter 14

17 Ibid. 30.17.

त जातमात्र भगवान ब्रह्मा लोकपितामहः ।
जातकर्मादिका कृत्वा क्रिया तुष्टाव च प्रभुम् ॥

18 Ibid, 23 1-2.

19 Kane P. V.; op. cit. p. 416.

20 Vamana Purana, Sara-mahatmya, 62-42.
प्रोवाच भगवान महयामकर उपनयनम् विभो ।

21 Vamana Purana, 36. 36-37.

22 Ibid., 30 38.

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enter the second third or fourth stage or might serve his teacher throughout his life. In the absence of the teacher, he might live with his son or his any disciple, but never with his daughter[24].

The Vamana Purana states that among four ashrama, the Gārhastha ashrama is the best one[25] beeause, a wife, a son or a grandson is the fruit of Penance. A house holder should marry a good girl, work according to his profession with the object of earning wealth and to perform sadācāra with the help of this wealth[26]. As said by the Brahmana of Sakala, every body should utter the Vishnu stotra thrice a day, for the removal of sins committed by him[27]

The Vamana Purana also states the duties of a house holder surfe. In the religious performances of the house, the wife had a definite role. For the welfare of the demonking, his wife vindthyavali herself lighted the lamp in the temple of Visnu, while well-versed Brahmanas recited the Sacred texts and King Bali participated in the religious performances.[28]

The Stage of a forest Hermit (Vanaprastha)

The man enters upon the stage of a forest hermit for securing the liberation of the soul after having seen the offspring of his son and the decaying of his body. In this stage of life he has to go to the forest and live on wild fruits, sleep on the ground, and worship deities with guests.[29]

The Stage of an Ascetic (Sannyas)

The person entered upon the last stage, viz. that of an ascetic casting of all attachments to the world, Practises abstinence from anger and Pleasures of the senses.[30] Then he should have an equal mental attitude towards all the creation of God.

Daily and periodical duties :

The daily and periodical duties and ceremonies form an important topic of the Dharmasastra. The Vamana Purana contains

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23 The spirit of freedom of selection of any of the ashramas after the completion of student life is found in Vatsyayana's Kamsutras. 1.2.2-5. But the Smrtis are strict on this point. See Manu Smrti, 6-35 and 37.

24 Vamana Purana, 14-8-9.

25 Mahabharata, 13.11.2; also state the superiority of the Garhasthashrama over all. The Smrtis also praise the Garhasthashrama

26 Vamana Purana, 14.11.17.

27 Ibid, 59 65.

28 Ibid, 68 59.

29 Ibid, 14-113 114.

30 Ibid, 14 116 817.

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some informations concerning the same topic. The data of the Vamana Purana as regards the daily duties of a house holder a forest hermit and an ascetic are discussed. The data not covered under the said section is being discussed here.

Getting up from the Bed :

From very early times, geetting up before the Sun rise is prescribed specially to a student and to me and all in general[31]. The Vamana Purana, following this general dictum states that one should get up from the bed in 'brahmamuhurta' and after getting up, one should pray to deities and sages[32]. One should also remember 'Suprabhat-strotra', composed by Siva[33].

Sauca :

There are several laws laid down in the ancient Sutra and Smriti literature on the topic of Sauca.[34]

The Vamana Purana states them in detail. One should not defecate stool near Goshala, near temple, on a road and on the fire. One should not defecate stool in the East or the West direction[35].

After defecating one should Purify hands and feet with clay and water. At the time of Purification one should apply once the clay to clean his penis, three times to his arms, seventimes to his left hand, ten times to his both the hands. One should not use clay for purification of an anthill, a hole of mouse, from the earth which is under the water and house.[36]

Dantadhavana :

Dantadhavana comes after sauca and Acamana and before snāna. The Vamana Purana states that one should do dantadhvana after sauca.[37]

Snana and Sanydhya :

After dantadhavana comes snana. The Vamana Purana mentions that one should take a bath after dantadhavana. Then one should denote the action of Prayer performed in the morning. This act is generally styled Sanidhyapāsanā'.[38]

Religions Life :

A study of Religious life of the people is important and a picture of the same can be had from the study of customs and

31 Maitrayaniyasanihita, 11-174.
32 V mana Purana 14.20.
33 Ibid, 14 23.25.
34 Kane P. V., History of Dharma Shastra, Vol. II p. 647.
35 Vamana Purana, 14.29.30.
36 Ib.d, 14.31 32.
37 Ibid, 14.33.34.
38 Ibid, 14.34 35.

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conventions, Believes and superstitions, worship of deities, Tirthas and Vratas associated with deities etc.

Customs and Conventions :

Customs and conventions have their own importance in social life, because one can know from the study of customs and conventions about the social states, a mode of socio-religious life and some other peculiarities.

Umā, the daughter of Himvāna married with Śiva. The guests—mainly Visnu, Laxmi, Brahma, Agni, Yaksa, Gandharva and Kinnar etc. were invited to participate in Barat of Śiva[39].

The Gandharva and Kinnar played music and Apsarās danced during this occasion.[40]

Before the celebration of marriage Uma's father Himvāna offered seat to guests and also offered Madhuparka[41]. This type of reception of guests is still prevalent in some parts of India.

Before marriage the bridegroom and bride were decorated by their relations and friends. Siva was decorated by Aditi, Surabhi, Sursā and other women.[42] Uma was also decorated by relatives of Himvāna.[43]

After the marriage ceremony the bride and the bridegroom passed their first night at the house of the bride's parent. Śiva and Umā passed their first night at Himvāna's house.[44]

The custom of Sati was widely prevalent in ancient times. The Vamana Purana records an instance of 'Sudeva' becoming a Sati. When 'Savan' the son of priyavrata died childless, then his wife sudeva became Sati.[45]

Beliefs and Superstitions :

'As long as a Society has a particular texture of custom and conventions woven around it and inherent in it, it would be ideal to dream of a society inmune from superstitions which in turn try to enforce the former's operations.[46]

This may be illustrated by a custom mentioned in the earlier section, Viz, the mode of the reception of guests etc. (Vamanapurana 53, 39)

39 Ibid, 53 9.
40 Ibid, 53 15-16.
41 Ibid. 53 39.
42 Ibid, 53-5-7.
43 Ibid, 53-33.
44 Ibid, 53-60.
45 Ibid, 46 5 10.
46 Mehta B. N., Ayurveda Ka Sam'ksipta Itihas, p. 65.

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Some of the rivers are believed to possess purifying powers[47], Vamana Purana mentioned nine holy rivers, Viz Sarasvati, Vaitarni Apaga, Ganga, Mandakini, Madhusrava, Vasunadi, Kausiki, Dr, Sadvati and Hiranvati, possessing purifying powers.[48] Among the above holy rivers the Sarasvati and Ganga occupies the foremost position by virtue of its holiness. Sarasvati is believed to purify a person by its very sight and to destroy the sins.

Worship of deities :

The Brahmanical trinity Brahma, Visnu and Siva were worshiped in Vamana Purana. Apart from them, Indra, Kartikeya and Ganesh as well as few of the goddesses influenced, the life and culture of the people then inhabited.

In Vamana Purana every deity has been ascribed to particular affair, Viz Brahma—creation,[49] Indra-Lord of heven and war of God,[50] Sun protectors of the Gods[51]. Kartikeya—God of war,[52] and Ganesha—Lord of dangers and difficulties[53] etc.

A man has to endure so many turmoils in his life-course. To avoid unknown misfortune, those days, different deities were postulated. To fight against the all ending epidemic, famine, dry, flood etc. peoples of those days had to make their celestial heroes Siva, Vishnu etc. were nothing but heroes having some supernatural power. And, I think, there is deep Psychological behaviour behind, ascribing those Gods to certain affairs with speciality in.

Tirthas :

The Vamana Purana mention several tirthas, Viz; Kurukserra[54], Prithudaka,[55] Renuka, Rinmochan, Panchwat, Kuru tirtha, Anraka-tirtha, Kamyakavana,[56] Sthanutirtha, Sthanuvat,[57] Puskara,[58] Prayaga,[59] Banaras [60] and Gaya[61] etc. The tirthas which mentioned

47 Carakasamhita, 8.20,
48 Vamana Purana, 34 6 8; for the holiness of the river see also Kurma Purana II. 36 36 37; Padma Purana III 12 85 86.
49 Vamana Purana, 2 23.
50 Ibid, 43 162.
51 Ibid, Saro-Mahatmya, 10 63-64.
52 Ibid, Chapter-31.
53 Ibid, 42.3.
54 Ibid, Chapter 21, 22, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 50 etc.
55 Ibid, Chapter 21, 22, 50.
56 Ibid, Chapter 41
57 Ibid, Chapter 43.
58 Ibid, Chapter 22, 57, 65.
59 Ibid, Chapter 22, 51.
60 Ibid, Chapter 3, 15-51.
61 Ibid, Chapter 57.63.

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in Vamana Purana, we can divide them into two main divisions (i) Tirthas associated with worship of a particular deity i.e. Kurukśetra. Renuka, Panchwat, Kuru tirtha and sthanutirtha and (ii) Tirthas associated with Pitrtirtha, where śraddha to the dead ancestors is performed i.e. Prithudaka. Rinmochan and Gaya.

The motive behind tirtha is that it purifies a person from sins and helps to achieve four types of purusharthas and salvation.

Vrata :

The origin and meaning of the Vrata is a matter of controversy.[62] It is usually understood to mean a religious performance observed on some particular day or days under some restriction on food and behaviour. Each vrata is also associated with a particular deity.

The Vamana Purana mentions several Vratas. viz, Akhanda dvadasi [63] Naksatra Puruśa Vrata,[64] Kalastani-Vrata,[65] Aś'unya sayana dvitiya vrata or cāturmāsya vrata[66] etc. The Vratas, which mentions in Vamana Purana, we can divide them into three main divisions (i) Vratas associated with Viśnu worship, i.e. Akhanda Dvadasi and Naksatra puruśa Vrata, (ii) Vratas associated with Siva worship, i.e. Kalastani and (iii) Vratas associated with several deities i.e. Asunya Sayana, dvitiya or caturmasya vrata.

The Vrata is performed with the object of attaining fame, good fortune, long house hold life, progency and salvation.

Conclusion :

We have dealt with different aspects of society and culture depicted in the Vamana Purana. It was prepared in the 6th century A D and then, ancient Indian culture was on its peak. Indian Natives were ruled by regional monarch. It was a period of peace and tranquillity based on agricultural products. Religions and mythology had a strong influence on the way of life of the natives. The priests were counsellors of the rulers in administrative matters. Theocricy was more dominant than democracy. The Varna system and the Varnashrama Dharma was more obligatory to the householders and they lived in harmony to safeguard their domestic and social interest.

I have already pointed out earlier in the body of the paper, that varna system was adopted for the division of labour based on the

62 For different views, see Apte V. M. in Bulletin of the Deccan college Research Institute, Poona. Vol III. pp. 407 48 Kane P. V. in History of Dharma Shastra, Vol V, Part I. pp. 1-46.

63 Vamana Purana. 16 26

64 Ibid. 80.2 30; also see Agni Purana, 191-1-23, Bhavisya Purana, 4.108; 17 42.

65 Ibid; 16.41-48.

66 Ibid, 16, 21 24; for this Vrata also see Agni Purana, 177.3.12 Bhavisya Purana, I.20. 4 28; Padma Purana, V. 24.1-19.

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physical and mental ability of the natives. This system faced a challenge during middle ages due to the flux of foreigners in our sacred land, in form of traders to establish their stone foot hold, later in the administration of local rulers—India was known as Aryavarta or Jambudwip in the ancient period and was famous for its scenic beauty, fertile land and hospitable inhabitants, who did not grudge to accomodate the foreigners in their land; when they express their intentions to settle down. The foreigners brought with them the leagacy of their alien culture and religion and the process of impact started. The agricultural style of life gradually picked up the influence of industrial change over and the primitive way of living under bent a change coming to modern period. We find great many changes already taken place through out the entire country in the field of social life. Science and technology, the gift of the 19th Century scientific renaissance has influenced not only the life of the natives, but have also changed their way of thinking.

Varna system did work well in Primitive time. But during middle ages its inherient herited came out in the form of superiority of the superior varnas over inferior one's. This psychology of superiority complex gave birth to a new 'ism' that is 'casteism'. No part over country is free from this casteism which decry with all our might both in legislative and public side, but the beneficiaries of casteism, is not ready to reject it. For the simple reason that they earn benefices. Therefore, the varna system and the Ashrama system of Primitive Indians have got to be either completely rejected or modified to suit the need of our, cynicism associated with a Varna system, has to be uprooted to make a room for healthy and balanced Philosophy of life, based on social justice, co operation and good will. The Philosophy of 'Sarvodaya' advocated by Mahatma Gandhi aims to establish a casteless society, based on equal right and duties for the over all development of the entire nation.

I, therefore, plead for a thorough modification of entire varna system in the light of modern needs of our social life for the smooth and harmonious growth. I am afraid that the superstitions of Varna System might have to face strong protest, to reject, if they do not agree to reform.

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VIII

The Conflict Between the Argument From Illusions and the Theory of Direct Realism

Rajyashri Agrawal

The conflict between the argument from illusions and the theory of direct realism is an impertant conflict in the theory of perception. Here it is remarkable that philosophers use the word perception not for mental apprehension, as Psychologists do, but they use this word in the sense of 'Sense-Perceptions'. "In Philosophy it is normally restricted to sense-perception to the discovery, by means of the senses of the existence and properties of the external world. Philosophers have been concerned with the analysis of perception, that is, the study of its nature and of the processes involved in it and with its Epistemological value—that is, how far, if all. it can be regarded as a sense of knowledge about the world."[1]

The problem of perception has a great importance in the history of Philosophy Philosophers have been struggling hard with this problem since a long time. The questions concerning the problem of perception are. What do we percieve ? Do we perceive real physical objects? Do we perceive physical objects as they really are? Or what we perceive is other than what they are ? Do we perceive them directly or through some representation ? How physical objects are perceived by us ? Are they perceived by a self or by any substantial entity, or is perception possible without any self ? A satisfactory solution of the problem of perception. thus, requires an explanation of the nature of physical objects and human experience and their relationship.

Philosophers have formulated their solutions to these questions in the form of different theories. The common sense view of the

1 Encyclopedia, Vol. 6 Page 79.

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theory of perception is that perception is a direct awareness, a straight forward confrontation (or being in touch, contact) with the external object. This theory is called Direct Realism. Arthur Pap describes this view in such a way that "Unreflective primitive men assume that the things that they see or touch exist also at the same times when they are not seen or touched or perceived in any other form or way, they further take it for granted that things have just these qualities which they appear to have. Let us dignify this unsophisticated creed with the name of naive realism."[2]

On the other hand. Indirect Realism claims that perception is primarily of mental representation of the external object, or mental that our perception of the external object is by means of private, mental sense.[3]

The theory of direct realism is criticized as it fails to explain dreams, errors, and illusions. The assumption is generally refuted by the argument from illusions. The argument from illusions is based on the fact that physical objects may appear different to the different observers. or to the same observer in different conditions. To some extent, the character of these appearences, conditions is casual and is determined by the state of the conditions and the observer. The argument given in favour of this view that physical objects are not perceived directly, but through some representations. There are several such arguments but only four of them are important.

1 THE ARGUMENT FROM HALLUCINATION

According to this argument —" When a person has a hallucination, he is directly aware of some "Sensuous Manifold",[4] because it seems to him as he is perceiving something where as there is no object at all. There are a lot of instances of total hallucination, for example, the drunkard sees pink rats where as there is no pink rats, or as Macbeth sees a dagger where as there is no dagger at all. So what a hallucinated person is aware of is not objective.

Here it is remarkable that although he is not aware of any physical object but he must be aware of something, for otherwise he would not act or speak, as he does. Thus—"What he is directly aware of is nothing but only a sense datum "[5]

But in normal sense experience what a person is directly aware of is qualitatively same as what he is directly aware of in hallucinating experience. Qualitatively hallucinatory experience is indistinguishable from the experience of seeing a real physical object.

2 Edward & Pap, A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, p, 148.
3 Encyclopedia, Vol. 6, p. 79.
4 George Pitcher, A Theory of Perception, p. 13.
5 Ibid. p. 14.

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Therefore it is concluded that even in normal sense one must be directly aware of nothing but sense-data.

2 THE ARGUMENT FROM DIFFERENTIAL CERTAINTY

By this argument it has been proved that what we see or what we are directly aware of are not certainly real objects, for we could be having a hallucination. for example, it is not certain, in a visual mode, that I see or that I am directly aware of a real tomato, for I might be the victim of an illusion, someone could have a wax object there to decieve me. So what is certain in a visual mode, is that I am directly aware of something real and tomatoish in shape. Therefore the red tomato shaped somewhat that I certainly am, in a visual mode, directly aware of cannot be identical with a tomato (if, indeed, there is one.) It must be sense datum."[6] ANOTHER good example of differential certainty is, a figure in a marble museum is mistaken for a real woman.

Thus the conclusion of this argument of differential certainty is that in any visual sen.e perception. one must be directly aware of nothing but sense-data Similar argument can be put forward for the senses other than vision.

3 THE ARGUMENT FROM PERCEPTUAL RELATIVITY

Under certain non-standard conditions, things look different from what they actually are. From a distance a large tower looks small or a green hill looks purple, or the straight stick looks bent in water, or from an angle the round coin looks elliptical, etc. In all such cases, something has the apparent qualities. Take the case of a coin which looks elliptical from an angle, there must be something elliptical, for the perceiver certainly has elliptical expanse before his consciousness. Something elliptical is definitely perceived. But this something is not identical with the physical object that is being looked at. For example it is not the coin that is elliptical, for we are supposing that it is really round.

Thus "The perceiver must be (directly) aware of a (nonphysical) representation of the physical thing he is looking at and the physical perceived quality must inhere in this representation. Such a non physical representation is a Sense-datum."[7]

Parellel arguments can be constructed for the other visually perceived qualities and also for the senses other than vision.

4 THE ARGUMENT FROM THE PHYSIOLOGY OR THE CAUSATION OF SENSE-PERCEPTION

The physiology of sense-perception gives us an account of how we see, hear, touch, taste, or listen. The perceiver does not see the

6 Ibid. p. 24.
7 Ibid. p. 29.

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physical object until the impulses reach the brain. The physiology of sense-perception is the system which co ordinates and co-relates all the systems of the organism. This system is the highly developed complex nervous system. All outside stumuli are perceived by this system through sense organs.

The nervous system comprises of the brain, the spinal cord and the nerves. The sensory nerves of the periphery carries some impulses to be interpreted by the sensory area in the cerebral cortex (a part of the brain which is composed of many layers of nerves cells.) Thus, the interpretation of sensation depends on stumuli from the peripherry relayed by several neurons reaching eventually the cerebral interpretating station in the brain, which is far removed from the object at the other end of the causal chain. It can be nothing but the causal chain. It can be nothing but the awareness of a mere representation or image of an object. But "such representations or images can only be sense-data."[8]

Again the same conclusion is drawn that "in visual sense-perception one is always directly aware of nothing but sense data. Similar arguments can be constructed for the senses other than vision"[9]

This argument from the physiology of sense perception is also called the causal form of the argument from illusion and as we have seen it is based upon the scientific fact. Science proves that the objects which constitute the coloured, noisy, redolent would of common sense are very much our own creation. We think that grass is green, stones are hard, snow is cold etc But Physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow are not the greenness hardness, and coldness that we know in our experience, but something very different. The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if Physics is to be believed, observing the effect of the stone upon himself.[10]

Therefore, it is inferred from this that we do not perceive physical objects in their natural states. Arthur Eddington in his book 'The Nature of the Physical World.' represents himself as a sitting down at his 'two-tables' one of which, as he asserts, "has extension, is comparitively permanent, is coloured and above all is substantial, while the other is 'mostly emptiness' releived by 'numerous electric charges rushing about with great speed'.[11] Here it is remarked by Prof. Ayer that there are two strands of this argument. One is that science corrects the common sense picture of the physical world. The other is that the common sense picture is in any case unlikely to be accurate because of its causal provenance.[12]

8 Ibid. p. 43
9 Ibid. p. 43.
10 B. Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 15.
11 Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, p. xi.
12 A. J. Ayer Central Questions of Philosophy, p. 83.

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The conclusion is derived from this scientific explanation that things are most probably not as they seem to be. There is a distinction between things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to us.

Thus Bertrand Russell's assuming that "Naive Realism leads to Physics, and Physics, if true, shows that Naive Realism is false Therefore, Naive Realism, if true, is false, therefore it is false".[13]

Prof. Ayer examines the assumption of Russel'. According to Ayer, what Physics shows is that the way in which things appear to us is casually conditioned by a number of factors which are extraneous to the thing itself. If, for example, this carpet now looks blue to me, it is because light of certain wave-length is being transmitted upon from my eyes, from impulses pass along the appropriate nerve fibers to my brain. In a different light, or if my eyes or brain were injured, it might appear to me a different colour, or no identifiable colour, at all. But to from this that we do not perceive things as they really are is to make the assumption that if a thing is appearing to have a certain property, is caused by outside factors then it does not really have it. The criteria for deciding what colour things 'really one' are according to Ayer is mainly a question of the colour they appear to be under what are regarded as normal conditions.

Thus Physics does not refute Naive Realism, in the sense that it shows it to be false. Physics does not prove that we do not perceive physical objects as they really are. But on the other hand in another sense, Physics does refute Naive Realism. A vacant of causal argument proves that light take time to travel. It is inferred by the argument that in such cases physical objects are not perceived in the state in which they really are. The sun as we see only as it was eight minutes before, when it comes to remote stars the difference may amount to thousands of years. It may even happen that by the time we see it the star has caused to exist.

Thus Ayer does agree with the conclusion which is offered by the scientific fact that we see physical objects only indirectly, what we directly see is something else It should derive us, without any argument, in top putting up a screen of sense-data between ourseleves and the physical world.[14]

After this discussion it is very clear that the sense data terminology and the terminology of Naive Realism are incompatible. If we accept one we must reject other. The common opinion in the conflict between arguments from illusion and the theory of direct realism is that Naive Realism is refuted by the argument from illusion. Prof Price in his chief work 'Perception' does maintain that "The argument from illusion is sufficient to refute Naive Realism. This is substantially true."[15]

13 B. Russel, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 15.
14 A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, pp. 93-95.
15 Price, Perception, p. 27.

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IX

On the Self : The Chandogya

Lawrence E Johnson

The teaching in the *Chandogya Upanisad* concering the true self is one of the richest and most fruitful to be found in the Indian philosophical tradition—indeed, in any philosophical tradition. It is a teaching which has been subjected to multiple interpretation. I propose, here, to try to add some useful commentary. It would be presumption indeed were I wish to attempt to explicate the full and true meaning of the central teaching of the *Chandogya*. That, and the centuries of relevant comment, are more than that to which I can hope to do justice. My more modest aim, ambitious enough, is to offer a useful discussion of some important but neglected aspects of the matter.

Viewing the matter from the vantage point of several centuries and a different cultural tradition, and so perhaps seeing things in another perspective, I may possibly aspire to offer some insight into certain facets of the *Chandogya's* teaching. In part, I shall be critical of what I regard as shortcomings in some of the traditional interpretations. My purpose, however, is not destructive Rather my purpose is to bring out *some* of the deeper meaning of the upanisad. I can do no more than that.

* * * * * *

> Prajapati said :
> The Self which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, which desires nothing but what it ought to desire, and imagines nothing but what it ought to imagine, that it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand, He who has obtained that Self and understands it, obtains all worlds and all desires'. (*Chand* VIII, 7, 1)[1]

1 I quote from the Muller translation, that being perhaps the most widely distributed.

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To know and understand such a self would undoubtedly be the highest wisdom, and it is hardly surprising that the Devas and Asuras should desire to obtain that wisdom. However, the highest Wisdom is not something which is easily to be obtained or lightly to be given. Symbolically, Indra had to spend one hundred one years as a pupil before he could grasp the Self.

Now, certainly Prajapati tells us of a most wonderous Self. But how do we know that there *is* such a Self for Prajapati to teach us of? At first we must take it on faith, accepting the point, as nearly as we can understand it, as a revealed truth Progressively, though, we are lead to a recognition that there *must* be such a Self, that it could not be otherwise. This truth, then, can only be realized when one has advanced to the point of being able to realize it. Ultimately, the truth goes beyond words since it is the truth which makes words possible. Before we reach that level of understanding, however, there are preliminary levels of understanding wherein words may lead us closer to the truth. Yet, like Virochana, we may fail to understand that which can be understood by the discursive intellect. In my treatment I shall discuss Prajapati's preliminary teachings as a means of approaching and clarifying certain of what I take to be the significant points.

The First Teaching

After dwelling as pupils for thirty-two years, Indra and Virochana were taught that the Self is the person which is seen in the eye (*Chand.* VII, 7, .). How are we to interpret that? Indra and Virochana interpreted it as meaning that the Self is the corporeal body seen reflected in the eye, or in a mirror or the like. Prajapati assures them that what they see there is indeed the Self. Virochana reports back to his fellow Asuras on the basis of his understanding, and accordingly, they give themselves over to materialism and the pursuit of bodily pleasures.

Indra, unlike Virochana, came to realize that there must be more to the Self than that corporel being which is subject to the fortunes and misfortunes of the body. If that were all there was to it, the understanding of it would certainly not be what Prajapati promised. Indra returns to inquire further of Prajapati, and is told that the teaching is indeed inadequate. There is much more to learn.

Prajapati did not deceive his pupils with his first teaching What he said, while incomplete, was quite correct. He taught them to the limits of their comprehension, and Virochana could go no further. The later teachings do not replace the earlier, nor contradict them, but progressively subsume them as Indra grows in understanding.

The standard interpretation, that of Shankara, is that the Self is that which is "seen"—by those who are wise—as the transcendental

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Self, that unperceived ground of perception which makes seeing possible. To truly understand the eye is to understand that. Shankara's interpretation here is certaily consistent with the *Chandogya's* ultimate teaching. Still, not only is that interpretation rather too forced at this stage. I believe that the more staightforward interpretation is the more fruitful.

Of course the corporeal body is the Self. So much as it is anything at all, what else could it be ? Virochana's mistake was to see the bodily self *only* in terms of its superficial appearance—that which might be reflected in an eye or mirror—rather than to try to understand it in the depths of its being. Yet the Self as deeply understood is not anything *different* Rather, we come to understand it differently.

In the west, Spinoza made a similar point. He was called a "God-intoxicated man" by some, and condemned as an atheist by others, because of his teaching that God=world=matter=self. It may seem like atheistic materialism if we interpret the equation as somehow "reducing" all to "mere" matter. Yet if we interpret it as meaning that matter is not so "mere" as one might have thought, that God is the basic reality of all things—that being the correct interpretation—then the doctrine is by no means the negativistic materialism condemned by Spinoza's critics There are many levels of materialism, and in the highest levels the term "materialism" loses its meaning. More broadly, there are many levels of monism, and in their highest levels even the term "monism" loses its meaning.

Prajapati taught that reality is that which is right there before one What is there could hardly be anything but real. The true Self, to *be* the true Self, can only be right where one is. Virochana's great error was to understand this in terms of a low-grade materialism concerned only with the superficial appearances of matter, and the superficial pleasures of the misconstruing mind. Indra was able to see through that, and so returned for a teaching which was deeper than the first teaching, but not at variance with it.

I have suggested that Shankara underestimates Prajapati's first teaching. While he is concerned, rightly, to defend Prajapati's veracity, there is more to it than that. Not only is Prajapati's first teaching technically correct, under a straightforward interpretation it naturally and progressively opens the way to greater depths.

The Second Teaching

After another thirty-two years, Indra was taught that the Self is "He who moves about happily in dreams" (*Chand* VII, 10, 1). Prajapati has now led Indra beyond mere appearances, beyond the identification of the Self with the simple objects of awareness and experience Now we are coming to understand the Self not as object,

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but as subject—not as dream, but as dreamer. This teaching has clear advantages over the former. No longer is the Self understood as something which is liable to the tribulations and changes of the phenomenal world. It is something deeper and more abiding. It is that experiencing subject for which appearances are appearances, and which underlies whatever reality they have.

This was a better teaching, and for a time Indra was satisfied with it. Still, as he came to realize, the experiencing subject is still liable to change and the experience of misfortune. The dream of pain is no less painful. When these doubts are expressed, Prajapati confirms that we must seek yet more deeply to find the true Self. Before we proceed to deeper teachings, however, we would do well to more deeply assess this second one. Like the first, it is, while incomplete, not at all incorrect.

Essentially, Prajapati's second teaching identifies the Self as the empirical self which is the subject of consciousness Rightly, Prajapati turns Indra's attention toward that which is more real than appearances and which constitutes them even as appearances. What Virochana took as the Self is of itself no more than a dream. The second teaching, though, is incomplete in that we cannot take the experiencer, the dreamer, as itself an object of knowledge. To do so would be to take the dreamer as part of the dream. We can no more identify the Self with the contents of the mind than we can identify it with the objects of consciousness. Nor can be *simply* identify the Self as whatever dreams, for that would be to identify the Self *merely* in terms of the dream, the experience, when in reality, the experience is only the surface phenomena.

Identifying the Self as the dreamer, the experiencer, is inadequate because such as that does not fulfill the promise made by Prajapati. Nor can such an identification, as it stands, withstand philosophical criticism—that being one of the major inadequacies of British Empiricism. Hume was acutely conscious of there being a difficulty :

> For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception ... I may venture to affirm...that [we] are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement... The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety... no *simplicity* ... nor *identity*... [but, he hastens to warn us,] The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor

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> have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed. (*Treatise* I, iv, 6).

While conscious of the problem, Hume failed to solve it. It is clearly true that we can never experience anything other than an object of experience. Yet it is wrong to identify the Self as a bundle of perceptions (experiences). A mere bundle of perceptions cannot collect itself. Nor can it form associations, or have/be lively anticipations of yet other perceptions—things which Hume called upon the self bundle to do. The moral is that we cannot find the subject among objects. That is where Kant went beyond Hume. He refused to seek the Self in experience, instead seeking it as that which serves to *constitute* experience and make it possible. For his part, Indra did right to return to Prajapati for deeper instruction.

A final word before we leave the second teaching. Prajapati was, of course, correct in stating that the Self is that which constitutes experience and for Whom experiences are. The mistake is to identify the Self merely in terms of the experience. Then, Indra's worries about charge and pain would be well founded. Certainly a dream of pain would be painful—if the dream constituted us. Yet the dream is nothing else than us, and the dream is more than nothing at all. While Indra is right in wanting to dissociate the Self from the dream, what is wanting is not distance but depth. Pain, so far as it is at all, is in the Self. It could hardly be anywhere else. Yet the true Self is beyond the experiential surface of pain and misfortune.

The Third Teaching

After yet another thirty-two years of penance as a pupil of Prajapati, Indra was taught that "When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest, sees no dreams, that is the Self, this is the immortal, the fearless, this is the Brahman" (*Chand.* VII, 11. 3). This takes us beyond the experience and experiencer toward that which makes experience and the experiencing self possible. "Then Indra went away satisfied in his heart"—for a short while. But, as he came to realize, if the Self is only a non-dreaming dreamer, an experiencer which does not experience, then the Self is no more than absolutely nothing at all. Again, Indra returned to Prajapati for further instruction.

The British Empiricists also were aware of the problem although, with neither Kant nor Prajapati to guide them, they were unable to solve it. Lock fretted that "Every drowsy nod explodes the self theory", and exploded it surely is, if the self is only experience, or if it is only an inert *tabula rasa* upon which experience is impressed. Bishop Berkeley was forced to agree that, given this conception, "in sleep and trances the mind exists not". "The so-called 'self' is only

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a stream of thought", wrote William James, a pragmatist heir of Humean skepticism, and "the passing thought is itself the thinker". Hume himself, in connection with the passage quoted above, observed that "When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may be truly said not to exist". Better can be said for the Self of Prajapati.

Again, Prajapati's teaching is incomplete, but it is by no means incorrect. What we are when we are awake and when we are asleep, when we dreaming and when we have no vestige of consciousness, is the Self and could not be anything but the Self. Yet as it was a mistake to identify the Self solely in terms of consciousness, so it is a mistake to identify it merely in terms of removing the consciousness. Prajapati points the way by teaching Indra that we must not seek for the Self in experience, but must seek for it as the ground which makes the experience possible. This cannot be a mere inert substratum, Locke's "something, I know not what". That would only be what is left...in reality, nothing—when features are removed. The Self is no more the absence of experience than it is experience. While both the dreamer and the dreamless sleeper are the Self, being none other, but the Self is deeper than that.

Bear in mind *Chandogya* VI. 8, 1 :

> Learn from me the true nature of sleep When a man sleeps here [deep sushupta sleep is clearly meant, wherein all consciousness is lost], my dear son, he becomes united with the True, he is gone to his own [Self].

Becoming united with one's Self in this way is more than mere denial of objectivity and of all phenomenality, more than mere negation. The true Self is something which is *more* real, not the absence of something which is less real. One goes *to* something. Accordingly, Indra could not remain content with mere negation, and recognized the need for a richer and more positive teaching. In response, Prajapati finally gave Indra his fourth and highest teaching.

In passing, I would note that Indra was only called upon to serve another five years as Prajapati's pupil. One might have expected another term of thirty-two years. I believe that the shorter term was because the incompletness of the third teaching was only the negative side of the incompleteness of the second teaching, and not a distinct incompleteness. We must identify the Self neither as the contents of consciousness, nor as their absence. In contrast, the advance from the first teaching to the second was much greater, overcoming a greater incompleteness.

The Fourth Teaching

Finally, after a total of one hundred one years, Prajapati gave Indra his fourth, final, and highest teaching, that of the last four Chandas of the upanisad. In this teaching he did not *give* Indra the

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Self, for Indra could obtain that, if at all, only on his own. To obtain it, Indra had to interpret Prajapati teaching correctly and use it properly. In our interpreting of this teaching, we must take care that we do not add yet another misinterpretation to the previous three. In the following, I shall not pretend to give a full explication of the final teaching Instead, I shall concentrate on certain aspects of the teaching which I believe are of critical importance, and about which I hope to be able to contribute some useful thoughts.

To my understanding, the key passage is that wherein Prajapati tells us (VIII. 12. 4-5) :

> ...there is the person of the eye, the eye itself is the instrument of seeing. He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self, the nose is the instrument of smelling. He who knows, let me say this, he is the Self, the tongue is the instrument of saying. He who knows, let me hear this, he is the Self, the ear is the instrument of hearing
>
> He who knows, let me think this, he is the Self, the mind is his divine eye He, the Self, seeing these pleasures through his divine eye, rejoices.

As I interpret this, the essential idea is that the Self, though not an object of experience, makes experience possible, that the Self, though not acting phenomenally, makes phenomenal action possible, and that the Self, though not thinking, makes thought possible. At this stage, it should be superfluous to add that which experiences or is experienced, which thinks, or which otherwise participates in our stream of phenomena, so far as it is real at all, can only be the Self. What we must not do is to identify the Self with the mere phenomenal manifestation which it makes possible, and which presupposes it.)

Now, what is this which serves as the foundation for our phenomenality? That is not a question which we can fully answer. My own remarks on this topic can attempt only the ambitious, to partially clarify certain aspects of Prajapati's teaching and its significance, rather than the impossible, to fully explicate the Truth which is the object of that teaching We cannot capture our Self in our words. At most, some words better than others can suggest what lies beyond words. Yet any words under-determine the reality. From any words, even Prajapati's fourth and highest teaching, there is still a leap to the Truth. Prajapati promised felicity to those who *obtain* the Self, not to those who are given some teaching about it.

We must accept the basic truth that there must be some transcendental foundation of our sphere of phenomenality, but this truth can be interpreted in many different ways. Even hard-core materialists can accept it, under their own interpretation[2]. Again, we might

2 They can take the transcendental ground of phenomenality to be the subconscious yet purely physical depths of the material mind

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conceivably take it that there are many transcendental constitutors of phenomenality; at least one for each of us. Such interpretations are ruled out by other upanisadic passages, of course, not the least of which being the "Thou art that" [*Tat tvam asi*] passage elsewhere in the *Chandogya* (at VI, 8·16). Taking the upanisad into account as a whole, together with the other upanisads, we must accept the principle that there is a unity underlying diversity, and accept that it is that unity alone which is to be taken as the constitutor of phenomenality. Here the Self is to be found. How, then, are we to understand this ?

Shankara based his philosophy very rigidly on the principle that unity must underlie diversity. His Advaita Vedanta takes Prajapati's teaching, that phenomenality presupposes a transcendental underpinning, and interprets it in terms of a universal and undifferentiated One. Still, as we have remarked, the teachings of the *Chandogya*, like all teachings, under-state the truth about reality. I shall argue that Shankara's interpretation in terms of a universal and undifferentiated One is not mandated by upanisadic authority, and, moreover, that it is not correct. By way of departure, and by way of contrast, let us here consider the Kantian teaching about the noumenal self (which has its own shortcomings).

On Kant, Shankara, and the Ground of Phenomena

The noumenal self of Kantianism is certainly not the Atman/Brahman of Advaita Vedanta, though each is called upon to underpin phenomenality. A very important difference is that for Kant, the noumenal realm is other than the phenomenal realm, being a realm of quite unknowable things in-themselves, whereas for Shankara, true reality is none other than the phenomenal, any difference being only an expression of our ignorance. For Kant, the noumenal self synthesizes the manifold of noumenal reality into those unities which make up our phenomenal world. The noumenal self, of course, cannot be an object of experience, being inferred only from its effects. Fichte then asks, quite pertinently, how, if we can know nothing about noumena, we can claim to know that there are any. We are forced to Fichte's conclusion that the real, so far as we can find it, is to be found only in the phenomenal, and that the synthesizing self is to be found only there. On this point, Shankara would be in

and, indeed, such an interpretation in implicit is most versions of modern materialism. (It would even be true, on mathematical grounds, that such a self could not comprehend a full specification of its own structure, since knowledge of such a self would necessarily require a greater information-storage capacity than that self could itself contain) On upanisadic grounds we cannot rest with materiality as such, but in any case it is worth nothing that the material mind may well have preconscious depths, and that these may be part of a wider material nexus.

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agreement with Fichte, though on the basis of different reasoning. (For that matter, on this particular point, that of not lapsing into such a dualism, the modern materialist, as well as Virochana, are quite correct.) Still, in spite of a gratuitous duality, Kant has raised an issue here which we must not ignore, that of unity and the manifold, the one and the many.

What Kant thought needed explaining was not the appearance of diversity in the world but, on the contrary, the coherent association and ordering of diverse perceptual elements. He was addressing himself to Hume's problem of explaining why bundles, be they selves, objects, or events, adhere as they do. Kant's solution, that there is a pre-perceptual percept-former, is correct so far as it goes, though we are not entitled to infer that it is truly different from the phenomenal. That is the conclusion implicit in Prajapati's fourth teaching, and that, in other terms, is Shankara's conclusion. But is not diversity, or the appearance of diversity, something which requires an explanation? Shankara thought that it did. Here we find different presuppositions leading different thinkers to very different conclusions.

For Shankara, a starting assumption is that there is unity at the root of (apparent) diversity, an assumption for which we have considerable upanisadic authority. Just in the *Chandogya*, not only are we told "thou art that", we are told "As all leaves are attached to a stalk, so is all speech [by implication, all differentia] attached to the Om. Om is all this, yea, Om is all this" (II. 23. 4). Moreover, that unity is prior to diversity was the conclusion of Shankara's reasoning. For any two things to be at all related, even if related by sharp contrast or opposition, they must be connected at a deeper level. If two things have absolutely nothing in common, they would not be in the same universe. So, all things must then be connected with all other things, with all differentia between them being subsumed under a greater unity. At the deepest level, then, there must be complete unity. All appearances of differentia in reality must, accordingly, be due only to our ignorance and relative to the level of our ignorance.

One might criticize Shankara's position at a number of points. To start with, one might question the claim that thing related with each other must be connected, in the sense of having something in common. It might be, instead, that all—or at least some—relations are purely external. This is a matter of some philosophical debate. However, we can side step that debate. Shankara claims—justifiedly, believe, in the light of numerous passages—that upanisadic authority is decisively in favor of the claim that being related entails having something in common. I shall not dispute that claim. My disagreement with Shankara is on the separate and further issue of

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whether the unity at the root of diversity is an *undifferentiated* unity. His claim to that effect is neither sufficiently supported by reason nor mandated by upanisadic authority. Certainly such a conclusion is not mandated by the *Chandogya*. However, before I pursue that issue, let us return to Kant, and inquire why he did posit diversity in reality.

Kant took it quite for granted that reality is diversified, it evidently never occuring to him that such an assumption required justification. The world of our experience *is* a world of diverse elements, and his objective was that of accounting not for their diversity but for their inter-relationships. We must proceed carefully here. According to Radhakrishnan.

> While Kant believes in a plurality of things in themselves, Shankara declares that there is only one fundamental reality. In this matter Shankara is certainly more philosophical than Kant, who illegitimately imports the distinctions of the world into the region of things-in themselves [3]

Now, Kant certainly did take noumenal as well as phenomenal reality to be manifold, and as we have already remarked, he was not justified in positing a radical distinction between phenomena and noumena. Still, it does not follow that he took the manifold to be composed of radically separated and independent things-in-themselves. Indeed, according to Kant, where there is relationship, there is underlying connection—provided by the noumenal self which founds the relationship. All of our phenomenal diversity is connected by, and founded on, our noumenal self. (Of course it may be that reality founds and inter connects itself, phenomena and noumena being at root the same.) Is Radhakrishnan correct in his charge that Kant is illegitimately imputing to things in themselves the distinctions of phenomenality? Actually, Kant did not impute *those* distinctions to them, but the question to be concerned with is whether he was illicit in supposing that noumenal reality must be differentiated in *some* way just because phenomenality is. Radhakrishnan, I suggest, did not give due weight to the need to provide an adequate explanation of the (apparent) existence of phenomena. Whence springs that differentiation—or that appearance of differentiation—which we find in the world? Kant thought that noumenal reality was manifold to start with, the noumenal self serving to organize the manifold prior to our phenomenal awareness. Setting aside the question of whether true reality is truly different from the world we experience (though it is hard to see how it could be radically distinct), the question we insist on is that of whether it is truly differentiated. If not, then the appearance of differentiation demands explanation.

3 S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, Allen & Unwin, London, 1927, p. 522.

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If ultimate reality is such that it gives rise to an appearance of differentiation, then it must contain some differentating principle—unless it is differentiated by something else. Seemingly, a duaiist more easily than a monist could accept one undifferentiated unity, as the dualist could refer differentiation to the rest of reality. But if phenomena, self, and ultimate reality are one, there being nothing else, then any appearance of differentiation can have its seat only there. If there is no differentiation in reality, then our mistake must spring from reality, there being, clearly, no where else it could arise. If this illusiory differentiation originates in reality, then our differentiated ignorance must be real.

Advaita Vedantins would not accept this argument. One traditional line of response would be to point out, by way of analogy, that as the unitary sun appears many when reflected in bits of glass, so the One appears differentiated when distorted by our ignorance. In general, the reply is that differentiation is due not to reality, but to our ignorant misapprehension of reality. This line of reply fails The sun/glass analogy is defective because there is more than one thing in the system: the bits of glass are many, and from them arise the multiplicity of the reflection. In general, the reply fails because we can account for the (apparent) differentiation of the undifferentiated One only by smuggling in some differentiating agent, be it glass or ignorance, which has moment in reality. Nor can we take refuge in the half way house of relative (partial) truth and reality. Ignorance can explain mistaken appearance — but only if there *is* ignorance. If there is ignorance there are differentia, while if there is no real ignorance then even partial misapprehension is not possible.[4] Still, while Shankara is incorrect in his claims about the undifferentiated character of unitary reality, we must not lose sight of the fact that—amongst many other valuable insights—he does proclaim an important truth about oneness at the root of differentiation. I shall attempt to clarify that truth and distinguish it from from the incorrect thesis of undifferentiated unity, doing so with respect to the *Chandogya*

Differentia, Dichotomy, and the One

Shankara is quite thoroughly correct in cautioning us not to foolishly allow our conceptual distinctions to lead us to imagine either that reality must divide along the lines of our distinctions or that those distinctions are absolute. His doctrine of relative truth and relative reality is based on the solid insight that even the best of beliefs are formed relative to their own system of meaning. Our words, our thoughts, our distinctions and associations — these are no more than

4 I discuss this issue in more depth in my "Oneness and Truth", *Darshana International*, Volume XVI, No 3 July 1976, pp. 64 77.

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our own creations, and they are only tools. Some tools are better than others, but any tool kit has its limitations and any kit can be replaced. Yet it is all to easy for us to attribute the shape of our conceptual apparatus to reality in its own right. Insistently and rightly, Shankara calls upon us to look beyond words to reality itself. In this he rests firmly on upanisadic authority :

> My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is clay. (*Chand.* VI, 1, 4).

To take up the upanisadic simile, clay *is*, and underlies things of clay. We treat it different ways, with our hands and minds, and it takes different shapes in our eyes and thoughts. Objects, our purposes in dealing with them, and the names and concepts we employ in doing so, these things are relative, transitory and superficial. We may form different objects from clay, or find them already formed, and we may refer to them all as "pots" or we may classify them in various ways according to our uses for them. Others may conceptualize them differently. The objects we make and the words which we use may serve our purposes during our life-time. but what there is and what remains is the clay. On the deepest level, beneath all of our conceptual apparatus, reality remains : "As all leaves are attached to a stalk, so is all speech attached to the Om".

Only through words and concepts can we separate one thing from the rest of reality and treat it as a discrete object. We can separate things superficially, relative to any number of conceptual/perceptual schemes, but neither our senses nor our minds nor our hands can dissociate that which is intrinsically indissoluble. Reality remains whole. On all of these points, Shankara was quite correct. I might add that some schools of western philosophy—but not all—have been insufficiently alert to these points.

These points do not entail the false conclusion that reality actually is undifferentiated. Two things must be noted here. Firstly, the fact that all systems of differentiation are relative so our conceptual schemes, with no system of differentiation being uniquely privileged, does not imply that there are no differentia. That reality as such does not warrant any *particular* system of differentiation is quite compatible with reality as such having differentiation in the sense of having—prior to all interpretation—its own character implicit within it. By analogy, the real number line of mathematicians has implicit differentia, with numbers being different from one another, even though there is no discontinuity and even though there are literally infinite ways in which, conceptually, we may subdivide and classify the real numbers. The second major thing to be noted here is that differentiation does not imply discontinuity. Just as the real number line or a topological solid may vary within itself, yet

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be absolutely continuous, so reality as such, the Brahman, may be differentiated in itself yet be one absolutely continuous whole. That it is one absolutely continuous whole, with no particular system of differentiation being privileged need not and must not lead us, as it led Shankara, to the false conclusion that the Brahman is a static undifferentiated unity. In such a conclusion we are not true to the One, and, thereby, we are not true to our Self.

Truth, Value, and Self

It has been something of a dogma in recent times — becoming less so, I am pleased to note — that there is a radical difference in kind between facts and values An "is-ought" barrier is sometimes invoked, and there are many other ways of making the claim. The basic point is that actual fact is totally distinct from any and all matters of value. (The corollary is usually drawn that values are therefore somehow less real.) There is even a certain amount of truth behind the claim, but ultimately the claim must be abandoned. The inescapable truth — quite shocking to the previously entrenched position — is that there can be no facts without values. All the facts we believe we know, that we conceivably could know, are matters of properties and relations applying to various things within our conceptual schemes. Yet all of those things, properties, relationships, etc., are recognized and distinguished from one another in our conceptual schemes because (mostly unconsciously) we take them to be important and the differences between them to be significant. Different people with different values conceptualize the world in different ways. The facts of *our* world contain our values implicitly within them.

Factually and morally, we must orient ourselves properly. Now, as I have argued, there are differentia implicit in reality, an infinite continuum of them. We do not project our conceptual schemes into a featureless void. Inwardly and outwardly, we project our conceptual schemes onto reality. (The illuiory snake is, after all, a misapprehended rope, and not just nothing.) Our aim must not be to obliterate differentia — which in itself would be to distort reality — but to obliterate misunderstanding. We must avoid misapprehension, radical division, unreal distinction and, in fine, distortion based on a particular and limited point of view. We must, then, take as our point of view that which is not a *point*, not a particular and limited self, but which is the whole, the One, the Self. Then, and only then, can we obtain undistorted knowledge and undistorted values.

It is in the light of a broader understanding of value that we must understand the doctrines of karma and transmigration. The *Chandogya* (V, 10, 7) tells us that :

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> Those whose conduct has been good, will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a Brahmana, or a Kshatriya, or a Vaisya. But those whose conduct has been evil, will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a hog, or a Chandala.

Similar remarks are, of course, made in the *Brihadaranyaka* and in several of the other upanisads. The point is not just that we create the conditions of our birth. Throughout our career we create our own life and, on the foundation of our true Self, we create our own self. As Saint Augustine told us, we are real according to the order of our loves. As we think and value, so we are. As we love the real and true, so we become real and true, and as we fall away from that we become lost in ignorance and unreality.

On the whole, the *Chandogya* stresses right knowledge as the way to salvation, while the *Brihadaranyaka* stresses right desire, but these cannot really be separated anymore than can facts and values be separated. However stated, the message of the upanisads is that we achieve salvation only by transcending the superficial and merging our particularity not into the undifferentiated, nor into nothing, but into the undistorted whole. As we progress and transcend particularity of point of view we do not lose contact with differentia. Quite the opposite. We realize contact with differentia as they are. We realize our Self. To resume our line analogy, in seeing one point or another point we do not see the line. We never shall see the line so long as we see only particular points. When we do see the line, though, we find all its points implicit within. Yet they do not compose the line. Rather, the line composes them. So the upanisads tell us, the Self composes our selves. In rising above our limited and limiting particularity and point of view, we obtain the Self — a Self which is empty of particularity, yet replete with the riches of infinite continuous differentia. Once we deeply accept that "We are That" and, in thought and desire, lose the distorted perspective of limited individuality we obtain that Self — that Truth, that One — and therein obtain all worlds and all desires. That, of course, is just what Prajapati promised.

As we noted previously, Shankara was quite correct in maintaining that there is unity at the basis of differentia, that distinctions do not rest on dichotomy between radically different things, and that reality need not differentiate itself along the lines *we* seek to impose upon it. Rather, our differentia are relative to our conceptual (and perceptual) schemes. Moreover, Shankara quite rightly rejects all particularity of point of view, on the highest level, and the distorted thoughts and values based thereon. No one way of differentiating reality is privileged, nor is any particular scheme of values absolute. Quite rightly, therefore, Shankara rejects all differentia which are

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based on particularity of point of view and are thereby distorted. However, it does not follow that we must reject all differentia. It may be that some differentia are not based on a particular point of view. More than maybe, since, as we have argued, there must be differentia in true reality, else there could be no distorted phenomena.

I do not pretend to have given either a complete account of the Self, or a full analysis of the *Chandogya's* teachings concerning it. No one could do that. I do offer my limited conclusions, at variance with those of Advaita Vedanta, as being in accordance with those of the *Chandogya* and, in their various forms, the other upanisads. The *Chandogya* encourages us to find the Self, which is the foundation of all things and all worthy teachings, via the perfection — and thus, ultimately, the self-transcendence — of our knowledge. The *Brihadaranyaka* calls upon us to find the Self through the perfecting of our desires in accordance with the True and Real (and therefore true Value). The *Isa* directs us to the One behind the differences of name and form, and points to the reconciliation of different descriptions and schemes of differentia in a trans-individual point of view. The other upanisads teach us in their own ways. Yet implicit in all the upanisads is the Self — the One, the True, the Real, the Value—which in its fulness is the foundation of all things. Beyond any teaching, that is the Self of the upanisads.

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Book-Reviews :

R. Puligandla : *Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 363, University Press of America. Inc., 4720 Boston Way, Lanham, Maryland 20706 U. S. A. New Edition (1985)

The author of this book is Professor R. Puligandla, at the University of Toledo, U S. A. He has been teaching Philosophy in United States for several years and has to his credit several works. The interest the American Universities are taking in histories, philosophies and Religions of Asia. Those discipline are becoming more and more popular and many Universities have strengthened their existing Departments or have started new Departments to teach these subjects. The author says in his introduction that the book is not only to introduce the students to the problems, methods, goals and temper of Indian Philosophy, but also to arouse in him or her sufficient interest in the subject to undertake further study of Indian Philosophy and culture.

This book is one of the best books on Indian Philosophy written recently. Professor Puligandla has very nicely dealt with the different aspects of philosophy—Epistemology, Ethics and Metaphysics of all the different schools of Indian Philosophy. Besides these aspects the author has developed many other things in the various systems of Indian Philosophy. He has considered very nicely and thoroughly the subject matter and divided his whole books as follows :

I. General Introduction, II. Charvakism : Materialism, III. Jainism, IV. Buddhism which he has subdivided into four Parts as mentioned here : A. The Buddhas Teachings, B. Philosophical Foundation of the Buddha's Teachings, C. Buddhist Schools of Philosophy—Hinayana-Mahayana, The Vaibhashika, The Sautrantika, The Yogachar, The Madhyamic School and D. Buddhist Psychology and Ethics, V. Samkhya, VI. Yoga, VII. Vaisheshika, VIII. Nyaya and IX. Vedanta which he has divided into Introduction, A Vedic Background, B. The Upanishads, C. Schools of Vedanta which have been divided : 1. Advaita Vedanta, 2. Vishistadvaits, 3. Dvaita Vedanta. X. Time and Hisiory in the

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Indian Tradition, and lastly: A Glimpse at the Contemporary Scene which has been subdivided into: Introduction, Shri Aurobindo and Shri Radhakrishnan.

In the end Dr. Puligandla has given Notes in minute details making many subtle Indian Philosophical details chapterwise, Glossary of Philosophical terms making philosophical concepts very clear and given quite an exhaustive Bibliography of books chapterwise making this book a very thorough guide for further reading and research in the field of Indian Philosophy, and lastly a very useful Index has been provided.

Dr. Puligandla is to be congratulated for bringing out *Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy* adding much more to existing books on Indian Philosophy making it upto date. The book will attract both Indian and Western Scholars, beginners as well as researchers in the field, He deserves congratulations on such a nice and scholary publication.

O. P. Ghai: (Editor and Compilar) *Unity in Diversity*. A Guide to the understanding of the fundamental unity underlying the great living religions of the world, pp. 132 Institute of Personal Development, Sterling Publishers Private Ltd, New Delhi—110016, and Bangalore 560009. Price Rs. 50/—

Sri O.P. Ghai, the editor and compiler of this beautiful collection of sayings of great Religions is a known teacher, writer and editor of Journal 'Life and Out look" devoted to successful living. In this book he has collected the sayings which conveys the message that there is a fundamental unity underlying the great living religions of the world.

Shri Ghai in this small and instructive guide has selected quotations and sayings on such important topics: Anger, Brotherhood, Courage. Deeds, Duty Evil, Faith, Family, Forgiveness, Friends, Giving. Golden Rule, Guidance. Happiness, Hate, Home. Immortality, Justice, Love. Man. Meditation. Obedience. Peace. Sincerity, Repentance, War. Wealth, Work and Wrath from Eleven Great Religions of the World: Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity. Confucianism, Jainism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, Shintoism and Sikhism.

Shri O. P. Ghai in his Preface writes: These saying reveal how religions originating in very different cultures and in ages far apart teach similar doctrines and principles of ethics and morals. He further says that the book will prove a useful guide to the understanding of the fundamental similarity underlying the religions and hopes that the book will inspire the readers.

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It is a book worth reading and contemplating upon for making our society worth living. It is indeed a nice collection of sayings of eleven religions on many important aspects of our life. Shri Ghai deserves congratulations for compiling such a useful collection.

Charles Hartshorne: *Omnipotence and other Theological Mistakes* pp. 144, State University of New York Press, Albany U.S.A. (1984)

Professor Charles Hartshorne is quite a senior Professor of Philosophy of U. S. A. He has taught for several years and is now leading a retired life and has published several books. The present book presents Hartshorne's Philosophical theology briefly, simply and vividly.

The author in his preface mentions that this book "is an attempt to present and defend the revised idea of God as simply and forcefully as I can"... The accessibility of options for belief is part of what religious freedom ought to mean. The option should be made more generally accessible than has been the case in the past. In this book it is one option that is directly presented, but it is defended against one vastly more widely known and for this reason may furnish a new opportunity to a fairly large class of people. ...In writing it I have tried to avoid needless technicalities and professional paraphernalia in order to communicate with a wider circle of readers... I definitely believe in God, in divine love as the key to existence, in love for God as (ideally) the divine love all-in-all of our motivation, and in love for fellow creatures as valuable and important, judged by the same principle of value-to-God as we should judge ourselves by. In other words I accept what Jesus said was "the Law and the Prophets", that is the gist of religion. If that makes me religious I think I am as religious as anybody".

Throughout the centuries some of the world's most brilliant philosophers and theologians have held and perpetuated six beliefs that give the world God a meaning untrue to its import in sacred writings or in active religious devotion: 1. God is absolutely perfect and therefore unchangeable. 2. Omnipotence. 3. Omniscience. 4. God's unsympathetic goodness, 5. Immortality as a career after death, and 6. Revelation as infallible. Charles Hartshorne deals with these six theological mistakes from the viewpoint of his process theology. The whole book is divided into four chapters besides Preface, Index of persons and subject index, as follows: 1 The common mistakes about God, 2. The Physical and the Spiritual, 3. Creation Through Evolution and 4. Equal Love for Self and Other, All-Love for the All-loving. These chapters have further

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been subdivided to make it more thorough and clear for general readers. This book has a great concern with practical issues of importance to all thinking persons, The author has very ably discussed different aspects in simple language so that even a layman can clearly grasp the ideas. It is indeed a scholarly book and the author deserves congratulation.

Saul Friedlander. Gerald Holto, Leo Marx, Eugene Skolnikoff (Editors) : *Visions of Apocalypse End or Rebirth* ? pp. 268. Publishers Holmes and Meier, New York and London, Price Cloth $ 28 50 and Paper $ 15 00 (1985).

Western Culture is a storehouse of apocalyptic prophecy, and during the last century, a strikingly large number of artists and thinkers have called into question the validity—and durability—of the concept of "Man' " itself. In one way or another they have announced the eclipse of the ancient belief that humanity is blessed with a unique endowment of soul, or some other distinctive core of spiritual or psychic autonomy or moral integrity. Saul Friedlander in his introduction says that this volume attempts, among other things. to place these ancient themes in their widest historical context : What are the roots of Western thinking about the End ? How has the apocalpytic imagination expressed itself over the centuries ?

It is a very interesting book consisting of twelve essays written by scholars of eminence divided into four parts. The first group of Essays : Herald A. T. Riche. The Archaic Heritage : Myths of Decline and End in Antiquity : Amos Funkenstein : A Schedule for the End of the World : The Origins and Persistence of the Apocalyptic Mentality : Saul Friedlander : Themes of Decline and End in the Nineteenth-Century Western Imagination and Frank Karmode : Apocalypse and the Modern, deals with Apocalyptic beliefs, beliefs in End and Renewal, including beliefs in a total End. The next group of essays Harvey Brooks. Technology-Related Catastrophes Myth and Reality; Robert S. Morison : Biological Eschatology, and Robert Jay Lifton : The Image of "The End of the World : A Psycho historical View; and the third group of essays : Matei Calinescu: The End of Man in Twentieth Century Thought : Reflections on a Philosophical Metaphor, Andre Reszler : Man as Nostalgia : The Image of the Last Man in Twentieth-Century Postutopian Fiction. an Richard Poirier : Writing of the Self analyzes modern thinking and writing about the end of "Man". The concluding Essays : Philip Morisons. The Actuary of our Species : The End of Humanity Regarded from the Viewpoint of Science, considers the fate of our species from the vantage of a distant star.

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Each section considers a different way of envisaging the End, yet the striking fact is that today all such visions seem to be converging. There is an astonishing continuity in apocalyptic beliefs. Each period has its prophets of doom, its ennunciators of new beginnings. Its heralds of the unthinkable. Each essay in this volume, in its own way, charts a possible descent towards the abyss, and each in its own way leads towards an act of faith—faith in man, in life, is mere beyond the last thought. It is quite an interesting book written by several scholars and is worth reading.

This book is unique from many aspects. The most important aspects is that the editors come from various disciplines. Dr. Saul Friedlander is Professor of European History, at Tel Aviv University. Professor Gerald Holton is Professor of Physics and Professor of History of Science at Harvard University. Professor Leo Marx is a Jr. Professor of American Cultural History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Professor Eugene B Skolnikoff is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Inter National Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Besides the Editors we have a galaxy of contributors who belong to various disciplines, sach as Prof. Harvey Brooks is Professor of Technology at Havard, Professor Matei Calisecu is Professor of Comparative Literature and West European Studies at the Indiana University, Professor Amos Funkenstein is Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv and Professor of History at the University of California, Los Angeles. Prof. Kermode teaches at Columbia University. Dr. Robert Jay Lifton is Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry at the City University of New York. Dr. Robert Morison is Professor of Biology Emeritus, Cornell University, and Visiting Professor of Science and Society at the Masachusetts Institute of Technology, Prof. Philip Morison, Professor of Physics at the Masachusetts Institute of Technology, Prof. Richard Poirier is Professor of English at Rutgers University. Professor Herald A. T. Reiche is a classicist at Masachusetts Institute of Technology and Professor Andre Reszler is a Professor of European History.

Indeed a very good collection of scholarly articles by eminent scholars of different disciplines on Visions of Apocalypse.

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Some Reflections on Classifications Of Human Beings

Troy Organ

The twentieth century paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin called attention to the interesting fact that the human animal is the only animal which has not evolved into species. According to modern scientists there are 2400 species of snakes, 3500 species of mammals, and 800.000 species of insects. The flying reptile known as Archaeopteryx has evolved into 9000 species of birds, but, *Homo erectus* has no species. Human evolution is manifest in races, not in species. One of the differences between a species and a race is that members of the former cannot interbreed and members of the latter can. Eagles and wrens are species. Eskimos and Hottentots are races. When I once discussed this fact with a high school student, she added that the offspring of an Eskimo and a Hottentot would be a "frigid midget." This physiological fact about human beings substantiates the moral and religious claim that no matter how greatly we differ in race, religion, culture, physical shape and size, talents, or intelligence, we are one. Hinduism expresses this claim in its grand insight *tat tvam asi* (That you are). The essential nature of the human being is to be found in the faith that all humnn biengs are manifestations of a Basic Unity which can be expressed with a minimum of intentionality as "That." Chardin argued similarly from his studies of human evolution for an ultimate convergence which he called the "Omega Point." Both the Upaniṣads and Chardin celebrate the human being as the instrument through which the universe, which is existentially one, realizes its potentiality for a higher form of unity. Through the human being, and only through the human being, can the universe which is *Dasein* (there in fact) become *Sosein* (there with the additional quality of knowing it

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is). This is why the *Mahābhārata* exhorts us to rejoice that we are human.

Man is nature's paradigm.[1] The human being is the model by which all other living beings are measured. Some lower animals see better than human animals, some hear better, and some have better senses of touch, taste, and smell; but human animals excell because only they are self-aware. The human animal knows it is an animal; it is the self-knowing animal, and therefore, as self-knower, it transcends animality. No mere animal knows it is an animal. Man is the universe becoming self aware. The evolution which brought him into existence is now in his control. He can terminate organic evolution by destroying all life on this planet, or he can fashion life in the mold of his dreams. Extinction or fruition are genuine possibilities. The human animal remains an animal—but a thinking animal. He solves problems, as do other higher mammals, but he also thinks about thinking — and this no mere animal does. Man is not imprisoned in animal nature. An appropriate metaphor is contained in the fairy tale of the prince who because of a witch's spell was placed in the body of a frog. Other frogs were locked in their frog-ness, but this particular "frog" was a prince who could be released only when kissed in love by a maiden. Greek and Roman mythology contain many illustrations of a self incarcerated in an animal or a plant, e g., the maiden Io was hidden by Zeus in a young heifer, Atalanta and Melanion became lions, the hero Narcissus was doomed by Nemesis to the life of a flower, the lovers Ceyx and Alcyone entered the bodies of two birds, Baucis and pHilemon became a linden and an oak, and Daphne became a laurel. The human being is an animal, but unlike other animals, the human animal transcends animality through inventions, art, culture, knowledge, and — above all — through self-consciousness. No animal qua-animal knows it is an animal. In the self-conscious animal the potentialities of matter, life, and mind can be realized. In the words of Julian Huxley, the human being is evolution "becoming conscious of itself." Evolution up to the state of self-awareness was unconscious evolution. Further evolution of the human being is in his hands. This is the awful responsibility and the glorious possibility consequent upon being human.

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1 Unfortunately, in English the word "man" is used as a translation of both the Latin *vir* (male) and the Latin *homo* (human). This is a remnant of male domination with which we now struggle. Such inelegances as "he/she," "male/female", "humankind", "humanhood", "personhood", "policeperson", "chairperson", and "chair" are, I hope, only temporary solutions of the problem. A return to Latin would solve the problem—but that is an unlikely solution !

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One important aspect in being human is the ability to classify human beings — both oneself and others. To be human is not only to know *that* one is but also *who* one is. Human relations are dependent to a large extent on a network of taxonomies, e. g., when I know that X is a London banker who votes the Tory ticket and who worships in an Anglican church and that Y is a charwoman who washes windows to make a living, I know what relations to take to X and Y. The most obvious class into which we place people is the sexual classification. When a child is born in any culture, the first question asked is "Is it a boy or a girl?" The answer to that question determines the attitudes, acts, words, and emotions which will fashion the entire life of the person. The sexual classification is undergoing radical change in the second half of the twentieth century. We have discovered that it is chemically and surgically possible to trasform a male into a female and a female into a male. We are learning that homosexuality and heterosexuality are physiological facts. We are discovering that male sexual dominence and female sexual passivity are rooted in culture not in nature. Masculinity and femininity must be carefully examined. The sexual classification remains basic, but its intentionality is going through radical change.

Some of the classifications of humans are rooted in prejudices, others in facts; but all serve to assign the individual to roles and indicate to others how the individual is to be treated. The ways of classifying seem endless. A few of the classifications illustrate the possibilities.

Names may originate as classification. Some of the names are vocational, e.g., Carpenter, Cooper, Smith, Farmer, Baker, Miller. Other names indicate the relation of a child to its father, e. g., Johnson means "son of John." In many cultures a name indicates a virtue which it is hoped the child will emulate, e.g., Patience, Prudence, Joy, Faith, Uma, Joti, Purushottam. Some individuals in their desire to be a class of one member have changed their surname in order that their name will appear in first place or in last place in a telephone directory, e.g., Aaba and Zzya.

Another classification is age. If "What is your name?" is the first question an adult asks a child, surely the second question is "How old are you?" Children draw sharp distinctions on with whom they will or will not play on the grounds of age: "He's only six years old. We eight-year olds don't play with six-year olds!" Journalists customarily state the age of a person in a news item when the age has no relevance save perhaps to prevent confusing John Smith (37) with John Smith (73). The three ages of man—youth, middle age, and old age—are sometimes indicated by descriptive and euphoric terms, e.g., storm and stress period, middles-

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cent, golden years, sunset years, and the "wellderly." Shakespeare divided the life of man into seven ages : (1) "the infant, mewling and puking in the nurse's arms," (2) "the whining school boy", (3) "the lover, sighing like a furnace," (4) "a soldier, full of strange oaths and bearded like the pard," (5) "the justice, in fair round bellow with capon lin'd," (6) "the lean and slipper'd pantaloon, with spectacles on nose and pouch on side," and (7) "second childishness and mere oblivion, sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything."[2]

In the United States identification of a person may include a wide variety of numbers : Social Security, driver's license, bank account, credit card, life insurance policy, voting registration, residential address, telephone, car license, driver registration, etc. Some of these requests for number identification border on the invasion of privacy, e.g., one is not legally obligated to give one's Social Security number as a form of identification.

Race is a common division, e. g., Negroid, Caucasian, Mongolian, Eskimo; but what constitutes a race and what is meant by racial pulity are difficult problems. It is a concept which becomes easily confused with nationality, language, and religion.

Nationality — German, French, Liberian, Indian, Mexican, etc. — seems to be an obvious and clear division, but problems can arise. A Japanese-American friend of mine was told in India that he was not an American because he did not "look like an American".

Vocation is clearly a division of mankind. "What do you do?" — meaning "What do you do to make a living ?" — is a natural question to put to a stranger. In India "What is your salary ?" is also acceptable — but not in the United States. Bertrand Russell once said that all human beings can be divided into three groups : (1) those who do the work, (2) those who tell others to do the work, and (3) those who decide what work is to be done. The last group, he added, are politicians.

There are many ways of classifying people according to their social and economic status. Master and slave was for centuries one of the unhappy divisions of mankind. There were also subclasses. For example, Aristotle distinguished between natural slaves and those who were made slaves by reason of capture in warfare. According to his Hellenic prejudices, no Greek could become a natural slave and no non-Greek could become a natural master. Other cultures have distinguished between the freeborn and those who bought their freedom, and also between those born into slavery and those who indentured themselves into slavery. The division into lord, vassal, and serf was an economic classification in Medieval

2 *As You Like It*, Act II, Scene 7.

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Europe. More recently such divisions as management and labor, bourgeoisie and prolateriat, white-collar and blue-collar workers, etc. have been offered. British nobility is a fascinating example of human classification.[3]

Political preferences or affiliations—e.g., Democrat, Republican, Whig, Tory, Socialist, Communist — are taken very seriously by some people.

Another common classification is in terms of the size of the community in which one lives. Urban and rural distinguish people — and presumably shape the pattern of their manners and morals.

Classifications by physical characteristics are numerous, e.g., color and texture of hair, eye color, height, weight, quality of vision, sensitivity of hearing, finger prints, teeth, blood type, bone structure, general health. Motor dominance is extremely important, e.g., right-handed, left-handed, ambidextrous. Some cultures appear to be structured on the assumption that right-handedness is right and left-handedness is wrong. Anthropologists sometimes divide humans according to the cephalic index, i.e., those whose skull's breadth is less than four-fifth of its length are dolichocephalic (long-headed) and those whose skull's breadth is at least four-fifth of its length are brachycephalic (short-headed). In addition to these natural distinctions some humans differentiate themselves through such means as cosmetology, plastic surgery, tatooing, and scarring.

Diet divides making into vegetarians, carnivores, lactarians, teetotalers, etc. Gracious hosts in many cultures inquire about their guests' food restrictions and prejudices before planning the menu. Once in India when my wife and I asked our invited guest if she had any food restrictions, she replied, "No. I am omnivorous."

Matrimonial status is another of the divisions found in all lands and cultures—single, married, widowed, and divorced. In some modern cultures a woman who has lost her husband is expected to spend the remainder of her life in mourning. Even in a remarkably open society clubs for "singles" appear to be necessary, especially for those who through the loss of a spouse find themselves ostracised in a culture oriented to the notion that marriage is essential for adulthood.

The classifications based on religious preference, language spoken, degree of literacy, and amount of formal education are obvious.

There are classifications which are temporary. For example, one is a motorist while driving a car, a pedestrian while walking, a

3 See Roy Perrott, *The Aristocrats*. New York: MacMillan, 1968. The order of nobles and the number in each order in 1968 were duke (non-royal) (26), marquis (29), earl (159), viscount (110), baron (535), and baronet (1480).

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passenger while flying in a plane, a customer when purchasing a commodity, a patient when under a doctor's care.

There are many psychological classifications. A classification into the same and the insane presupposes a fixed criterion for sanity. It is an interesting fact that there are subclasses of insanity, but not subclasses of sanity! Classifications such as introverts/extroverts, inner directed/outer-directed, self-directed/radar-directed, and homosexuals/heterosexuals are today regarded as tendencies rather than distinct groupings. Erich Fromm distinguished six character types: (1) The receptive, who feel that everything of value comes from outside the self. (2) The exploitative, who agree that everything of value comes from outside, but who, in addition, hold that it must be taken away from others. (3) The hoarding, who find security in what they possess, and regard all intimacy as a threat to personal security. (4) The marketing, who value persons for their exchange value, and hold that they must develop the kind of personality others will want to hire (5) The necrophilic, who having an excessive concern for law and order, pay no attention to persons involved, and treat fellow humans as things. (6) The productive, who seek to realize their own potentialities and become creators rather than automata. One of the most interesting of the psychological classifications is that offered by William H. Sheldon in *The Varieties of Human Physique* (1940) and *The Varieties of Temperament* (1942). According to Sheldon humans can be divided into endomorphs, mesomorphs, and ectomorphs. Endomorphs are viscerotonic, i.e., they are gut dominated, or intestine toned. Their dominant delight is the physical comfort of eating, drinking, and sleeping Their bodily shape is oval. Their body tends to be soft and relaxed, and their lips are flabby. They are fell-ers. Their reactions are slow. They make interpersonal relationships easily, are tolerant toward other people, and tend to sink into inertia and torpor. They appear to have a horror of activity. Mesomorphs are somatotonic, i.e,, they are dominated by muscles. Their delight is physical action. They are doers and conquerors. Their bodily shape is triangular. They have an intense will to power, and are insensitive to pain, noise, and distraction. They tend to be lacking in insight and tolerance. In action they may lose sight of the aim of the act. Their chief horror is the thought of growing older. Ectomorphs are cerebronic, i.e., they are brain toned, or dominated by the nervous system. Their delights are located in the consciousness. Their bodily shape is the long oblong. They tend to be physiologically overresponsive, to have tense muscles, and to make jumpy reactions. Hence they are often near exhaustion. They are not at ease among social groups, are intolerant of slower people, and therefore love privacy and seek solitude. Their chief horror is that of being ignorant.

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Another psychological classification is the quantitative and the qualitative, i.e., those fascinated with numbers and those who are more interested in qualitative distinctions. Deans, provosts, and presidents of colleges and universities who study statistical tables and report on the health of the university in terms of increase of student population, number of books in the library, size of gifts to the institution, and economic value of the buildings are classic examples of quantitative folk. Others are those who evaluate art objects, nations churches, homes, and even people in monetary values. The qualitative folk evaluate in terms of intelligence, beauty, creativity, culture, sophistication, morality, and other non-numberable characteristics. Bridges between quantitative people and qualitative people are difficult to build and maintain. Jose Ortega y Gasset offered a similar classification. According to him there are Marthalike people, "the busy and useful," who are always concerned about practical matters, and the Marylike people, the "loving and superfluous," who are concerned about theoretical problems. Ortega expresses his opinion that the better people "will find the superfluous to be the most necessary."[4]

A further important psychological classification is speakers versus writers. The former prefer speaking as a means of conveying meaning; the latter prefer writing. Television viewing and long distance telephoning are probably increasing the number of human beings who are functionally illiterate. I cannot resist noting my own deep concern about the decline in writing skills. The ancient Romans had a saying *Verba volant, scripta manent* ("What is spoken flies away, what is written endures").

R. H. Knapp and J. T. Garbutt offer a classification based on human responses to time imagery. According to them mankind can be divided into three groups according to motivational traits. The three are named Dynamic-Hasty, Naturulistic-Passive, and Humanistic.[5]

The Sheldon classification of human types is strikingly similar to classification made in the *Bhagavad Gītā* in terms of the three *gunas* (qualities): *sattva* (goodness), *rajas* (passion), and *tamas* (darkness). "The *sāttvika* type of man... is of medium height, slender, 'wheat-coloured,' pure in mind and body, long-lived, wise and possessed of great physical strength... The *rājasika* type is tall, muscular, passionate, full of physical energy... The *tāmasika* type of man is short and corpulent, with an 'animal' nature, and is dull

4 *What is Philosophy?* Translated by Mildred Adams. New York: W. W Norton, 1960, p. 91.

5 Robert Knapp and John T. Garbutt, "Time Imagery and the Achievement Motive." *Journal of Personality*. Vol. 26, 1958, pp. 426-434.

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and slow witted."[6] The *Bhagavad Gītā* adds that the *sāttvika* prefer juicy, soothing, fresh, and bland foods, the *rājasika* prefer hot, bitter, salty, and sour foods, and the *tāmasika* prefer cold, flat, and stale foods.

The class system in Hindu society is one of the most fully developed of all human classifications. The term "caste" comes from the Portugese word *casta* which means an unmixed race, but racial purity is not the meaning of the Hindu class system. The origin of the classification is undetermined. Whatever its origin, its connotation has to do with ceremonial purity. Caste restrictions program marriage, dining, and other human associations. In the four-fold classification known as *Varṇa*—the Brahmin, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, and Śūdra—the first three are called the "twice-born" in that they have two births, their physical birth and a spiritual birth growing out of Vedic study. The Śūdras and the outcastes are the "once-born" in that they have a physical birth and no spiritual birth as they are not allowed to study the Vedas. The twice-born are also classified according to the Vedic seer from whom each family is believed to have descended. This classification is known as *gotra*. There are seventy-two *gotras*. One's spouse should be selected outside one's *gotra*. In addition to distinctions of *varṇa* and *gotra* each Hindu is also classified according to his *jāti*. *Jāti* refers primarily to occupational differences. There are more than three thousand *jātis* in modern India. *Jāti* determines the group within which one must marry, those from whom one may receive food, those with whom one may eat, and the trade or profession one may enter. The *varṇa-gotra jāti* classification is obvious in matrimonial advertisements like this one found in *The Hindu*, a large Indian newspaper: "Wanted suitable non-Bharadwaja Vadama Brahmin between 38 44 for a good-looking virgin, aged 34, well-versed in music and domestic duties."

Confucius divided mankind into four groups based on their learning and ability to learn: "Those born with an understanding of the universe belong to the highest type of humanity. Those who understand it as the result of study come second. Those who study it with great difficulty come third. And the people who find it too difficult to attempt study come last."[7]

Charles Morris of the university of Chicago in the 1940s developed a classification of man based on thirteen philosophies of life, or, as he called them, "Ways to live."[8] The thirteen are:

1. Preserve the best that man has attained.
2. Independence of persons and things.

6 Benjamin Walker, *Hindu World*, Vol. II. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968, p. 264.

7 *Analects* XVI, 9. Translated by James R. Ware.

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3. Sympathetic concern for others.
4. Festivity and solitude in alternation.
5. Group activity, group enjoyment.
6. Constant making and remaking.
7. Dynamic integration of diversity.
8. Wholesome carefree enjoyment.
9. Wait in quiet receptivity.
10. Stoical self-control.
11. Meditation on the inner life.
12. Active adventuresome deeds.
13. Be an instrument of the great powers.

Robert S. D Ropp developed a similar classification in his book *The Master Game*[9]. According to DeRopp, every person plays a distinctive "game", i.e., a way of living with a specific end in view. There are nine games :

1. "Master Game" in which the aim is awakening or enlightenment.
2. "Religion Game" in which the aim is salvation.
3. "Science Game' in which the aim is acquiring and advancing knowledge.
4. "Art Game" in which the aim is appreciating and creating beautiful objects.
5. "Householder Game" in which the aim is raising a family.
6. "No Game" in which the person lives from day to day with no apparent aim. A classic statement of this game is presented in "The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam" as translated by Edward Fitzgerald :
   "Into this Universe, and *Why* no knowing
   Nor *Whence*, like water willy-nilly flowing;
   And out of it, as Wind along the Waste.
   I know not Wither, will-nilly blowing".
7. "Hog in Trough Game" in which the aim is acquiring wealth.
8. "Cock on Dunghill Game" in which the aim is fame and recognition.
9. "Molock Game" in which the aim is victory or glory.

DeRopp calls those who play the first four games "meta-game players" and those who play the last three games "object-game playees." He writes that these two kinds of people "have never understood one another and it is safe to predict that they never will.

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8 Morris' research is described in two of his books, viz. *Paths of Life*. New York : Harper, 1942 and *The Open Self*. New York : Prentice-Hall, 1948. See also Charles Morris, "Comparative Strength of Life-Ideals in Eastern and Western Cultures" in *Essays in East West Philosophy* Edited by Charles A. Moore. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951, pp. 353 370.

9 New York : Dell, 1968.

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They are, psychologically speaking, different species of man and their conflicts throughout the ages have added greatly to the scene of human misery."[10]

An interesting and controversial classification was offered by C. P Snow in 1959 in a lecture entitled "The Two Cultures."[11] His argument was that two groups of intellectuals in the Westesn world, fundamental to Western culture, have ceased to communicate. His words were the following: "I believe the intellectual life of the whole of western society is increasingly being split into two polar groups... at one pole we have the literary intellectuals... at the other [pole] scientists, and as the most representative, the physical scientists. Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension—sometimes (particularly among the young)—hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understanding. They have a curious distorted image of each other. Their attitudes are so different that, even on the level of emotion, they can't find common ground. Non scientists tend to think of scientists as brash and boastful... On the other hand, the scientists believe that the literary intellectuals are totally lacking in foresight, peculiarly unconcerned with their brother men, in a deep sense anti-intellectual, anxious to restrict both art and thought to the existential moment."[12] The "literary intellectuals" who defend and preserve the "traditional culture" manage the Western world to an extent remarkably little diminished by the emergence of the physical scientists, said Snow. They act as though the natural order did not exist. The scientists hold that the social opinions of the literary intellectuals are contemptible; and the literary intellectuals think the scientists are unduly optimistic about social melioration. Snow's "two cultures" was criticized so severely that he offered a revised statement: "Let me try again to make myself clear. It is dangerous to have two cultures which can't or don't communicate. In a time when science is determining much of our destiny, that is, whether we live or die, it is dangerous in the most practical terms. Scientists can give bad advice and decision-makers can't know whether it is good or bad. On the other hnnd, scientists in a divided culture provide a knowledge of some potentialities which is theirs alone All this makes the political process more complex, and in some ways more dangerous, than we should be prepared to tolerate for long, either for the purposes of avoiding disasters, or for fulfilling—what is waiting as a challenge to our conscience and good will—a definable social hope."[13] In his revised

10 *Ibid.*, p. 13 Note DeRopp's special use of the word "species".

11 See C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959.

12 *Ibid.* pp. 4-6,

1. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

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statement Snow advised his readers he was talking only in the context of education, and that he was arguing that patterns of education must change so scientists and literary intellectuals will be able and willing to communicate.

Once one becomes aware of the propensity of man to classify the human species one finds many unexpected and unusual divisions. The ancient Gnostics divided mankind into three groups symbolized by the three sons of Adam: (1) The descendents of Cain, the "fleshly" beings who are destined for corruption. (2) The decendents of Abel, the "soulish" beings who have a chance of salvation, (3) The "spiritual" beings who are destined for salvation. The Greek sage, Pythagoras, observing that some people came to the festal games to compete, some to ply their trade, and some to watch, divided mankind into those who seek fame, those who seek material profits, and those who seek to understand,

Plotinus divided mankind into those who exercise only their senses, those who in addition to sensing have learned to use their intelligence, and those "divine men... whose penetrating eye contemplates the splendor of the intelligible world, and who finally take their flight, as it were, beyond the clouds and the darkness of this world."[14] Again he says there are three classes of men: (1) Musicians, who are at home in the world of particulars, and who have difficulty with general terms. (2) Lovers, who remember having had contact with the Platonic Forms in a previous existence, but whose memory is confused and clouded. (3) Philosophers, who are naturally disposed to rise to the Forms, and who cnn do this without detaching themselves from the world of particulars.[15] And still again Plotinus refers to the three classes of men as three sorts of birds: (1) Big earthy birds "prevented by their bulk from rising off the ground even though they have wings" (2) Birds who can fly with difficulty who "do lift themselves, a little, about the earth, Their higher part transports them out of the pleasurable into the honorable. But, unable to perceive anything higher and with no where to set themselves, they fall back—in virtue's name—on the activities and 'options' of that lower realm they had thought to escape". (3) Birds who lift themselves out of the mist and fogs of earth. "There they stay, seeing from about what is here below, taking their pleasure in truth, like a man at home once again in his well-governed country after a far journeying,"[16]

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14 *Enneads* V. 9.1. *The Philosophy of Plotinus*. Translated by Joseph K[illegible]z. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, p. 29.

15 *Ibid*, I. 3. 1-3. *Ibid*, pp. 1-3.

16 *Ibid*. V. 9. 1. *The Essential Plotinus*. Translated by Elmer O[illegible]ien. New York: New American Library of World Literature, [illegible], pp. 46 47.

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Nietzsche distinguished two attitudes or mentalities : the Appollonian that seeks rational order, measure, and restraint, and the Dionysian that breaks down all barriers and ignores all restraints, He divided philosophers into the free spirits and the levellers. Swift in *Gulliver's Travels* divided the people of Laputa into "Big-Endians" and 'Little-Endians" depending upon which end of the breakfast egg they opened Emerson distinguished mankind on the basis of conservation and innovation. Alfred Korzybski said there are four classes of men : Drifting Fools, Static Fools, Dynamic Fools, and Time-binders. I. P, Pavlov divided the human race into thinkers, artists, and those whom he said are "the intermediate type." Samuel Butler divided mankind into those who sin and those who are sinned against. Winston Churchill, on one page of his book *Painting as a Pastime*. makes two classifications of man : (1) "those who are toiled to death, those who are worried to death, and those who are bored to death," and (2) "... those whose work is work and whose pleasure is pleasure; and... those whose work and pleasure are one."[17] Arthur O. Lovejoy in *The Great Chain of Being* distinguished people who "habitually tend to assume that simple solutions can be found for the problems they deal with" and people who are "habitually sensible of the general complexity of things."[18] E. F. Schumacker in *Small is Beautiful*[19] offers a similar classification : the "forward stampeders" who think crises of modern life can be handled by current methods and the "homecomers" who seek new life-styles. Psychologists sometimes speak of "larks" (the early to-bed-early-to-rise type) and "owls" (the later-to-bed later to rise type). A very important classification among diners and airplane travelers is the one between smokers and non-smokers.

In many countries a xenophobic division is drawn between natives and immigrants, e. g., in the nation of Israel Jews born in the nation (*sabras*) regard themselves superior to those who have immigrated. In Alaska "the real Alaskans" who have lived there since birth disdain those who come from "the lower forty-eight." In Hawaii a division is drawn between *kamaainas* (children of the land) and *malihinis* (newcomers). In Colorado members of the Colorado Native Society, whose only requirement for membership is a Colorado birth certificate, flaunt their superiority with a bumper sticker—NATIVE. Secret lodges with their esoteric rituals, symbols, and ceremonies have long been one of the ways of dividing people into those within a special group and those outside the group.

I submit that the classification which is most detrimental to the unity of mankind is the geographic with cultural overtones. The

17 New York : Cornerstone Library, 1965, p. 13.
18 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
19 London; Blond and Briggs, 1973.

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ancient Greeks made a curious North-South classification, i. e., the Hyperboreans, a happy people living in a land of sunshine and plenty beyond the north wind (Boreas), and the Ethiopians, a strange people with "burnt faces" who were occasionally allowed to attend the banquets of the gods. But the geographical-cultural classification which is most persistent and most damaging is the East-West classification. The assumption that East is East and West is West—and never the twain shall meet—has almost a sacred quality in the minds of many. Perhaps we ought to keep in mind that, whereas "East" is associated with the ancient and "West" with the *modern*, the world "oriental" designates the *rising* sun and "occidental" the *setting* sun, and that the sun which rises and the sun which sets is the *same* sun

Classifications of human beings are necessary and important efforts to know who and what we are. They are part of what it means to be human; but they are fraught with dangers, since they fragment aad compartmentalize when we should be establishing wholeness and harmony. Can the self-knowing animal recognize and appreciate differences without destroying the evolved and evolving unity symbolized in Chardin's *Omega Point* and in the Upanisadic Brahman or *Saccidānanda* (Being-Conscious-Value)? The future of the human being—*our future*—hinges upon an affirmative answer to that question.

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II

Some Notes on Buddhistic Social Philosophy

Francisco Zuniga

INTRODUCTION

To look for the social philosophy in Buddhism it is very difficult because neither today it is too clear what Buddhism is. Some people affirm that it is a philosophy, other say that is a religion and others say that it is neither a philosophy nor a religion, but a way of life. If Buddhism is only a religion, has nothing to do with society and politics. Religion is something practiced in solitude and politics is something to do with government and society.

According to Buddhism one should try to find one's own salvation by leaving society and enter into a secluded life. But this type of attitude is becoming more and more a luxury which society cannot afford to allow its members to have. With the world becoming smaller every day and all kinds of problems surrounding mankind, social relationships are getting to be more and more close and complex so that an individual is hardly able now to extricate his personal problems from social ones.

> "... Is Buddhism a religion or a philosophy? It does not matter what you call it. Buddhism remains what is whatever you may put on it. The label is in material. Even the label 'Buddhism' which we give to the teaching of the Buddha is of little importance. The name one gives it is inessential. What's in name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet".[1]

In spite of this clear quaotion (and wanting not to be involved in this controversy) the problem still remains: it could be found a

1 W. S Rahula. What the Buddha Taught. Grove Press, INC, New York, 1974, p. 5.

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social philosophy or something like a political thought in a doctrine whose main interest is man's liberation from all defilements and impurities such as desire, hatred, ill-will, ignorance, pride, conceit, etc? In other words; what could be the importance of the socio-political ideas in a doctrine primarily interested in the realization of Nirvana?

We are not saying that in Buddhism there is not socio-political thought at all. What we are trying to say is that there are many other topics of interest in Buddhism rather than socio-political ideas. Of course this opinion may be the result of our prejudices and ignorance.

> "... The Buddha preached his doctrines as a social morality as well as a means of salvation, in the course of historical evolution his teaching became stereotyped and his followers institutionalized. Also as a result of inevitable social pressures and processes, various socio-cultural elements crept into the fold of institutionalized Buddhism and in due course changed some of the central teachings of the Buddha beyond recognition..."[2]

Any way it is very important to say that before this contact with Buddhism our prejudices and ignorance were bigger. We believed, for instance, that Buddhism was only a religion trying to attain Nirvana and completely indifferent to social, economic and political problems. Now, we know, that there is also an ethical conduct (Silla) that is built on the vast conception of universal love and compassion for all living being, on which the Buddha's teaching is based.

> "... It is regrettable that many scholars forget this great deal of the Buddha's teaching, and indulge in only dry philosophical and metaphysical derivations when they can talk and write about Buddhism. The Buddha gave his teaching "for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, out of the compassion for the world' ".[3]

We also believed that Buddhism was only practiced for monks and in solitude running away physically from the world. The attainment of this ideal did not necessarily require a retiring into forests for seclusion and meditation because once the Buddha said that what made a truly religious person was not the mere plunging into the forest life but a life of wisdom and moral conduct* though traditionally the monks have tended to go into seclusion for meditation and the Buddha too at times praised forests and quiet places for meditation.

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2 Gunapala Dharmasiri in Buddhist and Western Philosophy Nathan KATZ (Ed.), Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd.; N, D. p. 13.

3 Rahula, op cit, p. 46.

* Cf. Dīgha Nikaya, I. 101.

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On the other hand, though seclusion may be useful for spiritual relaxation, the monks were always instructed to lead a busy social life once they have acheived their spiritual realization. The Buddha himself led a busy social life instructing people and even advising king on political matters. Now, we know that the common or lay man can practice the Buddha's teachings wherever they want. As Sariputta, the chief disciple of the Buddha, said :

"... One man might live in a forest devoting himself to ascetic practices, but might be full of impure thoughts and 'defilements'; another might live in a village or a town practicing no ascetic discipline, but his mind might be pure, and free of 'defilements'. Of these two—said Sariputta—the one who lives a pure life in the village or town is definitely far superior to, and greater than the one who lives in the forest".[4]

So, the Buddha (or Buddhism) did not take life out of the context of its social and political-economic background. He looked at it as a whole, in all its social, economical and political aspects.

"... His teachings on ethical, spiritual and philosophical problems are fairly well known. But little is known, *particularly in the West, about his teachings on social, economic and political matters.* Yer there are numerous discourses dealing with these scattered throughout the ancient Buddhist text..."[5]

Let us take only a few of these matters.

BUDDHISM AND POVERTY

Our aim in the following lines is to analyze the social philosophy in Buddhism by examining some political ideas in it that are (of course) closely connected with the social and economical conditions.

Buddhism is not only interested in lofty ideals, high moral and philosophical thought. Buddhism does not ignore the social and economic welfare of people, The Buddha was interested in the happiness of men, to him happiness was not possible without leading a pure life based on moral and spiritual principles, but he knew that leading such a life was hard in unfavourable material and social conditions.

Buddhism does not consider material welfare as an end in itself: it is only a means to an end—a higher and nobler end. But it is a means which is indispensable, indispensable in achieving a higher purpose for man's happiness. So Buddhism recognizes the need of certain minimum material conditions favourable to spiritual success—even that of a monk engaged in meditation in some solitary place. Poverty is due to the maldistribution of economic goods and it

4 Ibid. p 77.

5 Ibid. p 81. (underlined is ours).

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drove the individuals to theft and missappropriation, because they need to have a living.

> "The Cakkavattisihanada—suta of the Dighanikaya (No. 26) clearly states that poverty (daliddiya) is the cause of immorality and crimes such as theft, falsehood, violence, hatred, cruelty, etc. King in ancient times, like governments today, tried to supress crime through punishment. The Kutadanta sutta of the same Nikaya explains how futile this is. It says that this method can never be successful Instead the Budcha suggests that, in order to eradicate crime, the economic condition of the people should be improved : grain and other facilities for agriculture should be provided for farmers and cultivators; capital should be provided for traders and those engaged in business; adequate wages should be paid to those who are employed. When people are thus provided for with opportunities for earning a sufficient income, they will be contented, will have no fear or anxiety, and consequently the country will be peaceful and free from crime".[6]

Because of this, the Buddha told lay people how important it is to improve their economic condition. This does not mean that he approved of hoarding wealth with desire and attachment, which is against his fundamental teaching, nor did he approved of each and every way of earning one's livelihood. The Buddha (just like Christ) recommended to win our bread with the sweat of our brow. If this was not possible begging was permitted.

> "One of the most important monastic rules required that the monk obtain food and other bare necessities by begging. Mendicancy was not only and appropriate traditional model of asceticism and poverty, it had a number of positive functions : first, it expressed the spiritual independence of the monk, his nonattachment to worldly fixtures and his whole hearted commitment to the Dharma. Second, it was an exercise in humility, since he was obliged to accept what was given him without complaint... Third, the act of 'giving' (dana) was the central ritual means through which the laity could earn spiritual merit, and was often the occasion for preaching the Dharma...".[7]

Summarizing, Buddhism disliked proverty because it is not good for man's life minimum condition. The Buddha remembered kings and governments the importance of improving people's economic condition in order to avoid revolt, violence and crime. Buddhism look for favorable material and social conditions, but it did not mean—of course—that its position was a materialistic one (or something like that) as can be read in the next quotation :

> "The wise and moral man
> Shines like a fire on a hilltop

6 Ibid., pp. 81-82.

7 Pardue, P. A. Buddhism, The Mac Millan Company, New York, 1971, p. 22.

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Making money like the bee
Who does not hurt the flower.
Such a man makes his pile
As an anthill, gradually.
Grown wealthy, he thus
Can help his family
And firmly bind his friends
To himself. He should divide
His money on four parts;
On one he should live,
With two expand his trade,
And with the fourth he should save
Against a rainy day."[8]

BUDDHISM AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Equally important is the demand for status and fundamental human rights befitting increased economic and political power.

From the Brahmanic perspective the Upanisads were and esoteric gnosis restricted to the Aryan elite. All means of salvation were contained in the Vedic lore, and the law of Karma was tied rigidly to caste: one is born in a particular social station as a result of deeds in the former life, and conformity to caste roles is the precondition of salvation or at least of improvement in status in the next life.

"By contrast, the non-Brahmanic schools like Buddhism and Jainism—though they were not social reforming movements—denied *the ultimate sanctity of the vedas, the religious superiority of the Brahmans, and the ritual significance of caste...*"[9]

Their messages of salvation were preached openly. Admission was based on personal conversion, usually without ascriptive limits of caste, class, or sex. And it is not surprising therefore, to find evidence that their teachings found rich soil among upwardly mobile urban commercial and political groups, who held that both religious and social standing should be based on personal talent and achievement rather than hereditary right.

We appreciate this Buddhism point of view because we think that all men are created equal. Because we do not believe in ultimate sanctity of..... somebody. We do not believe in religious superiority and we do not respect social classes based on hereditary right, economic condition or any other privilege. Nevertheless we think that Buddhism position in this point it is not too clear Let's see :

8 Ibid . p. 29.
9 Ibid., p. 6.

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"As we trace the institutional development of the earliest community against the background of these endemic problems, we find it centered at first around the charisma and teaching of the Buddha himself. But the growing number of converts, the addition of lay devotees and the settlement of coenobitic communities around major cities in the Ganges valley forced the routinization of communal life. By the end of the Buddha's long ministry the Sangha was differentiated along several characteristic lines; most important was the two-class distinction between the monastic elite and the lay devotees".[10]

And it is not clear because there is difference between the monastic elite and the lay. This distinction remind us the Middle Ages relation between the Master and the apprentice. Since the laity did not share in the rigor of the full monastic life, it could not (except in rare cases) aspire to the benefits of the ultimate spiritual goal. The hardening of this line of demarcation appears subtly in a number of formulation :

"The man whose mind is preoccupied
with the welfare of children and herds
is overhelmed by death as a
slumbering village by a great flood[11].

This was asserted more strongly in the representative conviction that there can be no perfect man outside the monastic order. Nevertheless, characteristic institutional and religious adjustments were made: for the laity, there was a secondary method of salvation based on a merit making ethic but anyway there is a social stratification in Buddhism; sometimes aggravated (we think) by considering secondary aspects :

"... Rules governing admission to the Sangha excluded debtors, fugitives, those without parental permission, and those with severe diseases or bodily defects. It is apparent that these rectrictions were intented both to minimize public criticism and to protect the community against undesirables, since obviously the motive for joining the monastic order could be seriously distorted. In addition, the novice was not admitted to full ordination until his sincerity had been extensively observed and tested..."[12]

We think that the preceding lines are clear enough and do not need any comment. We only want to express our disagreement because debtors, fugitives, sick people and subnormal ones were excluded. Respectfully we ask : Who is responsible for man's misfortune ?

BUDDHISM : NON-VIOLENCE AND GOOD RULERS

It is true that the ideal form of government for the Buddha was a benevolent monarch, the king being elected and appointed by the

10 Ibid., p. 17.
11 Ibid., p. 18
12 Ibid , pp. 20 21.

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people rather than self-elected. The functions and qualities attributed to him and his kingdom manifestly show that in spirit the Buddha wished for a form of government where the citizens' wishes are consulted and respected and where the national wealth is distributed on an equitable basis as far as possible.

The ideal monarch will never rest happy until all the subjects in his kingdom are securely settled and content with their economic provisions and liveli-hood. The Buddha openly condemns the king who selfishly sits on the throne yielding to indulgence in sense-pleasures and drunk with the intoxication of authority*. If there is poverty in his kingdom the king is responsible for it and it is his primary duty to see that his subjects get their basic economic needs.

"It also should be mentioned that early Buddhism does not have a sophisticated theory of economic distribution. It was a primitive form of response to the problem of poverty and consisted mainly in giving wealth to the poor. A retiring monarch advises his son and heir to the throne : 'Dear son, whosoever in the kingdom are the 'have nots', to them let wealth be given'. An individual may righteously earn wealth and use it righteously, sharing it with others, but hoarding up food and wealth is condemned as strongly as is squandering money".[13]

The moral evils arising from a greedly disposition towards wealth or property are specially mentioned: such greed leads to advance and wickedness * A significant feature to be noted here is that the Buddha appeals to moral principles like loving-kindness and compassion for fellow human beings and to the moral consequences of anti-social behavior such as avarice and wickedness, in order to encourage men not to hoard to share their wealth with others, and to be moderate and content with one's share. All these admonitions were aimed at the ideal of equitable distribution of economic wealth of the community.

"The reason for such moral exhortations aimed at individuals was that the Buddha regarded the society as composed of psychological units-men and he believed that if an enduring change in society is to ocurr it should start with the moral transformation of the basic atomic units... However (insists Dr. Dharmasiri) though the Buddhist social aims does not quite reach the communist ideal of common ownership of property it seems clear that the Buddha was trying here to approximate to that ideal when he was emphasizing and equitable distribution of wealth. And, as a confirmation of this point, it should not be forgotten that the Buddha clearly envisages

* Cf. Samyutta Nikaya, I. 100. and Digha Nikaya, III, 65.

13 Katz op. cit. p. 139.

* Cf. Dhiga Nikaya III. 289.

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the communistic ownership of property as the perfect ideal state when he recommended it for the monks. For laymen his exhortation was to try to approximate to this ideal as far as possible because he probably thought that the communist ideal required a personal moral perfection of a decidedly high degree".[14]

In the early Buddhist literature it was thought proper to tax the prosperous provinces heavily so that some of their wealth could be distributed among the poor and the needy. This idea is illustrated with the help of a story about a king called Seri*. Here the Buddha seems to approve the idea that the ruler could justifiably tax or take from the abundance of the rich and give to the poor and needy. Distribution of wealth to the needy is the first of the four bases of popular of a king (the other three being kindky speech, sagacious conduct and feeling for the common good). The organized distribution of wealth is typical of the financial aspect of the Buddhist's king policy, and amounts in practice to an equitable distribution of wealth in his domain**.

The Buddha's concept of the Shanga community shows that for him too the communistic state was the ideal state of affairs but he thought that to realize this ideal another accompaniment was necessary : the moral perfection which had to be cultivated and attained by individual efforts. He considered private property to be a hindrance to spiritual progress and hence recommended that spiritual aspirants should enter the order of monks where the ideal social medium for spiritual progress could be found. This the Buddha believed that the realization of the perfect communist society needed a paralell development in moral progress among the participants in such a society.

When the Buddha was advocating his welfare economics he accepted the existing socio-economic class structure as given. What he tried to do was to change the hearts or attitudes of the people working within the structure. The ultimate ideal of the Buddha's teaching was to create the free man who was the master of himself by freeing him from the shackles of irrational and inmoral tendencies, i.e. : craving, hatred, and ignorance.

"For the Buddha the ideal was the arahant who had completely destroyed craving (lobba), hatred (dosa) and ignorance (moha). The arahant is a free man who had mastered himself in the sense that he is not subject to the sway of his irrational emotions but is capable of rationally regulating his inter-change with society and nature. The irrational forces and influences coming form outside

14 Katz op. cit. p. 140.
* Cf. Samyutta Nikaya, I. 58.
** Cf Dgha Nikaya, III, 61. 65. 145.

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cannot affect him because he has changed his attitude towards the world ...which for him is no longer that was before his realization of the ultimate moral ideal".[15]

It is too well known to be repeated here-that Buddhism advocates and preaches non-violence and peace as its universal message, and does not approve of any kind of violence of destruction of life. According to Buddhism there is nothing that can be called a "just war" (which is only a false term coined and put into circulation to justify and excuse hatred, cruelty, violence and masacre).

Who decides what is just or injust ? The mighty and the victorious are "just", and the weak and the defeated are "unjust". Our war is always "just", and your war is always "unjust". Buddhism does not accept this position.

"The Buddha not only taught non-violence and peace but he even went to the field of battle itself and intervened personally and prevented war, as the case of the dispute between the Sakyas, who were prepared to fight over the question of the waters of the Rohini. And his words once prevented King Ajatasattu from attacking the kingdom of the Vajiis."[16]

In the days of Buddha, as today, there were rulers who governed their countries unjustly. People were oppressed and exploited, tortured and persecuted, excessive takes were imposed and cruel punishments were inflicted. The Buddha was deeply moved by these inhumanities.* His views should be appreciated against the social, economic and political background of his time. He had shown how a whole country could become corrupt, degenerate and unhappy when the heads of its government that is the king, the ministers and administrative officers become corrupt and unjust. For a country to be happy it must have a good government.

The ruler of a country (king, prime minister, president and cabinet, or the name today want, they must practice : liberality, generosity, charity. He must have a high moral character. He must be honest and integral. He must be sincere in his intentions, must not deceive the public. Furthermore, he (they) must be kindness and gentleness and austere in habits.

If a country is ruled by men endowed with such qualities, it is needles to say that what country must be happy. But this was not an utopia, for there were kings in the past (like Asoka of India) who had established kingdoms based on these ideas.

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15 Ibid , p. 146.

16 Rahula Op. p. 84.

* The Dhamma datthakatha records that he directed his attention to the porb of good government.

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Asoka's ideology exhorts all men in the empire to cooperative pursuit of socially and economically efficient virtues. It discourages the practice of archaic and magical ceremonials, thus undercutting traditional religious customs that reinforced politically troublesome local groups and supported and entrenched class of archaic religious practitioners.

> "Show good behavior towards slaves and servants, obedience to mother and father, generosity towards friends, acquaintance, and relatives and towards ascetics and Brahmans, and abstention for killing living beings."[17]

There is no way to establish the specific legal reforms (if any), which he undertook to implement these views. What is certain, however, is that the inscriptions do not formally endorse caste laws, as do the inscriptions of later Hindu monarchs.

Although Asoka did not institute Buddhism as the state religion, he promoted Buddhist missionary movements which spilled over the borders into other lands (most important into Ceylon). Several of his edicts indicate that he tried to unify the Sangha and stem sectarian conflict which threatened effective support to the state.*

In Buddhism (as in Christianism) peace and non-violence is a milestone and the socratic ' gnosce te ipsum" seems present in the Buddha thought.

> "There can be no happiness or peace for man as long as he desires and thirsts after conquering and subjugating his neighbor. As the Buddha says: The victor breeds hatred, and the defeated lies down in misery. He who renounces both victory and defeat is happy and peaceful'. The only conquest that brings peace and happiness is self conquest. 'One may conquer millions in battle, but *he who conquers himself* only one, is the greatest of conquerors' ".[18]

CONCLUSION

We can conclude saying that there is no esoteric doctrine in Buddhism and that Buddhism is not only related with other world "matters" but it is present in everyday life.

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17 Pardue, I. A. op. cit P. 32.

* Socrates, Christ (and the prophets of Israel), Confucius and the Buddha were among the great innovators, who, in distinctive ways, offered critiques of the older values and redefined the meaning of existence and the nature of man and society within a more universal, transcendent framework which became the basis for long-range reconstruction.

See K Jaspers, the Origin and Goal of History (New Haven, 1955), specially his reconstruction of the "axial period", and R N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution", in Beyond Belief (New York, 1970), pp. 20-50.

18 Rahula, op. cit. p. 86.

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According to Buddhism the root of all evil is ignorance. We manifested our supine ignorance but now we feel more free of it; because we can add (here and now) that we know something more about "What the Buddha taught" as Rev. Dr. W. Rahula would said.

This paper, of course, is only an approach to the social philosophy in Buddhism. The theme itself is difficult and many our limitations.

> "A child in the kindergarten should not quarrel about the theory of relativity. Instead, if he follows his studies patiently and diligently, one day he may understand it..."[19]

In referring to Buddhism thought (not only socio-political thought) we are just like children but if we follow the "path" patiently and with diligence, train and purify ourselves earnestly, and attain the necessary development, we may one day know more and more about it.

> "According to Buddhism for a man to be perfect there are two qualities that he should develop equally: compasion (Karuna) on one side, and wisdom (panna) on the other. Here compassion represents love, charity, kindness, tolerance and such noble qualities, on the emotional side, or qualities of the heart, while wisdom would stand for the intellectual side or the qualities of the mind..."[20]

We will try to look for these qualities; not to be perfect (because it is very difficult to talk about human perfection) but in order to be better than we are now.

It is true that the Buddha said significant things about social philosophy; but the full implications of his social teachings were never worked out and even many of his explicit social teachings were, unfortunately, hardly put into practice succesfully as a working social philosophy. However, he did succesfully apply his teachings to organize the monastic order but that too, unfortunately, as an institution, in the process of history, amounted to a flight from the common society.

> "Though the Sangha has contributed some useful services to society and still continues to do so in educational and moral matters, it has now primarily come to be a parasitic social institution perpetuating a mass of ritual and superstitions in the name of Buddhism. Even if its effects are remedied and the Sangha rehabilitated in terms of the Buddha teachings, still it will have to seriously rethink its role in society".[21]

As the economic and social complexity of modern society is increasing at an unprecedented rate breading an enormous amount

19 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
20 Ibid., p. 46.
21 Katz op. cit. p. 148.

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of economic and social evils and problems, religious institutions like the Sangha (and churchs, temples, sinagogues.....as institutions) will be necessarily forced to find genuine reasons for their existence which otherwise would be an expensive burden to society.

In a sense man owes his being and existence to society*. When this is conceived in terms of contemporary welfare society, man has enormous obligations towards his society for providing him with security, health and education, or in short, for making him what he is. Therefore, it will be extremely difficult for him to extricate himself from... the social nexus where he is situated. Man is social being. The truth of this statement is so obvious that people have become oblivious to deep significance.

> "What is needed now is a re emphasis of this obvious truth. It is in this context that it becomes an immoral act to leave society to find one's own salvation when one's own society is beset with problems**. Theoretically, we saw how the Buddha has left enough room in his teachings for the addition or elaboration of this dimension of social involvement. What is needed now is such an elaboration and its pratical application. For example, if the Buddha has said that maldistribution of wealth leads to immorality then it is clearly an obligation for Buddhists to rectify any such maldistribution they find in their societies and attempt to reclaim morality from economic shackles."[22]

In order to be happy we have to fight against poverty (not only material poverty but spiritual one); against injustice, that is based in a not less injustice social stratification (or abitrary social division), and—last but not least—we have to fight against war (declared or not) and violence and its multiple morbidity forms.

Furthermore, we agree with Buddhism in saying that poverty is the cause of immorality and crimes; so we have to erradicate or eliminate poverty and the rest of absurdities : exploitation, torture, persecution... from earth surface. How would say thousand in chorus ? What an utopia.

It is not an utopia (and Plato, Bacon, Campanella, Moore. Huxley...know it). It is possible if we men live like men. If we stop the crazy armamentist race. If we do an equitable and just distribution of products and goods; in other words, if we love each other instead of hating each other.

The world today lives in constant fear, suspicion, and tension. Science has produced weapons which are capable of unimaginable

* Aristotle was right when he also defined man as 'social animal" and the man who decided to live alone must be a god or a beast.

** Of course, it is also inmoral to promise happiness in one "other life" in order to avoid and to drown the protest and fight against this life poor and deterimental conditions.

22 Ibid., p. 148a.

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destruction. Brandishing these new instruments of death, great powers threaten and challenge one another boasting shamelessly that one could cause more destruction and misery in the world than the other. They have gone along this path of madness to such a point that, now, if they take one more step forward in that direction, the result will be nothing but mutual annihilation along with the total destruction of humanity.

Undoubtedly, if we continue on this way our end is near, Science and technology must be utilized for mankind welfare and no wasting time, energies and money in N—bomb and bacteriological weapons. It seems for us that the biblical expression "... and it doesn't remains stone over stone..." would be an unquestionable truth.

> "Human beings in fear of the situation they have themselves created, want to find a way out, and seek some kind of solution. But there is none except that held out by the Buddha—his message of non violence and peace, of love and compassion, of tolerance and understanding, of truth and wisdom, of respect and regard for all life, freedom from selfishness, hatred and violence. The Buddha says : 'Never by hatred is hatred appeased, but it is appeased by kindness. This is the eternal truth'. "One should win anger through kindness, wickedness through goodness, selfishness through charity, and falsehood through truthfulness".[23]

Mankind future is in our own hands. All we have to do is ask super-powers (and some operetta countries) for disarmament and use this incredible gigantesque quantity of money (nobody knows exactly how much it is) in buying food and clothes and in building: h use, schools, hospitals and recreation centers.

> "Definitely it is not easy. Yet it should be tried. You may it is risky trying it. Surely it cannot be more risky than trying a nuclear war".[24]

To talk of maintaining peace through the balance of power, or through the threat of nuclear deterrents, is foolish. The might of armaments can only produce fear, and not peace. It is impossible that can be genuine and lasting peace through fear. Through fear can come only hatred, ill-will and hostility, supressed perhaps for the time being only, but read to erupt and become violent at any moment. True and genuine peace can prevail only in an atmosphere of amity, free from fear, suspicion and danger.

Finally, it is regrettable the partial or total unknowledge (particular y in the west) about these teachings. We hope that this situation can be solved little by little and in the long run we have a more integrated eastern and western world-culture.

23 Rahula op. cit. p. 86.
24 Ibid., p. 87.

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We want to end this work with a quotation that summarize.— unless for us — the most important and significant of Buddhism socio-political thought: the creation of an ideal society.

We want to proceed this way because we do agree with all these beautiful and meaningful lines :

> "Buddhism aims at creating a society where the ruinous struggle for power is renounced; where calm and peace prevail away from conquest and defeat; where the persecution of the innocent is vehemently denounced: where one who conquers oneself is more respected than those who conquers millions by military and economic warfare; where hatred is conquered by kindness, and evil by goodness; where enmity, jealously, ill will and greed do not infect men's minds; where compassion is the driving force of action: where all, including the least of the living things, are treated with fairness, consideration and love; where life in peace and harmony, in a world of material contentment, is directed towards the highest and noblest aim, the realization of the Ultimate Truth..."[25]

25 Ibid., pp. 88-89.

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III

Dr. R. D. Ranade's Integration of the four methods of God-realisation in the Bhagavadgita

S. K. Gupta

The methods of God-realisation in the Gita namely Karma-Yoga, Jnana-Yoga, Dhyana-Yoga or Raja-Yoga and Bhakti Yoga are complementary to each other. Together they may make one method which Ranade named as Mystical Method. In his book Dhyana-Gita, Ranade takes up Karma Yoga first. Good actions or Karma constitute the first step towards God-realisation. Moral preparation is necessary before one can aspire for God. A morally bad person has a dirty mind. Such a mind cannot have the right conception of God nor can meditate on God with concentration. As Dr. A. G. Javadekar, writes in his book... "Approach to Reality (p. 171) the knowledge of God is not possible without self-purification and God-love. Self-purification involves self conquest and self denial. Senses are to be controlled and detachment to worldly objects is to be inculcated. Niskama-karma of the Gita is a great purifier of self. Performance of our duties in a detached manner gradually makes a dirty mind clean. A morally good mind can have the right conception of God and devotion to Him. A person attached to the objects of the world acquires a slant which distorts his knowledge of reality. Right knowledge of God cannot exist in a mind having a wrong attitude towards the world. Niskama-Karma or detached performance of duties eliminates mental impurities and makes it steady. A steady mind is indifferent to success or failure in action. This is what the Gita calls siddhi-asiddhi samatvam In a completely steady mind as in the state of Naiskarma siddhi the vision of God occurs. Thus Karma or action ultimately

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leads to Jnana or knowledge of God (Gita-IV 33) The vision of G d immensely intensifies devotion to Him Such a person cannot do anything but to please God. His actions are offered to God

After Karma Yoga Ranade places Jnana-Yoga in his Dhyana-Gita. In Jnana-Yoga jnana or knowledge of God is to be acquired and mind is to be concentrated on God continuously. This process is called Nididhyasana in Sankara Vedanta. At this state no devotion to God is necessary according to some interpreters of Sankara's Philosophy. According to them devotion to God is necessary for mental purification before Nididhyasana is undertaken. According to Ranade continued fixing of mind on God without deep love for Him is difficult. Any knowledge of God must have its emotional counterpart. Knowing God and loving Him go together. Realisation of God within us is possible according to the Gita (VIII-21 & 22) only through one pointed devotion. The experience of 'I am God' is surcharged with God love. Ranade calls it Advaita-bhakti. Advaita is not incompatible with bhakti as the distinction between devotee and God remains in the integral experience.

Dhyana-Yoga is next taken up in Dhyana-Gita. Karma and Jnana are to be attuned to Dhyana. Karma makes the mind suitable for right knowledge of God (Jnana), which should be the object of constant meditation. Dhyana is meditation of God with breath control. The incoming breath is to be equalised in duration with the entgoing breath and with each breath the name of God is to be taken (Gita-VI 27) Mind is to be withdrawn from all sense objects and concentrated on God. When the mind becomes so steady on God that it does not waves like the flame of a lamp in a windless place, the vision of self occurs (Gita-VI 20). Continued practice of Dhyana makes self vision possible which is also a blissful experience. The bliss is experienced first within and then out side (Gita V 26). God is experienced within as well as outside. In all objects God is seen and all objects are seen in God (Gita-V 30).

Bhakti-Yoga comes next in Dhyana Gita. Dhyana should be blended with devotion to God or Bhakti (Gita-VI 47)... Contemplation of God with devotion is distinguished from concentration on God without devotion as in Jnana-Yoga. In the former process God is conceived as possessing all good qualities. Such a God can be loved In the latter process God is conceived without qualities. That is His real nature. But it is difficult to have such a conception. Gita tells that Jnana-Yoga is difficult process (XII. 5). Through God is without qualities yet to imagine Him as possessing qualities and love Him intensely as Bhakti-Yoga requires, is the easiest way of getting Him. One who can love God very quickly becomes free from bad qualities like fear, anger, infatuation etc. and contemplates God constantly. Constant loving remembrance of God with absolute

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dependence on Him moves God and His Grace descends upon the devotees. The vision of God is attained (Gita X. 11). Such a person need not bother about earning his livelihood. God takes care of Him. He is called a jnani-bhakta—a devotee who has attained the intuitive knowledge of God. His devotion is of the highest order. He is dearest to God. He ascends to the highest stage of God-realisation. He enters into God (Gita XVIII 55). Without intense devotion this state cannot be attained. Concentration of mind on God without devotion as in Jnana Yoga may lead to an experience of 'I am God' but not entry into Godhead.

Each of the four methods of God realisation according to Ranade may be instrumental in itself to many mystical experiences. First the self is experienced and the indentity of self with God is experienced. Thereafter God is seen in all objects outside (Ranade's Nitya-nemabali, p. 11). To attain quick results and higher experiences the integration of the four methods is recommended. Karma paves the way to Jnana which is necessary for Dhyana and Dhyana is to be combined with Bhakti. Further it may be noted that (a) Karma and jnana (b) Karma and bhakti (c) Jnana and bhakti are reciprocal in relation. They are mutually contributory. Niskama-karma leads to jnana or knowledge of God and more the knowledge of God the more niskama or detached we become in our actions. Next virtuous actions or karma generate devotion to God (bhakti). In the Gita (XII. 13 to 19) it is mentioned that virtues like contentment, non-violence, compassion, equanimity, desirelessness, detachment, freedom from pride, anger, jealousy, fear, elation, depression etc. are ultimaiely transformed into devotion to God. Also more the devotion to God the more such virtues the devotee acquires, Reciprocal relation further exists between jnana and bhakti. As our knowledge of God increases, the devotion to Him is intensified. On the other hand devotion to God enhances our knowledge of God. Loving some one is to know him more and more intimately. Such reciprocities are realised by mystics on the pathway to God. Ranade did.

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IV

Philosophy— The Need of the Hour

Sachchidanand Singh

It is proposed to study the nature and utility of philosophy in the present age of sense and science. The subject for the brief and critical study has been chosen in order to allay some misgivings and misconceptions about philosophy. Of course, philosophers of the present time are also responsible, to some extent for this sad plight of philosophy. To make this point more clear, it may be observed here that present day philosophers have divorced philosophy from life and values Philosophy, which was supposed to be the highest knowledge according to Indian traditions, has been denigrated its proper functions by modern linguistic philosophers themselves.

Consequently, it is seen that, now-a days, majority of philosophers have confined themselves to the problem of clarification of concepts, that is, linguistic and logical analysis This tradition of analysis has been initiated by Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, but it may be added here that logical positivists are responsible for doing a lot of harm to the cause of traditional philosophy. They have developed empirical tradition of the ancient and modern times and have advocated what may be described as 'logical empiricism' or 'logical positivism'. It is not necessary to go into details as to how the 'Vienna Circle' came into existence, it is sean that when Moritz Schlick came there some time in 1922 as Professor of Inductive Sciences; then some philosophers. Mathematicians and others formed the 'Vienna Circle' under his leadership.

This circle was interested mainly in two problems—firstly, they were over-fascinated by grandeur of sciences So naturally they believed that sciences alone are the custodian of knowledge. So,

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naturally they were unhappy with traditional philosophy, especially with metaphysical speculation. Naturally, it is seen that they advocated what is known as the verificational theory of meaning. According to this criterion, only those statements are to be regarded as meaningful which are verifiable either in the wider sense of the term or in the narrow sense of the term It is seen that Wittgenstein, Carnap. Prof. A. J Ayer and others strongly and staunchly advocated this doctrine. In fact, this doctrine, though subject to severe criticism, is really of foundational importance in this school of logical positivism. They have further tried to demolish and dismiss traditional philosophy or old philosophy on the basis of this celebrated doctrine of verification. It is clearly pointed out by them that metaphysical statements cannot be regarded to be meaningful because they are not verifiable in any sense of the term. It is not necessary to go into details of the problem and refer to all logical positivists and analysists in this context but it would be better to quote Carnap here who says thus : "Our thesis, now, is that logical analysis reveals the alleged statements of metaphysics to be pseudo-statements"[1]. Prof. A. J. Ayer also categorically and clearly reaffirms his views as follows : "So the conclusion is not that metaphysical assertions are uncertain or arbitrary or even false, but they are non-sensical".[2]

So instead of further expanding this point it may be concludingly observed that those modern philosophers i.e. logical positivists try to dismiss metaphysics as meaningless. Consequently, they uphold the view that philosophy is no longer concerned with the factual knowledge or with the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality but it is simply concerned with linguistic analysis or logical analysis. It is well known how logical-syntex, semantics and such other allied branches have become popular as a result of this approach to philosophy. Not only this but it may be also relevantly pointed out that now there has been something like veritable revolution in the realm of philosophy. Consequently, we come across now-a days meta-ethics, meta-theology, philosophy of science and such other new ramifications of philosophy. Now, therefore, these philosophers themselves may not encourage traditional approach to problems of philosophy and religion, rather such studies may be disfavoured and disowned by them. Consequently, philosophy has become too

1 "The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of Language" by Rudolf Carnap, translated by Arthur Pap. This article under another title was published in Brkenntnis. Vol. II, 1932. Here it has been taken from "Logical Positivism". p 61, edited by A. J. Ayer (The Frec Press Glencoe, Illinois, 1959. Third Printing, September, 1960).

2 "Demonstration of the Impossib;lity of Metaphysics" by A. J. Ayer, Mind, Vol. XLIII. p. 340 (1934).

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narrow and formalistic. It is seen that present day linguistic philosophers and logicians use such language and symbols that their views have become unintelligible to even traditional students of philosophy, what to speak of common readers. Tomlin has rightly observed this point when he remarks thus: "Today, as every student of philosophy knows it is not the upholders of metaphysics who are anxious to cultivate a private jargon of their own but the attackers of metaphysics; so that we have the strange and somewhat ludicrous spectacle of logicians protesting that they do not understand ordinary propositions unless they are "translated into scientific language".[3]

Thus, as indicated earlier, philosophy has become divorced from life. One of the important factors which has undermined philosophy, in recent times, in this over-enthusiastic approach of these new votaries of philosophy. Besides this, modern people have become too much impressed by modern development of science and technology. They think that science alone can fulfil their cherished goals. They can be happier and healthier by sciences alone. Perhaps they have become too much materialistic, that is why they are not able to realise the immense importance and role of philosophy.

It is not our intention to undermine or discourage science that would be equally insane and one-sided approach in fact science has got its own advantages. It would be ridiculous to ignore sciences but at the same time the importance of philosophy and spiritualism has to be properly appreciated and realised in the present age. It is all the more necessary in the present day crisis. It would be better to quote following lines in this context: "We are now at a time when the whole world is passing through a great crisis. After the second World War it seems the third World War is coming. Many persons are stupified as to what lies ahead in the womb of futurity... We forget that the real solution will come from men who have seen the Ultimate Truth, who have solved the mystery of the universe and the problems of human existence who stand high above human turmoil and earthly conflict in a plane from where all our fights and struggle seem like a play of ignorant children, Only they can save the world, only they can give us help to build the world anew".[4]

So, limitations of science has to be realised. Of course, this does not mean ignoring science because it would be foolish to deny the immense nnd tremendous contributions of science towards human welfare. In fact, philosophy is never opposed to science. Those who are ignorant of the real nature of philosophy visualise some

3 "The Approach to Metaphysics" E. W. F. Toulin (Kegan Paul, London, 1947), p. 269.

4 Pavitranand Swami, "The Builders of Real India", The Vedanta Kesri, Vol. LXVIII, No. 10, October 1981, p. 267.

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kind of antagonism between philosophy and science. In fact, both are right in their own spheres. So, philosophy should not be attacked from the platform of science. Really speaking, philosophy and science may be considered to be complementary to each other. One can be both scientific and spiritualistic. It is well known that Einstein and others were great scientists but they were equally interested in problems of philosophy and religion.

Now, so far as the question of equating philosophy with linguistic analysis is concerned as indicated earlier, this has also damaged the cause of philosophy by divorcing philosophy from life and making it too much formalistic and technical. Here it would be interesting and relevant to point out that it is never fair and justifiable to equate philosophy with linguistic or logical analysis. Thus, linguistic analysis can be regarded as an important branch of philosophy but not philosophy as a whole. To equate philosophy with linguistic analysis would be to identify the part with the whole which is never logically justifiable. Unfortunately, in their over-eagerness to make philosophy scientific and technical, these votaries of analysis are sacrificing the goal at the altar of the means. So, it would be better and justifiable to observe here that modern linguistic approach to philosophy should be appreciated in its true perspectives and in this sense it should be regarded only as a branch of philosophy. Prof. H. H. Price has rightly pointed out this fact as follows — "I conclude then that the modern analytic or clarificatory philosophers are studying nothing more or less than the theory of knowledge".[5]

So, although this recent philosophy of linguistic analysis may be considered to be quite an important development of philosophy, but its limitations has to be realised otherwise the real purpose of philosophy would be defeated. The philosophy of language should be pursued no doubt, but it should be pursued and studied like other branches of philosophy.

The heart of philosophy i.e. metaphysics cannot and should not be dismissed as something full of pseudo-statements.

So far as the recent attempt towards denial of metaphysics is concerned, it may be safely and justifiably pointed out that the basis on which metaphysics is denied and decried is itself weak and faulty. It has been already observed earlier as to how the theory of verification is faulty, narrow and weak. Besides this, metaphysics is a necessity. Man as a rational being is bound to think about himself and about the problems of Reality and the Universe about himself, so it would be unfair and unjustifiable to deny metaphysics because man cannot live without it. Dr. S. B. P Sinha[6] has rightly realised

5 "Clarity is not enough" by H. H. Price from 'Clarity is not enough', edited by H. D. I. Lewis (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 31.

6 Dr. S. B. P. Sinha, Metaphysics: Past and Present, Concluding Chapter (Darshan Peetha, Allahabad, 1981).

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the impossibility of denial of metaphysics and has opined that metaphysics has to continue. Here it would not be out of place to quote Dr. Radhakrishnan also in this context — "Man as a reflective being needs a metaphysical view. Even those who are opposed to metaphysics find metaphysical thinking inescapable. Whenever thought grows conscious of itself we have a metaphysics. Those who deny metaphysics do so as a result of a metaphysics which is not aware of being one".[7]

Thus, it should be clearly borne in the mind that philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular is a necessity. It is really useful and important persuit of human being. Man cannot remain satisfied with merely material comforts. His knowing and thinking capacity is bound to make him philosophise. Really speaking, Bradley was quite right when he declares that even anti-metaphysicians are brother — metaphysicians.

After thus indicating the necessity and importance of metaphysics, now, it may be relevantly observed here that the real nature and function of philosophy has to be realised. There are some misconceptions and misgivings about the real nature and function of philosophy. Philosophy is sometime ridiculed as mad man's persuit. It is sometimes said that a philosopher tries to search a dark cat in a dark room in the dark night, which does not really exist. This is the old statement about philosophy. Some modern thinkers sometimes disparage philosophy by describing it as pseudo-science or as something like emotional expression of a poet. In other words, philosophy is sometimes described as intellectual poetry. Without going into all these details, it may be sufficient to point out here that, one thus tries to find irrationalism and fantasy etc. in philosophy. All these are really unfortunate and sad. Philosophy is neither pseudo science nor intellectual poetry nor something like this.

Of course, philosophy is conceived as the highest type of knowledge according to our Indian philosophers. It has been already indicated how thinkers of Upanishads visualise it as something like the foundation of all knowledge. In India the equivalent term for philosophy is 'Darshan'. This literally means something like the vision of Reality. Here, it would be appropriate to quote Dr. S. C. Chatterjee. He says thus, "... It is termed in Indian literature, the vision of truth (darshana), and the Indian Savant affirms that a man of realization becomes free but one who lacks it is entangled in the world".[8]

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7 Foreword in "Metaphysics, Man and Freedom" by K.S. Murty. Foreword by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, p vii (Asia Publishing House, New York), (Andhra University Series No. 70). 1953

8 "Darshana—Its Different Meanings" by S. C. Chatterjee, Darshana, Vol. I, No. 1, January 26, 1961, Moradabad, (India), p. 1.

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Although it is interesting and illuminating to understand philosophy in this sense. Yet it would not be unjustified and unwarranted to appreciate philosophy in the wider sense of the term. In other words, philosophy may be understood as something like knowledge or rational interpretation of everything in this universe. There is some sense when philosophy is defined as the rational interpretation of universe in its entirety but here the axiological or valuational approach has to be taken into account. In fact, this may be regarded to be the important and indispensible nature of philosophy. Philosophy may be, therefore, characterised as something universalistic, rationalistic and something more. It is not merely intellectualism but at the same time it is not merely Moralism, It includes them but transcends them.

After making these observation, now, it may be concludingly observed here that philosophy cannot be regarded merely a theoretical persuit nor it is to be identified with practical phenomena alone. The history of Indian philosophy testifies to the fact that the gulf between theory and practice is not real but only apparent. Thus philosophy as the highest and sublimist human activity or persuit has to be appreciated and its due pivotal position has to be restored. This is all the more necessary in this present age of sense and science. Unfortunately, modernman is too much attracted towards science and technology. But science and technology have got their limitations. It would be foolish to decry the importance and utility of science and technology. Man has gained much through them but that is not all. We find that modern man is on the brink of crisis. We have seen two world wars and there is a fear of third World War. There are corruptions and maladies at individual, social, political and international levels. All these can be remedied to a great extent if man becomes real man. In other words, if he knows himself. To make this point more clear it can be observed here that the utility and importance or values of philosophy have to be realised. Moral and spiritual values have to be cultivated at all levels. All these can be materialised if philosophy gets its rightful place.

By way of some humble suggestions. it may be observed here that illuminating and interesting books of philosophy and religion have to be popularised. Even the government should do something in this direction. Then, it may be suggested that the teachings of philosophy and religion and such other allied subjects should be popularised and introduced right from the very beginning i.e from school stage. This subject may be usefully introduced among the students of technical education also. This experiment may prove to be quite useful. Ultimately, besides this administrators and politicians should be also made interested in this subject in some way or other. So, unless the rightful place of philosophy is not restored, it is feared that man cannot live peacefully and happily. So we have tried to study briefly and critically the nature and function of philosophy. Really speaking, the students of philosophy should try to take lead in this noble task i.e. restoring a rightful place to philosophy. This would be quite befitting in tradition with the history of Indian philosopby.

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V

Specificity and Peculiarities of Toynbee's Cyclic Theory of Civilizations

Vyara Nikolova

To Arnold Toynbee, author of a monumental experiment on the philosophy of history "A Study of History" (1), the cyclical pattern and fatalism are organically intertwined. He recounts several cyclical theories, stamped by fatalism and predetermining the decline of societies. In keeping with the first theory, civilizations are an incidental consequence of the running-down of the clockwork of the physical Universe; the second theory, which is biological in essence, asserts that a civilization like a living organism has its own inherent life-span and life-curve; the third theory, which is a racial one, points out that the breakdown of any civilization at any given time is due to the racial degeneration of its human components; according to the fourth, cosmical, theory, civilizations succeed one another by a law of their nature which is the common law of the cosmos (3,157). In the view of the English thinker separate civilizations pass through the following stages of development : 1. genesis; 2 growth; 3, breakdown; 4. disintegration. This cycle resembles the model employed by a number of cyclists, with Vico, Danilevski and Spengler as the most typical examples. With them the analogy to the living organism is rather emphatic and is represented as a proof in certain cases. With Toynbee, vice versa, a striving is evident to delimit himself, to draw the line between himself and them, stressing repeatedly that he does not model his views on the life cycle of living organisms.

All that raises a number of questions: Does Toynbee have grounds to reject the analogy between his conception about the

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development of civilizations and the specificity of the living organism? Even terminologically the above cited four stages are very close to the natural life-cycle. Van Dored raises a similar issue: If the evolutions of cultures or civilizations is subject to such a "law", is this not the same law, which determines and governs the development and the decline of living beings? (6, 118) On the other hand, provided that civilizations have a life-cycle similar to that of living beings, how are the elements of fatalism to be avoided? Assuming that all civilizations in the history of humanity have passed through the same cycles, how are inferences as to the freedom of human choice and will to be understood?

Thus we reach the basic issue: Does Toynbee have sufficient reasons to delimit himself from the cyclical pattern and in what way does he try to avoid it? The answer is implicitly related to the analysis of two problems: the specific interpretation of the stages of social development and of the character and direction of social development, basically the idea of progress in history. The peculiarity of the Toynbean viewpoint could be best understood when compared with two other cyclic theories — those of Danilevski and Spengler.

The Russian thinker N. Danilevski formulated five laws of the so called "cultural historical type", the last one reflecting his idea of the cyclical pattern on the analogy of the life of plants: origination, development, decline. He provided no explanation of the causes conditioning such a life-cycle: the innermost causes ruling the life-cycle of the plant are unknown as are the causes of the generation, development, aging and dying-off of cultures (8, 76).

The cyclical pattern is also characteristic of Spengler's philosophy of history: "Each culture possesses a limited number of possibilities for manifesting itself: it comes into existence, matures, wanes, but is never regenerated" (9, 23). By way of analogy Spengler takes into account the life-cycle of man and plants. The German philosopher eludes the issue of argumentation too. Moreover, he is the victim of an apparent methodological inconsistency. On the one hand, he points out the difference, even the contrariness between nature and history — contrariness, which to his mind is the specific essence of history. At the same time he tries to bridge the gaps between those opposites, explaining each of them by resorting to the other one, as is the case when he employs the analogy with the living organism and the historical development of civilizations not only as an illustration, but as a means of proving his idea as well.

In those two cases the cycle is both *essence and inner law* of the development of cultures.

There also exists, though, another variety of the cyclical pattern, with which the cycle is not an end in itself as far as the description

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of the historical development goes, but merely a *form*, i.e. a manifestation of the existence of the historical type of society. A typical upholder of that view is G. Vico. In this case human history is represented as an uniform process and thus the issues of progress and regress are actually problems related to the tendencies and direction of the social process. The English historian A. Toynbee also shares this "moderate cyclic theory".

Indeed A. Toynbee speaks of a cycle which he describes through the concepts "genesis, growth, breakdown, disintegration". But it is only at first glance that this view can be classified as cyclical in the classical sense of the term. On what grounds ?

First of all, Toynbee repeatedly states that civilizations are "objective realities" and not living organisms (3, 155). What can be firmly maintained in respect to them is that from the above mentioned four stages only the first one (genesis) is compulsory. And indeed, civilisations could not be objective realities if they did not have an ontological manifestation above all through the fact of their "appearance". The resemblance with Danilevski's and Spengler's view ends here. For Toynbee's precursors the problem of growth is an absurd and since according to their theoretical assumptions growth automatically follows the birth of a civilization, the way the succeeding stages replace consecutively each preceding one. Each civilization that has already emerged has predicted, precisely determined life-cycle. The English historian takes into account more possibilities. Once a given civilization is already in existence, it is not obliged to follow the affirmed cycle. (3 46) It can arrest its development right after its generation or during the so called "growth or during the breakdown; besides, it can remain undeveloped ("abortive").

In looking for a less trivial example to illustrate this, Toynbee employes crystals : "A crystal can also be an objective reality that changes in a regular pattern of phases" (3, 46). Toynbee does not expand this comparison, consequently the reader is left with the impression that it is not a very adequate one. Indeed, the crystal is also "born" and it "grows", but depending on external circumstances and not on its own inherent laws, it remains the same or changes its structure or breaks down. The "breakdown" of crystals, conditionally talking, sets in after a certain level of development is attained and the cases of insufficient development are due to organic damage. On the contrary, with civilizations, according to the view of the English historian, the change in the "crystal grating", figuratively talking, is not triggered off by external forces or conditions — Toynbee gives this a special emphasis — but by the active and creative role of the members of society, by the character of the "response to challenge", by directing the "mimesis" of the majority,

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etc. Probably what Toynbee had in mind what that like crystals civilizations can also arrest their development, "freeze" or get "petrified" during each separate phase.

In another comparison Toynbee reveals more fully the depth of his idea and the presence of dialectical moments. Recurrence is the object of comparison, The obviousness of recurrent cycles gives Danilevski and Spengler grounds to make them into an irreversible law, to generalize them. For Toynbee recurrence has a different character. It is only the visibility of historical development, but not an inner law—the discovery of periodic repetitive movements does not mean that they are also the main course of social development: "The movement of the wheel is admittedly repetitive in relation to the wheel's own axle; but the wheel has been manufactured and fitted to its axle only in order to become a part of a vehicle, and the fact that the vehicle can move only in virtue of the wheel's circular movement ronnd the axle does not compel the vehicle itself to travel like a merry-go-round in a circular track. The wheel is indispensible to the vehicle as a means of locomotion, but it is incapable of dictating the course on which the vehicle is to move" (3, 159). Thus the decisive course in human history depends on the freedom and the will of the individuals.

The theory of cycles evolved by Toynbee differs from that of Spengler in another point too. Alongside with the cycle, which is not an irreversible law, the English historian views human history as a uniform process, avoiding extreme fatalism and predetermination, asserting the presence of cultural "tradition" and interactions ("encounters") in the historical development of societies. It can well be said that not in all cases researchers of the philosophical and historical heritage of Toynbee and Spengler have accounted for this specificity. R. Collingwood is one of the few exceptions. Although he was acquainted only with the first three volumes of "A Study of History", he correctly perceived that "thus the triumph of naturalism, which in Toynbee only affects general principles, in Spengler penetrates into every detail" (7, 183).

Consequently, the "cycle" of development in the stages of social development in Toynbee's views is dynamic and flexible, it is not subordinate to strict regularities and irrevocable laws.

The next issue, to which we should furnish an answer if we are to make an inference as to the type of cyclic theory Toynbee expounds, is the issue of his attitude towards the problems of the direction of historical development and of progress, in particular.

To this end several starting points are necessary: in which spheres does Toynbee accept progressive development; do those spheres have decisive character in view of the social process; how

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does he see the most general tendency and direction of historical development ?

Toynbee's peculiar style of indefiniteness, of ambiguous and insufficiently elucidated situations (2, 267) is the reason why he has been contradictingly evaluated, reaching the two extremes—he has been proclaimed for a regressive and for a progressive author.

In which respects and in what spheres does Toynbee discern indisputable progress and where is he reserved in his opinions ?

A. Toynbee ascertains indisputable progress, in the first place, in the field of science and technology and after that—actually due to that—in the spiritual sphere of human self-perfection, self-expression and self-realization of those interests, abilities, potentials, that raise man intellectually and make his knowledge of the world and himself more profound. The incessant cumulative development of science and technology is a process of gradual release of human potentials that have previously been employed in a more material sphere, setting them free to act in a spiritual ("etherial") sphere, that is much more powerful (1, 3, 183). In other words, we witness a successive shifting of energy or shift in "accent" from a lower sphere of being to a higher one, i.e. a process of towering from the earthy to the unearthy, from the macrocosmos to the microcosmos Toynbee calls this process "etherialization".

Again in order to describe the process of advance and progression of civilizations, Toynbee introduces the concept "progress towards self-determination". (3, 140) It expresses the inner integrity, harmony and independence of societies (and of the personality respectively). In actual fact, this is a progressive change in activities, a shift in human energies from the external to the internal sphere, the surmounting of inner impediments and, therefore, a fuller and a more perfect self-expression (1, 3, 192).

There is another sphere in which the English thinker is rather reserved — morality. Toynbee emphasizes the lack of a correlation between the technological and moral progress of mankind. The human intellect has reached enormous pinacles in its development, but at the expense of its moral perfection. Otherwise, according to Toynbee, there is no viable explanation of the fact that man utilizes his intellectual and creative potentials to invent means of self-destruction. In this respect Toynbee holds extreme views: there is no proof that the so called civilized societies are morally more advanced than the so called primitive societies (5, 306).

Toynbee sees the salvation of humanity in religion — this spiritual force which will complete the moral and spiritual gaps of the contemporary man and will reverse his efforts from militarization and exploitation to the inner sphere of self perfection. Therefore to

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Toynbee the progress of religion is the most supreme spiritual progress (1, 9, 174).

What is the situation of religion, though, in the contemporary world ? Toynbee admits that religion is often neglected, unjustly "dethroned" by science and technology. But since mankind cannot live without religion (in the sense of a world outlook) for a long time, it will, in his view, regain its due place: "The gradual elaboration of religion reflects the major irreversible movement of history", and the eternal round of civilizations is merely a "point of leverage" in the development of religion (253). Religion can proceed "in its progressive divine movements on the basis of the cycles of birth and disintegration of civilizations" (1, 6, 235-6). Mankind's progress lies in the sphere of spiritual perfection, in the religious evolution from primitive animalistic beliefs through universal religions towards a syncratic religion of the future.

Toynbee's view of the leading role of religion has a historical analogue in the concepts of Voltaire. To both of them the social function of religion justifies its existence apart from its gnoseological significance. But if for Voltaire the belief in God is justified through socio-political argumentation (10, 1, 27), for Toynbee the need of faith ensues from moral and psychological incentives. Voltaire's aphorism "If there is no God, he should be invented" would be voiced in a different way with Toynbee—"No matter if there is a God, he should not be dethroned".

We attempted to prove that in spite of his contradictory and ambiguous statements, Toynbee has created a more or less progressive conception of social development. Many authors admit that as a criterion of progressive development Toynbee accentuates religion. But without clarifying the sense the English historian puts into the concept of religion, a simple answer cannot be given to the question of the character of his philosophical and historical conceptions. In his theories religion assumes an universal, comprehensive character. It is both religion in the true sense of the word, as well as an ideology, and foremostly a world outlook. Central to each world outlook is the problem of man and of man's place in the world (11, 73). In spite of the fact whether he has the right to generalise the function of the religion, we can make the conclusion that Toynbee's concept is also humanistic, for it enhances the view of man's development and of reaching a greater world harmony.

The aim we set ourselves, though, was more different : through an analysis of the problems, related to the interpretation of the stages and the idea of progress, to reach a conclusion about the character of Toynbee's theory of cycles. Are we in a position now, on the basis of the above mentioned analyses, to confirm that the

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cyclic theory of Toynbee differs from those of Spengler and Danilevski ?

The theory expounded by the English historian avoids the weak points of the "classical" cyclical patterns and at the risk of contradicting its initial principles reaches the necessity of establishing a more general progressive development : By acknowledging the development and perfection of society, although foremostly in the spiritual sphere, Toynbee is to be ranked among cyclists of the type of Vico, which entitles us to introduce the concept "moderate" cyclical patterns as opposed to the "extreme" cyclical patterns of Danilevski and Spengler. Besides, the Toynbean philosophy of history is richer, more flexible and less speculative and abstract. Therefore, after a due critical reconsideration, some of Toynbee's ideas can be put to use in the Marxist research of contemporary fundamental issues related to the philosophy of history.

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VI

Mysticism in Wordsworth's Poetry

R. P. Acharya

William Wordsworth was the supreme pioneer and founder with Coleridge of the English Romantic Movement—that momentous and epoch-making movement that broke the cult of dry, sterile rationalism in English poetry and ushered in a new era by establishing and vindicating the primacy and sovereignty of intuition and imaginative vision in literature as well as in life.

Romantic imagination, as conceived and cultivated by the Romantic poets like Wordsworth, Coleridge, Blake and Shelley etc. is something unique and unparalleled in its kind. It is essentially what Joubert called— 'the eye of the soul.' It is not a playful will-o-the wisp-not the vague, frivolous, capricious fancy indulging in utopian reveries or fairlyland fantasies. It is that sublime and crowning faculty of human spirit through which we can penetrate the ultimate mysteries of human life, of the soul of man as well as of the cosmos. It is that by which we may be able, to quote the pregnant lines of Blake :

> To see a world in a grain of sand,
> And a heaven in a wild flower,
> Hold infinity in the palm of your hand,
> And eternity in an hour. —Auguries of Innocence

In the romantic viewpoint, imagination is the only way of perceiving and realising the One in the many, the abiding behind the flux, the infinite behind the finite, the eternal behind the ephemeral, and the transcendent behind the immanent. And thus William Blake, the great Romantic poet and visionary, aptly observed : 'One power alone makes a poet — Imagination, the Divine vision'. Romantic vision upholds and vindicates the ultimate priority and ascendancy of Imagination over the logical and speculative reason of human mind while not denying or belittling the limited value and utility of

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the latter in human life. It cherishes the view that there are higher realms of experience, ultimate verities of life and baffl ng phenomena of the universe which the frail, finite human reason cannot explore and comprehend or only do it too inadequately and imperfectly. And it is only the Imagination which can offer fleeting flashes of profound and penetrating insight into the heart of reality. Imagination based on direct intuitive insight or flashes of immediate awareness is a faculty that transcends but does not reject the reason and intellect of man. Emphasizing the supreme importance and power of Imagination Wordsworth very perceptibly says:

> "...Imagination, which, in truth,
> Is but another name for absolute power
> And clearest insight, amplitude of mind,
> And Reason in her most exalted mood."[1]

While Reason divides, disrupts and dissociates things, Imagination links, unifies and binds them together. Thus in sharp contrast to the Cartesian metaphysics of Descartes which maintains a dichotomy between matter and spirit, microcosm (man) and macrocosm (universe), the Romantic Imagination finds in the entire universe — between the sentient living beings as well as inanimate objects a bond of all-embracing unity, solidarity and fellowship. Another characteristic feature of Romantic Imagination is the experience of wonder, fear, awe, rapture, ecstasy or reverence aroused in the perceiver's mind when it contemplates and communes with the things of the universe. Such awe-inspiring or rapturous supernatural (or numinous) experience is a vital factor in Romantic experience and the prime source of its vitality and intensity.

William Wordsworth had not only the exalted and inclusive imagination of a great Romantic poet but was also supremely endowed with the illumined spiritual vision of mystic. In the Wordsworthian mysticism the Romantic Imagination found its finest flower, its crowning revelation and consummation. Mysticism is the quintessence of Wordsworth's poetry, the ultimate and unfailing source of its inspiration.

Mysticism, broadly defined, is a state of sublime imaginative and spiritual experience in which one has direct, immediate and intuitive perception of an all embracing infinite and eternal Reality —the immanent-transcendent Absolute Being underlying and pervading but also transcending the sensible material universe. It is the sense of 'God in all' and 'all in God'. It is this sense of one ultimate Divine Principle permeating all things and all life of the universe as well as guiding, cherishing and sustaining them that inspires the mystic to conceive the vision of the ultimate divine unity of the universe, of all life. Mystic Imagination sees the living relationship

1 Prelude (1850 Edn.)—Book XVI (Lines 189 192).

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between the soul of man and the soul of the universe — a vision of cosmic unity, fraternity and fellowship.

The mysticism of Wordsworth is something unique in its kind, though it shares some characteristics common to all modes of mysticism. It is a type of Nature-mysticism; Though it bears a certain degree of affinity to Spinozistic pantheism it is not absolutely alike to it, for unlike the latter it does not regard Nature as the be all and end-all of the universe or equate and identify it with the Supreme Divine Spirit. Wordsworth's mysticism also differs from the Neo-platonic mysticism of Plotinus or the Christian mysticism of St. John of the Cross or St. Augustine. But it has something of the sublime beatific vision of Blake or the glowing paradisal vision of Dante. Like all true mystics Wordsworth believes that human life has a divine origin and divine destiny. As he said in his 'Ode on Intimations of Immortality :

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting;
The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting
And cometh from a far;
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
from God, who is our home.

Man is an essentially divine and immortal spirit, the 'Pilgrim of Eternity', 'the child of immortality' — Such is the fervent and glowing faith of Wordsworth, as of all mystics of all ages and climes. He said very aptly "Our destiny, our being's heart and home, Is with infinitude, and only there";[2] and that 'the great thought by which we live' is 'infinity and God'.

Wordsworth not only loved Nature but glorified, deified and divinized it. Unlike Shelley who at times spiritualized Nature in the manner of Wordsworth and at other times attempted to intellectualize and conceptualize it — transforming the object of Nature into some dogmatic socio-political doctrine, ideology or an abstract idea, as he did in 'Ode to the West Wind', Wordsworth's vision of Nature was constantly and consistently spiritual.

To him the vision of Nature always vouchsafed the vision of the Indwelling Divine spirit, the vision of that Cosmic Being, whom Shelley in a true Wordsworthian spirit has described in his illuminating and soul stirring lines :

That Light whose smile kindles the Universe,
That Beauty in which all things work and move,
That Benediction which the eclipsing Curse
of birth can quench not, that sustaining Love
Which through the Web of being blindly wove

2 Prelude (1850 Edn.)—Book VI (Lines 604-605).

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By man and beast and earth and air and sea,
Burns bright or dim, as each are mirrors of
The fire for which all thirst;.....

(Lament for Adonais)

Wordsworth's worship and adoration of Nature was never inspired by passion for aesthetic beauty, elegance and splendour. All forms and objects, aspects and appearances of Nature—Whether graceful, lovely and magnificent or sombre, awe-inspiring and forbidding—alike stirred and stimulated his visionary imagination, for they all of them were to him equally the living emblems and images of the Divine Spirit, the hieroglyphics of divinity. How even the dreary, appalling and awesome spectacles of Nature could bring intimations of the Divine Reality and profoundly impress on his mind its sublimity, majesty and grandeur is vividly revealed in one of the celebrated passages of 'Prelude' in the description of a scene on the Alps.

Black drizzling crags that spake by the wayside
As if a voice were in them, the sick sight
And giddy prospect of the raving stream,
The unfettered clouds and region of the Heavens,
Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light—
Were all like workings of one mind, the features
of the same face, blossoms upon one tree;
Characters of the great Apocalypse,
The types and symbols of Eternity,
Of first, and last, and midst, and without end.[3]

And this passage represents a profoundly moving and glowing description of the most memorable of his mystic experiences.

The fundamental traits of Wordsworthian mystic vision is also amply highlighted in those moving lines of his, where he speaks of

One interior life
In which all beings live with God, themselves
Are God, existing in the mighty whole,
As indistinguishable as the cloudless east
Is from the cloudless west, when all
The hemisphere is one cerulean blue[4]
or when he voices
...the sentiment of Being spread
O'er all that moves and all that seemeth still;
O'er all that, lost beyond the reach of thought
And human knowledge, to the human eye
Invisible, yet liveth to the heart;
O'er all that leaps and runs, and shouts and sings,
Or beats the gladsome air; O'er all that glides
Beneath the wave, yea, in the wave itself,
And mighty depth of waters.[5]

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5 Prelude (1850 Edn.)—Book II (Lines 401 409).

3 Prelude (1850 Edn.)—Book VI (Lines 631 640).

4 From a fragment found in a MS. Note book containing Peter Bell.

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All objects, high or low, sentient or insentient are to him suffused with the living presence of the Divine and instinct with life and feeling and even with consciousness and will of their own. This is movingly expressed in the following memorable lines of his—

To every natural form, rock, fruit or flower,
Even the loose stones that cover the highway,
I gave a moral life : I saw them feel,
or linked them to some feeling : the great mass
Lay bedded in a quickening soul, and all
That I beheld respired with inward meaning [6]

or when he addresses the objects of Nature as follows :—

Ye Presences of Nature in the sky
And on the earth ! Ye Visions of the hills !
And Souls of lonely places ! [7]

It is because of this perception of 'One interior life' in all by Wordsworth that even an ordinary and apparently trivial thing of Nature could kindle his vision and fill him with lofty and elevated thoughts — 'Trances of thought and mountings of the mind'[8] leading him to the sublimely reverent and profoundly mystic contemplation of the Divine immanent in all creation.

To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.[9]

And he says that even the smallest things of Nature seemed infused and irradiated with a paradisal splendour and sublimity.

The earth, and every common sight
To me did seem
Apparell'd in celestial light,[10]

The childhood 'spots of time' with its fits of vulgar joy, frolic and pastime, so vividly and glowingly depicted by Wordsworth in 'Prelude' were also punctuated by fleeting flashes of mystic vision— 'Gleams like the flashing of a Shield'[11] as Wordsworth so exquisitely put it.

Since Nature aroused in Wordsworth's mind a profound vision of the Indwelling Deity or the 'Wisdom and Spirit of the Universe'[12] as he calls it in the Prelude, he regarded it as the living fountain of his poetic inspiration and of moral and spiritual enlightenment and vision. He acknowledged that he was

...Well pleased to recognize
In nature and the language of the sense
The anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse,
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul
Of all my moral being.[13]

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6 Prelude (1850 Edn.)—Book III (Lines 130-135).
7 Prelude (1850 Edn.)—Book I (Lines 464-466).
8 Prelude (1850 Edn.)—Book I (Line 19).
9 Ode on Intimations of Immortality.
10 Ode on Intimations of Immortality.
11 Prelude (1850 Edn.)—Book I (Line 586).
12 Prelude (1850 Edn.)—Book I (Line 401).
13 Tintern Abbey Re-visited.

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All objects and things of Nature had for him some sublime and mysterious moral and spiritual message to convey :

> One impulse from a vernal wood
> May teach you more of man,
> Of moral, evil and of good,
> Than all the sages can.[14]

It is the fundamental faith of a mystic that 'the heart of light is the silence'. In the true spirit of a mystic, Wordsworth set a supreme value on silence and contemplative stillness or, as he called it, 'wise passiveness' and 'meditative peace' and was conscious of its profound and immense spiritual potentialities for bringing divine revelation and for penetrating into the ultimate cosmic mysteries. Amidst his visions of Nature, there came moments of such profound and hallowed stillness — of 'transcendent peace and silence'[15] as Wordsworth called it that through his Imagination Wordsworth attained the highest peak of his mystic vision gaining insight into the heart of reality. It was in moments of 'that peace which passeth understanding'[16], that as Wordsworth tell us :

> ..... Gently did my soul
> Put off her veil, and self-transmuted, stood
> Naked, as in the presence of her God[17]

In moments of such holy calm and peace, his mind was transported to a state of sublime ecstasy, an ineffable trance-like consciousness.

> Oft in these moments such a holy calm
> Would overspread my soul, that bodily eyes
> Were utterly forgotten, and what I saw
> Appeared like something in myself, a dream
> A prospect in the mind.[18]

Emphasizing those moments of sublime stillness and serenity and their inestimable value and significance Wordsworth in a pregnant and illuminating passage in 'Tintern Abbey Re-visited' says :

> .....that serene and blessed mood,
> In which the affections gently lead us on, —
> Until, the breath of this corporeal frame
> And even the motion of our human blood
> Almost suspended, we are laid a sleep
> In body, and become a living soul :
> While with an eye made quiet by the power
> of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
> We see into the life of things.

and also in 'Ode on Intimations of Immortality' :

> Hence, in a season of calm weather
> Though inland far we be,
> Our souls have sight of that immortal sea
> Which brought us hither;

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14 The Tables Turned.
15 Prelude (1850 Edn.) — Book VI (Lines 139-140).
16 Prelude (1850 Edn.) — Book XIV (Lines 126-127).
17 Prelude (1850 Edn.) — Book IV (Lines 150-152).
18 Prelude (1850 Edn.) — Book II (Lines 348-352).

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VII

The Psychological Time of Man in Some Upanishads

(Or an Attempt to Compare the European and Indian Pattern of Behaviour at the Dawn of The Two Cultures)

Stefania Dimitrova

Why the psychological time is a matter of examination in this work ? Can it be a sure criterion for comparison between the two styles of life ?

The personality as a subject of life is characterised with an unceasing extend of activities, A dynamic self-controlled system—the personality advances on two corresponding planes a HORIZONTAL and a VERTICAL one (level and upright).

1. The horizontal plane is THE SOCIAL FORM OF MOVING. Here the personality enters different social relations, accomplishes more and more social roles. And submit them to each other.

On this plane emerges the possibility of the social important aims (realised as meaning of life) to guide man in his behaviour.

2. The vertical plane is plane of TIME EVALUATION (i. e. the ability of time perception) which ensures the individual form of development.

Different strategies of resolving contradictions take shape on the level of the time organized being.

The three different purposes forwards future, present and past find expression in three different strategies of resolving contradictions and become apparent in three different patterns of life.

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So including the time analysis into the analysis of the personal behaviour we find solution of the paradox: how is it possible a system of equal values (as the hierarchy of social important values) realized as a purpose of life, to be presented by different strategies of behaviour in everyday life ?

So : THE TIME AS A REFERENCE MARK IN THE STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN AND INDIAN REFLECTION.

"For the primitive societies (in the epoch of Vedas and Upanishads) that still live in recorded only biologically time, without its corrosive action being able to exert itself upon consciousness by revealing the irreversibility of events, regenerate themselves periodically though expulsion of "evils" and confession of sins".[1]

A beginning of the avowal of sins was the day of the NEW YEAR (conception of eliminating a fault through the rite of construction) Every New Year is the beginning of a new life, a regeneration realised by the sacral actions of the rite which actualize the mythical moment of the Creation. "The man has felt the need to reproduce the cosmogony in his constructions whatever be their nature (texts, rites, dances etc...) This reproduction made him contemporary with the mythical moment of the beginning of the world and he felt the need of returning to that moment as often as possible in order to regenerate himself".[2]

For the primitive consciousness the imitation of the cosmogonic act is a return to the mythical time of the primordial oneness, the world of the archetypes. The repetition of these archetypal models is a reactualisation of the mythical moment. The entering into this time —the MYTHICAL TIME, is an opposition of the PROFANE TIME (of the everyday life) The periodic suspension of the profane time of duration and projecting the celebrant into a mythical time, as a cansequence of the ceremonies, is a suspension of the time as history —annulling the time "The need of periodic regeneration that these societies also feel, is a proof that they too cannot perpetually mantain their position in what is called paradise of archetypes".[3] The time outside this paradise is a remembered history, realized as "accumulated sinfulness".

To abolish sinfulness was a kind of magical conception of destruction of the remembered history through continual reactualisation of the atemporal (ahistorical) mythical moment.

Such a return to ILLO Tempore for the primitive consciousness could restore the disturbed balance. However the constructive ritual

1 Eliade, M. "The Myth of the Eternal Return. Cosmos and History" N. Y. 1974 p. 74.
2 Ibid., p. 76.
3 Ibid., p. 74.

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shows us something more than the imitation as a possibility of restoration of the world, hence recreation. That is why every act of the rite has the power of a sacral act wich not just reconstructs but recreates the world : "This reproduction made it contemporary with the moment of the beginning and he felt the need of returning as often as possible in order to regenerate itself."[4]

In the Ist millenium of the B. C. The Vedas prescribe rites for everyday reconstruction of the world. Among the most archaic tribes of India we find also the reconstruction of the Cosmogonic Myth as a curative rite by recitation wich helps the patient though reconstruction of his life. With every sacrifice the Brahmans reactualize the archetypal cosmogonic act And the coincidence between the "mythical instant" and the "present sacral act" supposes both the abolishment of the profane time and the regeneration of the world. Without the sacred act of the authorised Brahman the sun will not rise, the moon will fall down, the life will end. He has a position of cosmical responsibility for everyday reconstruction of life. The practice of sacrifices ensures the triumph of Rita (the cosmical principle of order) as a universal organizing reality in reference to the chaos dangerous for all living entities.[5]

The idea of a "well —arranged world" due even to submission of Gods (Devata) to the law —Rita, is in close relation to the cycle of sacrifices. This belief joins the far-away celestial phenomena with the circle of sacrifices. "The sense of right and wrong is reduced to regular sacrifice".[6] Lately Rita is identified with Satya (truthfulness) which requires a boundless duty bravery, diligence and soon."[7]

The principle of organizing reality Rita attains the significance of moral law. But anyway the mean responsibility for the life hangs upon the authorized Brahman.

The vigilence of the ordinary man (in the time of Vedas) is realized only in the ritual assistance i. e. in the sacred moment of personal effort to reestablish the primordial unity of his own being through the annihilation of the memory. Only in the small peace of empirical (profane) time when it transforms into ILLO TEMPORE —(mythical time) the sacrificer takes the responsibility of his behaviour, his life is fully conscious. The really Present is the time when the consciousness is in maximum tension and vigilance. This piece of time "has a particular relation to the sacred, involves maximum participants, an institutionalized act called —FEST".[8]

4 Ibid., p. 78.

5 Bongard Lewin, G.M. "The Archaic Indian Civilisation" Moscow 1982, p. 42.

6 Ibid., p. 36.

7 Ibid., p. 42.

8 "Myths of the World", Vol. I, II. Moscow 1982 p. 329.

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The primitive consciousness has not revealed the value of the profane time transformed into a sacral one.

In European mythopoetical tradition the idea of fest is associated with such basic characteristics as "everpervading sacrum, pragmatism (an indispensable action), effectivity, the power fullest instrument for man's mutual interaction with nature ever accompanied by a ritual...".[9]

Even when the feast looses his status and its deritualizing transforms it into a play, folklorical text, or a custom the semantics of each word refers to feast, emphasizes the idea of sacrum — i. e. *Holy* day, nedelia (Russ. notdoing, sunday).

The holiness requires a vigilance and responsibility, but it's only a small piece of empirical time.

Constructive rituals performed by the traditional man presuppose more or less explicit imitation of the cosmogonic act. For him the imitation of an atemporal mythical time ILLO TEMPORE. So the profane time is felt as an expectation of the future sacred time, some kind of life "besides the present".

The consciousness at the (time of Vedic Brahmanic ceremonies and European archaic culture) did not find the value of the profane time i. e. did not reveal the really PRESENT.

THE MAN OF UPANISHADS FIND THE REAL VALUE OF EMPIRICAL TIME. An enormous conversion of consciousness is done from the external world to the internal one. The two antipodes MAN —GOD unite in the present. The conflict Man Divine Force becomes absurd "God what is said is not the mere masic that is defined in scriptures and may appear in front of the meditative mind but the mystery of the immanent and transcendent the ultimate depth of man's own being"[10]

THE MAN OF UPANISHADS CONVERGES THE MODEL OF THE WORLD

The responsibility for the everyday reconstruction of the being becomes personal. One builds oneself as "the awallow builds his nest with every act, thought and feeling—all his life becomes an eternal sacrifice, The smallest reality of being becomes a rite for reconstruction. The circle birth—life death is shortened and enlarged ad infinitum. This cyclic recurence is everpervading. The mantra AUM (OM) accompanies every breathing and represents tbe same cycle of birth-death life. The sound A is the beginning, the first letter the birth. The sound U—is the murition, maturity, full life. The sound M–is the letter of the death (the name of the God

9 Ibid., p. 330.

10 Campbell, J. "The Masca of God" vol. II N. Y. 1973 p. 32.

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of death-Mara) the finishing. We found this cycle in the smallest piece of personal existence—the breathing,

But the most important of this circle is the silence between the end the beginning (i.e. the Mythical time).

In breathing it is represented by the grammar sign (viram) after this sign the sound stops briefly and the silence represents the Mythical silence of ILLO TEMPORE before the Creation.

The abolition of profane time makes it contemporary with the realm of archetypes. With every breathing We can imagine the enormous need of eternal renewal, reestablishment of the primordial unity a thrist for this unity. So with every breath man takes the responsibility for the new era of his life. After the primordial silence he inspires again and begins the cosmogonic A-U-M cycle anew.

For a consciousness wish can not resist such a tension of every breath vigilance the Cosmical cycle of birth-life-death is prolonged ad infinitum.*

During this cycle there is a progressive decrease in duration of each new yuga which corresponds on a human plane to a decrease in the lenght of life, accompanied with corruption in moral and a decline in intelligence. This continual decline upon all planes-biological, intellectual, ethical and social shows the terryfying perspective of more suffrances in future Yugas (time). Besides all these incalculable transformations they have a soteriological function; simply contemplating their panorama terrifies man and forces him to realize that be must begin the same transitory existence and endure the same sufferings over millions upon millions of times again. This results in intensifying his will to escape to transcend his condition of living once for all-to identify with Atman (Brahman).

In the state of Turya and Samādhī "the subject is in unity with the object of the mental concentration"[11] and the meaning of time disappears. We found the urge of the archaic consciousness to nullify the time in the idea of Atman (Brahman and Karma) Samsara

* We found in Mahabharata the idea of the periodical destruction of the world: The smallest unit of measure of the cycle is YUGA —the "age". A Yuga is preceded and followed by a "dawn" and a "twilight" that joins the ages. A complete cycle or Mahāyuga is composed of four ages of unequal duration: first Kṛta Yuga lasts 4000 years plus 400 years of "dawn" and "twilight", then comes the Treta Yuga—3 000+300, Dvāpara—2 000+200 and Kali Yuga 1 000+100 years. Hence a Mahāyuga lasts 1 200 years The complete cycle is determined with a dissolution Pralaya Each Mahāyuga has 1 200 years considered as divine. A total 4 320 000 for a single cosmic cycle A thousand of such Mahāyuga constitute a Kalpa. Fourteen Kalpas make a Manvantara. One Kalpa is equivalent to a day of Brahma. His life is hundred "years".

11 Kanev, K. "Yoga, Basical Terms" Sofia, 1984 p. 151.

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The Indian speculation on cyclical time reveals a sufficiently marked "refusal of history" but it differs fundamentally from the archaic conceptions, whereas the man of the traditional cultures refuses history through the periodic abolition of the Creation, thus living besides the reality. The Hindu spirit in it's supreme tension disparages and even rejects this reactualisation of auriral time which is no longer regarded as an effective solution of the problem of suffering[12].

The Hindu metaphysics search an annullment of time hereby abolishing the Karma and liberating from Sansara. In accordance with them to enter the eternal present—"now", one has to come beyond the law of the causuality Karma and discover Atman/Brahman as the supreme existence. Arrived at the source of the being Atman, one enters the timelessness or the moment of Creation. There are no bounder events (which are conceived as personal ones, respectively remembered as history). So there is no past and future, but only a perpetual "becoming". The man of the Upanishads realizes this supreme act of freedom not through the help of the authorized Brahmans but alone, by himself "When he converges his eyes to the inside" (Kena Upanishad).

"If one does not hear anything else, does not see anything else, does not know anything else—this is the Infinity. If hears, sees, knows something else-this is the finite" (Chandogya Upanished),

The Atman, the personal essence, has no reference to time. Because every relation (rememberance or project) to the past or the future is an identification with the lowest levels of conscience (the empirical or the somatic ones).

In the source of personal being —Atman there is no event conceived as personal (resp. trough the empirical and somatic level of consciousness) i.e. there is no event which could be remembered and thus bound the man in the chain of Karma/Samsara. The division of the consciousness in "ego" —"non ego" is an identification —no Atman (no essence). The way to Atman/Brahman is a particular undressing of the identifications till one reaches a maximal contraction of being —the "gravitative collapse". Where the consciousness has maximum density and an enormous store of energy for transcendence into another reality —the reality of the Universal Doer.

The tradition of the cited Upanishadic texts marks an issue from the profane time (empirical time) through contraction of this time till onepointedness (equal to an instant) or through reproducing ad infinitum of the mythic time of Creation. This is the revealing of Atman (Brahman through self-perfection. But such a view of life needs an equal behaviour exerted in full conscience for the responsibility of every instant (every breath) An exceptional in tensity of vigilance is required by the follower. A criterion for perfection can be the development in form of a spiral, organized on the one hand by a nonegoistic conscience and on the other with maximal vigilance. The more the consciousness is freed from egoism, the more it is vigilant and responsible for others. On the other hand the more consciousness is tended with attention and responsible for every act —the more the thoughts are nonegoistic. freed from the illusion of

12 Eliade, M. "The Myth of the Eternal Return. Cosmos and History" N.Y. 1974 p. 117.

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the personal doer (caused by the identifications with the lower levels of the empirical and somatic consciousness. The evolution is the thirst for the conscious action conceived as the Universal Doer.

But such a criterion would have a value only for somebody who has such a view of life. to follow the way to Atman/Brahman. And what about the consciousness of the ordinary man lost in the empiric and somatic world?

The tradition coming from the Vedas takes care of the "victims" of the profane existence. They could not conceive the need of rejecting the identifications. The conception of four Yugas has a soteriological function for such a consciousness-intensifies the efforts to escape the human conditions through Nirvana. "The Indian (Hindu) conception of the four ages is consequently invigorating and consoling for man under the terror of history. In effect on the one hand the sufferings that fell upon him because he is contemporary with his crepuscular decomposition, help him to understand the precariousness of his human condition and thus facilitates his enfranchisment. On the other hand the theory validates and justifies the sufferances to undergoing his existence, and thus by tbe very fact that he is conscious of the dramatic and catastrophic epoch"[13].

Tha present is a consequence of the past, the future a consequence of the present.

The Man of the Upanishads becomes equal to his own being because it is in his power to construct the world.

The European has to act with big precision and responsibility only in the rite. His social activity is realized in reference to the future mythical time when all sins would be destruct i.e. in fest and rite.

For the Hindu, the social activity is a constant tension and responsibility of every act (even the most trivial).

If the ethical norms of the European in relation to the view of eternal return of mythical time allow him to accumulate sinfulness till the new return (the next rite) when it will be destroyed. The causality law Karma does not permit such a possibility. As a supreme ruler ethical, the law of Karma proposes two alternatives: either life in human conditions and aggravating suffrances justified by the fact of their awareness, or constant urge to go beyond the limited human condition, the profane existence and rejection of the egoistic thoughts.—life in the limitless "now".

The structure of archaic thoughts and spirituality realizes two different strategies of nullifying time: the time perception by the European follows "the arrow of time" from past-through present—to future, the man of Upanishads like the Demiurge lives (or exactly tries to live) in the eternal actual instant of the Present.

If we have to merit the Upanishads in their merit we have to tell that herein we find the history of a developed consciousness which imposes for its supreme controller not the distant future but the full of life and responsibility PRESENT,

13 Ibid., p. 118.

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VIII

Upamana In Advaita Vedanta : A Case of Ontology Influencing Epistemology ?

Arvind Sharma

I

As is well known, Advaita Vedānta accepts the six *pramānas* as enumerated by the Bhatta school of Mīmāmsā.[1] One of the *pramānas* held in common by both the schools is *upamāna*.[2] *Upamāna*, however, is also accepted by various other schools as a *pramāṇa*, though not by all[3] and the conception of *upamāna* in these various schools also tends to differ.[4] Thus while in Gautama it is described "as knowledge of *something*, previously unknown, on the basis of its similarity to a familiar thing, e.g. 'The *gavaya* (a wild deer) is like the cow' ",[5] in later Nyāya, it is applied to the knowledge of "the *denotation* of a new word on the basis of its similarity to a familiar object".[6] Sabara, the commentator on the Mīmāṁsa-sutra, on the

1 T. M. P. Mahadevan, *outlines of Hinduism* (Bombay : Chetana Ltd., 1960), p. 144.

2 Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1969), p. 69. It may be noted, however, that "Śaṁkara refers only to *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda* as *pramāṇas*; the later Advaitins accept the others as well" (*ibid.*, p. 69, fn. 6).

3 S. Chatterjee and D. Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (University of Calcutta, 1968), pp. 196-198.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 319.

5 Dhirendra Mohan Datta, Epistemological Methods in Indian Philosophy, in Charles A. Moore, ed., *The Indian Mind* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), p. 127, emphasis added.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 128, emphasis added.

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other hand "describes this knowledge as a kind of analogical argument, as would appear from his example that we know the existence of souls in other bodies by the analogy of our knowledge of our own bodies having souls".[7]

It is, however, the Advaitic understanding of *upamāna* as a *pramāna* which concerns us here.

> But later Mimāmsā and the Advaita Vedānta conceive *upamāna* in a different way. About the Nyāya conception, they point out that it is a mixture of knowledge from authority and an inference based on it. According to them, *upamāna* is a process like this: When a man perceives a cow, and afterward perceives a *gavaya*, he judges, "This *gavaya* is like that cow". From this knowledge of similarity he passes to the knowledge "That cow (perceived in the past) is like the *gavaya*". This last knowledge is peculiar. It is not perceptual, for the subject "cow" is not now present, and when it was perceived in the past it was not known to be similar to the *gavaya* (which was not known then) It is not an inference, since no universal premise is used to reach the conclusion. So, it is classed apart and called knowledge from similarity (*upamāna*).[8]

The most significant point to note is that one passes from the knowledge "This *gavaya* is like the cow" to the knowledge "That cow is like the *gavaya*".[9]

What necessitated such an interpretation of *upamāna* ?[10]

II

It will now be suggested that Advaitic ontology and Advaitic soteriology seem to have influenced Advaitic epistemology here. Although scriptural authority is the primary source of knowledge about Brahman, the Brahman it testifies to is the *sole*, the *only* Reality. But if Brahman is the only Reality, then the scriptures must be less than ultimately Real. Indeed, "Sankara unhesitatingly states that when the final truth of non-dualism is realized, there will be no perception; for the Veda also becomes non-existent then".[11]

If, however, the scripture is ultimately unreal, yet this unreality can be of two kinds: that which is capable of being experienced and that which is not.

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7 *Ibid.*

8 *Ibid*

9 "...from the similarity of A to B, we come to know the similarity of B to A" (T.M.P. Mahadevan, *op. cit.*, p. 132).

10 Two questions arise at this point which will not be pursued in this paper: (1) Why did such a concept of *pramāṇa* arise in Mīmāṁsā ? and (2) is its presence in Advaita Vedānta merely a borrowing from Mīmāṁsā ? Though these questions are not faced in this paper, it may be suggested that the latter possibility does not negate the philosophical justification about to be provided, as it could also be a justification for borrowing.

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> In short, according to the Advaita Vedānta, the immutable, the independent and the eternal alone is the Real; and Brahman alone answers to that description. The entirely unreal is incapable of evoking any activity, e.g., nobody is afraid of the hare's horn or the barren woman's son. On the other hand, the appearance of a snake in a rope can frighten people; so the 'rope snake' is not utterly false. The world and the Veda have the same status, i.e. they are capable of being experienced, but they are not real. They are *mithyā*.[12]

Now the question arises : How can *mithyā* Veda produce valid knowledge ?

> Teachers of Advaita have given various answers to the question, "How can the valid and real experiences of non-duality result from Vedānta sentences, which are themselves false ?" Sankara replies that the Veda, though not absolutely real, can nevertheless make the absolutely real known to us; just as a woman or a cobra seen in a dream, though false, has physical as well as psychical effects which extend into waking experience. For example, a man who dreams that he has been bitten by a cobra may die of shock; and dreams can also be portents of future 'bad' and 'good' in waking life.
>
> Suresvara says that just as though a pot is *mithyā*, it is useful in bringing water, even so the sentence "That Thou art" is *mithyā*, but can cause Brahman knowledge. He also says that for a man who desires *moksa*, right and ascertained knowledge is generated by the sentences of the Veda, just as sleep, can be removed by a dream. Elsewhere a Suresvara says that as one who is awakened from sleep by the dream of a thief does not see any thief after waking up, even so an ignorant man well taught by the Veda does not any more *see* any teacher, *śāstra*, or ignorant person, apart from himself.
>
> Śaṅkara, gives another example. The written symbol 'A' is read as 'A'. whenever it occurs; but in fact it is only a *false* representation of the letter 'A', which is eternal and all-pervasive. Vācaspati gives the same example in a slightly different way by saying that by placing accents on letters, which are themselves neither short nor long, difference in meaning is caused. Rāmānanda gives a happier example : The sketch of a snake drawn on a paper is not a real snake; it is only an appearance of a snake, yet it can give us correct knowledge of a snake. Similarly, the knowledge of the thing (*artha*, i.e., Brahman) produced by a study of the Veda is valid.[13]

Among the Vedas, it is really the Vedānta Vākyas which are said to play a key role in generating the *anubhava* of Brahman. Thus "according to Śaṅkara, *anubhava* is the assured conviction.

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11 K. Satchidananda Murty, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 99.

12 *Ibid.*

13 *Ibid.*, p. 100.

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the clear undoubted awareness that one is Brahman, which is *generated* by Vedānta Vākyas".[14]

But the Vedānta Vākyas emphasising the unity of Brahman and Atman are themselves unreal, only the unity is real. In that sense, from an experiential point of view they are statements such as "The *avaya* is like the cow". Rāmānanda's example of the drawn snake and the real snake is helpful here. Till the real snake is experienced one might say : "The real snake is like the drawn snake" (The wild deer is like the cow). *After* the experience of the real snake one might say "The drawn snake is like the real snake (which I have seen)" (The cow is like the wild deer).

So long as the identity of Brahman is not realized it can only be a similarity, while one is yet in *māyā*. Once the identity is realized and one returns to *māyā* one can only resort to similarity to talk about it. But one can now say: *that* is like *this* instead of having to be told *this* is like that.

III

To conclude: this two-tier Advaitic ontology and its attendant soteriology may have imparted to the *pramāna upamāna* its interpretation in Advaita Vedānta as indicating a reversal of knowledge of A from B to that of B from A.[15]

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14 *Ibid.*, p. 114; also see p. 118 and 136 for even stronger statements.

15 It must be admitted that the relationship between Advaitic epistemology and ontology is far more complex than might appear from the paper. What it does is to suggest a possible direction of interaction. For a concise statement of the issues involved in the relationship between Advaitic ontology and epistemology see M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932), pp. 358-359.

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IX

Copernican Revolution or Ptolemaic Counter-Revolution
(Kant's Cosmic Humanism)

Alexander Litchev

A wide spread historico-philosophical tradition ascribes unambiguously to Emanuel Kant a peculiar "anthropocentrism", because he puts Man into the centre of the world-edifice. In this sense Bertrand Russel too, true to his irony, sarcastically remarks: "Kant spoke of himself as having effected a "Copernican revolution", but he would have been more accurate if he had spoken of a "Ptolemaic counter-revolution" since he put Man back at the centre from which Copernicus had dethroned him."[1]

And here quite legally the question arises: whether these authors, who present Kant in this respect as a certain "new" Ptolomeus, are not right?

If we turn towards the philosophical heritage of this thinker we can find statements as if speaking for such a thesis. So for example he declares in his "Anthropology": "The fact that a man can have in his imagination the conscience of his own 'Ego", places him over all the other beings living on earth".[2] In the "Prolegomens" we can read that Man is the "Supreme law-giver" of nature. And in "The Critics of Ability to Judge" it is pointed out, that Man's existence under moral laws represents the final goal of the world.

But it is quite true that without getting into the heart of Kant's conception, we cannot accept at all this thesis, which is based only

1 Russel, Bertrand. Human knowledge: its Scope and Limits. London, 1948, p. 9.

2 Kant's Werke. Akademie Textausgabe. Band VII, Berlin, 1968, S. 127.

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upon single quotations beyond the general context of the whole. Because other citations might also be presented with no less persuasiveness, "proving" just the opposite. In this respect we could immediately point to the famous words from "Critics of the Practical Mind", put also as a posthumous epitaph on Kant's gravestone: "Two things fill up the spirit with an always new and upgrowing admiration and awe, the more often and continuously reflection deals with them: the sky of stars over me and the moral law in me." And again there it is unambiguously pointed out that the viewpoint of the innumerable majority of worlds eliminates the significance of Man, as a being, that must give back to the planet Earth (an insignificant point in the universe) the matter out of which he was created, after the end of his short life.

An analysis of the problem of Kant's "anthropocentrism" is according to us principally important not only for that whether it (in spite of its allegation) does not perform some "ptolemaic counter-revolution". This problem bears a special significance not only for the adequate rationalisation of its conception of Man, of his place in the world and in the wholeness of the universe. Its clarification is immediately connected with something much more important, namely with the final directedness of Kant's philosophy, with the principal rationalisation of the dimensions of its humanism.

For us the final directedness of humanism in Kant's philosophy is not only "anthropocentric", just the opposite—it possesses a qualitatively new moment, put down for the first time in the history of philosophy clearly and unamibiguously. And this is the problem of the cosmical dimensions of philosophy, of its principal universality—a humanism directed not only towards man, but also towards every possible judicious being.

For Kant philosophy is a science of the relationship of cognition to the essential aims of the human mind, subjected in the end to one supreme aim—the realisation of Man as a purpose in itself. But here we must give a more precise definition. Nearly in all his works when speaking about Man he adds: "and all the other judicious beings", or "about all judicious beings with no difference". According to Kant if there must be one supremest principle exrpressed in a "categorical imperative", then it must have for its foundation in "the judicious nature that exists as a purpose in itself". And this must be a principle not only for the human progeny, but also for "any judicious nature at all". Such a principle possesses a universality, because it takes into account "all the judicious beings as a whole". Or said in other words, in the end it provcs that for Kant philosophy is a science of the relation of cognition to the supremest aim—the realisation as a purpose in itself of a very judicious being and not only of man.

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And as far as the thinker considers Man to be a final and "supremest goal" of the directedness of his philosophy, he makes this with the reservation that Man is the only being on Earth that has an intellect and from this point of view he can be used as a foundation and "a general starting point" of the philosophical analysis in this respect, because "out of all judicious beings we know him at best..."[3] And if for Kant man is some "model" of cognition of the "judicious being in general", then this is so only because of the still consistent lack of contacts with such beings. In this respect he speaks utmostly clearly that only because of the fact that we still do not know any other judicious beings except Man, we can on a general plan venture to make them conditionally rationalised as we are ourselves.

Out of all this we can clearly assume that Kant's philosophy is not only anthropocentric and "ptolemaic", but for the first time in history of thought it definitely puts the problem of the cosmical universality of humanism. Of course long before him some philosophers had also put forward the problem that the existence of other worlds with judicious beings in them was possible (e.g. Epicurus, Nikolai Kouzanski, Giordano Bruno, Leibnitz, etc.). But always in this respect Kant tries for the first time to elaborate a philosophy having a universal significance for all judicious beings in general.

The idea for an uncessant juxtaposing of man with other judicious beings, inhabiting other worlds, pierces nearly all the basic works of Kant. Something more—it is the essential basis of the final directedness of his thinking. Even in his famous "categorical imperative" ("Critics of the practical mind"), as a culmination of his moral philosophy (closing in essence the system), Kant stresses unambiguously the principle of his universal cosmical humanism, declaring: "Man, and in general any judicious being, exists as a purpose in itself, and not only as a means". Just because of this Man must always be considered as a purpose of all his deeds, directed both towards him himself and towards any other judicious beings in general. This is a universal humanist principle possessing doubtlessly actuality in our contemporaneity as well, when the scholars really speak of the eventual possibility to establish contacts with civilisations and other judicious beings in the outer worlds.

The universal cosmical humanism in Kant's philosophy is not an occasional product of his speculative reasonings. It is an immediate result of his nature-scientific exercises within the "up-to critical" period. And regardless of the fact that the thinker rejects later on the materialism of his earlier conceptions, this idea remains to sound as a leitmotif in his philosophy.

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3 Kant's Werke. Band I, Berlin, 1968, S. 355.

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The "Copernican" idea of the multitudeness of worlds inhabited by judicious creatures springs up in Kant as a direct consequence of his cosmogenic theory. It is especially clearly put out in his "General history of nature and theory of the sky" (1755), where he destroyingly criticises not only the "geocentristic", but also the "anthropocentristic" prejudice of his time. And if Engels utters that Kant's theory of the emergence of all now existing heavenly bodies from the circling of the nebulous masses is the greatest achievement of astronomy from Copernicus' time, making the first break-through in the metaphysical way of thinking, then we could with no less reason say that Kant makes the first serious headway forward in history of thought in the limitedness of metaphysicalness of the "anthropocentric" humanism.

In his "General history of nature and theory of the sky" Kant depicts an impressive image of the world edifice, in which nature, extravagant in the dialectics of its titanic activity, destroy's whole world and world systems, in order to engender new ones. In the endless power of its movement single living beings die, to give way to new ones to appear. And "Man himself, who looks like the crown of creation, is not an exception of this law". Because natural calamities sometimes wipe out whole nations from the face of Earth. Just because of this Man should not put into his head that the world had been created only on his behalf. Here Kant tells the anecdotic story of a certain joker from the Hague, who is well acquainted with the "general information about the world of science".

This anecdote tells us about the parasites inhabiting the head of a poor man, which imagined to live on some boundless globe being the centre of the universe and they themselves to be the crown of creation. On a certain occasion once the most intelligent of them saw the head of a nobleman inhabited with its likes. Then it went immediately to its fellow lice and let them know that they were not the only ones in nature and that there was another world too, inhabited with much more lice...

Kant tells this anecdote to put out that such a way of thinking does not quite differ from the human way of contemplation.

Because in this case the said parasites express very well the prejudices of most of the people if we admit that they could imagine that world would be fully thoughtless if they were not its centre and "focus of all aims of nature". In this respect "Man, who is as well boundlessly far away from the supreme degree of life, wishfully thinks of phancies of the like, referring to the necessity of his existence".[4]

4 Kant's Werke, Band I, S. 353.

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The sarcasm put down by Kant in making such a conclusion, clearly reveals his bellicosing "antigeocentrism" and "anti anthropocentrism". For him, still in the "up-to critical period" there is no doubt that "most of the planets are doubtlessly inhabitable, and the not inhabitable ones will be inhabited after a certain time" as a result of the dialectics of the movement of the matter in life. This is a deep internal convincingness that will go along with him up to the end of his life and will find its conceptual culmination in his universal cosmic humanism. But this convincingness does not ensue from his cosmogenical theory only, from his ideas of nature's dialectics, but has its foundation also upon definite materialistic views of Man's nature, which are immediately influenced by his contemporaneans—the French materialists of the XVIIIth century.

The materialistic conception of Man with Kant, in his "early" works of the "up-to critical period" represents an interest not only as a historico-philosophical fact in his intellectual biography, but contains also important aspects in clearing up his views about "judicious beings", inhabiting inhabitable worlds—views which though in another interpretation, will be invariably present also in his works of the "critical period".

In his materialistic conception Kant examines Man as a being wholly connected with and dependent on the material world that surrounds his and in which he lives. According to him there is no doubt that independently from the gap separating the thinking ability from the movement of the matter "Man acquires all his notions and ideas from the impressions which the universe provokes through his body in his soul".[5] His ability itself to think is fully dependent on the matter to which he is connected. The matter not only leaves its mark upon Man's senses, not only works as a middleman (in form of the human body), but is also necessary he to be able to think by means of his internal activity.

As Man ("the best known judicious being") is the result of the development of the matter and is immediately determined from it, it is logical, according to Kant, this principle to refer also to other "judicious beings", inhabiting other worlds. They should be such like the forms and qualities of the matter involved in their creation. It follows that "the substance, being the ingredient for the inhabitants of different planets, including the animals and plants on them, should generally be the lighter and thinner, the elasticity of their fibres and the adjacent structure of the body the more perfect, the farther away these planets are from the Sun".[6] It follows, Kant concludes, that the intellectual development of the other judicious

5 Kant's Werke, Band I, S. 355.
6 Kant's Werke, Band I, S. 358.

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beings is also determined by the qualities of the matter on their own planets with which they are necessarily connected. Thence the beings inhabiting heavenly bodies at the farthest distance from the Sun, are at a quite higher degree of development than those on planets at the nearest to our star. The more etherial and mobile matter, connecting the far away inhabitants, makes them "much more delightful and perfect than the others, because of their higher speed of ideas... clarity and liveliness of notions... and their ability to relate these notions among them", and they have also a greater "elasticity in performing activities...".

Because, for Kant, the degree of probability of this inter-dependence is so great, that it is "close to a full reliability", we can definitely build up some presumptions about the quality of the other judicious beings living on the planets within our Solar system and the Cosmos. And based upon a hypothetical balance the end result should be relatively soothing for the human spirit. Because if one takes into consideration the middle position of Earth in respect of its distance from the Sun, compared with the other planets, then "the human nature ... sees itself between two extreme limits of perfection from which it is equally remote". And if our idea of the "most deserving classes of judicious beings", living on the far away planets in the Solar system may wake up a feeling of jealousy and inferiority, then our view towards the more inferior degrees must calm us and must return up to some extent our self-opinion and must soothe us.

Such a view of Kant's does show us in the end how far he is from the traditional notions of "anthropocentrism" of his time and how insistently he opposes such prejudices, declaring that from such a point of view we can see "thinking creatures", for which some Greenlandian or Hottentot would look like Newton, and on the other hand — creatures that would look at Newton with such an astonishment with which we look at an ape."[7] And along with this Kant stresses that independently from the middle status in which Man is in dependence on the place of Earth in the Solar system, before him "the way is open towards achieving the bliss of glory", and this way depends only on him, on his endeavours and efforts to develop his natural gifts and abilities as a judicious being.

Independently from a certain naivity from the point of view of modern science, still in these notions of Kant's from his "up-to critical period" we see the clear setting of an important task for mankind, i.e. to make known Man himself, but not as some solidified creature, eternally equal to himself, but as a being in development that can and must create its future. And this is clearly seen in the thought that if we remain only on the viewpoint of a mechanis-

7 Kant's Werke, Band I, S. 360.

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tico-materialistical examination of Man, he would be "the most contemptible of all creatures". For Kant the surmounting of this viewpoint could be achieved only on the basis of a convincement that Man has "a hope for the future", because "the powers included in him have a full development in store before them".[8] This is a leitmotif that will be unfolded later on in the "critical works of the thinker in connection with his conception about the progressive development of Man in history. For Kant from this period the task of philosophy is not only to investigate what nature makes of Man, but also what he as a free acting creature must do with himself with the development of his society.

Kant's ideas of the cosmical universality of humanism and the progressive development of Man in his history find their place as one of the theoretic sources of marxism. Not occasionally one of the basic themes in Marx's scientific analyses is the progressive development of Man in history in direction of building up of such a society, in which every man will find the reason of his life in the free development of all his powers and abilities as a self-purpose. In this respect Engels stresses, that marxists are proud to have led back their origin not only to Saint Simon, Fourie and Owen, but also to Kant, Fichte and Hegel.

8 Kant's Werke, Band I, S. 356.

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X

Reason Sexist ?

Joseph W. Smith

1. THE CRITICISM

The feminist movement[1] is important for the challenges which it has made to receive scientific theorizing. for feminist thinkers have an acute cognitive sense of smell which has enabled them to accurately detect ideologies[2]. This sense is not however infallible. In this essay I shall review some major feminist theorists' attitudes towards. and critiques of, critical rationality, principally in philosophy[3]. These feminist theorists propose that reason is sexist, and

1 It is a non-trivial task to define 'feminism'. J. R. Richards in *The Sceptical Feminist*, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1983) defines feminism as a belief that society has *unjustly* treated women. But as John Charvet in *Feminism*, (J. M. Dent and Sons, London, 1982) points out (p. 146), someone who believes that justice requires that women should remain in the domestic sphere would be a feminist on this account. The basic idea of feminism is the social equality of women with men. Women should be treated equally with men because of the moral necessity of giving common respect to all rational agents. cf. C. McMillan, *Women, Reason and Nature: Some Philosophical Problems with Feminism*, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982), p. ix.

2 cf. R. Hubbard, M. S. Henifin and B. Fried (eds), *Women Looking at Biology Looking at Women*, (Schenkman Publishing Co., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1979).

3 For some recent works on feminist philosophy cf. M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. A. Elliston and J. English (eds), *Feminism and Philosophy* (Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa. New Jersey. 1977); J A. Sherman and E. T. Beck (eds), *The Prism of Sex* (University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin. 1979); N O Keohane, M. Z. Rosaldo and B. C. Gelpi (eds), *Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology*, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982; M. Midgley and J. Hughes, *Women's Choices: Philosophical Problems Facing Feminism*, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1983).

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practices such as philosophy are drastically in need of a major conceptual overhaul.

I would like to begin my discussion by distinguishing the target position from some earlier feminist criticism of rationality. But before doing so it is necessary to respond to an objection which may be made. The direction may be stated as follows. People may be sexist insofar as they unjustifiably discriminate on the basis of sex, but science and reason itself cannot be sexist. How, it may be asked, can the inference 'x is square, therefore x is not round' be in any way related to matters of human sexuality ? The claim that reason is sexist would seem to commit a category mistake, ascribing a property to an object which it could not meaningfully be said to have. In reply to this objection it can be argued that the view of science and logic which it presupposes is questionable. It is presupposed that science and logic have no metaphysical and evaluative commitments, and this I have argued elsewhere is incorrect.[4] The evaluativa ladenness of logical statements could obviously not be such that the statement 'x is square, therefore x is not round' is sexist, but it would more plausibly be along the following lines : (1) the standards of logical correctness have built-in sexist or (2) the methods of critical discussion have sexist biases. We will review one such argument along the lines of (2) below. Here I note that the question 'is reason sexist?' is by no means conceptually absurd.[5]

There is something resembling a cult of unreason in feminism that runs like a subterranean stream, occasionally bursting to the surface with violence.[6] Germaine Greer for example has said :

> The rules of logical discourse are no more relevant that the Marquess of Queensbury's are to a pub brawl. Female hard-headedness rejects the misguided masculine notion that man are rational animals. Male logic can only deal with simple issues: women...are more aware of complexity.[7]

Whilst these remarks are vague, Greer does not fail to give one the impression that reason, "male logic", can be of little use to the practical feminist. Other feminists, as Richards points out,[8] see theories and arguments as merely ways of expressing their gender experience. Reason according to this view is just a way of experiencing the

4 J. W Smith, *Reductionism and Cultural Being*. (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1984). On the metaphysical presuppositions of logic cf. R. Routley. *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, (Australian National University, Canberra, 1980).

5 cf. also M. Ruse, "Is Science Sexist? The Case of Sociobiology", in his *Is Science Sexist* ? (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981), pp. 219-244

6 cf. Richards, op. cit. note 1, chapter 1 for a less concise discussion.

7 G. Greer, *The Female Eunuch*, (Paladin, Herts, 1971), pp. 108 109.

8 Richards, op. cit. note 1. p. 33.

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world, ourselves and others and it by no means supplies universal standards of judgement and criticism. Still other feminists may accept that reason supplies universal standards of jugement and criticism, but feel that men have monopolized conceptual weapons and used them as a tool for oppression of women. They conclude on this basis that reason is bad in itself, and that a more intuitive or mystical approach to the understanding of life and the world must be adopted.

There are a number of responses which could be made to the feminist criticisms of reason. One general criticism can be made of all of these arguments, as McMillan has recognized.[9] This is that the feminists are sharing with their antagonists a problematic distinction between women as emotional, and men as rational and that reason and emotion are the sorts of things that can be compared and preferred. On to be rational is to experience the triumph of reason over emotion; to live an emotional life is to be open to inclinations, to be spontaneous and free. Traditional sexist writers with rationalist inclinations have claimed that reason is intrinsically superior to emotion, and since men have a greater capacity for reasoning and women excel at loving-kindness, men are therefore intrinsically superior to women. This tradition has been faced with the embarrassing difficulty, that the faculty of reason has also been taken as that which distinguishes human beings from animals. Woman thus could be viewed as merely a human-like animal, yet strangely enough, an animal capable of loving and nurturing *real* human beings. The feminists who are attracted to the cult of unreason characterized above, merely invert the rationalistic sexists' position. They claim, either explicitly or implicitly, that women are superior beings to men, even though women are oppressed by men. This is because women are more emotional and open to compassion than men, and emotion is superior to reason.

Even if we grant that women as a group are more emotional than men as a group and men as a group are more rational than women as a group (and ignoring the difficult statistical problems which would arise in testing such a vague claim), little philosophical interest would adhere to such a claim. It is the additional thesis, that reason is superior to emotion or emotion superior to reason that generates this problem. There is little reason for accepting this thesis. The notion of "superiority" is very obscure. If we attempt to explicate this notion by means of the notion of *preferability*, then by virtually any account of preferability neither thesis can be accepted. Conceptually cashing out the meaning of the term 'preferability' by means of 'rational choice' trivializes the question for it is obviously a *rational* choice to be rational. But if we say on the

9 McMillan, op. cit. note 1, chapters 1 and 2.

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other hand that 'preferability' means 'that which satisfies the greatest number of human interests in a given circumstance', then in some circumstances reason is "superior" to emotion and in other circumstances emotion is "superior" to reason. Therefore the claims that reason is *generally* superior to emotion, and emotion *generally* superior to reason, are false.

In any case it is an unjustified thesis to propose the reason and emotion are *necessarily* in conflict and are the sorts of things that are capable of being exclusively preferred. That conflicts occur is undeniably true, but it is also true that the same person attempts to resolve the conflict as soon as possible by solving the problem of life which generated the conflict. If this cannot be done, suffering usually occurs. If reason was "superior" to emotion or emotion "superior" to reason, any conflict between reason and emotion could be easily resolved by following the dictates of that which is "superior". That we agonize so acutely when conflicts occur between reason and emotion, strongly indicates that reason and emotion do not stand in any master-slave relationship (as even "great" philosophers such as David Hume thought), but are two important components of a flourishing human personality. To be a person, rather than merely an organism that reasons, one must have an emotional life; together they from an organic unity.

The feminist critique of reason which we have just considered is very vague and basically sexist itself. There are however more sophisticated arguments, worthy of more extensive treatment.

2. THE ADVERSARY PARADIGM

Janice Moulton[10] has criticized a paradigm in philosophy which she calls the adversary paradigm. As she characterizes this paradigm, all philosophical reasoning is, or ought to be, deductive. Philosophical research consists in the presentation of counter-examples to general philosophical claims. Philosophy on the adversary paradigm is a debate between adversaries who advance general claims and try to defend these claims against counter-examples. It is believed that this method is the best way of subjecting general philosophical claims to the most rigorous and searching criticism possible. A Darwinian method of argument is often advanced in justification of the adversary method. A theory or general philosophical claim which does not survive criticism is not fit to survive. But claims which survive criticism may be held until refuted by future counter-examples. Moulton believes that the adversary paradigm is inherently aggressive and individualistic, and further, is open to a series of logical objections.

10 J. Moulton, "A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method", in S. Harding and M. B. Hintikka (eds), *Discovering Reality*, (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983), pp. 149-164.

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First, the adversary paradigm is said by Moulton to work well in the consideration of particular arguments, but not so well in considering interrelated systems of ideas. If we are to take each claim one at a time then a provisional acceptance must be made of some premises for the sake of argument. Whilst these premises may in due course be questioned, "we would have to provisionally accept most of the ideas we disagree with most of the time. Such a method can distort the presentation of an opponent's position, and produce an artificially slow development of thought".[11]

Second, the adversary paradigm requires us to withhold evaluation of a system of ideas until we can find a common ground for debate. Further, "the adversarial criticism of some arguments may merely strengthen support for other ideas in the system, or inspire makeshift revisions and adjustments".[12]

Third, the adversary paradigm allows exception from criticism of programmatic claims in philosophy, that is, claims that are not fully worked out. Counter-examples cannot refute these claims because any counter-examples will be taken as merely research problems yet to be solved. In fact Moulton believes that this is in itself not an intrinsically bad thing; philosophy should become more concerned with the relationship between reason and larger systems of ideas, such as philosophical systems and scientific theories. In doing so it will accept other methods of evaluating, reasoning about and doing philosophy.

Moulton's objections to the adversary method are in my opinion reactionary and it is against the interests of feminists to accept them. I began this essay by pointing out that feminist literature is important precisely because of its challenge to receive theoretical opinion. To do this it is necessary to adopt the adversary method if one really does want to establish that some particular claim is false. Feminist critics of sociobiology for example,[13] have not been content with educating ignorant and unenlightened sociobiologists, but have strived to criticize the many sociobiological theories of human sexuality because they are both false and sexist. This is ideologically important because the uncommitted may become committed on the basis of such arguments. The adversary method is a tool which the feminist can use for this purpose. If men have used reason as a weapon of oppression, then women can in return use reason as a path of mutual emancipation, by debunking pseudo-science, exposing ideology, and giving reasons for political action.

In fact it is Moulton's own unsubstantiated opinion that the adversary method is opposed to systematic philosophy. As I have

11 Ibid., p. 154.
12 Ibid., p. 155.
13 cf. Hubbard (et al), op. cit. note 2.

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seen the matter in my books *Reductionism and Cultural Being, The Progress and Rationality of Philosophy* and *Essays on Ultimate Questions*, adversial methods are important to the system builder because there are *competing systems* and if one is to make a rational choice between such systems, criticism is necessary. The adversary method allows such criticism to be possible. Indeed Moulton herself *criticizes* the adversary method by arguments, so her paper is self-refuting. Thus she is inconsistent: she too is within the scope of the adversary paradigm and has given no serious challenge to this position.

It may be thought that the criticism of whole systems of ideas or philosophical paradigms is impossible because some common ground for debate is needed. Now whilst this is true in general, it is false in particular. The feminist and her antagonist may disagree in matters of public policy and sociology, but not necessarily about the standards of a good argument. Debates in the philosophy of logic may exist about the nature of such standards, but they are not usually of relevance to matters of public policy for example. Such systems of ideas can be criticized by means of the organons of reasons of a theory of rationality. For example, a system of ideas may be demonstrated to be contradictory, and hence false. This is a common method of criticism employed by feminists against their intellectual antagonists. Whilst an opponent may be led to revise his ideas, this is not necessarily a bad thing as Moulton believes. It shows a conceptual victory, the success of the argument. To regard this as a bad thing is an unintelligible attitude and an attitude which is not in the interests of feminists to accept.

3. CONCLUSION : FEMINISM AND REASON

In this essay I have examined and criticized a problematic and undesirable current in feminist thought : the distrust of reason and critical rationality. This orientation is based upon distinctions which are accepted by the antagonists of feminism, and which the sceptical feminist need by no means accept. Even the more sophisticated arguments of Janice Moulton are subject to these difficulties. Her attack on what is a paradigm of "being rational" in philosophy, the "adversary method", is severely mistaken and ultimately self-refuting. It will do feminist theory nothing but harm to be sceptical about reason. Rather, feminists should strive to be more rational, argue more clearly and produce work which lacks the dogma, narrowness and pettiness of an alarming proportion of feminist writing. To do so would be to engage in a truly emancipatory theoretical practice, rather than engaging in a practice which undermines the credibility and respectability of feminism as a cognitive enterprise.

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XI

Concerning the "Non-Technological" Methodology of Science

Dimiter Ginev

Which are the ideological functions of the methodology of science ? For many contemporary philosophers this is a meaningless question. Since Karl Mannheim the natural sciences are regarded as ideologically irrelevant. "It is true—writes Mannheim—of this type of knowledge (natural sciences, mathematics and logic—D. G.) that its genesis does not enter into the results of thought (4, p. 263). On the other hand, since Wittgenstein the philosophy of sciencs is conceived not as an autonom body of doctrine but an activity, which "aims at the logical clarification of thoughts". (11, 4.112) As a consequence, the methodological conceptions and models related to the natural and formal sciences should be treated only as tools for logical analysis of pure theoretical constructions. Now it seems that this view is accepted with respect to the methodology of all branches of science, including social discipline and humanities. The conceptions and models in question are systems of standards for rational scientific behaviour, or "codes of scientific honesty" (Lakatos). Among the most discussed standards one can mention the search for maximum explanatory power, the elimination of *ad hoc* hypotheses, the simplicity of scientific theories, the prediction of maximum new facts in the domain of investigation, the achievement of high degree of coherence between mathematical formalism and conceptual apparatus, the concurrence of new scientific theories to the commonly accepted style of scientific thinking and so on.

The attitude towars the methodology of science which excludes its deological functions and recognizes it only as an instrument for

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more effective scientific activity will be qualified here as a "technological" one. This qualification is valid regardless of the interpretation of scientific truth (correspondent or coherent theory) or of the epistemological status of theoretical constructions (realistic or instrumentalistic position). The predicate "technological" doesn't concern also the principal orientation (logical or historical one) of the methodological conceptions. Logicism and historicism are alternatives one another with respect to way of evaluation of scientific knowledge — they provide alternative answers to the questions whether there are universally valid and historically invariant standards by means of which science may be analyzed and whether the reconstruction of scientific knowledge can be accomplished solely by reference to the formal structure of the theories and the relevant evidence available at a given time. (cf. 1) But both logicists and historicists agree in rejection of any non reconstructive (in particular ideological) function of methodology.

The "technological" attitude has its own historical cultural which should be taken into account in order a "non-technological" alternative to be formulated. The existing ("technological") methodological conceptions and models are built up through a reflection upon the typological characteristics of the traditional scientific theories. By the notion "traditional scientific theories" I mean such structural unities as classical theory of gravitation, statistical equilibrium thermodynamics, classical and relativist particle mechanics, theory of electrolite dissociation, ensime kinetics, classical genetics and so on, which are dominating in the scientific knowledge since the end of XVIIIth century. The main typological characteristics of these theories are the following:

1. They are models for explanation of certain classes of empirical data and for prediction of new facts. There is a logical symmetry between the explanation and prediction.

2. The fundamental equations are covariant, i.e. the mathematical formalism of each traditional theory is invariant with respect to all phenomena of the research area which for this reason could be interpreted as homogeneous one.

3. Each traditional theory has on the one hand a domain of validity or a "set of intended applications" (Stegmuller) where the theoretical postulates are verified and confirmed and on the other hand a potential domain of invalidity where the theory might be falsified.

4. The functions of the traditioual theories are only cognitive. They can not provide a value interpretation or principles for projective transformations of their research objects. Besides they investigate these objects only in abstract (mathematical) space and time.

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Each one of the existing ("technological") methodological conceptions and models takes one or more of these characteristics as a base for the formulation of the standards for rational scientific activity. Let me give some examples.

The methodology of logical positivism emphazises on the meaning of the invariant domain of validity (the verification and confirmation of the theory, the reduction of the theoretical terms to the observational language, etc.). "Since the meaning of every statement of science must be statable by reduction to a statement about the given, likewise the meaning of any concept, whatever branch of science it may belong to, must be statable by step-wise reduction to other concepts, down to the concepts of the lowest level which refer directly to the given". (7, p 11).

The methodological principles of Sneed Stegmuller's structuralist model are based on the peculiarities of the mathematical formalism of the traditional theories So Stegmuller writes that "we can identify the fundamental structure (i.e. mathematical structure— D G.) with the totality of those entities which satisfy it, i.e. with the *set M of models* of the axiomatized theory." (8, p. 153).

The different variants of falsificationism (including the methodology of scientific research programmes) are constructed through a reflection on the potential domain of invalidity, i.e. the domain which contain all facts which contradict of a theory and which could be obtained as results of severe tests. "Yet it is not the marvellous deductive unfolding of the system which makes a theory rational or empirical — writes Popper — but the fact that we can examine it critically; that is to say, subject it to attempted refutations, including observational tests ..." (6. p. 221).

Hempel-Oppenheim's D N model of explanation is based on the confinement of the theoretical functions only to the cognitive ones and on the symmetry of explanation and prediction. "It may be said, that an explanation of particular event is not fully adequate unless its explainations (the statements of antecedent conditions plus the general postulates of the theory — D. G.), if taken account of in time, could have served as a basis for predicting the event in question." (3. p. 249).

Refering only to the epistemological status quo of traditional science, the existing methodologies serve only as a canon for a preservation of the traditional science but not as an organon for a creation of new (non-traditional) forms of scientific rationality. In this connection one can introduce the notion of a "methodological technologism" as opposed to the methodology aimed at the epistemological change of science in accordance with the actual requirements of the social practice. But the methodological technologism has

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implicit ideological functions as well. Let me consider them schematically.

The traditional science could be regarded as a classical bourgeois phenomenon or more precisely, the origin of traditional science is determined by a capitalistic social practice. There are many reductionistic attempts at a historical explanation of this form of determination. E.g., the interpretation of the genesis of traditional science as a direct response to the needs of industrial revolution (B. Hessen); the revealing of the spirit of traditional science as an implication of protestantism because the Calvinistic ideology "was hoped from the empirical knowledge of the divine laws of nature to ascend to a grasp of the essence of the world ..." (9, p. 58); the reduction of the origin of "Galilean science" only to the changes in the manner of thought (E. Husserl, A. Koyre) and so on. Being away from these reductionistic attempts and realizing the complexity of the relationships between the origin of traditional science and the specifity of premonopolistic society I want only to point out an interesting conflict. From marxist point of view the rise of traditional science is during the period of real manufactures (*die eigentliche Manufakturperiode*). But at this time the applicability of scientific results in material practice has been accidental. For this reason the traditional science of XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries could be regarded as an autonom intellectual system whose perspective of development are determined predominantly by the "internal logic" of science. This autonomy is the necessary historical condition for the formation of the above mentioned principal typological characteristics of the traditional science. However, the theories based on these characteristics are relavant only to a very restricted class of research objects.

The transition from the period of real manufactures to the period of great industry (die grosse Industries) is crucial for the social existence of science. The essence of its new social functions connected with the process of material productivity are most precisely defined by Marx who writes in '*Das Kapital*':

"Der Gesamtprocess wird hier (in der maschinenartigen Produktion — D. G.) objektiv, an und fur sich betrachtet, in seine konstituierenden Phasen analysiert, und das Problem, jeden Teilprozess zu verbinden, durch technische Anwendung der Mechanik, Chemie usw. gelbst, wobei naturlich nach wie vor die theoretische Konzeption durch gehaufte praktische Erfahrung auf grosser Stufenleiter vervollkommnet werden muss." (5, S. 401).

The new social role requires an extension of the spectrum of research objects. But the typological characteristics of traditional science prohibit such an extension. The conflict between the requirements of social practice and the restricted possibilities of science

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begins in the midd . of the XIX'h century. In this conflict one can see the "tacit" ideological functions of the existing methodologies. The "canonization" of traditional science accomplished by them and the prohibition of non-traditional theories is a form of social conservatism, as far as in this way they don't act on behalf of the revolutionary social practice.

An abstract reaction towards the narrow-mindedness of the existing methodological conceptions is represented by P. Feyerabend's "epistemological anarchism. But his criticism is only a negative programme confined to the assertion that "there is no guarantee that the known forms of rationality will succeed and that the known forms of irrationality will fail. *Any* procedure, however rediculous, may lead to progress, *any* procedure however sound and and rational, may get us stuck in the mud" (2, p.368, footnote 1). The epistemological anarchism doesn't offer a constructive programme and couldn't be treated as a really critical, i,e. "non-technological" methodological conception. The principle "anything goes" is not a claim for new non-traditional scientific theories but serves only as a premise for "relaxation" of the methodological normativeness. Considered from ideological viewpoint the epistemological anarchism is a special kind of bourgeois liberalism.

Let me now turn to the clarification of the functions which a genuine "non-technological" methodology of science ought fulfill. In accordance with the considerations being discussed so far these fnnctions should be in two respects: critical and projective. The first one means the implementation of a critical methodological analysis of the scope of validity of the traditional science. The result of this analysis will be the outline of the problems demanding for their solutions the scientific grasp of new research objects and resp. the building of new types of theories. As far as these prob ems have been emerged from the actual social practice, a preliminary interpretation of this practice is necessary. Thereby the categorial context for the carrying out of the critical analysis in question would be provided. From Marxist point of view the theoretical system of this interpretation is the historical materialism.

The projective function consists of construction certain projects for different types of non.traditional theories. In conclusion I shall enlist the chief types of such theories. All of them contradict one or more characteristics of the traditional scientific theories.

1. Nomologically assymetric with respect to the time theories, i.e. theories whose fundamental equations are not temporally covariant. The building of such theories shall allow the investigation of research objects not in abstract time when "the correlations between events depe d o ly on the time intervals between those events

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and do not depend on the time when the first of them takes place..." (10, p. 3') but in real historical time.

2. Theories which haven't extensionally closed set of paradigmatic intended applications.

3. Theories with "value potential", i.e. theories which beside explanation and prediction of new facts in research domain give value interpretation of the objects being investigated.

4. "Multi plans" theories. i.e. theories which are built up in such a manner that an investigation of research objects in different plans is allowed. Examples of these plans are: synchronic and diachronic analysis; functional investigation and historical-genetic reconstruction: macro— and microhistorical reconstuction etc.

5. "Theories of artificial", i e theories whose objects are the natural things but objects which must be constructed.

It is obvious that these types of non-traditional theories are inerrelated on various parameters. There are many attempts at building of such theories, carried out in different disciplines. But that is another topics.

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XII

Austin to Advatia

N. Malla

In this short note, I wish to point out that Professor R. C. Gandhi, in his attempt to mystify both Austin and Advaita has sacrificed all the norms of logic and has fallen an easy prey to myth-making,

For the sake of convenience, I will state the theses of Prof. R.C. Gandhi one by one and offer my own comments on it.

1. Ritual performance lies at the heart of all language

According to Prof. Gandhi, Austin has failed to take note of a very elementary and basic fact about language. It is the ritual performance. We invariably perform a ritual in using language. Per forming ritual is one kind of saying. This ritual saying preceeds all kinds of acts i.e. locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. So, *saying* preceeds doing. Even, Austin's illocutionary speech act, i.e. doing something in saying something is preceeded by this ritual performance. "I-am-that-I-am", is such a ritual-saying. This saying in a way, preceeds all sorts of speaking. Even the mumbled linguistic emissions made in drunkenness do not fall outside the Ken of such ritual performance. Gandhi maintains "In communication we first seek the kingdom of Atman-Brahman and secure it and all Vyavaharika meanings become available to us (P. 155). This is how Gandhi discovers Advaita in speech acts.

My comments on the Advaitic thesis of Gandhi are as follows : He fails to make any distinction between fact and fiction. The author makes on a priori assumption that linguistic communication is based on a ritual performance which means I am Brahman. This does not happen as a matter of fact. The author's love for Advaita blinds him to sacrifice obvious facts about linguistic communication. Again, I wish to point out that the thesis cannot be accepted as a

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point of logic. The concepts of speech act and linguistic communication do not contain the idea of 'I-am that I am". Instead of arguing out that the stage of stillness (sthita pr jna) lies at the root of all linguistic communication, the author simply asserts it.

2. Linguistic communicative capacity is an unmistakable sign of godl keness

The author maintains, "speaking and listening are the spanda of Siva, Atmabodha illumined self consciousness" (P 158). I wish to make the following comments in this connection. It is true as a matter of fact that human beings use language. The use of language might have put human beings in certain advantageous position over other non-language using animals. To say this is to state a fact about human beings. But the author on the basis of this fact treats man as a god. I wish to point out that the author without giving arguments glorifies man. One can very well say that man is a devil because by use of language he tells lies and plays tricks. From the fact that man is a language — using animal the author concludes that he (man) is god like. I wish to point out that this derivation is illegitimate.

3. Use of language establishes the causal independence not only of the speaker but of the hearer too.

Gandhi maintains that use of language is indicative of man's freedom without giving any argument. How does he substantiate his view that in using language man declares his freedom ? Gandhi has no answer. One possible answer that could be given on his behalf is this : Use of language, is in a way instinctive. As nobody compells a man to feel hungry, similarly nobody compells anybody to use language though on certain occasions we may force somebody to speak something. This is linguistically odd to say that I am a free individual because nobody compells me to feel hungry. I feel hungry on my own only. Similarly, it is odd to say that man is a free creature because the uses language on his own. Gandhi seeks to mystify everything including use of language.

Gandhi again maintains that in speaking, the speaker not only establishes his causal independence but also of others. Not only the speakers are causally free but also the hearers. But on what basis does Gandhi say this ? Has he got any arguments or evidences to offer ? Emphatically no. Instead of giving arguments. Gandhi falls back on mythology. He argues in the following manner. Vinayak (a god in Hindu pantheon) is imaged massively but he has a little mouse to ride Vinayak is massive but is causally uncoercive for the simple reason that he has a very small rat to ride. I wish to point out that a mythical symbol is a free structure. Any number of interpretations can be made out of it. One can very well say that

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Vinayak is causally coercive because he rides a small rat and the latter is very harmful, ipso facto. Vinayak is coercive, Gandhi in order to mystify speech and communication ultimately falls back on myths and there he fails miserably.

4. In using language we proclaim our victory and declare our renunciation

Gandhi claims that in using language we declare our freedom and renounce our agency. He goes a step further and discovers Bhakti and Nishkama Karma of Geeta in communication. He even discovers Advaita in communication. I wish to point out that Gandhi here also tries to mystify communication and speech. He forgets the obvious fact that as a matrer of fact we use language for various purposes, can the author deny that sometimes language is also used to manipulate others ? Is he prescribing that one should not use language to manipulate others ? In fact, Gandhi is not clear whether he is describing uses of language or prescribing a particular use of it. He seems to be blowing hot and cold in the same breath. Gandhi treats communication very sacred. But what for ? Is it the case that anything and everything can be treated as sacred or profane depending on one's sweet will ?

5. The world speaks to us Advaita

The author attempts to give a communicative interpretation of Kant. He maintains that the world does not impose itself on us. It simply occasions experience on us. From this the author concludes that the world speaks Advaita to us. This Advaita-mania of the author makes him see Advaita everywhere. He treats communication as many-centredness of self-consciousness. But how does he say so ? Has he any *argument* in support of this thesis ? Possibly no. To sum up : If one does not make any difference between philosophy and myth—making then one can discover Advaita everywhere.

"What We Do and Say In Saying and Doing something". R C. Gandhi *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XI No. 2, April 1984 p. 145 160.

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Books-Reviews :

David Edward Shaner : *The Bodymind Experience in Japanese Buddhism.* A Phenomenological Perspective of Kukai and Dogen, pp. 250. State University of New York Press, Albany, U. S. A. (1985).

This is one of the best books on Body-Mind Awareness aspect of Japanese Buddhism. The whole book is divided into seven chapters, besides Preface, Notes, Glossary, Bibliography, Index and Acknowledgments. The chapters are as follows: 1. Phenomenological and Comparative Philosophy. 2. A Phenomenological Description of Bodymind, which is sub-divided into : 1. Phenomenology as the study of Essences, 2. The Phenomenological Description of Body Mind Experience, 3. The Essential Bodymind quality in All Experience a. First Order Bodymind Awareness (1) Bodymind awareness as the condition for noetic and noematic relations (2) Bodymind awareness as the dynamic quality of all experience (3) Bodymind awareness as the condition for the spatio-temporal character of experience b. Second Order Bodymind awareness c. Third Order Bodymind Awareness: Chapter 3. KUKAI : A Descriptive Philosophy subdivided into : 1. Introductory Back ground 2, The Prescriptive and Speculative Aspects of Kukai's Metaphysics, The Secret and Mystic Aspects of Enlightenment a. Exoteric and Esoteric Buddhist Philosophy, b. Hosshin Seppo, c. Sanmitsu, d. Sokushin Jobutsu, e. Hongaku; 3. Kukai's Metaphysics and philosophy of Enlightenment : A Descriptive Account, a. Phenomenalism and Reflexive, Phenomenological Methodology; b. Exoteric and Esoteric Thinking : Modes of Experience and Pathway to Enlightenment (1) The Vehicles for First Order Bodymind Awareness (a) Mantras (b) Mandalas (c) Mudras: Chapter 4 : First Order Bodymind Awareness as Enlightenment: 1, The Neutralization of Theistic Positings 2. The Expanded Periphery and Experience of the Horizon in toto 3, Dynamism and Simultaneity, 4. Sedimentation and Bodymind Awareness and 5. Kukai's Description of Paradigmatic Modes of Experience, and A Summary.

Chapters 5 and 6 deal with Dogen. Dogen : A Descriptive Philosophy, 1. Introductory Background 2. Dissolving the Rift between Theory and Practice a, Hongaku, b. Shinjin datsuraku, Shuusho ichinyo, d. Sokushin zebutsu, and e. Hosshin Saeppo. 3. The Descriptive Project of Shobogenzo : a. Genjokoan b. Shinjingakudo, c. Uji, d. Kaiinzanmai. Chapter 6. Dogen : First Order Bodymind Awareness as Enlightenment, 1. The technique of cultivating Zazen

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Awareness 2. Hishiryo and Theistic Neutralization 3. The Expanded Periphery, Horizon in toto and Zazen Awareness 4. Dynamism and Zazen Awareness 5. Simultaneity and Zazen Awareness 6. Sedimentation and First Order Bodymind Awareness.

Chapter 7. Phenomenology and Japanese Buddhist Philosophy divided into : 1. An Appraisal of our Method, 2. The Relation between Philosophy and Culture Revisited, 3. Phenomenology and Japanese Philosophy.

In the end very useful Notes, Glossary, Bibliography and Index have been provided to make this volume a complete book on the Bodymind Experience in Japanese Buddhism—A Phenomenological Study of Kukai and Dogen.

The author deserves congratulations on bringing such an encyclopaedic volume based on the Bodymind Experience in Japanese Buddhism according to A phenomenological Study of Kukai and Dogen.

Kenneth W. Morgan (Editor) : *The Path of the Buddha.* Buddhism Interpreted by Buddhists, pp 432, Motilal Banarsidass, Publishers, Delhi. Varanasi, Patna and Madras, Price Rs. 125/- (Indian Reprint, 1986).

This book is a very scholarly contribution consisting of articles by eleven internationally known Buddhist scholars who include : Bhikshu Jagdish Kashyap, Hony. Director, Nalanda Pali Postgraduate Institute, Nalanda and also at the Banaras Hindu University, Maha Thera U. Thirtila, Lecturer in Buddhist Philosophy, University of Rangoon, Burma. The Venerable Balangoda Ananda Maitreya, Chief Nayaka Theo of the Sudhamma Sect. Balangoda, Ceylon, Susumu Yamaguchi, President and Professor of Mahayana Buddhism, Otani University, Kyoto, Japan, Zenryu Tsukamoto, President of the Institute of Humanistic Studies and Director of Research in Religion, University of Kyoto, Japan, Lobsang Phuntsok Lhalimgpa, Official of the Tibetan Government, Kalimpong, India, Shinsho Hanayama, Professor of Indian Philosophy, University of Tokyo, Japan. Mitsuyuki Ishida, Professor of Buddhist Philosophy, Ryukoku University, Kyoto, Japan, Reiho Masunaga, Professor of Buddhist Philosophy and Zen Buddhism, Komazawa University, Tokyo, Japan, Shobun Kubota, President of Sociology, Rissho University, Tokyo Japan and Hajima Nakamura, Professor of Indian Philosophy, University of Tokyo, Japan.

The eight articles contributed by eleven Buddhist scholars have very well been edited by Kenneth W. Morgan, University Chaplain and Professor of Religion, Colgate University U.S.A.

The present book presents Buddhism from the Buddhist point of view. It is quite an earnest attempt on the part of eleven devout

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scholars of Buddhism describing the beliefs and practices of the Buddhist world twenty five centuries after the Buddha. The contributions of the eleven scholars are as follows : 1. Bhikshu Jagdish Kashyap : Origin and Expansion of Buddhism; 2. Mahathera U. Thirtila : The fundamental Principles of Theravada Buddhism; The Venerable Balangoda Ananda Maitreya: Buddhism in Theravada Countries: Susum Yamaguchi: Development of Mahayana Buddhist Beliefs; Zenryu Tsukamoto: Buddhism in China and Korea; Lobsang Phuntsok Lhalungpa: Buddhism in Tibet; Shinsho Hanayama: Shinsho Hanayama, Mitsuyuki Ishia, Reiho Masunaga and Shobun Kubota have contributed towards Buddhism in Japan; and Hajime Nakamura: Unity and Diversity in Buddhism.

These eleven article have given us good insight into the different aspects of Buddhism. They are : The origin and expansion of Buddhism, Fundamental Principles of Theravada Buddhism, Buddhism in Theravada Countries, Development of Mahayana Buddhist Beliefs, Buddhism in China and Korea, Buddhism in Tibet, Buddhism in Japan, and lastly Unity and Diversity in Buddhism.

In the end quite an exhaustive Bibliography-Translation of Buddhist Writings has been provided along with very important Glossary of the Buddhist terms and in the last Index has been provided.

This is one of the recent best books on Buddhism and its different contributors have fulfilled great demand for such a nice book written on the various aspects of Buddhism.

The editor Kenneth W. Morgan has very ably edited this book 'The Path of the Buddha' and we appreciate the efforts of Motilal Banarsidass in bringing out such a nice volume on Buddhism.

Donald H. Bishop (Editor) : *Chinese Thought — An Introduction* pp. 484, Motilal Banarsidass, Publishers, Delhi, Varanasi, Patna and Madras, First Edition (1985) Price Rs. 175.00.

Dr. Donald H. Bishop is a Professor of Philosophy at Washington State University. He has contributed a large number of articles over one hundred to scholarly and popular journals along with two volumes dealing with Buddhist leaders of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

This book is a very scholarly contribution to the Chinese Philosophy. This one book covers various main streams such as Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism, Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism. Their flow has been sustained by numerous philosophers — Confucius, Lao Tzu, Mo Tzu, Mencius, Hsun Tzu, Han Fei, Chou Tun-i, Chu Hsi, Wang Yang-ming and K'ang Yuwei and others. This book deals

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with the basic views of those philosophers and their influence on Chinese history and culture. The present volume is a co-opera ive venture of Indian and Chinese scholars who include: Jeff Barlow, S. Y. Hsieh, Sung peng Hsu, Shu hsien Liu, Fred Sturm, Yuk Wong, Josph Wu and David C. Yu.

The Editor in his preface mentions with the entrance of China into the World arena again, it is essential that people have a better understanding of the philosophies which have determined Chinese culture. The contributions of the scholars in these essays fulfil this demand. Each contributor writes from his own perspective, of course; however, the editor has attempted to introduce uniformity in the work.

The whole book is divided into three Periods: The First Period: Ancient Period which includes six chapters: 1. Chinese Thought before confucius —Donald H. Bishop, 2. Confucius — Shu-hsein Liu, 3. Taoism — Joseph Wu, 4. Mo Tzu — Donald H. Bishop, 5. The Legalist Philosophers — S Y. Hsieh. and 6. Mencius — Chung-Ying Cheng. The Second Period Medieval Period consisting of four articles: Introduction — Donald H. Bishop; 2. Chineses Buddhist Philosophy — Fred Sturm, 3. Neo-Confucianism — David C. Wu, and lastly Wang Yang Ming — Yuk Wong. The Third Period is Modern Period which consists of 8 articles: 1. Introduction — Donald H. Bishop, Wan Fu-Chih — Donald H. Bishop, 3. Kang Yu-Wei — Donals H. Bishop, 4. Sun Yat-Sen —Jeff, 5 Hu Shih — Sung-peng Hsu, 6. Mao Tse-Tung and the Chinese Tradition — Donald H. Bishop, Contemporary Philosophers Outside the Mainland — Joseph Wu, and 8. The Chinese Contribution to World Thought — Donald H. Bishop.

The editor Prof. Donald H. Bishop has done a great service to the Chinese Thought by bringing out such a nice volume on the Chinese Thought. This will attract readers well versed in English and keen in understanding the Chinese Thought. This book will be of great value for those who are interested in basic understanding of the Chinese tradition and Thought. Chinese Civilization is one of the world's oldest, and a tradition which has lasted so long must have enduring values and can contribute to today's world.

This book gives true insight into the basic philosophical Ideas of the Chinese Philosophy and its development from ancient period to Modern Times. It is indeed an excellent introduction to the Chinese Thought and a very well impressive book. The book will surely attract general readers and philosophers who wish to acquaint themselves with Chinese thought.

Prof. Donald H. Bishop deserves congratulations on such a nice book on Chinese Thought. It is creditable for the publishers for bringing out this volume which in this age seems to be of great value.

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Edith Ehrlich, Leonard H. Ehrlich And George B. Pepper (Editors/Translators) : *Karl Jaspers Basic Philosophical Writings,* **Selections, pp. 556, Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio (U.S.A;) Price** Cloth Binding $ 55.00 Paper 26.95 (1986).

The present book Karl Jaspers—Basic Philosophical Writings comprises of Selections which are very well edited, translated and edited by three great scholars—Edith Ehrlich, Leonard H. Ehrlich and George B Pepper. The whole Book is divided into seven parts as follows :

Part One—The Open Horizon which is subdivided into: I Origins in Scientific Research which is further subdivided into : 1. An Autobiographical Account and 2. Pluralistic Methodology. and II Philosophical Foundations 3. Kant : The Phenomenality of Being, 4. The Nature and Significance of the Basic Philosophic Operation, and 5. The Turning; Part Two—What is man ? subdivided into : 1. The New Situation which includes 6. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche Their Historic Significance and 7. In Search of a New Perspective on Man and II The New Perspective which consists of 8. Existence-Existenz, 9. Communication : The Loving Struggle, 10. Historicity, 11. Freedom, 12. Limit Situations, and 13. Absolute Consciousness: (Love, Faith). Part Three—What is Philosophy I. Introduction consisting of 14. The Present Task of Philosophy and 15, The Modern Tripartition: Science, Philosophy and Theology, and II Periechontology: The Systematic Task of Philosophy has been subdivided as follows: 16 (1) Preliminary Distinctions, and (2) The encompassing which we are or can be, 17. Existence, 18. Consciousness-as-such, 19. Spirit, 20. Existenz, 21. (3) The Encompassing that is Being itself, 22. World, 23. Transcendence, 24 (4) Reason—The Bond within us, 25(5) Distinctions and Relations 26(6) Transcending and Objectification, (7)The uses of Periechontology 27. The Relation of One's Philosophy to Tradition, 28. The Idea of a Common Fundamental knowledge III Philosophy and Its History which consists of 29. The Idea of a World History of Philosophy 30 Greatness in Philosophy, and IV Philosophy in Its Everyday Mode. Part Four—What is Truth ? is divided into I Truth for Man in Time Background consists of 32. (1) Truth in respect of each other, 33 (2) The Richness of Diversity and the One, 34. Truth; Summary of the Theory—First Part Aspects of the Theory (1) : Truth and Untruth 35. The Source of all untruth: Finitude and Consciousness. 36. Truth expressed through untruth, 37. Truth as tied to Falsehood Aspect of the Theory (2) : The Break through of the One Truth 38. Basic Situation and Philosophy Decision, 39. Interpretation of Breakthrough, 40 Configurations of Truth in the Breakthrough, 41 Aspect of the Theory (3): At the Limit Two Possibilities : Reason and Catholicity, 42. Aspects of the Theory (4): The Completion of Truth in Time, 43. Truth and Communication : Summary of the Theory—Second Part : II Metaphysical Truth : The Reading of Ciphers, 44. Background : The Appearance os Transcendence in Existence, 45. The Nature of Ciphers (1) : Existenz ;

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Where the Cipher script is read, 46. The Nature of Ciphers (2) : The Three Languages, 47, The Nature of Ciphers (3) : The Many Meanings of Ciphers, 48 The Struggle in the Realm of Ciphers, 49. At the Limit of Ciphers (1) : Foundering, 50. At the limit of Ciphers (2) : Transcending all Ciphers, 51. At the limit of Ciphers (3) : The Other Way of Thinking and 52. Reason Vs. Mysticism: Part Five Philosophy : Distinctions and Relations is divided into I. Philosophy and Science which consists of : 53 Characteristics of Modern Science, 54. Outlining the Sciences of actuality, 55 Limits of World Orientation and 56. Philosophy and Science : II Philosophy and History into 57. The Axial Period, and 58. Overcoming History, III Philosophy and Politics into 59. The question of German Guilt, 60. When Politics Fails : The Power of the Ethics Idea, 61. The Superpolitical Power of Sacrifice, 62 Reason and Democracy and 63 In What can we trust?. and IV Philosophy and Religion which consists of 64. How Philosophical Faith and Revelational Faith see each other, 65. A Change in the Appearance of Biblical Religion? and 66. Can the Two faiths meet ? Part Six : Testimony of Communication is divided into I Max Weber which is subdivided into 67. A Memoir, and 68. The Scientist—The Man II Martin Heidegger, III Hannah Arendt, and IV Gertrud Jaspers into 71. A Memoir and 72. If Gertrud were to die before me, and Lastly Part Seven Encounters with Limit Situations divided into J3 Jaspers on His Illness, and 74. Journal Entries 1939 1942.

In the end Exhaustive Bibliography has been provided which is divided into 1. Jaspers Books and Monographs A. in German B. in English Translation, and C. Chronological List, and 2. Writing about Jaspers—A. Major Studies and B. Articles in English.

Jaspers is one of the most original and potential thinkers of the twentieth century. His thinking is rich in ideas, far in its explorations, complex in structure, varied in application, and vast in scope. The present book is very well edited one and by means of a systematic organization of selected excerpts from various writings, to give the reader an insight into the wide scope of Jasper's Philosophical achievement. In this important book an attempt has been made to acquaint with all the works of the author and ideas of the twentieth century philosopher, Jaspers. This book will help the scholars as well as laymen to know much about this scholar. Even students and teachers who are teaching Jaspers will be benefitted by this great work.

The whole book is divided seven Parts, which are divided into seventy four sections, covering all the aspects of Jaspers Philosophy already appeared in English. It has 40% of the material which was never published anywhere in English. Many unpublished ideas have come into existence in this book. This book is a very good contribution to the Philosophy of Jaspers.

It is indeed a very good collection based on the works of Jaspers, very well edited, translated and suitable introduction has been provided at many places. Editors deserve heartiest congratulations in bringing out such an exhaustive and complete work on Jaspers giving us full insight about his thinking and philosophy. This is really a very valuable contribution on Jaspers and publishers and editors deserve congratulations.

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